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united service 






Vol. XXIX. New Series 


(vol. cl. old series) 



\The right of translation is restrvtdl 










" Albynn Gu Bragh " ... Uniform in Highland Regiments 553 

A. W. A. P H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge i 

"Backsight Fore- The Defence of Duffer's Drift 398 


Bellaiks, Captain N., The EducationalValue of Universal Service 261 

Bignold, H. B., Author of The Control of the Paci6c Route » 

*' The Burden of Empire " 

BURNEY, Arthur G. ... Our Military Forces before 1820 241 

Carr-Ellison, Lieut-Col. The Interests of Officers and the Service 72 

" Chancton " The Gymnastic Training of Recruits in the 

British Army 66 

Chawner, Major W. H., The Capture of Havannab 87 

2nd Essex Regiment 

Clarke, Major J. L. J., British Field Organisation. A Suggestion 175 
East Yorkshire Regiment, 
D.AA.C., 3rd Army 

„ „ „ ,, The Double Company System for British 

Infantry ... ... ... ... ... 267 

COLLISON, Captain C. S., A Reformer of 1781 304 

2nd W.I. Regiment 

"Colonel" How to get Recruits 610 

" Colonial, A ' The British Cavalry and the Lessons of 

1899 to 1902 419 

COMPTON, Major T. E., late The Apparent Movements of the Stars. 

The Northamptonshire With Some Remarks on Marching by the 

Regiment Stars 3' 

" £. A. S." India to England vid Japan and Canada 307 

Editor, The " The Glorious First of June" 225 

„ „ Mr. Arnold Forster's Army Scheme ... 606 



Ferguson, Colonel James, The Ancient Obligation of National 

9th V.B. (Highlanders), Military Service in Scotland 250 

Royal Scots 

Fetherstonhaugh, Capt. The Organisation of Volunteer Infantry 

T. and the Training of its Officers 180 

"Fourteen" The Training of Recruits. Our System 

during the last Twenty-five Years ... $3^ 

" Garrison Gunner ** ... The Duties of the Royal Garrison Artillery 234 

Hallewell, Lieut.- Colonel, Notes on Mounted Troops 424 


Harrison, General Sir Imperial Defence in its Relation to Fiscal 

Richard, G.C.B Policy 131 

Hepper, Captain L. L., R. A. The Royal Artillery 237 

H o R D E R N, Lieutenant " Blue Water " or " Hearth and Home " ? 470 
Lionel H., R.N. 

„ „ Two Imperial Problems 117 

INNES, Colonel Thomas, The Norfolk Commission. Voluntary En- 
C.V.O.,late Lieut.-Colonel listment and an Efiective Militia ... 370 

Commanding 3rd Battalion 
The Gordon Highlanders 

" Irishman" Our Military System. Is Reform possible? 485 

''K** ... Suggestions for the Improvement of the 

Annual Course of Musketry 300 

Kelly, Lieutenant W. The Japanese Attack on Port Arthur, 
Hyde, Royal Engineers November, 1894 428 

King, George A Comrades of Greater Britain 463 

y, „ Australia's Unpreparedness. Major- 

General Sir Edward Hutton's Annual 
Report ... ••• 595 

... 377 

KlNG.HARMAN,ColonelM.J. Army Recruiting 

„ „ „ The Education of Army Officers 

... s88 
... 266 
... 128 

Lart, Charles, E. ... Vicarious Patriotism 

Laughton, L. G. Carr ... Belligerents and Neutrals ... 
„ „ „ Policy goes beyond Strength 

Leyland, John The Uses of the British Navy. A Lecture 

delivered at the Whitechapel Art Gallery 

to an East End Audience 569 

Maguire, Dr. T. MiiiLER British Soldiers in Foreign Armies ... 621 

Mair, Captain R. J. B., R.E. The Capture of Gibraltar, July 24, 1704 ... 544 

Maude, Lieut .-Colonel F. The Evolution of Modern Strategy — VI. 44 
N., late R.E. 



. ■ • 



































McHardy, Captain A. A., On Heavy Artillery 54 

D.S.O., Royal Artillery 

Mead, Major H. R., Indian Notes on Night Attacks during the Early 

Army Part of the Boer War 2Co 

" Old Soldier, An " ... A Retrospect on a Successful Campaign... 77 

**Oneofthe Old School" The British Cavalry and the Lessons of 

1899101902 541 

Ramsay, James S The Colour of Warships 2$ 

"Red Coat" South Africa for Soldier Settlers 211 

n » Some Advantages and Disadvantages of 

the Army ... ... •*. ... ••• 5'^ 

19 ^, Mr. Arnold Forster's Proposals : How 

they strike a Regimental Officer ... 601 

''Reiver" Cavalr>' Training — Canada, 1904 414 

Roberts, Colonel Sir How- The Auxiliary Forces Commission. Home 

land, Bart., V.D., Com- Defence with or without Compulsion ?... 499 
mandingThe London Irish 

Ross, Captain C, D.S.O. ... The True Interests of Great Britain in the 

War between Russia and Japan ... 142 

Shore, Commander the Dummies for Drill Purposes 475 

Hon. H. N., R.N. (Retired) 

„ „ „ Where was the Convention of Cintra 

signed? ... ... ... •.. ... 81 

SiLBURV, Major P. A., Federation in Defence 157 

D.S.O., Permanent Staff, 

), T) If The Navy and the Colonies 4S3 

SiMONDS, Major C. B., Aflairs of Both Hemispheres. A Study in 

R.G.A. Colours ... ... ... ... ... 4^0 

**SOLDADo" The Decisive Range ?95 

Thierry, C. De Colonial Grievances ^, 21 

"Trainband" The Volunteer Adjutancy 64,0 

** Volunteer High- The Norfolk Commission, and after ... 355 


"Ward-Room" Discipline in the Navy ... in 

White, Arnold The Precedent of Louisiana 335 

Wilson, Captain C. The Employment of Q.F. Artillery in the 

Holmes, R.F.A. Field 192 

Wylly, Colonel H. C, C.B., The Protection of Small Columns in Camp 

late The Shenvood Foresters and on the M arch 2 84 

„ „ „ Across the Norlh-East Frontier 642 

Young, Norwood Colonial Preference, and Colonial Navies 12 



Across the -North-East Frontier. Colonel H. C. Wylly, C.B., late The 

Sherwood Foresters 642 

Affairs of Both Hemispheres. A Study in Colours. Major C. B. 

dIMONDSf R.Ct.A. ... ..« •.. ... ... ••• ... ••• 4-^^ 

Ancient Obligation of National Military Service in Scotland, The. 

Colonel James Ferguson, 9th V.B. (Highlanders), Royal Scots 250 

Apparent Movements of the Stars, The. With Some Remarks on March- 
ing by the Stars. Major T. E. Compton, late The Northampton- 
shire Regiment ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 3' 

Army Recruiting. Colonel M. J. King-Harman 377 

Arnold Forster's Army Scheme, Mr. The Editor 606 

Australia's Un preparedness. Major-General Sir Edward Hutton's Annual 

Report. George A. King 59S 

Auxiliary Forces Commission, The. Home Defence with or without 
Compulsion ? Colonel Sir Howl and Roberts, Bart., V.D., Com- 
manding the London Irish Rifles 499 

Belligerents and Neutrals. L. G. Carr Laughton 226 

"Blue Water" or "Hearth and Home"? Lieutenant Lionel H. 

xlOKDKRN, fx.^. ... ... ... ... ... ••• ... ... 4/0 

British Cavalry and the Lessons of 1899 to 1902, The. " A Colonial" 419 
„ „ „ „ „ „ „ * One of the 

KJLjIJ Ov^nC/v/L ... •.. ... .a. ... ... ... ... 34 

British Field Organisation. A Suggestion. Major J. L. J. Clarke, 

East Yorkshire Regiment, D.A.A.G., 3rd Army Corps 175 

British Soldiers in Foreign Armies. Dr. T. Miller Maguire 621 

Cambridge, H.R.H. Duke of. A. W. A. P i 

Capture of Gibraltar, July 24, 1704, The. Captain R. J. B. Mair, R.E.... 544 

Capture of Havannah, The. Major W. H. Chawner, 2nd Essex 

XxcgimenL ... .(. ... ... ... «.. •.. ... ... 0/ 

Cavalry Training— Canada, 1904. *' Reiver" 414 

Colonial Grievances. C. De Thierry 21 

Colonial Preference, and Colonial Navies. Norwood Young 12 

Colour of Warships, The. James S. Ramsay 25 

Comrades of Greater Britain. George A. King 463 

Control of the Pacific Route, The. H. B. BiGNOLD 2 

Decisive Range, The. "Soldado" 29s 

Defence of Duffer's Drift, The. " Backsight Forethought " 398 

'» » « »» » » ••• ••• 5'7 

Discipline in the Navy. "Ward- Room" iii 

Double Company System for British Infantry, The. Major J. L. J. 

Clarke, East Yorkshire Regiment, D.A.A.G., 3rd Army Corps ... 267 




Dummies for Drill Purposes. Commander the Hon. H. N. Shore, R.N. 

^KetircQ^ ... ... ••• •*• ... .*• ••* ••.• .*. 47$ 

Duties of the Royal Garrison Artillery, The. " Garrison Gunner" ... 234 
Educational Value of Universal Service, The. Captain N. Bellairs, 

Xx..Vi^*/\. ... ■• ... ... **. ... ••• ... ••« 201 

Education of Army Officers, The. Coloael M. J. King-Harman ... 62 
Employment of Q.F. Artillery in the Field, The. Captain C. Holmes 

WILSON. Xx«F .rV. ... ... ... ... *•. ... a.. •.. 102 

Evolution of Modem Strategy, The — 

VI. Lieut.-Colonel F. N. Maude, late R.E 44 

vxi. ,, fj fj ... •*. •.. ... 104 

villa „ J, }| ••• ... ... •«• 2/3 

1^. fy yf )j ••• ••• ... ... 3^9 

A.. ff ij II ••• ••• »•. ... 031 

Extracts from the Journal of Major Andr^. 649 

Federation in Defence. Major P. A. Silburn, D.S.O., Permanent Staff, 

iNiatai ..• •*• ••* *•. *** .•* ••• ••• ••• ^3/ 

Forster's Proposals, Mr. A. : How they strike a Regimental Officer. 

IvED'^OAx •«. ... ■•• ... ... •.. ••* •*• OOi 

Gymnastic Training of Recruits in the British Army, The. " Chanxton " 66 

Heavy Artillery, On. Captain A. A. McHardy, D.S.O., Royal Artillery 54 

How to get Recruits. "Colonel" 610 

Imperial Defence in its Relation to Fiscal Policy. General Sir Richard 

liARRiSON, w.>M>.13. .•* ... ••. .•• ... a,. .,• 13^ 

Imperial Federation for Defence (Speeches by Sir John Colomb and Cap- 
tain Mahan, U. S. N.) ... ••• •.. ... ••• ... ... 579 

India to England vtd Japan and Canada. " E. A. S." 307 

Interests of Officers and the Service, The. Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Carr- 

jL«l^l^ldV^^ ... ... ... ••• ... •*• ... ... ... 7^ 

Japanese Attack on Port Arthur, Noveaiber, 1894, The. Lieutenant W. 

HvDE Kelly, Royal Engineers 428 

Letters to the Editor "• 434» 5S7» ^68 

Navy and the Colonies, The. Major P. A. Silburn, D.S.O., Permanent 

dtan, ^ aiai ... ... ... ... •.• •.. ... ,,, 4^') 

Norfolk Commission, and after, The. "Volunteer Highlander " ... 355 

Norfolk Commission. Voluntary Enlistment and an Effective Militia, 
The. Colonel Thomas Innes, C.V.O., late Lieut.-Colonel Com- 
manding 3rd Battalion The Gordon Highlanders 370 


■ • ^ 


Notes on Mounted Troops. Lieut.- Colonel Hallewell, C.M.G. ... 424 

Notes on Night Attacks during the Early Part of the Boer War. Major 

H. R. Mead, Indian Army 200 

Organisation of Volunteer Infantry and the Training of its Officers, The. 

^ Captain T. Fetherstonhaugh 180 

Our Military Forces before 1820. Arthur G. Burney ... 241 

Our Military System. Is Reform possible ? "Irishman** 485 

Policy goes beyond Strength. L. G. Carr Laughton 128 

Precedent of Louisiana, The. Arnold White 33s 

Protection of Small Columns in Camp and on the March, The. Colonel 

H. C. Wylly, C.B., late The Sherwood Foresters 284 

Reformer of 1781, A. Captain C. S. Collison, 2nd W.I. Regiment ... j04 
Retrospect on a Successful Campaign, A.' " An Old Soldier'' ... 77 

Reviews 95,216,321,442,562,674 

Royal Artillery, The. Captain L. L. Hepper, R. A. 237 

Some Advantages and Disadvantages of the Army. " Red Coat " .... 510 

South Africa for Soldier Settlers. "Red Coat " 2 n 

Suggestions for the Improvement of the Annual Course of Musketry. 

J^. ... ... ... •*• ... *•• .a. ... ... ^VA/ 

Sundries 92, 213, 317, 435, 557, 669 

" The Glorious First of June." The Editor 225 

Training of our Recruits, The. Our System during the last Twenty-five 

Years. "Fourteen" 538 

True Interests of Great Britain in the War between Russia and Japan, 

The. Captain C. Ross, D.S.O. 142 

Two Imperial Problems. Lieutenant Lionel H. Hordern, R.N. ... 117 



Uniform in Highland Regiments. " Albynn Gu Bragh " 553 

Uses of the British Navy, The. A Lecture delivered at the Whitechapel 

Art Gallery to an East End Audience. John Leyland 56^ 

Vicarious Patriotism. Charles E. Lart 58^ 

Volunteer Adjutancy, The. "Trainband" 640 

Where was the Convention of Cintra signed ? Commander Hon. H. 

N.JShore, R.N. (retired) 81 


United Service 


% IBmtt^Ig ^tbkfaj 0f all ^atbital (?Jiwstbns. 


APRIL. 1904. 




H. B. Bignold, Author of 'The Burden of Empire.' 2 


Norwood Youngs. 12 

[ V. THE COLOUR OF WARSHIPS. James S. Ramsay. 25 



I Major T. E. Compton, late The Northamptonshire Reg^iment 31 


I Lieut -Colonel F. N. Maude, late R.E. 44 


I Captain A. A. McHardy, D.S.O., Royal Artilleiy. 54 

^ Colonel M. J. King-Harman. 62 


ARMY. ''Chancton.*' 66 


Lieut-Colonel R. H. Carr-EUison. 72 


"An Old Soldier." 77 

Commander Hon. Henry N. Shore, R.N. (retired). ii 


! Major W. H. Chawner, 2nd Essex Regiment 87 



[ (Far Compute Table of ConUnts see page v* of AdvertisemejU Sheet) 




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NOV t: 1936 


By H. B. Bignold, Author of * The Burden of Empire.' 

Those who have studied the course of the trade-distribution of the 
world, are fully cognisant of the effect of the opening of the Suez 
Canal. In 1870, 486 vessels passed through, of a tonnage of 
436,609. In 1890, 3425 vessels of a tonnage of 6,783,187, TJ per 
cent, of which was British. In 1898, 3503 vessels of a -total tonnage 
of 9,238,603, 68 per cent, of which was British — and it is instructive 
to note here that while the percentage tonnage had shrunk by nine, 
the total British tonnage between 1890 and 1898 had increased by 
considerably over a million tons ! 

The protection of every British ship of this enormous number, 
huge tonnage, and incalculable value falls practically on the British 

Protected by the Channel Squadron the trade passes to Gibraltar, 
a harbour of refuge ; next Malta supplies another resting-place^^ 
while the Mediterranean Squadron takes up the task of protection ; 
coming past Port Said and Suez, with its canal — which may not be 
blockaded — Aden, another rest-house, is reached ; and then the trade 
branches off to India, and China or Australia, or East and South 
Africa. In the former case the East Indian Squadron, with bases in 
India and Ceylon, continue the task of safe-guarding, until the 
China Squadron or the Australian Squadron takes it up, while the 
Cape Squadron carries on the task of guarding such of the fleets of 
commerce as are destined for South Africa. 

Everywhere the same system ; squadrons each policing its own 
waters, but all available for mutual co-operation, and each with one 
or a number of naval bases and harbours, and if the British 
command of the sea pre-supposes one thing more than another, it 
is that there shall always be naval bases available for our Navy, 
which our possible enemies shall lack. 

Every fortified naval base, containing fast cruisers for commerce 
destroying, means a hornet's nest to be watched on the eve of 
hostilities and to be blockaded the moment war is declared. 

This pre-supposes enormous naval preponderance. 

Those economists who keep on bewailing the fact that a nation 



of 40,cxx),ooo cannot keep its relative as well as its absolute 
preponderance in commerce, who regard the progress of powerful 
and highly civilised communities like the United States and 
Germany as being significant of the coming ruin of the British 
Empire, perhaps expect Great Britain to maintain the same 
relative preponderance on the sea, as she now has — ^but the thing is 
as impossible in the one case as in the other. 

Now that the Great Powers have turned their attention to the 
sea as they have never done before ; now that Germany, France, 
the United States, Japan and Russia, have all embarked on Navy 
building; — the Navy of Great Britain, while easily the strongest 
of all, must gradually lose iti present proportional strength. 

Such being the case, it behoves all who take an interest in the 
future of our race — which future, like our past, must be on the sea— 
to make such provision as it is possible to do against the coming 
struggle for the Pacific. 

The Panama Canal. 

The Panama Canal will probably be open for traffic inside often 
years. The United States Government has fully made up its 
mind that the Canal shall be— and who shall withstand it ? certainly 
not a little Central American Republic 

Bearing in mind the effect that the Suez Canal had in diverting 
trade from the old route, it is easy to see that the Panama Canal 
must have niomentous consequences for Australia and New 

The distance of London from Sydney by way of Suez is 12,682 
miles, by way of Panama and Tahiti it will be 12,370, and shorter 
still by way of Panama and Fiji. Avoiding the coast of France, 
with her commerce destroyers, our fleets of commerce will at once 
seek the open sea— where they are safest — until they come at 
length to the West Indies. Here the possessions of foreign Powers 
are trifling, Martinique and Guadaloupe ; and it is to be noticed in 
this place, that at the end of each war France has always bargained 
for the restoration of these islands, if they happened to be in our 
hands — she has always recognised their strategical value. 

It is remarkable that the abandonment of Port Royal as a 
British naval base should be determined on at this precise 
juncture 1 

Coming through the Panama Canal, the Cocos Islands, belonging 
to us, are passed, and then the Galapagos, belonging to Ecuador — 
and it is signiflcant that France has been endeavouring to purchase 
one of them from the present owners for a naval base. The 
Marquesas, belonging to France, are next in the line of ocean 



traffic, but they have no good harbour. Fiji, an important 
dependency of the Empire, which must have a great future before 
it, will doubtless be a port of call, and Samoa is passed on the way, 
some two or three hundred miles out of the direct route — but Apia, 
as the men of the Alder know, is a perilous harbour, and can never 
be a naval base. (America has a harbour in Pago Pago on Tutuila) 

After passing Fiji, on which the trade routes from Australia and 
New Zealand must converge, with the single exception of New 
Caledonia, belonging to France, there is no possibly hostile power 
within striking distance, and while Noumea is suitable for a naval 
base, having a good harbour, when once inside, it is difficult to 
enter. At present the New Hebrides are under the dual control of 
England and France. Havannah Harbour in Sandwich Island, and 
Port Sandwich in Malekula, two of the group, are undoubtedly two 
of the very best harbours in the whole of the Pacific. There are no 
British traders at Port Sandwich itself — though in the neighbourhood 
the British predominate. The French in New Caledonia admit 
that the failure of France to obtain the New Hebrides would 
isolate and mean the ultimate loss of New Caledonia itself. 

" The Harbour of Havannah, in the Island of Sandwich, one of 
the group, is" (writes a well-informed correspondent, Mr. W. E. 
Johnson, in the Sydney Morning Herald oi i8th June, 1901) "one 
of the finest in the Southern Hemisphere. It is commodious enough 
to comfortably accommodate the whole of the French and British 
Navies combined. It has splendid anchorage, is land locked, and 
has plenty of depth ; and as the islands are within a few days* 
steaming of Sydney, it will readily be seen what immense strategical 
value they will possess in the hands of a hostile power. With such 
a convenient naval base to operate from, our mercantile marine 
could be perpetually preyed upon ; our own Navy would need to be 
immensely strengthened in Australian and New Zealand waters to 
afTord anything like adequate protection to our commerce." 

M. Paul Beaulieu, writing in the Economiste Frangaise, ad- 
vocated in June, 1901, the annexation by France of these islands in 
exchange for the surrender by her of the rights of the Newfoundland 
French shore. 

The trend of matters in connection with the New Hebrides 
shows conclusively that the French Authorities in New Caledonia, 
the few French settlers in the islands themselves, and public men. 
of more or less standing in France, are each and all turning covetous 
eyes on these fertile and soon to be strategically important islands. 
It must not be forgotten that position aflfects the value of territory 
no less than chessmen, and while we could afford to overlook the 
acquisition of territory in regions, such as Central Africa, which 


have no immediate bearing on our position as mistress of the sea» 
it would be suicidal on our part to permit the establishment of a 
hostile naval base in the very track on what must soon be one of 
the great trade routes of the world. 

As France, true to her practice, assists her Colonists with 
t>ounties, and the British Government, with a wealth of Colonies on 
its hands, is very indifferent to the fate of its own Colonists, it is 
easy to see under what disadvantages English settlers in these 
islands are labouring. 

More land is said to be represented by documentary titles held 
by French traders than the total area of the islands can show, and 
while one could afford to look at the matter not too seriously if it 
stopped there, it is easy to see that when the alleged sale is 
supported by an effective occupation by the purchaser and his 
family, the position of affairs is immediately altered very much to 
our disadvantage. 

Le Journal des Nouvelles- Hebrides, published in Sandwich 
Island, stated as far back as September, 1901, *' that the only solution 
X)ossible is the annexation pure and simpleofthe Archipelago of the 
New Hebrides by France." Later developments are significant, 
also, and no less a person than M. Etienne, the leader of the French 
Colonial Party, has since suggested in the National Review of July, 
1903, a partition of these islands, thus acknowledging rights on our 
part, once scouted. France in the suggested partition was, of 
course, to have the southern islands having the harbours ! 

The group consists of thirty-five islands and islets altogether, 
more or less considerable, with a population of from 60,000 to 
100,000. Sandwich Island has about 200 French residents. 

The Daily Express, surely with small knowledge of the subject, 
advocated in January, 1902, that full recognition of French rule in 
the New Hebrides should be made in exchange for the settlement 
of the French shore dispute, and although the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, in reply to a cable from Sir Edmund Barton, then 
Federal Prime Minister, stated that the position in regard to the 
question had not altered since the cable of 26th March, 1900 (in 
which it was stated that nothing of the sort was contemplated by 
the Home Government), still the very fact of the cable having 
been considered necessary by the Federal Prime Minister is 

The Federal Prime Minister, in his Maitland Manifesto of 9th 
January, 1902, stated, "As to the annexation of the New Hebrides 
by either France or England, I do not think that is likely, for some 
time to come at any rate, and notwithstanding some articles from 
French papers, which have been republished here, which articles 


you may take with a grain of salt" But it is as possible for Sir 
Edmund Barton to have been mistaken in 1902 as Lord Derby 
in 1883. 

The New Guinea Fiasco. 

The annexation of New Guinea by Sir Thomas Mcllwraith, the 
then Premier of Queensland, in 1883, was made on the ground that 
its possession would be of value to the Empire, and conduce 
especially to the peace and safety of Australia and the develop- 
ment of Australian trade, and the prevention and punishment of 
crime throughout the Pacific, and that the establishment of a 
foreign Power in the neighbourhood of Australia would be injurious 
to British and more especially to Australian interests. The Imperial 
Government was asked to ratify the act of annexation — an act 
with which the other Australian colonies were wholly in accord. 
Lord Derby, then in power, refused to endorse the annexation^ 
stating at the same time, '^ that the apprehensions that some 
foreign Power was about to occupy New Guinea appeared to be 
indefinite and unfounded." The very next year Germany 
established herself on the territory 1 And although in answer to 
the strong representations of the Convention of 1884, called by Mr. 
James Service, then Premier of Victoria, the Imperial Government 
moved, with the result that the following year (1885) a division 
was made between herself and Germany of the territory which Sir 
Thomas Mcllwraith had endeavoured to annex, the delay cost the 
Empire 40,000,000 acres of territory, the protectorate of New 
Britain, New Ireland, and the islands adjacent, and meant the 
lodgment of a strong colonising foreign Power in the close 
neighbourhood of Northern Australia. 

The thing that happened in the case of New Guinea may 
possibly take place in the case of the New Hebrides if the Imperial 
Government does not realise its responsibilities more in the one 
case than it did in the other. 

It cannot be too strongly reiterated that the magnificent 
harbours of Havannah, Port Sandwich, and Vila, when taken in 
conjunction with the fact of their being so near one of the great 
world-trade routes of the future, give to the New Hebrides an 
importance quite out of proportion to their acreage, population, or 
present worth. 


Malta is a tiny speck of territory, but what would be the fate 
of any Government which proposed to give up that stronghold in 
the Mediterranean ? Havannah harbour is capable of being made 


just such a stronghold in the Pacific We cannot hope for ever to 
be in a position to blockade every hostile naval base ; let us there- 
fore make them as few in number as we can. 

French Designs. 

To show how really in earnest the French are in their designs 
on the New Hebrides, it is only necessary to refer to the attempted 
annexation in the Eighties, which was only gone back upon at the 
direct instance of the British Government, and, moreover, we 
cannot blame France for attempting to do what we should have 
long ago ourselves done. 

An Englishman (Captain Cook) discovered and chartered these 
islands, British vessels did most of the subsequent surveying in the 
group, and Englishmen commenced commerce with them in 1840^ 
forty years before the French had any landing on the islands to- 
speak of — and the islands must belong to the English. 

The great Australian shipping firm of Bums, Philp and Co., Ltd., 
has done more for British control in the Pacific than people at home 
know, and Mr. James Bums, the Managing Director, is the last 
man in the world to advertise himself. To British traders in the- 
islands they too often represent the only link with the outer world. 
They offered, to take one example, 80,000 to 100,000 acres of land 
in the New Hebrides, held by them under good title, to intending^ 
settlers on long leases, at nominal rents and no re-appraisement of 
the land to make the leases other than nominal, and in addition 
the firm promised free passage to intending settlers, and on the 
1st June, 1902, the first batch left Sydney for the Island of Santo, 
and others have since followed. 

It is not unimportant to note that the final division of the New 
Hebrides may possibly be determined by the counting of noses, 
French and British. 

The building up of a tariff wall round Australia has a disastrous 
effect on British colonisation in the Pacific — in the New Hebrides 
as elsewhere — and undoubtedly makes the number of British 
colonists less than it would otherwise be. 


The Americans have embarked on a colonial policy, and are 
looking about for naval bases — and small blame to them. The 
Island of Suvarrov, which lies in the very track of the coming 
Panama Canal trade, is the object of their immediate longing. 
This island belongs to us. It possesses an excellent harbour, and 
as such, as pointed out before in this article, has a value quite out 


of proportion to the fertility or extent of territory or commercial 
advantages. America already has Pago Pago on Tutuila, one of 
the Samoan group. 


But while America for a long time to come cannot be regarded 
as a rival of ours for sea-power (and in any case the fact of the 
strong sympathy existing between the two nations would make her 
the least dangerous of our competitors in that direction), and while 
France, owing to her enormous national debt and diminishing 
population, is badly situated for the coming contest, Germany, on 
the other hand, is undoubtedly our coming rival ; she has two of the 
requirements of a great Colonial Power — she has production, she has 
shipping — and she is in the course of obtaining the last link — colonies. 
It would be the utmost folly on our part to assist her by letting her 
establish a naval base in the direct line of the Panama route. It 
is an open secret that she wishes to exchange comparatively useless 
rights in the Solomons for a position in the Tonga (or Friendly) 
Islands. One has only to glance at the map to see how immensely 
she would benefit by the proceedings she contemplates. True she 
has a position in Samoa, but Samoa has no good harbour capable 
of conversion into a naval base ; the Harbour of Vavau, in Tonga, 
is well situated for this purpose, being right in the line of traffic ; 
indeed a line drawn from Sydney to Colon passes through Tonga. 
And Germany makes no secret of her longing for sea-power. Time 
and again the Emperor has stated that the future of Germany must 
be on the sea. The German Navy League, established in a great 
many cities of the Empire, has tens of thousands of members. 
The German Navy is supposed to be excellent in morale; in a few 
years the scheme of expansion will be complete. Her carrying 
trade, which is increasing enormously in volume, must be protected, 
and small blame to her if she seeks to take advantage of our 

Tonga is a British Protectorate — it can only change that 
character for a British possession. 

I have already referred to the prompt advantage Germany took 
of Lord Derby's blunder in New Guinea in 1883. Her Colonial 
possessions in the Pacific are by no means insignificant. Yap, 
Pelew, and the Carolines, German New Guinea, New Britain, and 
New Ireland, and the Marshall Islands, Buka and Bougainville in 
the Solomons, Samoa, represent a great advance in one generation. 
What she has not got, what she needs, wants and requires badly, 
and what she must not be allowed to obtain, is a naval base on the 
line of the Panama traffic. 


German Trade in the Pacific. 

Sydney commercial men feel the difficulty of competing against 
rivals heavily subsidised by their Government. There is no doubt 
that Germany is very much in earnest Their Government system 
of subsidies, while disastrous for the taxpayer in the Fatherland, 
makes things delightfully easy for the German in the Pacific in 
competition with a British subject 

An interesting example of this was given in the case of the 
trade in the Gilbert and Ellice Group. The Germans brought out 
an English trading company, and, owing to the fact that German 
cargo was carried to the Marshall Island practically at the expense 
of the taxpayer in Germany, were rapidly gaining great influence 
in these islands. The enterprising firm of Bums, Philp and Co., 
Ltd., of whom I have already made mention, with the help of a 
small postal subsidy, have been for some time running steamers to 
the group regularly, with the lesult that the British influence is 
rapidly extending — and one more service has been performed for 
the Empire by the great shipping firm. 

Reported Annexation of Tonga. 

The cable in the Sydney papers of 17th October last reported 
the annexation of Tonga by Germany in return for the cession of 
some of the Solomon Islands to Great Britain. As was pointed 
out at the time, Germany relinquished any supposed rights she 
might have had — which she could easily afibrd to do, not having 
any — over the Tonga Islands, at the time of the Samoan agree- 
ment It might possibly have been only a kite to show the way 
the wind was blowing, but it is high time that Great Britain awoke 
to the fact — and showed by her action that the awakening had 
taken, place — that the coming Panama Canal will give to the 
Tongan. Harbour an importance quite out of proportion to the 
present commercial value of the island. Clearly, being a British 
Protectorate, the annexation could not take place without Great 
Britain's consent Later cables and an assurance from the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies to the Right Hon. R. J. Seddon, the 
Premier of New Zealand, have shown the rumour of annexation 
to be baseless, but coming as it did from a blue sky, it was signifi- 
cant — and Vavau has an excellent harbour. Moreover, the possible 
number of inhabitants in the German Solomons which Great 
Britain was said to have had ceded to her is, when compared to 
the number of inhabitants of the Tongan Group, no great attrac- 
tion for a Power which counts its subjects by tens of millions ; 
whereas the fact of Tonga being in the line of the Panama Canal 


traffic is of the utmost consequence, when taken with the fact 
of the great harbour of Vavau we have before referred to. 

To use the homely expression — Germany is " playing for keeps." 
The Governor of German New Guinea issued a proclamation 
recently, roughly translated as follows : — 

" From the Imperial Government. At a meeting of the 26th June, the im- 
portant question of language in the Colony came into consideration, as well as 
the matter of a language to be spoken to labourers and natives. It appears 
very sad that a meeting consisting of Germans could, under the guidance of 
Anglicised Germans, favour the retention of ' Pidgin ' English, seeing that even 
the presence of any Anglicised half-caste is sufficient to compel a body of 
Germans to carry on the conversation in more or less faulty English. Surely 
it is high time that in this at least a change should take place, and that the 
hearts of the Germans in the Bismarck Archipelago, if they retain any sympathy 
at all for the Fatherland* should awaken to the consciousness that this continua- 
tion of, this leaning towards English national ways, must end in the amalgama- 
tion of the Colony with the Australian Commonwealth as soon as the financial 
independence is gained and an independent policy develops itself. 

** I expect the awakening of a healthy German sentiment, tenacity in the use 
of the German language in conversation and correspondence, guarding against 
all foreign ways and influence, as well in home life as in company, and I beg 
to communicate the contents of this exhortation to all subordinates, employees, 
and friends. 

*' The Imperial Government, 

" (Signed) Hahl." 

With conspicuous tact the Governor refers to the Anglicised 
half-castes, and this requires a word of explanation : I understand 
that a former United States Consul married a daughter of the 
family of Mataafa, the celebrated Samoan Chief, and their daughters, 
who were educated in Australian and American schools and 
colleges, and are now all married to prominent German citizens 
and officials, are the half-castes referred to. 

One word more — the day of Russia on the sea is not yet, the 
day of Germany to her Empire-builders seems dawning, but with 
due care on our part our sea-power can do for us in the future what 
it has so often done in the past. But we must be the strong men 

The foregoing brief points draw attention to the need of 
supporting two bodies in the Empire ; two non-political, non- 
sectarian bodies, with a platform so broad that free-trader, and 
revenue-tariffist, and preferentialist, men of every shade of religious 
belief, can find room, and ample room, for each and all of them ; 
the only qualification being that he should be a subject of the 
Empire, the only open sesame demanded that he should be 
anxious for that Empire's prosperity — I refer of course to the 
Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee and to the Navy 


It is a far cry from here to the heart of the Empire. A New 
Zealand Statesman said, referring to the distance, that there were 
1 200 excellent reasons against New Zealand joining the Common- 
wealth ; on the same basis of argument there might seem to be 
12,000 excellent reasons against the Home Government taking heed 
to the present position in the Pacific ; but we know that wherever the 
English flag floats is truly a portion of the Empire as though it 
were within sound of Bow Bells, and it is only by invoking the aid 
of powerful and well-established journals and organisations that 
the individual can hope to have his voice heard in the din of the 
vast Empire who claims us as her children. 

And it is in the hope that public support will be given to these 
great organisations, striving to do their utmost for a strong Navy 
and a logical scheme of defence based on that Navy, by showing 
one more example of the vital need of that Navy and of that 
organised scheme of Imperial Defence, that I have ventured to 
draw attention to the pressing question of the control of the 
Pacific route. 



By Norwood Young. 

Colonial preference aims at increasing Colonial, at the expense 
of foreign, trade. If it had that effect how would the position of 
the British Empire be changed in regard to war, and the prepara- 
tion for war ? 

That it would be changed goes without saying, because in all 
countries preparation for war is determined, to a lai^e extent, by 
trade considerations. If you alter the character of your trade you 
will have to reconsider your war equipment. In any commission 
of experts to inquire into the effect of Colonial preference, one 
half of the members ought to be drawn from the fighting services, 
and the majority of these should be naval. Meanwhile the House 
of Commons contains not a single representative of the Navy, and 
while the Empire's best brains are concentrated upon the trade 
problem, its naval aspect is seldom mentioned. 

Not being a member of either of the fighting services, I should 
hesitate to enter upon a discussion of this subject were it not that 
the bearing of naval war upon trade is neglected by the recognised 
authorities in naval history. To the civilian Colonist the trade 
results have as great an interest as the incidents of battle. 

It may be as well to consider briefly the main effects upon trade 
produced during the chief British wars of the last century — the 
Napoleonic and the Crimean. 

After the battle of Trafalgar the British Fleet had a supremacy 
at sea to which there is no parallel in history. Any State which 
ventured to oppose it lost Colonies, shipping, and sea traffic. 
Britain insisted, in accordance with a time-honoured rule, in regard- 
ing enemy goods as liable to capture even when carried upon a 
neutral vessel ; and thus derived the fullest profit from her naval 
superiority. Napoleon, having nearly the whole of the land of 
Europe under his control, ordered the closure of all European ports 
to British goods, and also prohibited the export to Britain of 
certain goods such as hemp, timber, tar, etc, which were required 
by the British Navy. The sequel showed that he hurt the Continent 


more than the island. British ocean trade, having no European 
rivals to fear, extended enormously in non-European^|countries ; 
and even in Europe, though restricted, it continued, in spite of 
all Napoleon*s efforts. Europe had no sea-trade but this clandestine 
intercourse with its British enemy. At last Spain and Russia 
refused any longer to stev in their own juice. Spanish resistance 
to Napoleon gained back for Spain some of her losses, by the 
opening of Spanbh ports to the great world of non-Napoleonic 
trade. The campaign of Moscow was the result of the Russian 
refusal any longer to be excluded from British markets. 

Napoleon's error was that he did not realise the profit Britain 
would obtain from non-Napoleonic trade, and the loss to Europe 
by exclusion from such trade. 

When, forty years later, the Crimean War began, the conditions 
had greatly changed. Railways on land, and steamers at sea, had 
immensely improved the methods of transport The volume of 
the world's trade had increased enormously, and especially at sea. 
Every nation had become gravely interested in ocean traffic. 
Neutrals stood far greater risk, in war time, of disturbance of their 
prosperity. It was evident that some of them would resent any 
such interference with their trade as was experienced in the 
Napoleonic wars, when a British cruiser would stop and search any 
neutral vessel, and if it had enemy goods on board, would take it 
in to a British port, and confiscate the goods. Anxious not to 
offend such neutral«, the British Government announced that it 
would abandon, for this occasion only, its right to capture enemy 
goods on a neutral ship. The British and French Navies had 
little effective work beyond the blockade of Russian ports, whereby 
the safety of the shipping and commerce of the Allies was assured. 
The effect of the 4>lockade upon Russian trade was merely to 
deflect it from its usual route, and thus increase the cost of trans- 
port. Russian goods crossed the land frontier into Germany, and, 
by means of the new railroads, easily found an outlet on the sea 
from German, Dutch, or Belgian ports, in Allied or in neutral 
vessels. There was a dislocation, and a diminution of Russian 
trade ; but not such as to constitute a portentous national 

Since the Crimean War other great changes have occurred. 
The British Navy, though still the strongest, has several formidable 
rivals ; the British policy of free imports has made Britain the 
dumping-ground of the world ; and as a natural sequel, the increased 
importance of the British market has stimulated the growth of 
transport facilities to that market, both by land and sea. 

In keeping with these changes was the rule of conduct in 


maritime war agreed to by Britain and the other Powers at the 
dose of the Crimean War. By the Declaration of Paris in 1856, 
Britain abandoned those rights against neutrals which she had 
maintained throughout the Napoleonic war, but temporarily allowed 
to lapse during the Crimean conflict. The rules then formulated 
have been adhered to in all wars since that date. They provide 
that the neutral flag protects the cargo, even though that cargo 
belong to a belligerent, unless it be contraband, and unless the 
neutral vessel was attempting to use a blockaded port They 
constitute a 'premium upon neutrality, and it may be regarded as 
certain that no strong neutral will, in future, allow a belligerent to 
interfere with goods carried in the neutral's shfps which are not 
contraband nor striving to break blockade. It follows that in the 
next great war the trade of the belligerents will seek the shelter of 
the neutral flag, thus avoiding all the risks of war. No merchant 
will pay war insurance if he can help it. 

Let us take a concrete example, and imagine that the British 
Empire is at war with the Dual Alliance — France and Russia. What- 
ever may be the fate of the hostile Navies, the merchant flags of the 
belligerents would, if the war were prolonged, eventually disappear. 
The largest British ships would be taken by the Admiralty for 
naval work. There would be difficulties, undoubtedly, in the 
transference of the remainder of our shipping to neutral flags. 
Most of the ocean-going ships of the world are British, and the 
purchase of so enormous a property, even if all neutral States 
opened their registry to ships built and owned in Britain, could not 
be conducted in a minute. Many of the British officers and men 
would be wanted for the Navy, others might be unwilling or 
unable to serve under a foreign flag ; it would not be easy to 
improvise a n^w personnel. Efforts would be' made to keep the 
British merchant flag afloat by the expedient of convoy, but even 
with such naval protection war insurance would be high, a tax that 
the neutral ship would escape. The ultimate fate of our shipping 
would be to fly the neutral flag. The safety of the transport of goods 
would be more important even than the carrying trade. There would, 
however, inevitably be scarcity of shipping, and loss, by changes in 
the personnel^ of efficient service. There would be delays caused 
by searches for contraband : and some ports would be closed by 
blockade. Freights would rise. More would have to be paid for 
imported wares. Anglo-Russian trade would, as in the Crimean 
war, be conducted through neutral channels, finding its way across 
the sea from a German or North Sea port. Anglo-French trade 
would seek similar means of transit. Exchanges would not be so 
easily manipulated as in time of peace, and prices would rise ; but 


the bulk of the British trade would continue, under the protection 
of the neutral flag. 

It is sometimes said that an enemy such as the Dual Alliance, 
having far less shipping and sea trade than Britain, being much 
less dependent upon the sea, would refuse to recognise the sudden 
transfer of British ships to a neutral State ; and would also enlarge 
the definition of contraband, so as to make it include those com- 
modities, such as food stuffs, and raw materials for manufacture, 
that are of chief importance to Britain. But in either case they 
would be inflicting injury on neutrals. Any serious interference 
with the British merchant service, or with British merchants, would 
gravely affect the prosperity of every country in the world. If 
British ships were laid up, and British shipbuilding stopped, the 
world's sea commerce could not be carried on. If the British 
market were closed the world's producers would be ruined. It is 
not probable that the neutrals of the world, who are so much more 
powerful now than they have ever been before, and have every 
reason to expect profit from their neutrality, would submit to the 
loss they would sustain from such action. 

Meanwhile the rival navies would be contending for a mastery 
whose ultimate reward would be, not, as in the Nelsonian days, the 
capture and destruction of the enemy's sea trade, and his complete 
exclusion from ocean commerce, but — a very minor prize — the 
blockade of certain of the defeated enemy's ports. Now blockade 
is not what it used to be. Its difficulties have gravely increased ; 
the number of port^ to be watched is greater; and even if the 
whole of the enemy's coast were closed (an utter impossibility) his 
sea trade would continue, carried by the railways to a neighbouring 
neutral port, and thence in a neutral ship. Steamers, railways, and 
the Declaration of Paris have between them greatly curtailed the 
injury that can be inflicted by the exercise of sea power upon a 
State which has many -ports, either on its own cost line or on that 
of its neutral neighbour. 

In the case suggested, of war between Britain and the Dual 
Alliance, if invasion of the parent State were found to be im- 
practicable, attack upon Colonies and upon Colonial trade might 
offer some advantages. 

Colonies, as a rule, are backward countries, in need of further 
development They are deficient in railways, in ports of their own, 
and in neighbouring neutral ports ; and they are not thickly 
populated. They are thus pecuh'arly open to effective blockade, 
and to invasion by the landing of troops. Their safety consists in 
their distance from the great European naval Powers. But any 
Colony which cannot be used as a naval base would be a source of 


weakness to the parent State in a serious naval war. Colonial 
trade also, being belligerent, would be exposed to a danger that 
Anglo-neutral trade would escape. 

The only Colonies that are of value in naval war are those 
which have little trade with the mother country, and can be used as 
fortified naval bases. The greater the trade with a Colony the 
more serious is the injury and loss from the dislocation of that 
trade in war. 

Neutrals, on the other hand, are of immense value to a 
belligerent. Britain, especially, must lean heavily on neutral 
assistance. By means of strong neutrals she will get some return 
for her lost shipping ; to them she will look for the continuance of 
the greater part of her trade, and especially for her imports of food 
and of raw materials. 

It is said that, deriving, as we do, most of our supplies from the 
United States, the position is highly dangerous for us in case of 
war with that Power. It is supposed that in an Anglo-American 
war we should not get United States supplies, and we would get 
Canadian ; and, therefore, that we ought in time of peace to 
encourage Canadian, and discourage United States trade. The 
position is exactly the reverse. In case of war with the United 
States the Canadian export of corn would be stopped by a United 
States land force, which would cross the Canadian border, and hold 
the railways. The movements of American produce would not be 
so restricted. The British Navy would not be able to blockade the 
whole American coast, nor would the American Navy succeed in 
closing all Canadian ports. Unless the whole North American 
coast were hermetically sealed the producers of the United States 
would get their wares out of the country somehow, if necessary 
even by the use of Canadian ports. The aim of the United States 
would be to damage Canadian corn growers, and benefit the 
American ; to replace Canadian by American corn in the world's 
markets, of which Britain is the chief. As I have already shown, 
at a time when ocean trade was trivial to what it is now, Napoleon, 
the most powerful tyrant Europe has known, failed to stop the 
trade between the countries under his influence and Britain, owing 
to the determination of European producers to get their goods to 
the best market. Similar causes will produce similar, and even 
greater, results now that the British market is so much more 
important than it was in the early part of the last centuiy. 

The radical difference between the British and all other Empires 
should be remembered. Every State but the British (and the 
Japanese) has a land frontier. Except on the Canadian border, 
the British Empire has no land frontier abutting upon a civilised 


neighbour. Nearly all Anglo-foreign, Anglo-Colonial, and inter- 
Colonial — that IS non-domestic — trade passes over the sea, a 
highway open to the ships of all nations. The British com- 
munications, being by water, are permanently exposed to attack. 
No British superiority in naval force can make so wide a public 
path secure from belligerent operations. Throughout the Napoleonic 
war, even when there was no Navy in existence on the high seas 
but the British, the enemy's privateers continued to inflict grave 
losses on British shipping. The American and German States are 
strengthened by Federation, because such union enables them to 
make safe from molestation their internal roads and rails. It is 
possible for such Powers to become self-suflScient, to keep out 
foreign intruders. That is not possible for the British Empire. 
Its blood-vessels are permanently infested with foreign bodies. 
In time of war some of these will be so controlled and directed 
by the enemy as seriously to retard the circulation. No such 
conditions are to be found in any other Empire. 

It IS true that if the British Empire were at war with the whole 
world, if there were no neutrals, then, indeed, Anglo-Colonial trade 
would be most advantageous, although some trade would still 
continue between the belligerents themselves. In such a case the 
naval conditions would revert to those of Nelsonian days as far as 
regards shipping. The modem difficulties of blockade would still 
keep that method of pressure comparatively harmless when applied 
to countries well provided with ports and railways ; but all the 
British trade would have to be carried in British ships. It might 
well happen that the safety of the Empire would then depend 
upon the extent to which its various parts had learned to be 
mutually dependent, to be self-sufficient, to do without foreign 
intercourse in time of peace. It seems to me that this is one of 
the ideas that lies at the base of the preferential proposals, namely, 
that as all foreign Powers have anti-British tariffs in time of peace, 
so they are all enemies, and would be so in time of war. The 
important fact is that, in spite of tariffs, British foreign trade 
steadily increases, and consequently foreign countries are more 
and more unwilling to lose that profitable trade by the forcible 
interference of war. 

In the Boer War the assistance of Australia and Canada was 
of great value, both materially and morally. Yet it was worth 
less to Britain than the neutrality, unfriendly as it was, of Germany, 
France, and the other Continental Powers. That neutrality was 
due partly to the strength of the British Navy, but also, perhaps 
In a greater degree, to the large trade carried on between Britain 

and the Continent, most of which would be lost in a war. If there 
VOL. CL. 2 



had been no such trade it is not probable that either the British 
Navy or the Colonies would have succeeded in preventing a 
European support of the Boers. 

It is clear, then, that if Colonial preference attained its aim of 
encouraging Colonial, at the expense of foreign, trade, it would 
increase in time of war the exposed area of British trade. It 
would also lessen the improbability of war. The free imports of 
Britain have, for half a century, been the dominant factor in the 
history of the world, the chief stimulant of trade, the main influence 
in cheapening commodities, and the great incentive to peace. A 
change in this policy would lower the value of the British market 
in time of peace, and therefore reduce the effect of the loss of that 
market by war. At the present foreign States do not care to 
quarrel with their best customer. Reduce the value of that custom 
and you lessen the disinclination for war. 

Enough has been said to show that Colonial preference and 
preparation for war ought to go hand-in-hand. If the Imperial 
use of the sea is to be increased in time of peace, special arrange- 
ments should be made to meet the increased disturbance of that 
sea-commerce in time of war. 

The Colonial share in naval expenditure at present takes the 
form of a small cash payment to the Admiralty. It is, for many 
good reasons, highly unpopular in the Colonies. In any case it 
is certain that no really substantial payment of that kind would 
ever be made by the self-governing Colonies. But these countries, 
Australia, for instance, would welcome any assistance the Admiralty 
might give them towards the formation of an Australian Navy 
allied to the British. Personally, I think that the best, the most 
Imperial, policy would be one of complete confidence, supported 
and endorsed by a willing, and unstinted, generosity. Instead of 
demanding cash, Britain should give it. She should make a present 
to Australia of a modern war-vessel, without any conditions or 
stipulations whatever. Australia, I have no doubt, would herself 
voluntarily engage to man and equip the vessel at Australian 
expense, and to place it and its personnel entirely at the disposal 
of the Admiralty. For such a purpose Australians would willingly 
put their hands in their pockets, and an Australian Navy would 
gradually be created, which would be of great value to Britain in 
time of war. In this way the increased danger to Australia and 
Australian trade that would result from Colonial preference might 
be nullified, without any set-back in Australian loyalty. 

There is an idea that Imperial Naval Federation on the 
basis of Colonial contributions to the British Navy, and Colonial 
representation in the councils of the British Navy, may be forced 


upon the separate parts of the Empire, by the common sentiment 
of fear, which would result from a preferential tariff. Experience 
has shown that, where all other arguments fail, the separate units 
of a nation may be forced into a coalition by an enemy from 
without. The German Federation, which is thought to have begun 
with a ZoUverein, and to have been consummated by war, and the 
danger of war, is much in men's minds. But the analogy is 
unsound, owing to the fact that the German Federal Units are 
joined together by land contact, while the British are separated by 
the sea. 

What we all want is to strengthen the British Empire in peace 
as well as in war« That can only be done by arrangements which 
are of mutual and permanent benefit. The question will not be 
solved in terms of " sacrifice," but of advantage and profit For 
this reason (with all respect) it is a mistake for Britain to ''think 
Imperially,'' if by that is meant that she is to consider the wants 
of the Colonies before her own. There is only one possible basis 
of Britannic Federation, and that is the continued prosperity of 
Great Britain, the maintenance of her position, not necessarily of 
primacy, but at least in the front rank of the world's Powers. 
It is often said that as soon as a Colony has grown to the size 
and importance of the parent State, it will wish to sepau'ate. But 
loyalty is not, as is commonly supposed in this country, an 
admission of inferiority, and, therefore, destined to terminate as 
soon as a Colony is great and powerful. Loyalty is a mixture of 
self-confidence and ancestor-worship. If the parent State for any 
reason loses the respect of the Colony, then, but only then, will 
loyalty diminish. The relative magnitude of parent and Colony 
is a matter of small importance so long as the parent is able to 
maintain a respectable figure in the world. There was nothing 
inevitable about the American Revolution. If the revolting 
Colonies had always been treated as Canada and Australia are 
now, they would not have revolted, and the United States would 
at this moment be a British Colony, and proud of the position. 
Britain with her bold self-confident policy of free imports, her 
readiness to meet all competition, her refusal to take shelter behind 
a wall, her great success and importance, is an object of respect 
and admiration to all nations, and thus of warm loyalty from the 
Colonies. It is not the size of the Colony, but the character and 
position of the parent that determines loyalty. If, then, Colonial 
preference is a British sacrifice, reducing British trade in peace, and 
increasing her weakness in war, it must be regarded to that extent 
as an anti-Federal, even a disruptive, factor. 

Colonial preference may, as Lieutenant Hordem has remarked, 



create an "atmosphere" in which the germs of Imperial Federation 
may ultimately grow. But the attitude of British naval authorities 
towards the Colonies is hostile to such a growth. Lieutenant 
Hordern, for instance, in the February issue of the United 
Service Magazine, gives expression to what is probably a very 
general opinion in the Navy, when he says that the Australian 
desire for an Australian Navy is due to her " wish eventually to 
become independent" This is a most unfortunate error, and it 
shows an ignorance of Colonial feeling that augurs ill for a satis- 
factory scheme of Imperial Federation. If that were Australian 
sentiment there would be no chance of a Federal Union on any 
voluntary basis ; and Australian assistance in the South African 
War would be incomprehensible. 

Lieutenant Hordern also expresses a common naval opinion 
when he says, "If each of us had separate navies, the total required 
would be very much larger than a single Navy to protect us." He 
would, then, presumably, consider that if the money spent by Japan 
upon her Navy were paid to the British Admiralty, the resulting 
British Navy would be "very much " stronger than the two separate 
navies would be now, as allies ; and that the safety of Japan would 
be greater than at present. The Japanese would not agree with 
him. The undoubted advantage of unity of control may easily be 
exaggerated. If by that unity you reduce to almost nothing the 
contribution of Australia, and thus prevent the Colony from making 
the considerable exertions which she would willingly undertake for 
an Australian allied Navy, you lose more than you gain. 

Colonial preference may, or may not, be advantageous to the 
trade of the British Empire. As to that, it seems to me vain to 
attempt any reliable forecast It will, however, weaken the Empire 
in war, and thus force Australia to an increased expenditure in 
naval preparation. The only direction that outlay can take will 
be the gradual formation of an Australian Navy. Even without 
Colonial preference this will come in time. When that day arrives, 
the mistaken obstruction of the Admiralty to Australian desires, 
and the ungenerous suspicions of British naval authorities, will be 
forgotten ; and an Anglo- Australian Federation will be formed on 
the basis of a Naval Alliance. 

Norwood Young. 

By C. De Thierry. 

In the February number of the United Service Magazine, 
Lieutenant Hordem criticised my article on the "Colonies and 
Free Trade " in the January number. But, if he will pardon me 
for saying so, I am at a loss to account for his title. True, 
Colonials differ in opinion from Englishmen who think on Imperial 
questions after the manner of Lieutenant Hordem, but wherever 
the grievance may be, it is not on their side. That " England 
never likes to give anything for nothing to her own " he denies, 
saying that ''at least we gave them their lands without asking 
a return." Evidently, in his opinion, " we " and " they " are two- 
different breeds, and the obligation is all on one side. But were 
not the men who made Canada, Australasia, and South Africa. 
British citizens ? Were they not as much entitled to develop the 
Empire, for which their fathers fought, as their brethren for whom 
they made room at home ? Were they not animated by a nobler 
spirit in creating new communities oversea than Englishmen, whose 
energies were wasted in the pursuit of such political will-o'-the- 
wisps as disarmament. Free Trade, and universal brotherhood ? 
To-day the effect is apparent to all the world. The work of 
Colonial Englishmen will give to England a position even more 
glorious than any she has yet known ; the dreams of insular English- 
men have exposed her almost naked to her enemies. 

Again, what would be the value of Australasia or Canada with- 
out Colonists ? They would be an even greater drain on the 
Mother Country than the Colonies of France and Germany, because 
the native population is too small to give any return to trade. 
They are, and always have been, one of the main sources of 
England's wealth by reason of the faith, labour, and enterprise of 
the settler. Surely Lieutenant Hordern cannot possibly wish his 
readers to understand that "we" gave the Colonies their lands 
without asking a return. But, for the sake of argument, let us 
admit the transaction. Then all I can say is " we " never made a 
better investment. It has yielded us cent, for cent " We " were 
not quite so disinterested as Lieutenant Hordern would like to 


believe. Nothing was done for the Colonies without a clear idea 
of receiving an equivalent in an increased volume of trade. Before 
the Crown was robbed of its privileges by the House of Commons, 
charters were, indeed, given to Colonists conferring on them 
certain lands oversea, but the colonisation of the nineteenth 
century was carried out on different lines from the colonisation of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For instance, when did 
"we" give the Colonies in Rhodesia their lands? Most people 
believe that the Empire owes that great Province to the genius of 
a man who received no support from the Home Government what- 
ever. The same is true of Nigeria ; and over how much territory 
west of the Great Lakes would the British flag wave to-day had 
Canada not built the Canadian Pacific Railway ? Not a square 
mile. The history of the Empire is a magnificent refutation that 
" we '* gave the Colonies their lands. 

Lieutenant Hordern says that " the duty of the Navy to ward 
off attack on territory is ignored, and yet it is the fulfilling of this 
duty which has enabled the Colonies to develop in peace." Seeing 
that no Power during the first half of the nineteenth century had 
a Navy worth talking about, it is difficult to see how any Colony, 
with one exception, could have been attacked. That exception 
was Canada, which has been invaded from the United States 
several times. The Colonies developed in the peace secured to 
the Empire by the Napoleonic wars, which left England supreme 
in the world. As a matter of fact, the Navy until twenty years 
ago was allowed to decline until it was admittedly inefiicient as a 
basis for diplomacy. It was the growth of rival Fleets, largely paid 
for by British Free Trade, which waked us out of the lethargy we 
fell into after Waterloo. Apparently Lieutenant Hordern looks 
on defence and the Navy as one, but what would Canada have done 
without her Militia in 1812, in 1837, and in 1866, when she was 
invaded by the Americans ? New Zealand has also had to rely on 
her Militia in war time, and so has South Africa. 

That the Colonies have looked on the Navy as a bulwark of 
defence is certainly true, but is there a nation in the world which 
would not welcome Colonies on similar terms ? England, a small 
country with wealth and resources accumulated in a thousand years 
of effort, without adding a man to her Army or a ship to her Navy, 
saw herself gradually becoming the centre of a world dominion 
whose Provinces are practically Continents. They, however, rose 
from the ground in less than a century, and everything they used 
came from the Mother Country. They were thus potential sources 
of wealth, as they are now of political power. The return, which 
Lieutenant Hordern denies, has been so magnificent that it inspired 


the statesmanship of Disraeli in the nineteenth centaiyi and to-day 
inspires the statesmanship of Mr. Chamberlaia 

Heaven preserve us from an Imperial House of Commons, 
which is a purely insular ideal. The Colonies want representation 
in the capital, but not at Westminster, and a beginning was made 
last year when the Canadian Minister of Militia took part in the 
deliberation of the Imperial Council of Defence. I have never 
maintained that " we " were careless of Colonial interests, as these 
are well looked after on the spot What I do maintain is some- 
thing very different, that we have only lately begun to see great 
national questions from the Imperial point of view. Even now the 
payment of ship-money is the one way in which we can conceive 
Colonial aid to the Navy. Our brethren over sea, however, decline 
to accept the principle to any great extent They want to develop 
Navies and Armies of their own, and in this they are quite right, for 
without them neither a national character nor sense of responsibility 
can be fully developed. A nation that pays for its defence is a 
nation that is not worth defending. What the Empire needs is not 
centralisation, but decentralisation, with a supreme Imperial Council 
which will secure harmony in policy, training, organisation, and 
direction in war-time ; and because the Colonies venture to say so. 
Lieutenant Hordem suggests that they are both selfish and in- 
sincere. Apparently he does not perceive that if the sea unites, it 
also divides. Hence an Imperial House of Commons is never 
likely to be realised. As for the independence cty, it is played 
out. When the Colonies disagree with the Mother Country they 
always want to be independent Else why should they disagree ? 
When their Imperialism stood the strain of fifty years of Little 
Englandism, it will stand anything. 

Lieutenant Hordem argues on the question of defence on much 
the same lines as the Opposition argue on the question of Fiscal 
Reform. Because their idea of a commercial policy is Free Trade, 
no Colonies have ever made preferential offers. They shut their 
ears to popular opinion which finds expression in resolutions 
of commercial and industrial associations ; to the voice of dis- 
tinguished Colonial Statesmen in Office and in Opposition ; to the 
general tend of Colonial policy as it was moulded by Macdonald, 
Rhodes, and other great leaders of the past ; to the deliberations 
of Colonial Conferences ; and to the Conferences of Premiers. In the 
same way Lieutenant Hordern assumes that, because the Colonies 
see nothing to be gained by representation in the House of 
Commons at Westminster, and refuse to pay ship-money, they 
want to shirk responsibility for defence. To convince some 
Englishmen that the Colonies are serious in their desire for 


Preference and a sound system of Imperial Defence is impossible, 
for, like the woman convinced against her will, they are of the 
same opinion still. What they want is a paper scheme, though 
who is to draw it up, and how it can be constitutionally presented 
to the United Kingdom, no one knows. Their attitude towards a 
foreign country in such circumstances is unthinkable. Why, then, 
should it be tolerated in our relations with our own people ? 

"Our common forefathers struggled for proper representation 
for many centuries. What has happened to their descendants in 
the Colonies that they, too, do not insist on the same ? " This is 
rather good, seeing that they took fifty years to secure self-govern- 
ment, and by the time they have secured Preference and repre- 
sentation in the Mother Country another fifty will have passed. 
They are insisting on the need for both, and have insisted, con- 
stitutionally, of course, since the Confederation of Canada and 
before it. " You shall have representation in Parliament," says the 
insular Englishman, and is quite shocked and hurt that the 
Colonial is not overwhelmed with gratitude at the honour. He 
forgets that the House of Commons is a declining factor in public 
affairs, and hardly ever discusses a great Imperial question without 
making itself a spectacle for gods and men. Even if the idea were 
practicable, which it is not, it could never be carried out on a 
population basis as Lieutenant Hordern proposes. A few millions 
of people living on a continent which was a wilderness a century 
ago are not in the same position as forty millions of people living 
in a small group of Islands which have been settled for a thousand 
years. Fortunately, Colonials are confident that they will bring 
the Mother Country round to their way of thinking because they 
have so often done it before. It is not they, but she, whose mind 
changes on great Imperial questions. For instance, she was violently 
opposed to self-government, then just as violently in favour of it. 
She despised Colonies, and wanted to get rid of them ; now she 
glories in them and wants to keep them. She was wedded to Free 
Trade in the nineteenth century, the twentieth finds her seeking a 
divorce. And in every instance the change of attitude has been 
brought about by Colonial influence. Hence the concentration of 
the Colonies on the question of Preference. When that is settled 
the Empire is practically united, for a common trade policy must 
produce a common policy of defence. 

C. De Thierry. 

By James S. Ramsay. 

Within the last few years the British fighting services have 
abandoned the war colours given them in the days of the Common- 
wealth. Oliver Cromwell clothed his sober Ironsides under breast- 
plate and buff-coat in the scarlet which has now been discarded for 
khaki and "heather mixture." So in the Commonwealth Navy, 
the uniform of the ships was appointed to be black. The naval 
black, however, proved less constant than the soldier's scarlet. 
During the greater part of the eighteenth century British warships 
were coated yellow, with black streaks along the lines of ports. 
Those were the days of elaborately carved and gilded stems, with 
huge square lanterns, decorative effect being carried to a height 
from which more utilitarian ages soon fell away. But why should 
the naval architect have rejected the services of the carver and 
gilder, and the painter with his pots of canary yellow ? Ranges 
were short, there was small chance of a misunderstanding when 
battles were conducted almost at stone-throwing distance, and 
finished, in the last resort, by boarding. Build and rig were better 
guides in the eyes of a seaman of that age than the colour of hulls, 
and for a fleet to slink away unseen was difficult when fleets were 
numerous and must perforce increase their mass of canvas with 
the necessity for speed. Much could be learned from the canvas. 
Lord Cochrane, reproaching the Admiralty for their failure to 
keep the British cruisers properly equipped during the Napoleonic 
wars, declared the enemy's coasters disappeared into port whenever 
the worn and blackened sails appeared on the horizon. A quaint 
instance of the naval application of the principles of Sherlock 
Holmes is recorded by the late Admiral Sir Henry Keppel. On 
one of his earlier voyages, a signalman reported a passing vessel as 
from home. Asked by his officer how the deuce he could tell that, 
he called KeppeFs attention to the fore-topsail being discoloured. 
What had that to do with it ? The signalman explained that the 
look-out men were young hands, and their stomachs could not 
stand the difference of motion in a swell! When Sir Sidney 
Smith reconnoitred Brest in 179S, he merely altered the appearance 


of the Diamond and stood boldly in, conversing in French with an 
officer who hailed him from a French ship lying near. So in the 
Mediterranean, Lord Cochrane's famous little Speedy conducted 
part, at least, of her commerce-destroying under the guise of a 
Danish brig. 

It was Lord Nelson who broke away from the orthodox colour 
of the British Navy and introduced a new system of painting, 
which lasted with only a trifling change as long as " wooden walls " 
held the sea. It consisted, Captain Mahan tells us, of black hulls 
with yellow streaks at the lines of ports, and the port-lids black. 
Sir Edward Codrington, who joined Nelson after his return from 
the West Indies in pursuit of Villeneuve, says in a letter, " Lord 
Nelson's squadron (of which we have eight with, us) seems to be 
in very high order indeed ; and although their ships do not look 
so handsome as objects, they look so very warlike, and show such 
high condition, that when once I can think Orion fit to manoeuvre 
with them, I shall probably paint her in the same manner." The 
Nelson style, it would thus appear, was eagerly adopted by vessels 
coming under his command, and the 'Forecastle Recollections' 
of a seaman of the time inform us that one of the first causes of a 
certain tyrannical officer's unpopularity with his crew was an order 
to paint out the famous " chequers." Not even in the British fleet 
at Trafalgar, however, was there uniformity of colour. In the 
recently published memoirs of Captain Hoff'man, R.N., *A Sailor 
of King George,' we are told that on joining the blockading fleet 
off Cadiz his ship was ordered to paint in yellow, with black streaks 
and yellow masts. The allied fleet was in all colours. A narrative 
of the battle, quoted in Sir W. Laird Clowes* * History of the Royal 
Navy,' thus describes them : " Some of them were painted like our- 
selves, with double yellow * sides, some with a single red or yellow 
streak, others all black, and the noble Santissima Trinadad with 
four distinct lines of red, with a white ribbon between them . . . 
the Santa Anna • . . was painted all black." Here was a case 
where confusion might have occurred in the kaleidoscope of a battle 
where breaking the line was from the first the British leader's 
object. "It was remarked by Nelson," continues the narrator, 
"that the enemy had the iron hoops round their masts painted 
black. Orders were issued by signal to whitewash those of his 
fleet, that in the event of all the ensigns being shot away, his ships 
might be distinguished by their white masts and hoops." The 
black hulls which Nelson reintroduced remained the uniform of 

* The term "double yellow" refers to the Nelson colouring— the double line of 
yellow at the ports. 


British ships of war for fifty years, though white lines were in time 
substituted for yellow, and on hot foreign stations yellow remained 
the standard colour till, in the days of ironclads, it gave place to 
white. Sir Henry Keppel, on going out to China in 1867, found 
the flagship at Hong Kong, the Princess Cliarlotte, " a huge three- 
decker, painted yellow and white, and looking shorter and higher 
than any Ning-Po junk." 

When wooden ships began to give place to ironclads, in the 
sixties of last century, " invisibility " for ships of the line remained 
unthought of by naval, men. Already, however, the advantage of 
colour protection for small craft had begun to be realised. In the 
Russian War of 1854, ^ British squadron under Sir Charles Napier 
dominated the Baltic. The Russians would not venture out ; they 
lay in their fortified harbours chiefly at Croostadt Had the 
mobile torpedo-boat been in existence, no doubt they would have 
attempted to harass the British ships, which patrolled the Baltic 
from the breaking up of the ice till the winter storms compelled them 
to go south for shelter. Not having torpedo-boats, the Russians 
employed fixed torpedoes — submarine mines we should now call 
them — to secure the channels of approach. The late Admiral Sir 
B. J. Sulivan, then captain of the paddle-steamer Lightnings and 
an officer of distinguished surveying abilities, was employed in 
reconnoitring. At Bomarsund the Master of the Fleet made an 
unsuccessful attempt, going in with three large black boats on a 
moonlight night He was fired upon when a thousand yards from 
the shore. Two nights later. Captain Sulivan went in on a cloudy 
night, in a small boat painted light blue, the men dressed in the 
same colour, and was able to make investigations and fix buoys five 
hundred yards nearer the Russian forts. It was during the Crimean 
War that ironclads first made their appearance in the armoured 
batteries propelled by steam, which our ally. Napoleon IH., sent 
out to bombard Kinbum. Those vessels, says Mr. H. W. Wilson, 
in his ' Ironclads in Action,' " had a heavy, sullen appearance, were 
spoon-bowed, and painted grey." 

The American Civil War, however, was destined to afford the 
first real trials of the ironclad in naval war. It was a one-sided 
business, for apart from armoured river gunboats on the one hand, 
and commerce destroyers like the Alabama on the other, the South 
had no navy. On both sides the protective value of colour was 
recognised. When Farragut forced his way up the Mississippi, 
running the gauntlet of the Confederate forts, not merely did he 
improvise armour by winding chain cables round the vital parts of 
his ships, but he had them daubed externally with river mud so as 
to make them hard to difl'erentiate from the banks, and so to 



confuse the aim of the rebel gunners. A step further was taken 
at the bombardment of Vicksburg. There, as narrated in Willis J. 
Abbots 'Bluejadcets of '61/ Admiral Porter, commanding the 
gunboats and mortar vess e ls, ^ had the masts and rigg^tng wrapped 
with green foliage so that, Ijring against the dense thickets of 
willows that skirt that part of the river, they were invisible. Other 
boats that were in more exposed positions had their hulls covered 
with grass and reeds so that they seemed a part of the swamp that 
bordered the river." On the Confederate side colour protection 
was chiefly appreciated in connection with the blockade-runners. 
Several British naval officers, finding time hang heavy on their 
hands while waiting for promotion, took up the command of fast 
steamers for this purpose, and the officer afterwards known as 
Hobart Pasha was one of these. The vessel in his charge had 
her masts and spars cut down to bare poles, with only a "crow's 
nest" for the look-out man. The hull showed no more than eight 
feet above the water-line, and was painted a dull grey. For 
blockade-running, however, Hobart expressed the view that speed 
was the prime essential. 

The same officer was destined to make further experiments in 
the science of colouring and backgrounds in naval war. Passing 
into the Turkish service, he held a command in the Black Sea 
during the Russo-Turkish struggle of 1877. Here the first 
practical experience of torpedo-boats in war was gained. With 
their laige ships, the Turks had a superiority on the open sea. 
But they were most vigorously and persistently attacked by the 
Russian torpedo-boats. Carried to the scene of action on fast 
steamers, those little craft — painted sea green — were launched to 
the attack with their crews fresh. More than one Turkish armour- 
clad fell a victim to Russian enterprise. Several bold attacks were 
made on the Turkish squadron lying at Batoum, and in the Sulina 
mouth of the Danube. Describing an attack at Batoum, Hobart 
says : " As a sportsman, I calculated that to fire at a dark object 
in the night, especially when that object had a background of high 
hills, such as we had at Batoum, was most difficult, so the first 
order I gave was no lights, not even a cigarette light ; utter 
darkness under severe penalties." A Russian sympathiser lit a 
fire on the high ground behind the town as a beacon to the 
prowling torpedo-boats, but even with that, the darkness prevented 
accurate or effective torpedoing of the ships. Darkness in harbour 
and motion at sea were Hobart's great safeguards against torpedo 
attacks. " A ship," he says, " cannot be seen in the dark, if she 
shows no lights, at more than five hundred yards' distance, and a 
moving ship would have been most difficult to hit" 


Down to our oxn day, no great naval war has furnished data 
as to the value of particular colours as between two hostile 
squadrons. In the Austro-Italian war of 1866, the Austrian ships 
were painted black, and the Italians grey. But this distinction of 
colouring is worth recalling only in connection with TegetthofTs 
order to his inferior and improvised fleet, ** Ram everything grey/' 
an order, the spirit of which was so eff"ectively realised that the day 
of Lissa ended the war at sea. So, in the Chino-Japanese war, we 
cannot find it to have been of any particular moment that the Japanese 
fleet was painted white, and the Chinese black. The Americans, 
however, in the operations ofl* Cuba in 1898, thought it well to 
substitute a leaden hue for the brilliant white hulls and saflron 
upper works in which their warships flgured during peace. Here, 
probably, we have an indication of the fear of torpedo attack, to 
which a blockader is exposed in modern war. The blockaders off 
Cuban ports had more than one terrible night's work repelling 
torpedo-boats which existed only in imagination, and even " Fight- 
ing Bob," now Admiral Evans, has lefc it upon record regarding 
one of those scares, that " if I saw one torpedo-boat that night, I 
saw a thousand." 

In the British Navy of recent years a striking and picturesque 
colour scheme — black hulls, white upper works, yellow funnels, 
and orange, or tawny, masts and fighting tops — reigned until the 
Admiralty order of 1902, which substituted a uniform grey tint. 
From time to time, however, experiments in colour had been 
made. Thus, when exercises intended to represent a blockade were 
carried out at Bantry Bay in 1885, much was heard of the ram 
Polypltemus^ a unique type in our Navy, and one which constructors 
have not repeated. Mr. Villiers, one of the press correspondents 
with the fleet, thus describes her : — " The Polyphemus is painted a 
low tone of grey, so that in misty weather she mixes herself up 
with the background of hills in the bay, and is almost invisible at 
a few hundred yards ; though ugly enough, it is the right sort of 
war paint." Experiments in colouring were not resumed upon a 
large scale until the Boer War had directed general attention to 
the desirability of making a flghting force inconspicuous. By the 
summer of 1901, the Admiralty's search for an "invisible" tint 
was manifested in the variegated colouring of several of the ships 
engaged in the naval manoeuvres, and in the end the present leaden 
hue emerged triumphant. 

There is one peculiarity of naval " khaki." Tested as it is by 
every variety of atmosphere and light, it can scarcely be said to 
possess finality. On the occasion of the visit of the Channel 
Squadron to the Forth a few months ago, the writer had his 


attention directed to the remarkable change in the appearance of 
the ships, from black to a pale ashen grey, according as they were 
seen against the light or with a background of the dark trees on 
shore. In a haze, all distinction of outline becomes blurred. 
With such large bodies as ships, however, an " invisible " tint in 
the military sense is hardly possible. We must not be led to 
expect too much in this respect, for the analogy of land war does 
not fully apply. The soldier takes cover in the inequalities of the 
ground. On the sea, as Napoleon said, there is no " field of battle." 
The combatants are in the open, in a field as fair and unimpeded 
as the floor of an arena. Such an idea as a ship of twelve or fifteen 
thousand tons trying to skirmish behind rocks only requires to be 
suggested for its absurdity to become manifest Further, though 
the sea's surface tells no tales, as ground does, trails of smoke 
may indicate the' passage of a fleet, even though the ships 
themselves are not to be distinguished. Particular colours 
may assist torpedo craft to approach, unobserved, closer to their 
prey, and might conceivably assist battleships to escape a torpedo- 
boat attack, though the odds, of course, are against the bigger 
object In the case of the Japanese attack upon the Russians off 
Port Arthur in the present war, it does not appear that any other 
colour than the black, in which Mr. Bennet Burleigh saw them, 
would have materially benefited the latter, their fleet lying, as it 
did, at a fixed point, with lights apparently burning, and its oflicers 
not anticipating an attack, as one of them confessed, for " three or 
four days." In a fleet action in the open sea in daylight, probably 
the best that can be claimed for " invisible '* paint is the momentary 
hesitation imposed on gunners in taking aim. Nor should it be 
forgotten that invisibility may constitute a peril in certain evolutions, 
either in war or peace. The recent collision between the Prince 
George and the Hannibal, while the Channel Fleet was carrying out 
night manoeuvres off the coast of Spain, has its own suggestiveness 
in this connection. 

James S. Ramsay. 




With Some Remarks on Marching bv the Stars. 
By Major T. E. Compton, late The Northamptonshire Regiment. 

The apparent movements of the stars are usually described as of 
tv^o kinds, due the one to the diurnal revolution of the earth on 
its axis, and the other to the annual movement of the earth in its 
orbit round the sun. 

The apparent movement caused by the first motion of the 
earth — that is to say, the first kind of apparent movement — is the 
rising of the heavenly bodies eastwards, and their movement 
towards the west exactly as the sun appears to rise near the east 
and set near the west The second kind of apparent movement, 
although not so noticeable, is equally well known (also as east and 
west movement), i.e. each star will be found to rise four minutes 
earlier each twenty-four hours, so that a star that at this moment is 
rising in the east will in about six months' time be setting in the 
west at the same hour, because four minutes a day = two hours a 
month = twelve hours in six months. 

If we treat the apparent as real motions, it is the heavenly 
sphere that really moves. The stars, and the sun, which is also a 
star— the nearest star — and, in fact, all the heavenly bodies for a 
brief period of time may be considered as set in the sphere, and as 
it moves the stars move with it. The sun and stars for ordinaxy 
practical purposes are absolutely fixed, but, of course, the moon and 
planets have their own proper movements, and into these I do not 
pn)pose to enter. Nor do I propose to refer at length to what I 
will call the four minutes' movement or second kind of apparent 
movement. It will be sufficient to state the fact that a star rises 
and sets practically four minutes earlier every evening, and that it 
is well to keep this fact in mind when wishing to make use of the 


star for marching by, or for orientation by night. Diagram, Ffg. i,* 
is intended to illustrate this phenomenon, showing cause and effect. 
It is obvious that as the earth moves round the sun, the set of 
stars seen by an observer on the equator, rising this evening, must 
be entirely lost to the view six months hence. Here in England, 
latitude ^\^^ there are large numbers of circumpolar stars which 
are visible all the year round at any hour of the night, others 
which are lost to view for shorter or longer periods, and some 
southern stars that cannot be seen at all. This is the effect of 
latitude ; for with regard to southern stars, for example, we cannot 
see more than 90° from our zenith, and consequently in latitude 5 1° 
all southern stars with a declination more than yf must be 
invisible, t The earth moves in its orbit 1°, equal to four minutes of 
time, each twenty-four hours. This is the cause. The effect is to 
produce the apparent movement I have attempted to describe. 


-^u.4c CL^ midnighi 

Fig. I. 

N.B. — This figure shows that a star or constellation rises six hours earlier every three 
months, which is equal to four minutes a day. 

Owing to the immense distance, all lines drawn from the earth*s orbit to a star may 
be considered as parallel. 

It is, however, with the first point of apparent movement, i.c, 
the revolution of the starry sphere from east to west, that I wish 
especially to deal in this article. As I have already said, the 
revolution of the earth on its axis has the effect of making the 
sphere appear to revolve in the opposite direction, and the stars to 
pass eastwards to westwards by night, exactly as the sun appears 
to move by day. This is obviously true, but it is not nearly the 
whole truth. What I wish to draw attention to is*that for purposes 
of marching and of orientation generally there is not one movement 
of this kind, but three movements. In fact, in this latitude I might 
even say there are four movements. 

In section 41, Combined Training, it is stated that the general 
direction can be effectively kept by means of the stars, and further 

* The ellipticity of the earth's orbit is much exaggerated in this figure, 
t 51 + 39 = 90. The declination of a star is its angular distance from the celestial 


that it is important that an officer should acquire sufficient know- 
ledge of the stars to enable him to ascertain his bearings by 

In order to find their bearings by the stars, in the Southern 
Hemisphere especially, officers must know two things at least-— 

(i) How to identify a star. 

(2) The bearing of that star at the moment of time required. 


Thi Sou^lk*^-^ iro^^ 





SoiUA Pcie 






Fig. 2. 

In the Northern Hemisphere Polaris, the North Star, revolves 
within 2° of bearing of the Pole. In the Southern Hemisphere the 
principal star of the Southern Cross, a, is on the meridian when 
the Cross is nearly vertical, Le. when 7 the upper star (superior 
transit) of the long limb of the Cross is from the vertical one-eighth 
of the distance between 7 and 8 Crucis (see Fig. 2). When the 
Cross is Vertical both a and 7 have passed the meridian, but will be 

VOL. CL. - 3 



approximately south. This fact ns referred to in a manuscript 
which the present writer submitted to the War Office in June of 
last year. I observe that it has now been included in the new 
* Manual of Field Sketching and Reconnaissance' (page ii6). 

But the difficulties of finding your bearings by the stars, except- 
ing only Polaris, in this sort of fashion is well illustrated by the 
subsequent paragraph in that Manual, where the statement is made : 
" an idea of the true south at other times than when the Cross is 
vertical may be obtained by remembering that this constellation- is 
about 30° distant from the southern celestial pole." 

The mean polar distance of these four stars is about 30^ as 
stated. But the polar distance of stars with a declination greater 
than the latitude has only a slight and very deceptive relation to 
their azimuth or bearing ; and it is the approximate bearing of the 
stars that an officer wants to know. For instance, in latitude 
34° S the bearing of 7 crucis at four and a quarter hours from 
meridian (upper transit) is either 138° or 232° before or afler 
meridian respectively. From its position from the vertical at that 
time an intelligent observer following the Manual would estimate 
the bearing at 25° from the pole, whereas the mean bearing is 
clearly about 40^ ; and the higher the * latitude the more this 
divergence will increase, so that in New Zealand, say latitude 
40° S>i where the intelligent observer following the Manual might 
assume the mean bearing of the Cross from its position from the 
vertical at three hours fifly-four minutes from meridian to be about 
24° from the pole, the divergence amounts to nearly 20^ It is really 
about 44^ the bearings with this hour angle in that latitude being 
136° 14' and 223° 46' before and after meridian respectively. 

Assuming a star to be identified, what is its bearing at any 
given moment of time ? 

No book, I believe, has ever been printed in any language giving 
the information required, for the stars' bearings change irregularly, 
not only with regard to the hour of the night, but with regard also 
to the latitude of the place. On page 38 I have shown that this 
want can, however, be supplied immediately, if required, for those 
parts of the world where it would be most useful ; but in the first 
place it is important to understand the movements of the stars, for 
the alterations in bearing differ with each movement very materially. 
In order to explain clearly, it is hoped, to persons who are not 
well acquainted with astronomy, the apparent movements of the 
stars caused by the diurnal movement of the earth, I have adopted 
a convention which is illustrated; in Figs. 3 and 4 ; and I begin by 
assuming all lines and circles to be in the same plane. This is not, 
I am aware, the usual method of attacking an astronomical problem, 


but in this instance it works well, and I may mention with regard 
to my statements generally that they would never have been 
published had I not previously submitted them to competent 
criticism, and received an imprimatur of unquestionable authority. 

The latitudes that I had in mind when I set myself to consider 
this subject were from the equator to latitude 34° on either side, 
for within these limits are included the whole of Africa, India, and 
the greater part of Australia. It will be easily understood as 
applied to England ; but in this latitude there are, as previously 
noted, a considerable number of circumpolar stars which do in a 

Fig. 3. 

way certainly introduce a fourth movement, viz. from west to east 
below the pole such stars make an inferior transit, and with these 
I will deal later on. For the present it must be understood that 
the superior transit is alone referred to when the meridian is 

An observer in either hemisphere .looking towards the pole 
will find that the stars appear generally to make a convex 
movement; whereas, looking in the opposite direction, the arc 
which a star appears to make is concave. Fig. 3 will explain what 
is meant It will be observed, however, on looking at the diagram 
that some stars may rise in front of the observer, and moving east- 
wards as regards bearing, pass to their meridian behind him, x.yj^., 




thus making a concave movement round the observer. I have 
therefore divided the stars into three categories. 

1. Stars with a declination of the same kind but greater than 
the latitude of the observer (which in the diagram is identical with 
the horizontal line passing through his zenith). 

2. Stars with a declination of the same kind but less than the 
latitude of the observer. 

3. Stars with a declination of an opposite kind to the latitude 
of the observer, Le, north if the observer's latitude is south, and vice 

The movement which stars of the first category appear to make 
is convex. The movement which stars of the second category 
appear to make is as shown in the diagram, ue. they rise in front of 
and pass behind an observer facing the pole to the meridian, and 
then again pass in front of him as they sink towards the horizon. 
The movement of the third category is concave. 

The movement of the third category (southern stars in the 
northern hemisphere) is simple .'enough. To an observer in the 
northern hemisphere looking south they rise in the east, i.e. on 
his left hand, and pass gradually over to the west, their bearing 
increasing continuously. This increase, though not regular, is 
calculable, and the approximate bearing of any one of these stars 
at any moment of time can easily be determined. The disadvantage 
with this category is that they are always in comparatively rapid 
movement, especially in their first and second hours from the 
• meridian ; but even with the most unfavourable conditions it is 
possible to make some use of them. 

The third category has been dealt with first because it is the 
simplest to explain, and taking them in order, as we began with 
the third, we will now consider the second cat^ory. For the sake 
of simplicity, I will confine myself to the northern hemisphere, but 
if for north we read south, the explanation is in a general way 
equally applicable to the southern hemisphere. 

The stars of the second category^ it will be remembered, the 
declination of which, though north, is less than the latitude, make 
a concave movement round the observer. Their bearing six hours 
before and after meridian is known, being in the lowest latitudes 
nearly equal to their north polar distance, or to 360°— N.P.D. 
respectively* (in the southern hemisphere 180 — or + their south 
polar distance), and their bearing on meridian is, of course, also 
known ; it only remains to find the hour when such a star is due 

* Iq the higher latitudes the bearing will differ considerably from the polar distance ; 
but all to the observer's advantage, as the star will vary so much the less from the east 
or from the west and its movement will be slower in consequence. 



east or due west Scales can then be worked out to determine its 
approximate bearing at any moment of time. All this is merely a 
matter of computation. The peculiarity of stars of this category is 
their comparatively slow movement in bearing before they arrive 
at the east or west line. 

It is evident that if at six hours a star bears its polar distance 
when rising, the angular distance it has to pass over before it reaches 
the east and west line is 90° minus its polar distance. But it is 
also clear that its declination equals 90° minus its polar distance. 
Therefore the angular distance it has to travel in bearing between 
six hours and due east (90°) is equal to the declination. Now, for 
example, let us say a star's declination is I2^ In latitude 17° the 
time from meridian when it will be due east is three hours. Con- 
sequently the angular distance in bearing which it has to travel in 
three hours from P.D. to due east is 12^, or 4^ in one hour on the 

When the declination is less, it is evident that the average rate 
of movement will be less. The most favourable combination of 
latitude and declination in this category is when they are nearly 
equal. The movement of these stars up to the east and west line 
and from it when setting is very regular, and as this movement is 
slow, they offer themselves for use as guides while in this position. 

We now come to the first category. In the latitudes to which 
I have referred on a previous page, viz. i^ to 34°, a very large 
proportion of stars are included in this category, increasing, of 
course, as we near the equator. Looking at diagram Fig. 4, it will 
be seen that a star of this category moves eastwards, i>. its bearing 
increases up to a certain point of its arc, which we will call T, from 
which point it decreases until the star arrives on the meridian, 
where its bearing will, of course, be 0° or 360° (180° in the southern 
hemisphere). From the meridian, again, it moves westwards, and 
its bearing decreases from 360° up to a certain point which we will 
call T', and which is at the same angular distance from the meridian 
as T. Thence its bearing increases until in the lower latitudes, 
in India, for example, every prominent star of this category with 
one or two exceptions sets. The points T and T, it will be 
noticed, represent the maximum and minimum bearing of the star 
before and after meridian respectively. Now, the great peculiarity 
and great advantage of this category for orientation is this : that 
i»hen a star is in or near the position indicated in the diagram by 
T or T', the apparent movement of the star is very slow indeed. 
The rate of movement varies somewhat with the latitude and 
declination of the star, but for two or three hours it will remain 
at very much the same bearing, and this is obviously exactly what 



is required for making use of it successfully and easily in night 

It is necessary, however, to determine the bearing and also the 
hour of the night when the star is there. Looking again at the 
diagram, Fig. 4, it will be seen that, assuming all lines and circles 
to be in the same plane, the star arrives at the points T and T' at 
the moment when the line from the observer's eye to the star is 


> ' 

Fig. 4. 

tangent to the circle it appears to make round the pole. We there- 
fore require : (i) to determine the hour when the star is tangent to 
the circle, (2) to determine its bearing at that hour. This, again, is- 
merely a matter of computation. Astronomically expressed, the 
problem reads, '' to find when the azimuth of a star is greatest and 
its motion vertical, the declination being greater than the latitude ; "' 
.but as the hour-angle of the vertical motion is equal to the hour- 
angle of the supposed tangent, and the greatest azimuth is equal 
to the tangent bearing, the results are identical.* ' 

From the foregoing notes it will be seen that marches could be 
carried out in all latitudes almost at any time by first category 
stars with certainty and without much special intelligence being 
required of the person responsible for the march. The tangent 

-^ • ^^- • — - I — I IM I 

* The hour-angle of a star is its distance in time from the meridian. 


times and bearings of 107 stars for all latitudes, i^.to 34^ from the 
equator, have been computed, together with tables for making use 
of second and third category stars in a similar way. These have 
been ready for many months. It is, however, a case of supply and 
demand, and up to the present the degree of interest evoked 
has not been thought to be sufficient to justify the expense of 

'Before going on to consider the important matter of identifica- 
tion, a further remark is necessary to clear up the question of those 
northern stars which in these latitudes make an inferior transit 
These, as previously stated, after passing six hours from meridian 
westwards commence a west to east movement below the pole. 
What is this movement ? Does it constitute a fourth movement f 
The answer is. No. For the twelve hours during which they are 
making the superior transit half-<:ircle they are for the most part in 
the first category ; and for the twelve hours of the inferior transit 
their movement is the same as that of the third category, and they 
should be treated accordingly (see page 36). The same remark 
applies to the higher latitudes of the Southern Hemisphere ; in New 
Zealand and in America south of Buenos Ayres. 

With regard to the identification of the stars I have prepared 
rough charts. Figs. 5, 6, and 7, by the aid of which I hope I may be 
able to give an idea of the way to easily recognise constellations- 
and stars of the first and second magnitude. These charts refer 
solely to stars which are visible in England in the month of April 
much in the positions they are shown, between the hours of 7.30 
and 9 P.M. 

In each chart there is a star of reference which the observer 
should face when he begins his observations. Polaris is the star of 
reference in Fig. 5. On one side is the first magnitude star, Vega^ 
and opposite to it, nearly equidistant from Polaris, is another first 
magnitude star, Capella, Above Polaris is the Great Bear, and below 
and also nearly equidistant is Cassiopeia. Draco lies between Vega 
and the Great Bear, and Cepheus lies between Vega and Cassiopeia. 
The second magnitude star a Cephei lies very near to a line drawn 
from Vega to 7 Cassiopeia ; and 7 Draconis, a very useful and promi* 
nent second magnitude star, is near to Vega and on a line drawn 
from that star to /3 of the Great Bear, which is the pointer furthest 
from the pole. In this figure therefore we have seventeen stars 
easily identified. 

7 of the Great Bear. 
5 of Cassiopeia. 
2 of Auriga. 

I of Lyra. 
I of Cepheus. 
I of Draco. 


Polaris, or the pole star, is situated nearly on a line drawn from j3 
through a of the Great Bear prolonged about six times the distance 
between these two latter stars, which are for this reason called the 

Although the first magnitude stars and many of the second 
magnitude stars have names which' have for the most part been 
handed down from the remotest antiquity, yet, as of course is well 
known, the ordinary astronomical way of distinguishing them is 
by the characters of the Greek alphabet There is, however, no 
necessity to burden the memory with these. When an observer can 



J.* •f 

i fn ^ P ^''^ ^♦^ O***" 

« i />» 





Fig. 5. 


K.B. — The Zenith is the point in the sky immediately above the observer. From the 
Zenith to the horizon is an arc of 90°. As the altitude of the pole is always equal to the 
latitude, it follows that in latitude 51° N. Polaris is approximately 39° from the Zenith. 
The polar distances of a and fi of the Great Bear (the pointers) being 28° and 33*^ 
respectively, they have an altitude of 79° and 84° respectively when on meridian. 

recognise the constellations, a glance at a star map will be sufficient 
to refresh it. The seven principal stars of the Great Bear are 
lettered consecutively, beginning from the pointer nearest the pole. 
Cassiopeia's five bright stars are also lettered consecutively ; but 
this is by no means always the case. 

Two pairs of third magnitude stars further from the pole than 
the plough of the Bear are easily recognised on a clear night. 
They represent two of the Bear's paws, a hind and a fore ; they are 
lettered 1, k and X, /u respectively (see Fig. 5). 

Rfgiilus is the star of reference in Fig. 6. At half-past eight 


on the I Sth of April the pointers of the Bear will be nearly over- 
head. /3— a, the pointers, point to Polaris (see Fig. 5). Similarly 
a — ^/3, pointing the other way, lead us to the Great Lion, which is 
very much the same distance from the pointers as Polaris, but rather 
farther, viz. eight times the distance between them. 

The seven princi{)al stars of the Great Lion are easily dis- 
tinguished. The brightest at the handle of the reaping-hook, as 
the head and shoulders of the Lion is often called, is Regulus, a first 
magnitude star, the next brightest being Denebola at the tail. 

^fttCiiUs ^ ^ lAfoksftf S^uik to Rtptlut 

• Conmet 

Fig. 6. 

Regulus is on the meridian, ue. due south at this hour on this 
date and four minutes earlier or later for each subsequent or previous 
date respectively. Looking due south at these hours, this beautiful 
star cannot be mistaken, for it has an altitude, when on the meridian 
on this latitude, about equal to that of the pole star, f>. about 50°. 

Denebola, as previously stated, is at the end of the Lion's tail, 
and following the curve from Regulus through B Leonis and 


Denebola we come, at ao interval of a little more than the distance 
between Regulus and Denebola, to Arcturus a Bootes, and still 
following the curve, to Corona (the Northern Crown). This is a 
small constellation composed chiefly of third magnitude stars, and is 
only readily seen with the naked eye on a very clear night ; but the 
principal star (a Coronae) is of the second magnitude and is always 
distinct. The stars between Corona and Vega are of the constella- 
tion Herailes. A line drawn through the Great Lion from the 
blade of the reaping-hook through the Lion's back to the horizon 
will pass through Spica, a first magnitude star (a Virginis). 

Another way of identifying Arcturus is to follow the curve of 
the tail of the Bear. Arcturus is in prolongation of this curve at 
about a little more than the length of the tail from the end star, and 
if the curve be still further prolonged towards the south it will 

p^iiux^, ..Cojrc 



euofv ^^ 

^<^.. •' -• ' 


Looking West 
Fig. 7. 

indicate Spica, which when visible is always near the horizon, its 
meridian altitude in this latitude being only 29°. 

Alnilam of the constellation of Orion^ the centre star of the belt, 
is the star of reference in Fig. 7. The splendid constellation of 
Orion in which are two stars of the first magnitude (Betelgeuse and 
Rigel) cannot fail to be recognised. 

Alnilam is only 1° from the celestial equator ; to the north are 
Betelgeiise and Bellatrix, and to the south Rigel. In a half-circle 
round it, and as seen this month above it, are five stars of the first 
magnitude. A line drawn through the three stars of Orion's belt 
towards the southern horizon will indicate Sirius, the most brilliant 
star of the heavens. Sirius is at one end of the bright half-circle 
and Capella (see Fig. 5) is at the other. Sirius is south and 
Capella north, and on the arc between them are Castor and Pollux 
and Procyon (a Canis Minoris). Draw a line from Sirius through 


Orion, between the belt and Bellatrix, and nearly equidistant from 
Orion is Aldeberan (a Tauris). This deep red star may also be 
recognised as near the Pleiades, likened by Tennyson to fireflies 
tangled in a silver braid, which belong also to the constellation of 
the Bull. Alcyone is the brightest star of the Pleiades. 

The Pleiades would lead us to Aries, Aries to Andromeda, 
Andromeda to Pegasus ; but these two latter constellations will have 
set soon after dark. . 

From the Pleiades also the constellation of Perseus can be 
identified. A graceful curve of small stars Jeading us from the 
former group to a Persi. j3 Persi is Algol, the remarkable variable 
star (see Fig. 7). 

The constellation of Perseus has recently been especially in- 
teresting owing to the sudden appearance, on February 22nd, 190 1, 
of a Nova of great brilliance, brighter than Aldeberan. I was in 
India at the time, and well remember seeing it otx the next evening. 
It was then about as bright as Aldeberan. Every week its bright* 
ness declined, until by the end of April, when at sunset it was on the 
western horizon, it could be scarcely seen. When Perseus next 
appeared in the eastern sky the newcomer had disappeared 
altc^ether. The cause of its light was undoubtedly a mighty con- 
flagration; but the cause of the conflagration is, I believe, still 
somewhat obscure, as more than one theory has been put forward 
to explain it It is hoped that this brief description of a part of the 
heavens may show how easily the stars can be identified by any 
one who desires to know them, and further that the explanation of 
their apparent movements which preceded the description may be 
of some help to officers and others who may wish to make use of 
them for orientation or as guides to march by. 

Useful star maps at a low price are those by W. Peck, F.R.A.S., 
published by Gale and Inglis. They are contained in that author's 
'The Constellations and How to Find Them,' issued separately 
for the northern and southern hemispheres. I have found them 
invaluable for purposes of identification. 



By Lieut.-Colonel F. N. Maude, late R.E. 


Whilst countless commentators have wearied their readers with 
their views on Bonaparte's campaign of 1796, the equally brilliant, 
and for British purposes far more useful, exploits of the Archduke 
Charles during the same year in the valley of the Danube and 
upon the Rhine have received but scanty attention even in the 
country of the victors, where until within the last ten years no 
adequate study of this, the most instructive of all their many 
campaigns, had even been attempted.* 

Where in Italy Bonaparte had only been handling somewhere 
about 30,000 men in a mountainous region some fifty miles square, 
Moreau and the Archduke in Germany had been at the head of 
armies, numerically not insignincant even in the present day, and 
moving in a district complicated by forests, rivers, and mountains 
fully four times as large in area, and whereas, in the former, the 
victor owed his successes mainly to the absence of the supply 
difficulty ; in the latter, the Archduke was almost as much 
hampered as Wellington in Spain, by the necessity of conciliating 
the inhabitants of the region in which he was moving. 

I would wish particularly not to be misunderstood on this point 
of supply. Neither Bonaparte nor the Austrians could afford to 
neglect their communications altogether, but whereas victory 
solved all difficulties for weeks for the former, the Austrian 
magazines being generally well provided, the French when defeated 
left nothing but a desert waste to the conqueror, who thereby found 
his freedom of movement curtailed almost in direct proportion to 
the freedom and rapidity of movement the other gained. 

In pursuing Joubert after his victory at Wurzburg, neglecting 
for the time the threat of Moreau's presence in his rear, and harass- 
ing him till the loosely knit French Army became a mere rabble, 
then returning in time to threaten Moreau's retreat to the Rhine, 
the Archduke showed greater boldness than Bonaparte and more 
real insight into the true nature of war ; but this alone will not 

• See ' Geist und Sloff im mcdernen Krieg,' by C. von B. K. Vienna, 1893. 


suffice to place him in history on the same level as a " strategist/' 
a master of the art of leading armies, because he was lacking in 
that extraordinary driving power which characterised Napoleon , 
and could not exact from his followers of all ranks that extra- 
ordinary self-abnegation which seemed to permeate all ranks of 
the French Army when under their leader s eye. 

The Archduke was a master in the art of moving armies about. 
Napoleon in the art of making them fight, and of the two the latter 
seems to me the greater gift. 

The success of the Austrians, however, by no means suffices to 
condemn the French design. The special circumstances of the 
case must be taken into account ; but this is just what the average 
commentator, from the days of Jomini onwards, has always declined 
to undertake. To him the French were foredoomed to failure by 
the form of their operations — an advance on exterior lines. I submit 
that this form was not a matter of free choice, but of necessity for 
the French Government, and that nothing known or which could 
reasonably have been known to their authorities at the time of its 
conception justified any want of confidence in its ultimate success. 

A French Army in those days needed a vast area to subsist 
upon, and if both their armies had been moved on one line, the 
probabilities are that it would have starved before it could have 
caught up with the retreating Austrians, who, being numerically 
much the weaker, must have fallen back to pick up reinforcements. 
By the lines selected, the French moved through the richest 
country available, and each wing was not only strong enough to 
give a good account of itself, but quite as big as any General of the 
time could handle in action or on the march with effect. 

Against any other Austrian leader but the Archduke, the plan 
promised almost certain success, and his qualifications at the time 
of its inception were quite unknown even in his own Army ; but 
even he would have failed if the French had possessed the cohesion 
of regular troops and been better served by their cavalry, for at the 
crisis of the campaign it was the superiority of the Austrian horse- 
men in the duties of reconnaissance and screening, helped by the 
fact that the great collision took place in districts which especially 
favoured the latter and hampered the former, which alone enabled 
the Archduke to withdraw unperceived from the front of one 
enemy and concentrate his whole force upon the head of the other. 

The real miscalculation of the French Government lay in their 
over-estimation of the strength of their materials. Their armies 
were not homogeneous enough, their leaders not energetic enough for 
their task. Had the latter been able to impress on the former but 
a mile a day additional mobility, the weight of numbers must have 


told, and the Archdoke would have been crushed between hammer 
and anviL 

To attempt to establish as an axiom on these and similar data 
that exterior lines of operation necessarily place an army at a 
disadvantage seems to me a negation of all true scientific reasoning, 
which is careful always not to generalise from insufficient examples. 
A broader survey of the facts is needed before a sound conclusion 
can be arrived at 

If double lines of operations were under all circumstances un- 
desirable, what becomes of all the chapters and aiguments by 
which Jomini and his faithful followers, amongst whom Hamley 
may be assigned almost the first rank, seek to bolster up their 
.theories as to the advantage of a re-entering frontier, as demon- 
strated in the campaign of Marengo, 1880, Uhu, 1805, and more 
recently in Bohemia, 1866 ? In all three the exterior lines were 
successful ; but can any one suppose that the existence of a mere 
imaginary line drawn across a map can seriously modify the result 
of collision between two fighting forces ? 

A more detailed survey of the facts is necessary before one 
proceeds to any generalisation, and, as much new light has been 
shed on the subject by recent historical investigations * — light which 
'enables us to view Napoleon from quite a diflferent standpoint than 
that of a mere conjurer with words and phrases— I propose to deal 
with his campaigns at somewhat greater length. 

When Napoleon returned from Eg)rpt in 1799, he found on 
every frontier his work of conquest undone. In Italy the Austrians, 
to whose armies for the time SuvarofT had succeeded ib imparting 
some of his own energy and resolution in attack, had swept the 
French back behind the Alps, leaving only Genoa, where Mass^na 
still held out as a rallying point, and in the north also the French 
were behind the Rhine ; only Switzerland still remained under the 
control of the Republic, though it would be hardly accurate to 
describe it as friendly. 

The finances of France were almost at as low an ebb as in 1796, 
and it seemed to Europe that her last reserve of men and horses 
had been expended during the previous struggle. 

Only one man even in France thought differently, and whilst 
the Austrians, after Suvaroff's withdrawal, had relapsed into their 
habitual lethargy, he was at work creating out of the most un- 
promising materials a new army, which in his hands became 
destined to reverse the tide of ill-fortune. 

I have always considered this as by far the greatest triumph his 

• See the recent publications of the French General Staflf, especially de Cognac's 
* UArm^ de Reserve,* 1800. 


creative energy ever accomplished, for he was not yet emperor and 
had still to fight against ignorance, incompetence, and political 
intrigue, practically alone, with no trained staff to help him. 

Though the ranks of the armies had been terribly depleted, 
there were yet men and units in France who, under one pretext or 
another, had managed to adhere to the depdts, and taking the 
Army List and distribution returns, he proceeded to " dig out " every 
man he could find still available for service. Once these had been 
** rounded up " they appear to have accepted their fate with sufficient 
cheerfulness — for the morale of the " Army of Reserve " was un- 
deniably above reproach — and though the temperament of the nation 
may account for this in part, the fact that the pinch of hard times, 
as in 1792, was again beginning to exercise its customary effect 
on human nature, furnibhes probably the stronger half of the 

These units he proceeded to concentrate by a series of route 
marches, embracing every post-road in France on a general line of 
cantonments from Dijon to Geneva, and one must study the maps 
and original orders given in Monsieur de Cugnac*s ' L'Armde de 
Reserve,' my principal authority for these pages, to realise the 
astounding capacity for detail labour this whole proceeding involved. 
Of course he had assistants, but from the exceedingly confidential 
nature of the matter they must have been few, and he himself must 
have carried the thread of the whole design in his own brain through 
all the turmoil, danger, and excitement of his day-to-day life, for 
the year was a critical one in his fortunes, and though First Consul, 
he was by no means secure in his seat. 

The execution of this concentration took time, of course ; many 
units had 600 miles to march, and long before the heads of the 
columns could reach their ultimate destination, it was allowed to 
leak out by the secret police that a great army was concentrating at 
Dijon, further that a visit there would well repay any foreign secret 
agent, for Bonaparte himself was about to review the gathering. 

Following the hint, the secret agents, all or most of them well 
known to the police, journeyed down to Dijon and saw General 
Bonaparte review an exceedingly mixed force — of boys, old men, 
and cripples, not 10,000 strong, who had been collected for the 
occasion and dignified with the title pro tent, of " Army of Reserve.'* 

They sent off their "secret and confidential" reports in all 
haste, and this time these were not interfered with in the post ; and 
presently all the Courts in Europe were laughing over stories and 
cartoons ridiculing the " Corsican's " ridiculous bombast in styling 
such a collection an army ; but hardly had the authors withdrawn 
from the scene, having been carefully induced to move by the same 


secret police, than the heads of the real columns b^^an to arrive, 
and in the first dajrs of May a very sufficient Army of Reserve took 
up its al'.otted position. 

Practically this *^ ruse " detennined the result of the campaign, 
for so convinced were the Austrians of the truth of the information 
they received, that to the very last, even when the whole Army was 
on Italian soil, and almost in their rear, they rerused obstinately to 
credit the reported strength with which they had to deal, and hence 
the hesitanqr which marked their preliminary concentration. 

Except in the wilds of Manchuria, such a scheme would seem 
to have but little chance of success nowada}^, and it would seem, 
from Mr. Balfour*s statement of our Naval and Military policy, 
made in the debate on the Army Estimates, 9th May, that some 
such calculation lies at the base of his recent change of opinion as 
to the possibility of a ** surprise raid " upon our coasts. If, however, 
the increased power of rapidly moving troops conferred by railways 
and telegraphs be considered, the conclusion seems hardly a sound 
one, and rather suggests want of information and deficiency of 
grasp on the part of his strategic advisers. 

The French Army and War Office of to-day is in a very different 
condition of readiness to what it was a century ago, and it would 
seem to me a very simple matter to arrange in peace time for the 
despatch of, say, 1 50 trains from almost as many inland stations by 
upwards of ten separate double lines of railway to deliver their 
contents along a front from Dunkirk to St Malo between 6 p.m. 
and midnight on any particular day of the week without exciting 
diplomatic attention ; nor would it take much finesse to decide on 
a line of operations which would suffice to occupy very fully the 
attention of our Navy during the critical six to eight hours these 
troops would require for their sea-passage. Once on shore, how 
long would it take our new "Districts" to concentrate for the 
defence of London ? Should we prove very much quicker than the 
Austrians ? 

The point is this : all history teaches that the maintenance of 
peace depends, not on the knowledge of facts as they are, but on 
the view taken of some few of these facts from opposite standpoints. 
How those facts which are known strike the respective observers is 
almost entirely the consequence of the previous training their minds 
have already received, and I submit that no foreign statesman or 
soldier, trained to view war from the Napoleonic standpoint, in 
contra-distinction to ours, the " Nelsonic," to coin a word, could 
hesitate in his answer if called on to give an opinion. 

I hold the "sea-power" standpoint as firmly as any man in the 
country, and would give very little for the chances of success of 


such an enterprise ; but even if we sank every transport within a 
mile of their beach, the war would have begun and we should be 
in for a bloody struggle of endurance which could not last much, if 
at all, less than two years, and which would cost us one thousand 
million even if we were successful. 

My impression has always been that the object of our 
expenditure on armaments is to preserve peace unbroken. Our 
present policy seems to me expressly calculated to invite aggression. 

No officer occupying the position of the French generalissimo 
could, if called upon by his Government, declare on his honour 
and conscience that the Army under his command was incapable 
of attempting by surprise raid the capture of London, for to do 
so would be to confess that he and those under him had neglected 
their duty. Only six weeks ago a mere stroke of the pen on our 
side would have sufficed to give him the necessary facts to decline 
the responsibility. Since the Prime Minister can hardly change 
his mind for the third time, I confess to awaiting the future with 
no little anxiety. 

Reverting again to the main current of our story, even when 
the Army had been thus successfully concentrated, it was very far 
from being a mobilised field force in the present sense of the words. 
Though organised in divisions, it was almost without field artillery, 
its trains were chaotic, and its ammunition supply ludicrously 

Though everything had been foreseen and ordered by Bona- 
parte, there was then as always a difference between giving an 
order and getting it obeyed ; and now comes a fresh display of 
that marvellous capacity for work and the development of energy 
in others which formed the dominant characteristic of this unique 
nature. Again, one must turn to the pages of de Cugnac and read 
the sheaves of orders and despatches that flowed from his pen. 

Instructions to send on ammunition by post relays, to pick up 
so many hundredweight of lead in one arsenal, so many pairs of 
boots in another. To form factories for the manufacture of cartridges, 
and the baking of biscuit at Geneva. Orders to seize every boat 
on the lake to provide transport for provisions, in fine, orders to 
every subordinate to carry out and complete the duties which each 
ought to have done without any reminder. 

Ultimately by the 14th May a sufficiency of stores and munitions 
were collected for the movement to begin, and if space permitted 
it would be interesting to give in detail the whole list of deficiencies 
which even then remained to be made good. 

It raises the whole question of when an army passes from the 
stage of being a mere aggregation of individuals and becomes a 

VOL. CL. 4 

[vol. XXIX. NEW SBSIU8.] 


concrete fighting entity. In view of the many discussions of recent 
years on army organisation, it is well worth considering this point 
at some length. 

Neither the dictionary nor even the Encyclopcedia Britannica can 
help us to solve the riddle. Theoretically an army becomes an 
army from the moment the orders appointing a commander, staff, 
and naming its units are issued, and it remains one until a similar 
edict decreeing its dissolution appears ; but the range of its fighting 
value meanwhile may vary almost indefinitely, and this is a point 
that statesmen who are not soldiers and soldiers who are not 
statesmen are both apt to overlook. 

The former, having decreed the constitution of a field force, 
forthwith imagine they have created a counter of definite value in 
the game, and expect it to justify its existence by deeds forthwith. 
The latter, knowing all the thousand and one details that remain to 
be adjusted before ideal efficiency is attained, hesitate to act before 
all things are perfect, and by hesitation lose the whole chances of 
a campaign. 

■ Thus, in 1870, a first victory was the one and only chance of 
the French Army, and a comparison of the numbers available on 
both sides up to the 3rd August show that more than the chance, 
almost the certainty of winning such a victory existed, had the 
different Corps and Division Commanders been ready to move. 

But they were not, or considered that they were not. One had 
no water-bottles for his men, another no "flannel bandage "(?) 
" cholera belts," a third wanted to put his men through a course 
of musketry with the new rifle, etc., etc. Surely, as the French official 
account now in course of publication points out, had the uncle, not 
the nephew, been in chief command, he would have made short 
work of all these objectors. 

The driving enei^y, that all-conquering will-power which accepts 
no excuse for failure, knowing well that men have marched and 
conquered, shoeless, ragged, and starving, was needed to set the 
men in motion, and what such energy can accomplish this 
marvellous campaign of Marengo remains as an example ; but it 
must be studied in de Cugnac's pages, not Hamley's. 

Almost to the day the Army started, but so short of musket 
ammunition that a special order was issued prohibiting the use of 
ball cartridge for the training of the recruits in musketry, though 
many had only the day before received their arms for the first 
time ; and to teach a man to load his weapon in those days was 
not quite such a simple process as it has since become. 

Does not the ability combined with the iron resolution needed 
to judge exactly the moment at which the fighting value of this 


army would suffice for its task and to launch it forward for its 
I>erformance, undismayed by the cloud of uncertainties which still 
encircled the future, suggest rather more of the " art of the leader " 
than the mere recognition of the advantage to be derived from 
falling upon the enemy's communications — a trick obvious to every 
schoolboy at play. 

Actually, there is no evidence to show that this idea of drawing 
advantage from the possession of Switzerland, ue. from the angular 
base, was originally the conception of Bonaparte at all. On the 
contrary, the plan had been in the air for months beforehand, 
indeed, ever since Switzerland fell under French control De 
Cugnac's work and the despatches on which it is founded can 
leave no doubt on the point, which, of course, lay equally at the 
bottom of Moreau*s simultaneous invasion of South Germany ; but 
whereas Moreau took over an army organised an J equipped in all 
except one essential detail (horses for his pontoon train), Bonaparte 
had to find, organise, and equip his own, and that, too, with such 
rapidity that the secret could not leak out. 

That an army could cross the Alps admitted of no doubt what- 
ever, they had done so repeatedly for centuries, and only in the 
preceding year MacDonald and Suvaroff both had succeeded in 
surmounting them by more difficult passes and in far more severe 

The men who marched from Gilgit to the relief of Chitral, or 
who are even now forcing their way into Thibet, at an altitude nearly 
double that of the summit level of the St. Bernard, would laugh at 
the physical obstacles of the route even as they stood in those days ; 
but how many men have we had since the days of Sir Charles 
Napier who would have dared such an effort with such an army, 
and with no better information than lay at Bonaparte's disposal ? 

The only moves of modem times which can be placed in 
approximately the same category are Sir Donald Stewart's march 
from Candahar to Cabul, and Lord Roberts' move in the reverse 
-direction ; but in each case the fighting superiority of our force was 
mcontestable, the country easier, and both were assured of abundant 
supplies on arrival at their destination. Bonaparte had to take his 
supplies from his enemy first, and, as matters actually turned out, 
to capture both the guns necessary to complete his equipment, 
together with their ammunition also, for the protracted defence of 
Ford Bard cut off his artillery and ammunition columns for som? 
ten days ; and his advance guard, under Lannes, actually entered 
the plains of Italy and stormed Ivrea without any guns at all. 

Reading his St. Helena despatches, I have always been reminded 
of the story of Blucher who, having won a brilliant victory over the 



French, very much to his own astonishment, said to his Chief of 
the Staff, Gnetsenau : " Now sit down at once and show them that 
we can not only win a battle, but explain how we did it" It has, 
in fact, always seemed to me that having won a most glorious 
campaign, Napoleon felt bound to put himself right in the eyes of 
the " strategibts " with their " science of communications," by calling 
their attention to the care with which he moved to Milan in order 
to establish an alternative line of retreat and supply in case of 
disaster. But what kind of a line of retreat or supply would the 
St. Gotthard have been for a beaten French Army ; there was 
no St Gotthard railway, the pass was even worse than the St 
Bernard ; what stores were there awaiting his arrival at Zurich^ 
and what would have been the attitude of the Swiss mountaineers,, 
particularly the German-speaking ones, to a French force in dis- 
ordered retreat. Napoleon does not say. But the Swiss must have 
had very short memories, for in quite recent events had they behaved 
much better to their oppressors than the Afghans did to us between 
Cabul and Jellalabad in 1838. 

This excentric movement not only sacrificed Mass^na in Genoa, 
to relieve whom had been the object of the march, but set free the 
besieging force under Ott', and gave time for Elsnitz, who was then 
opposed to Suchet on the Var, to retreat and rejoin the main army, 
the two together very considerably outnumbered the reinforcement 
Moncey brought to the French main body at Milan. 

The whole movement is so opposed to the Napoleonic practice, 
that one can only suppose a yielding to overwhelming necessity, 
that necessity being the provision of subsistence and ammunition 
for his exhausted men out of the rich Austrian stores which had 
accumulated at Milan. 

It would be an interesting experiment to prepare a war game 
map, altering the names and eliminating all political considerations, 
then give the situation as it appeared to Bonaparte on the 24th of 
May, to a series of players trained in the modem school and see 
what the consensus of opinion would make of it I have little 
doubt what the result would be : a concentration against the 
nearest fractions of the enemy's field army with a view to defeat 
them in detail before they could reunite. Surprise is so evidently 
the essence of the operation that no one would dream of sacrificing 
the opportunity as Napoleon actually did ; the presumption, there- 
fore, as I have already stated, is very strong that the compelling 
force to which even his will had to bow must have been of a very 
unusual nature. 

It is unfortunate that the Austrian records of this campaign are 
unusually scanty; but quite recently the Staff at Vienna have 


published two monographs, the first by Count Neipperg, who was 
on the Staff of General Melas, the second by the Prince of Hohen- 
zollem, who throughout the campaign was with General Ott. Both 
contain much which is of interest with regard to the internal con- 
dition of the Army ; but neither gives sufficient explanation of 
the extraordinary slowness with which information and orders 
circulated within the Imperial Army. 

When one considers that no point in the whole theatre of 
operations was more than seventy-five miles from headquarters — 
and that four days should have been ample to mass the whole 
90,000 men that Melas commanded anywhere in the vicinity of 
Alessandria, one is absolutely amazed at the appalling lethargy 
which let some twenty days, from 24th May to' 14th June, slip by 
in inaction. The truth seems to be that up to the very last the 
Austrians did not believe in the existence of the Reserve Army at 
all, but thought they had still only to deal with the small column 
methods of the previous decade — small commands which could be 
brushed aside whenever their concentrated Army chose to move — 
and their initial success at Marengo, in spite of all their blunders, 
goes far to justify this view. After all, it was only a relatively small 
column — 22,500 (less Desaix on detachment) — which opposed^them 
that day, and the Austrians ought to have crushed it beyond hope 
of rallying long before Desaix returned to the ground, in which 
case the state of the French would have been a good deal more 
hopeless than that of the Austrians ; for there was not a peasant 
in Lombardy after the French excesses of 1799 who would not 
have risen against them once committed to a retreat. 

Neipperg's diary shows quite clearly that Melas was absolutely 
^ bluffed " into surrender by the astounding audacity with which 
Napoleon lied. The Imperial Army was still far more numerous 
and better in hand than the French, and might easily have renewed 
tiie attack next day or slipped away to Genoa, where their supply 
and transhipment to any point of the coast, thanks to our fleet, 
was assured, but their commander's nerve had given out, and his 
imagination entirely failed to grasp the enormity of the falsehoods 
with which he was confronted ; nor is it easy to blame him, for the 
effrontry with which the French officers carried off their claims was 
and remains unparalleled. 

With not 5000 men in hand, and the bulk of their Army still 
flying in panic twenty miles to the rear, they spoke as if still at the 
head of victorious masses, and the Austrians may well be forgiven 
if they failed to " go one better." 

F. N. Maude. 

Note.— With reference to de Cugnic's work, so often referred to above, I would call 
^)ecial attention to Major-General Purse's lxK>k, * Marengo and Hohenlinden.' This 
is the first attempt in our language to utilise the value of the material published by the 
French Staff, and deserves the closest attention of all students of Napoleonic times. It 
Jkas further the great advantage of being written by a practical soldier, not by a University 

{To be continued,) 

By Captain A. A. McHardy, D.S.O., Royal Artillery. 

Much has been written and much has been said in recent times 
on this subject, and it is with some diffidence that I venture to 
express my views, especially as on several points I know that they 
are not those generally held. 

Practically all the arguments used nowadays for and against 
heavy artillery must be, and are, supported by instances from the 
Boer campaign, and although this campaign was in some respects 
an approach to what we may expect a Continental war to be, stilL 
we must be careful not to regard all its lessons as absolutely final. 

To the Boers we owe some gratitude for having shown us, from 
the earliest days of that campaign, the important r6le that this 
branch of the regiment must play in future warfare ; and now that 
the bulk of the Continental armies have taken the subject into 
serious consideration, we must not allow ourselves to lose ground 
and take a second place in this branch. 

As far as is at present understood. Continental Powers are 
considering heavy artillery more as giving great power against 
earthworks than as "mankillers" — except in Switzerland, where 
recent experiments have altered their views on this point. 

Roughly, the Russians are still undecided as to the armament 
of any branch except that of their Field Artillery. The French 
have a gun approaching 5-inch calibre for heavy artillery work. 
The Swiss have 4-gun batteries of 4'8-inch guns and 8-gun batteries 
of 4*8-inch mortars. The Germans have their 4-inch and 6-inch 
guns, a 6-inch howitzer and 8-inch mortar, though the last is likely 
to be superseded in the Field Service. 

Of the four nations mentioned above, the first three have their 
organisation completed ; but the Germans have now under 
consideration the question of the organisation of their heavy gun 
batteries. The present resolve of foreign armies is to fight their 
guns in mass rather than dispersed. 

Heavy artillery, as understood by some, means anything up to 
7 tons behind the motive power — shell of any weight up to 200 lbs. 


and range perhaps 10,000 yards. But what is implied in this paper 
are guns of 5-inch calibre firing a shell not over 60 lbs. up to 
1 1,000 yards, and giving not more than 4 tons behind the team or 
traction engine ; and a smaller number of howitzers weighing not 
more than 4 tons behind the team and ranging to 9000 yards. 
The present 47-inch gun was found in South Africa too long, and» 
like the 5 -inch gun, too heavy behind the team. There is no doubt 
that much heavier armament can be manipulated in the field should 
necessity arise, but our organisation would hardly admit of this 
necessity being •* often.*' 

In the latter part of May, 1900, the Boers mounted a 6-inch 
gun on the top of Pougwan Mountain, the southern buttress of 
Laing s Nek. To do this required the united strength of 3 span 
(54) of oxen plus the Wakkerstroom Commando, then 500 strong. 
This gun was hastily taken down the mountain early in June, the 
same commando manning the drag ropes, and after a successful 
trek northwards to the eastern line, it was eventually destroyed, 
the remnants being found by the 19th Hussars. 

During the fighting on the Tugela at Vaal Krantz a Boer 6-inch 
moved about on the Doornkop heights to the eastward of our lines, 
and played its part well, but was removed long before the day of 
" Pieters Hill," without, I believe, much difficulty. 

But our case is different, and it is hard to believe that even the 
keenest of battalion commanders would relish being called upon to 
perform such service. There was one day (the 17th February, 
1900) in which a British 6-inch gun did useful work from the 
unusual position of a railway truck anchored in Chieveley Station 
(Natal). The shooting was excellent, and the heavy lyddite shell 
this gun threw so well at the Boer lines told that day. Three 
or four such guns ready with their railway trucks might usefully be 
kept in store ready to proceed with the ist and 2nd Army Corps 
to any land where railways exist or where they can be laid. 

It is obvious that the longer the range of a gun, the flatter will 
be the trajectorylof its shell at short ranges, and hence, to be able to 
employ searching fire, a percentage of howitzers will be necessary 
in the heavy artillery. It is not intended for one moment to 
detract from the merits of searching fire — on occasions it is most 
useful, as was seen on the Tugela during the four or five days 
immediately preceding the Battle of Pieters Hill — but it will not be 
the form of fire most used even in wooded country. 

Howitzers will be required also to deal with field works 
against which the flatter trajectory of guns is ineffective. A 
proportion of two guns to every one howitzer should meet all 
requirements in future campaigns. 


Accuracy of fire from howitzers has been brought to great 
precision in the Si^e Artillery, but the system adopted is not, of 
course, applicable to heavy artillery, and much training will be 
required to ensure quick and accurate laying and consequently 
good shooting at long ranges. 

It seems generally agreed that the proportion of shrapnel shell 
with a heavy gun should be 75 per cent as against 25 per cent of 
lyddite ; and I would add 80 per cent of lyddite to 20 per cent 
of shrapnel with the howitzers. 

As to the draught of the future — ^the present 12-ton traction 
engine is good on a hard dry road, but not on a wet one. Some 
ten traction engines left Frere (Xatal) on the evening of the nth 
January, 1900, with the column under Sir Charles Warren bound for 
Spion Kop, via Springfield. About 9 P.M. a heavy shower came on, 
and lasted for perhaps an hour. When dawn broke next day the 
ten engines had run aground in every conceivable position, the 
furthest out being some eight miles from Frere. 

Once off the road the present engine is out of its element, and 
no liner facing the south-west monsoon rolls and pitches, smokes 
and groans more, than does our friend the 12-ton engine. 

Much lighter engines would seem indicated. One writer has 
suggested a form of motor, and there is no reason why at some 
future date this form of power should not be efficient for work 
across countr>\* 

Eight horses of the Army Service Corps type can move four 
tons with ease over any country that they may be called upon to 
manc^uvrc owr — team, tu'o abreast and drivers mounted on the near 
horses. This tjpc of animal, or better still, the Field Artillery 
horse, is more serviceable for this class of work than, as has been 
suf»gcstt\l, the heavy dray horse. The latter requires more food, is 
more c.\ j>ensive, more delicate, and must be more carefully handled 
than his lighter brethren in order to get full value out of him. One 
argument that has been used against horse draught for heavy 
artillery is the large amount of forage that will be required ; but 
the engine rtHjuires forage toa Coal is not picked up in the fields, 
and oats and grass sometimes are, and one thmg is certain, that a 
horse will go a great deal longer without water than any engine 

In a recent cam{xiign the horses of one r^ment were called 
upon to go wiAout water forty-eight hours. They did so without a 
casualty ; no engine could do this. 

• The ^H^drail, if its \*aluc proves to be as greftt as is claimed for it, appeals to furnish 
a complete solution of this question of militaiy traction.-^ED. U.S.M. 


The training of heavy artillery has been very fully dealt with 
of late ; but, in these days of specialism (vide our American cousins)^ 
we must not expect that any nation will give the companies that we 
send out to act as heavy artillery so long time as did the Boers to 
get accustomed to their guns and the vagaries of field life, to get 
accustomed to long land ranges and land targets, and generally to 
know how to take their places among mobile troops. A writer in 
a current magazine had recently an excellent article on this subject, 
and should a line ever come to be drawn between coast defence 
"gunners " and those that are to operate with troops in the field, 
the problem will probably be easily solved. 

The choice and occupation of a heavy artillery position requires 
perhaps more care and skill than that of any other, for, being 
granted, that no gun in the open can live against a gun of even 
equal power under cover, the delay necessary to move a heavy 
weapon from an exposed position might cost us very dearly. 

The importance of having an establishment of capable signallers 
in all batteries, but more especially in heavy artillery batteries, 
cannot be too strongly urged, not only from the point of view of 
the battalion commander, who sees with natural indignation the 
few signallers he has taken away to act with detached batteries and 
guns, but to save time and labour by keeping up communication 
between the C.R.A. and the battery commanders, and the battery 
commanders and their observation posts. But in no case does a 
signal message mean that the signaller must at once move on to 
the sky-line. 

As to the future role that heavy artillery batteries must play 
in warfare, the question of supply of ammunition will possibly 
prove a difficult one ; but granted that sufficient ammunition 
exists at the base, the advance dep6ts, and in the ammunition 
columns, as one modern writer has said, ** undeniably the battery 
which has solved the question of ammunition supply will conquer 
in the war of the future." 

About 290 rounds was, I think, the greatest amount of ammuni- 
tion expended by any heavy battery in one day during the late 
war ; and, under the present organisation, with selected officers in 
charge of the ammunition columns, the supply necessary to provide 
for an expensive day here and there ought to be kept up without 
great difl5culty. 

When we mass our guns, the control of the supply of ammuni- 
tion will be a simple matter, but it is when we come to disperse our 
guns that difficulties must and will arise ; and, if we are to take 
the new German method of infantry attack — namely, in lines of 
groups of men, each group five to ten yards apart — as a general 


examp^e^ m^ii^sed gims will be a necessity, at anjr rate in the early 
%\^t% cA the war* 

The Boers obtained their best effects by dispersed guns. At 
Spion Kop, at Vaal Krantz, and all along the line, there are many 
instances in which single Boer guns well earned their lanrels ; and 
as the late Colonel Walford, R.A^ has said, it is impossible to 
realise what woald have been our difEcuIties on the Tngela had 
the Boers employed shrapnel fire with massed gnns. 

It would seem fair to suppose that in any Continental war we 
must be prepared in the early stages of the war to meet massed 
brigade divisions of heavy artillery. Whichever form the campaign 
may take— either, as was suggested recently, a running fight for 
several days followed by a form of siege, or, as in our recent ex* 
pcriences, a big fight of two months gradually merging into 
scattered fights of small bodies — it is evident that as one side or 
the other becomes gradually weakened and broken, it will be im- 
possible for the leaders of that side to employ their troops in that 
most difficult of organisations — ^large bodies — and with this in view 
heavy artillery, after it has played its part in the early battles, will 
be more useful in sections and single guns. 

The necessity for heavy guns with the attack in these days of 
smokcV-ss powder has been witnessed by most of us and fully dis- 
cussed by Colonel Callwell in his * Tactics of To-day.' It would 
go hard with any infantry attack that tried to get home without 
artillery support ; and just as at Pieters Hill the heavy guns 
played on the Boer trenches till our brigades were almost up to 
them, and then, increasing the elevation, searched the ground 
beyond the Boer lines, so must heavy artillery be prepared to 
support their infantry in the future. And as with field artillery, 
once launched into the attack, the fewer changes of position the 

In the defence, heavy guns in mass should be very effective 
with shrapnel, but one can only assume what would happen, as we 
have no experiences at present of this manner of fire. Provided 
that the Artillery of the defence do not expose all their guns at 
ftr^ti nllowing themselves to be drawn into an artillery duel, a 
heavy blow mi^ht be dealt to the attackers' lighter artillery, his 
mounted triH>ps» or infantry reserves. While on this point, the 
ditlicultios attending the location of guns even when firing smoke- 
lc5<3» iHwdcr SiUind almost worse than they are in reality. Those 
in the line of fii^ could generally locate the gun to within a degree 
ftxMU the sound of the first n.)und. Even in wet weather a thin 
va|H>ur» much ivscmblin^j smoke, could almost always be seen (with 
a iJvxHl gUsj^^ to rise fa-^m subsev|uent rounds of a Boer gun^ 


Whether this vapour was dust or not it is hard to say. If the 
infantry and mounted troops were accustomed to pass to their 
artillery any information regarding the presence of a hostile gun or 
guns, good results would inevitably follow, but this was not always 
carried out in the late war. 

A special use of single heavy guns that allies itself most closely 
with the defence is that of firing an occasional shot at extreme 
range, and, if necessary, with sunken trail, into the '* Brown " of the 
enemy's troops. 

Early in June, 1900, the Boer 6-inch gun on Pougwan Mountain, 
that has been mentioned before, fired a single round at 10,800- 
yards into the " Brown " of Lord Dundonald's Mounted Brigade 
jost off-saddled on the slopes of Mount Prospect. Three men of 
the mounted infantry were hit, and the brigade had very hastily 
to move. 

Later on in the year, about August, the Boers near Lydenburg 
dropped a shell into the Volunteer Company of the Gordon High- 
landers on the march at a range of about 10,000 yards with diie 
effect ! The general results of such rounds, if effective, and one 
must be now and then, is undoubtedly great throughout the troops 
in the vicinity. 

The question of "sniping" with heavy artillery guns is one 
that has evoked much hostile criticism, as it leads to expense of 
uncommonly heavy shell ; but this, too, may have its points if used 
in a discreet manner. One example will perhaps suffice to explain 
my meaning. 

There was in 1901 in Northern Natal a post on very command- 
ing ground. This post owned a heavy gun. Away to the north- 
east, on ground which was neither ours nor the enemy's, were 
three or four Kaffir kraals. The commandant of the Utrecht 
Commando was wont to send a patrol from time to time to these 
kraals, gaining, no doubt, invaluable information of our movements 
every time. This patrol baffled the efforts of the most resolute of 
mounted troops. But one day the post commander got his chance. 
The Boer patrol rode up about 9 A.M. to the kraals ; and to make a 
long story short, the heavy gun sniped six times at 6000 yards. 
The Boers ran from kraal to ant-heap and ant-heap to donga and 
away, but no Boer patrol ever visited that region again till after 
peace was signed. 

Mobile heavy artillery being practically in its infancy as an 
organised body, has as yet had, of course, no opportunity of dis- 
tinguishing itself in what are known as small wars. In such 
countries as Somaliland, where the extent of view is generally 
limited to about 100 yards through the bush, where the going is 


sandy and in wet weather impossible for wheels, heavy guns would 
•be useless, even the two mountain guns and the 7-pounder camel 
guns could do but little in the last campaign. But in other 
countries, such as Uganda, single guns should be useful ; while on 
the Indian Frontier there are many places where, with our South 
African experience, heavy guns now could go. The loth Field 
Battery experienced but little difficulty in travelling into most 
valleys with the Malakand Field Force, and that was in 1897 and 

A few 50-pound lyddite shell fired against the Pathan towers 
and villages would save the hard-worked sappers and miners avast 
amount of extra labour. 

With advanced guards, horsed heavy artillery guns should be 
most useful, especially in dealing, with temporary positions of the 
defence such as are referred to in section 24 of * Combined Train- 
ing.* But with the rearguard, unless the heavy guns of the force 
are literally mobile, they would be best employed, as has already 
been suggested, in occupying positions some distance ahead and 
employing long range shots. A retiring force, strong in mounted 
infantry, could afford to allow the guns to hold on to these 
positions till the enemy's troops were within, say, 4000 yards, but 
as a general rule this could not be done. 

It has been said that artillery has no moral effect if no real 
result is taking place, but this is not borne out by the experiences 
of many of the Boers. When we come to analyse moral effect, 
surely it means the fear of the individual lest he get hit, and if 
that is enough to keep one's adversary behind his stone or at the 
bottom of his trench or wherever it may be, but little more is 
asked for except that a shrapnel bullet may eventually hit him. 
Artillery officers who were at Pieters Hill will remember the 
strings of yellow Boer prisoners that filed that day down the hill 
across the Tugela — made yellow, clothes and skin, by the lyddite 
shell, and whether true or not, I was told then of the terrible 
stomachic and neurotic complaints engendered by the lyddite 
explosions and the number of burghers invalided to Pretoria there- 
from. I heard this from prisoners in 1901, from the Boer Generals 
at Vereeniging in 1902, and in the latter end of that year from ex- 
prisoners returned from the over-sea camps. I have been assured 
by specialists that these effects are more imagined than real. If 
so, is not this moral effect ? 

In conclusion, we must remember that the Republican gunners 
in the late war, gallant fellows though they were, did not distinguish 
themselves by the way they kept their guns in action under dis- 
advantageous circumstances ; in fact, a remarkable case of this was 


observed on the Brakfontein position just below and immediately 
east of Spion Kop. A gun emplacement had been erected, but 
was not occupied for some days. At last a gun opened from this 
spot only to have some eight or ten rounds of naval 47 flung at 
it. The Boer gun hastily withdrew, and examination of the ground 
a few days later showed that no round had struck within twenty 
yards of the emplacement 

But we were not then fighting against thoroughly disciplined 
troops, and in the future we must expect in our big wars to 
encounter gunners who can give and take far more punishment 
than did the Staats Artillery, and nothing but a very high standard 
of specialism will win, more especially in the important branch of 
mobile heavy artillery. 

A. A. McHardy. 

By Colonel M. J. King-Harman. 

Surely the country has been afforded a splendid object lesson by 
the recent entrance examinations for Woolwich, Sandhurst, and 
•Osborne respectively ; from which all who wish to do so can form 
an opinion as to the best way of commencing and carrying out the 
education of those who are intended to become officers in the fight- 
ing forces of our country. Those who differ from the opinions 
expressed in the following few pages, might possibly assist much 
towards a proper solution of this important national question, if 
they would take the trouble to ask the Editor to allow them space 
for the expression of their views in this Magazine. 

How does the case stand to-day ? On the one hand, we see 
the Navy, with their usual practical sagacity, taking carefully 
selected boys of twelve to thirteen years of age, subjecting them to 
a medical examination first, closely followed by a simple common- 
sense test of their educational grounding, and then sending them off 
to their school at Osborne to be there trained up step by step, under 
strict discipline, as professional naval oflicers. During the most 
impressionable years of their lives, those boys are continuously 
breathing a naval atmosphere, becoming imbued with naval instincts 
and traditions, having their characters built up morally and 
intellectually, and their physique developed ; so that they are ready- 
made officers, in the fullest sense of the word, by the time they join 
their first ships. 

The excellent result of that training is proved by the universally 
acknowledged fact that British Naval oflicers are incomparable. It 
has been repeatedly proved by the past history of the nation, and 
it will be proved again and again whenever we are engaged in war. 

On the other hand, we see totally different methods pursued by 

the vacillating, unready War Office, that recognised plaything of 

Party politicians, which alters its rules and regulations almost as 

often as it changes the uniform of its officers, and to as little 

, purpose. 

A miscellaneous lot of lads of between seventeen and nineteen 


years of age, who have been subjected to no previous selection or 
medical test of any kind, most of whom have been specially 
''crammed" for the occasion, are collected at certain centres and 
are put through a long, difficult, and unpractical examination, which 
is not in any way a test of their fitness for a military career. The 
successful ones have then to go to London for a medical exami- 
nation, which could have been carried out with equal efficiency and 
with less inconvenience at the centres before the literary one ; and at 
which no test whatever of physical endurance, or stamina, or manly 
qualifications is applied. They then go to Woolwich or Sandhurst 
as the case may be, where for the first time they get any instruction 
in military subjects or any taste of discipline, and are put through a 
course for which they have not been previouly prepared, and which 
is erroneously supposed to fit them for the onerous and responsible 
duties of army life — which includes the command of men. It is only 
fair to state here that the course at Woolwich is a much more 
soldierly and more useful one than that at Sandhurst ; but even 
there the Cadets are not made to take off their coats and learn all 
about the making and the mechanism of modern artillery and 
engineering appliances, in a real practical manner calculated to 
make them efficient instructors of their men when they leave the 
academy. And further it may be added that the new practice of 
sending Cadets out into camp to attend and take part in military 
manoeuvres, is all nonsense, and a waste of valuable time. This 
innovation was introduced merely as a sop to satisfy a popular out- 
cry, and it has not acted beneficially in any way ; so the sooner it is 
put on one side, with all other shams, the better. 

Even on paper, the difference between the methods adopted in 
the sea and land Services is sufficiently striking to make one anxious 
to find out which is right and which is wrong — for they cannot both 
be right ; but when one comes to see the finished article, and to 
compare the naval officer of twenty years of age with the infantry 
or artillery subaltern of the same age, there is no longer any room 
for doubt that the naval system is the right one. It is, therefore, 
high time for the nation to inquire why the system, which is so 
obviously wrong, should not be discontinued at once. Now is the 
time to root out our antiquated and unmilitary system of miscalled 
military education, which is giving us such a mixed lot of unpre- 
pared officers, many of whom are not gentlemen by birth, and who 
are consequently not so desirable as those who are. It has been 
well said that the essential quality for a British officer is that he 
shall be a gentleman, and if any one wishes to learn the reasons for 
that, he will find them correctly given in the review of the life 
of that fine specimen of an officer and a gentleman, the late 


Prince Christian Victor, which was published in this Magazine for 
May, 1 9^3. 

It should be borne in mind that our much-vaunted system of 
officering the Army by means of open competition, was not 
introduced — even ostensibly — for the sole purpose of improving 
the military efficiency of our officers ; but for political reasons, that 
the Government of the day might gain a fictitious popularity by 
opening the commissioned ranks to all classes, and so democratising 
the Army. The Admiralty stood firm and declined to approve 
of such an uncalled-for change, which they wisely foresaw would act 
prejudicially on the whole force under their control, and the naval 
lieutenant is now — as indeed he always was — worth his weight in 

Lord Wulseley was the right-hand man of the Secretary of State 
at that time, and must have approved of the change ; but his 
Lordship*s subsequent condemnation of that, and other changes of 
the same date, which we find referred to in the issue of this 
Magazine for August 1900, shows how clearly that broad-minded 
solditr saw the evils resulting from such unwise legislation. Lord 
CardwelFs declared belief was that open competition would give us 
a body of officers devoted to their profession, caring for nothing 
else, industrious and frugal, and that the country would then, for 
the first time, get full value for the money spent He knew well 
that Germany was the first military nation in the world, and that 
the methods by which the highly-trained, devoted, and. aristocratic 
officers of that army were obtained, were exactly the opposite to 
those which our Government \\-as introducing on his recommenda- 
tion, but he cared rK>t Successive Governments have deliberately 
adhered to the upsetting rule then enforced, and we find ourselves 
to-day in the anomalous position of being a nation which is con- 
stantly engaged in >»-ar, and yet still unable or unwilling to adopt 
one uni\'ersal s}*stem for officering our sea. and land forcea 

It would be x'er)* difficult, if not impossible, for any one. to 
prox'e what advantages the country has gained during the past 
fortv-two years from the competitive s>-stem, which operates, not 
bv the selection of the best material, but by the rejection of the 
suwrtluous aspirants in excess of actual requirements. But we do 
know for certain that it has not given us a body of officers who are 
one whit more dcTOted to their profession, more frugal or more 
industrious than their predecessor ; we also know that a more ex- 
trAvajjant style of living has been introduced by the new-comers, 
which is not wwking for the good of the Army, and we further 
Ki\o\\\ what is much worse, that the physical standard of our officers 
htt}< l^ccn lowcnxl, as can be seen from the official returns of 


invalids during the war in South Africa, and that we have many 
now in the commissioned ranks who are neither liked nor respected 
by their men, and who ought not to be holding such positions. 

It is not necessary for the good of the Army that the officers 
should be men of means, but it is absolutely essential that they 
should be born gentlemen. 

As regards the literary qualifications of the boys who pass the 
severe but unpractical educational tests for commissions, there is 
not much to be said that was not known before. Lord Roberts 
quite recently referred, in an official report, to the reiterated com- 
plaints regarding the defective handwriting, and the want of know- 
ledge of grammar and English composition among the cadets, 
which he rightly attributed to the neglect of proper instruction at 
school. Then we have Sir Oliver Lodge, who is one of the leading 
educationists of the day, bringing an unanswerable indictment 
against English schools, beginning at the top, in which he correctly 
states that "The majority of the boys turned out of them are 
ignorant." That " they are not ashamed of their ignorance ; they 
are not usually even aware of it" And, lastly, we might easily be 
led to believe that very little practical importance is really attached 
to education by the War Office ; since, under the stress of the late 
war, a large number of aspirants were admitted into the Army 
without any educational test at all, many of whom were sons of 
gentlemen and had previously failed to pass the competitive 

We now have a strong-minded, intelligent and courageous War 
Minister, who is quite capable of bringing our military educational 
system into line with that which has succeeded so well with the 
Navy, if he can only find time to devote to it, and, if he once takes 
the matter in jiand, we may rest assured that he will not spare him- 
self until he has matured a scheme, under which the officering 
will be as good in the Army as it now is in the sister Service. 

But the first question to be asked is this : Does Mr. Arnold - 
Forster read the UNITED SERVICE Magazine ? * 

M. J. King- Harm AN. 

* It may, I think, safely be asserted that Mr. Arnold-Forster has read every article 
on naval or military organisation or administration, that has appeared in this Magazine 
during the past fifteen years. Bat I doubt whether there are a dozen other members of 
Parliament who ever consult any Service publication whatever. — £d« U. S. M. 

VOL. CL. 5 

[vol. zxix. new series.] 



By "Chancton." 

When a man enlists in His Majesty's Service, whether he becomes 
a cavalryman or an infantryman, he goes back, as it were, to the 
beginning of things, and whatever he may have known, or fancied 
he knew before his enlistment, becomes of no avail, and he has to 
be taught his new profession from its very beginning. If he has 
joined the infantry, he is at once put to drill on the "square," 
morning and afternoon, besides going to the regimental school, 
doing fatigues, and generally learning the business of soldiering. 
The cavalry recruit does all the above, and in addition goes to 
riding school, learns to groom and take care of a horse and saddle, 
besides being taught something, if only a very little, about the 
nature and simple ailments of the animal he attempts to ride. 
All this makes the recruit's day a pretty busy one, and there is 
not very much spare time in which to amuse himself after he has 
done his work and cleaned his kit for the morrow. But into the 
midst of all this teaching comes another and most important course 
of instruction. It is the recruit's course of gymnastics. This course 
lasts for three months — one might almost say, is scattered over 
three months — in lessons of one hour per diem when the recruit 
can be spared from his other multifarious duties. The lessons, in 
most stations, are held about eleven o'clock in the morning, a time 
when the recruit is probably beginning to feel somewhat tired, 
having been kept pretty well on the run since dawn. The instruc- 
tion is generally in the hands of qualified gymnastic instructors who 
have been through the long course of gymnastics, and who are 
consequently well-developed men and generally in hard condition. 

In the gymnasium the recruit is drilled more strictly than any- 
where else, riding-school not excepted, and is made to '*jump" to 
the word of command in a manner that is never dreamed of on the 
" square." He begins his gymnastic instruction by being taught 
how to stand properly, march properly, and " double " properly. 
Even in these simple exercises many, hitherto almost unused. 


muscles are brought into play, as the recruit finds out to his cost 
the next morning when he gets out of bed. He is stiff and sore 
in the thigh, calf, and instep, and continues to be so for some days 
till the muscles become harder and more accustomed to the 

For about a month his work in the gymnasium is confined to 
free gymnastics, which comprise exercises requiring no apparatus 
to work on except a boarded floor and an iron bar to pull up to. 

These exercises, to go more closely into the matter, are raising 
on the toes, bending and stretching the legs, bending and stretch- 
ing the arms, raising and lowering the legs (both lying on the 
floor and hanging on the iron bar), pulling to the breast on the 
iron bar with ordinary grip and hands reversed, pressing up from 
the floor, with straight back, on the hands and toes, hopping on 
either foot, the gymnastic march, and deep breathing. 

All these simple exercises set the recruit up, develop his muscles, 
broaden and deepen his frame, and make him hold himself up, and 
walk as if he were a man, instead of the rather round-shouldered, 
shambling individual he was when he enlisted. He is then, at the 
end of the first month, fit to go to recruit's exercises, very simple 
ones, on the parallel bars and the wooden horse, such as clearing 
the bars to the front and rear, pressing up between the bars, and 
jumping and vaulting the horse in various ways. 

All this is very good exercise — some might call it hard work, 
and not be very far from the truth in so doing — and of the best 
kind, as it develops the recruit equally all over his body, and gives 
no undue preference to any muscle or set of muscles which would 
tend to cramp him. 

Simple dumb-bell exercises are also used on the lines laid down 
by Sandow, the only fault with these being that the dumb-bells 
issued for use are far too small in the grip to be of any good. To 
work dumb-bells without gripping them tightly is quite useless, and 
no man with an ordinary-sized hand can get a good grip of the 
present dumb-bell issued for use in gymnasia. The inspector of 
gymnasia in India invented a dumb-bell some two years ago that 
combined lightness with a very good grip, composed of strong 
metal tubing with the ends splayed outwards at right-angles to 
the tube, the whole thing being about six inches long, and the 
thickness of the metal being regulated to make each bell about 
two pounds weight. 

But to return to the recruit, it seems to be a great objection 
that all this gymnastic training should come in the middle of his 
every-day task. To begin with, he has done half a day's work 
before going into the gymnasium, and is consequently not very 



fresh ; he goes out of the gymnasium rather tired and is at once 
pounced upon to finish grooming his horse, if he be a cavalryman, 
or to do " fatigues," etc., if he belong to the infantry. He is, then, 
in the afternoon taken on the " square " again, where he is drilled 
by the regimental drill sergeant, who- probably has ideas of his 
own as to training recruits, and who puts him through " extension 
motions " or perhaps "physical drill" in his jacket and belts, which 
hamper him considerably without doing him any good. Sometimes 
the coats and belts are taken off, but even then the man is in 
heavy trousers and thick boots, which hinder the free movement of 
the legs and body, which is so necessary. Added to which the 
different style of drill nxust confuse him a good deal. He is not 
asked to, nor is he expected to, move so smartly on the "square" 
as he is in the gymnasium, nor is the discipline so strict ; besides, 
the instructor, not going through the exercises himself with the 
men, is very apt to forget how tiring they are, and very often 
keeps the men at it longer than they should be, and in constrained 
positions. How often does one see, during the sword exercise, an 
instructor, having given the order to form, let us say, the second 
guard on the left, keeping the whole squad in this very constrained 
and awkward position, while he explains to some recruit how it 
should be done ? It stands to reason that this sort of thing must 
be bad for growing lads, as our recruits generally are, since it not 
only makes them sick of the work, but tends to unduly tire and 
cramp them. 

In the gymnasium the greatest care is taken not to over-tire 
any one, the principle being that work done when a man is tired 
does not do him good, but does do him harm. It only disheartens 
him — he cannot do it properly, and in endeavouring to so do it he 
may strain himself severely. 

Would it not be much better if all recruits were handed over to 
the gymnasium entirely for the first three months of their service, 
and were made to go through a really good course of gymnastics, 
beginning as has been described above, so as to strengthen and fill 
them out as well as to set them up and make men of them ? 

Then, having been more fully set up and developed than is 
possible at present, they would be quite fit to take their place at 
riding-school and foot-drill, as they would have been taught a 
certain amount of drill in the gymnasium, and would be much 
more fitted to bear arms and be taught to ride than they are now. 
There is nothing like a gymnasium for improving men's nerve 
and confidence in themselves, as they are brought on gently and 
allowed to " feel their feet," as it were, gradually, without in the 
smallest degree being allowed to shirk the work. 



Of course this would mean more gymnasia and more instructors 
all over England, and not only all over England but wherever 
British troops are stationed, but surely it would be worth doing. 
The extra expense entailed would not be very great, and the 
benefit to the men would be enormous. 

Besides, it would not delay the recruit in his training, as he 
would be the more fitted to receive instruction, and so get on 
quicker afterwards, from having had a thoroughly good grounding 
to start with. 

By "handing the recruit over to the gymnasium," it is meant 
that he should do perhaps three or four hours of gymnastics and 
drill in the gymnasium per diem, and then he would be at liberty 
to attend schools and lectures when he came away. But he should 
be set to do no other drill or fatigues of any sort, or even guards, 
during his first three months of service. 

This could the more easily be done if recruits were all enlisted 
at a specified time in the year, as perhaps may soon be brought 

Under the present system the recruit gets a little of this and 
a little of that under all sorts of instructors, all through the day, 
when his muscles are really not fitted to do the work, and he 
himself can hardly take in all the various forms of instruction, and 
understand them. 

Let the recruit go to the gymnasium for his first training, but 
let him be handled by instructors of his own branch of the Service. 
At present there are many more Infantry gymnastic instructors in 
the Service than there are of other arms, and rightly too, as the 
Infantry largely exceed in number the Cavalry and Artillery, but 
might not a due proportion of instructors to each arm be secured ? 
Men do not like being drilled by instructors who do not belong to 
their own branch of the Service. It may be asked why. The 
answer is that there is a big difference in the drill and customs 
of the different arms of the Service, and naturally men prefer to 
be brought up and drilled in the customs and drill to which they 
belong. As a very small instance of this, it may be pointed out 
that, in numbering off from the right, the Cavalry soldier is taught 
to turn his head smartly to the left on giving his number, and if 
he should chance to do this in the gymnasium when under an 
Infantry instructor, that instructor generally takes the keenest 
pleasure in checking him sharply, and in pointing out to him 
before the whole class, and with a good deal of sarcasm, that he 
is not there to show off any of his Cavalry tricks. And, vice versd, 
the Cavalry instructor is often heard to say, " You may do that in 
the Infantry, but you don't do it here." This is all very galling 


to the recruit, and might be very easily overcome by having 
instructors from all arms to teach their own men. They would 
also be necessary in order that the recruits should learn their own 
form of drill. 

The School of Musketry, Hythe, forms separate squads for 
the instruction of Cavalry and Infantry, though in that case the 
instructors themselves are all, or very nearly all. InfantrymeiL 

Surely it would cost no more to have separate squads of the 
different arms in the gymnasium than it does at present, and it 
would tend to promote keenness and emulation among the recruits 
composing those squads. If this system were to be carried out— 
viz. a three months' course of gymnastics on enlisting, without any 
other work, but schools and lectures for the recruit — and carried out 
under instructors belonging to his own branch of the Service, 
would not the recruit be more fit in all respects to join the ranks, 
and to receive the ordinary instruction which is his lot, than he is 
at present ? 

To hark back a bit ; surely the first task, not to say aim and 
object of the drill instructor, whether he belong to the gymnastic 
staff or not, is to make the recruit stand up and hold himself 
smartly ! 

Yet nearly, if not quite all, his efforts in this line are brought 
to nought by the present mode of "standing at ease." When 
bearing arms it is a most constrained and uncomfortable position, 
but when without arms it is much worse. Most animals when 
standing at rest slack the bock and stand in an easy position, but 
the soldier is made to plant his feet firmly about ten inches apart 
and stand with a straight leg and knees braced, which is a good 
deal more tiring and irksome than standing at '* attention." But 
when no arms are carried the soldier is made, in addition, to hold 
his hands behind his back, thereby forcing his shoulders forward, 
rounding his back, depressing his chest, and protruding his stomach. 
Let any one stand up stripped before the looking-glass, and standing 
sideways to it, first assume the position of " attention." Note the 
position of the shoulders and chest well, and then " stand at ease " 
as laid down in the drill book, with hands behind the back and feet 
apart. Mark how the point of the shoulders moves forward, the 
chest is depressed, the back rounds up like that of a drowned rat ! 
Let the experimenter stand thus for a few moments and see if a 
longing to throw his chest out, and his shoulders back, does not 
come over him I 

It will be said : " But if the man stands properly, as laid down, 
all this ought not to occur." The only answer is, " Try it" Read 
the instruction for " Standing at Ease," and try it. How long can 


any man keep the constrained position required by the drill book, 
and consider that he is standing at ease ? 

The old way of drawing back the right foot and of holding the 
hands in front of the body was a much easier and less constrained 
position, besides being much smarter in appearance.* 

Let the recruit work hard while he is at work, and give his 
whole attention to it ; but when he is told to " stand at ease/' let 
him be comfortable and easy. Let us give our recruits a more 
thorough and systematic gymnastic training (be it understood that 
trick-work is in no sense advocated), at the same time grounding 
them well in elementary drill and schooling, and Government will 
be well repaid when they become trained soldiers, which they 
would do with greater rapidity and thoroughness than they do at 
the present time. 

* The amusing or, perhaps more correctly, the melancholy feature of the reformed 
'* stand-at-ease," is that it was introduced by the gymnastic authorities themselves, and 
after some years of illicit existence within the precincts of the gymnasia only, was finally 
foisted upon the Service in general through the medium of Infantry Training, The 
portion is a decidedly uneasy as well as an unsightly one. — £d. U. S. M« 



By Lieut.-Colonel R. H. Carr-Ellison. 

There has recently been a good deal of interesting correspondence 
on this subject. Still, however, a few things remain to be said. 

The inducements offered to officers to improve their minds and 
enlarge the horizon of their thoughts and ideas are very inadequate 
and disappointing. The hard-working officer of small means has 
not sufficient inducement offered to him to give up time and money 
to follow out any particular line of study, or to go abroad to learn 
languages and see how things are done in other countries. No 
officer, except he have pretty certain hopes of a nomination, of a 
fair chance of success in the Staff College examination, thinks now 
of working for it or of incurring the expense of preparation. 

At present an officer can only enter the Staff College on com- 
pleting five years* service and before attaining the age of thirty-five. 
Under the existing system, the Staff College affords the only hope 
an officer has of showing his power and capabilities, and the only 
inducement to him to step out and free himself from the ranks of 
the "mental loafers." But, even though he should be fortunate 
enough to get into the Staff College, it may mean nothing unless 
fortune favour him with a Staff billet. To encourage young officers 
early in their career some opening might be given by allowing 
them, on completing three years' service, or reaching the age of 
twenty-three (and being duly recommended by their C.O.s), to go 
up for and qualify for the Staff College ; such qualification to be 
recognised as making them more eligible for billets as Adjutants, 
Intelligence Officers to Regiments, and minor Staff Appointments. 
And further, that half the marks above the number required to 
qualify should be carried forward and count in the competitive 
entrance examination for the Staff College which every officer might 
be eligible for, after six years' service, or at the age of twenty-six. 

Such a scheme would help to open the way for many a young 
soldier with a wish to improve his career, before his zeal became 


dulled by the humdrum of home soldieriog and stereotyped 

Interpreters, — Better inducements should be given to officers to 
qualify and keep up their knowledge of foreign languages, 
especially in Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Arabic, or Turkish. 
There might be some system of annual allowances to officers, 
varying in value, according to the standard of examination passed, 
and officers in receipt of such allowances should be liable to be 
called on to come up for examination as required, or if they wished 
to try to qualify for a higher rate of allowance. This would bring 
the system for the promotion of officers of the Army more into line 
with the latest Naval re-organisation scheme, where promotion so 
much depends on examination and merit. 

Promotion. — In spite of what many people feel about inter- 
regimental promotion interfering with esprit de corps, there is much 
to be said for it. If the liability to outside promotion was limited 
to officers on attaining captain's and field rank, and in the Cavalry 
to within the Corps into which regiments would be formed,, 
viz : — 

Dragoon Guards' Corps 7 Regiments 

Lancers' Corps 6 Regiments 

6 Regiments 

6 Regiments 

Dragoons' Corps 3 Regiments • 

Hussars, 12 5 '*' Corps ... 
( 2nd ,, 

the officers affected by this scheme of promotion would have 
reached a time in their career when the question had begun to force 
itself upon them as to whether they meant to stick to soldiering as 
a profession, or only to remain on in the Army until it suited them 
to retire. 

To induce the latter class to leave and make way for those who 
hoped to make soldiering their profession, some greater inducement 
should be held out to persuade them to leave on their becoming 
majors, or before attaining a certain age, and so help to form a 
large reserve of officers, which is so urgently required, besides un- 
blocking prom otion and conducing to general efficiency, by bring- 
ing younger men into the higher ranks. I cannot think that esprit 
de corps would be materially affected. The good soldier does his 
duty because he is a soldier. Such a man drops easily into the 
customs and feelings of a new Corps as he takes its uniform. 

In the Navy an officer is proud of the service to which he belongs. 

• For the last case the numbers should be brought up to six by raising three new 
Dragoon Regiments. They are badly wanted in our Army, ill-supplied as it is with 
mounted troops. 


He does not lose esprit de corps on account of a change of ship, 
though this is not altogether applicable to the Army. If a vacancy 
occurred in the field-rank of a regiment, when the senior captain 
had above the average service of the captains in the regiments of 
that Corps, then the step would naturally go in the regiment 
Expenses would be materially decreased by the scheme of Corps 
promotion — the necessary alterations in uniform would be but 
trifling compared with those necessitated by other changes, such as 
from Hussars to Lancers, etc Exchange should be encouraged 
within Corps. 

Regiments' Supply of Drafts. — The Corps organisation would 
also simplify much the supply of drafts to regiments abroad, and 
be more easily worked than the linking of regiments for the training 
and supply of trained men, which is also unsatisfactory to the com- 
manding officers of both regiments ; moreover, the linking system is 
very liable to total dislocation through any alteration in the tour of 
service. In the "Corps System" — all recruits enlisted for the 
Corps could be sent from recruiting centres in batches of the 
number required and su table for instruction to any one regiment 
of the Corps, and on reaching it posted to any one squadron, thus 
facilitating the instruction and training of recruits by ** batching " 

To go even further than this, a system of Corps dep6ts might 
work very well, and to a still further extent prove the advantage 
of " batching " recruits, thus saving labour, time, and instructors. 
Regiments at home and abroad would then be composed entirely 
of trained men only, and be fit for service at a moment's notice. 
Corps* depots would, I think, have the advantages, without many 
of the disadvantages, of the depot system now to be done away 
with, and of the linked regimental system. However, this is rather 
outside my subject, so I will not go further with this interesting and 
much-discussed question of regimental organisation, instruction, 
and supply of trained soldiers. 

Confidential Reports. — This is a question the difficulty and un- 
pleasantness of which, I know, is often felt by no one more keenly 
than by those who have to make the reports. Reports are, of 
course, a necessity. They must be confidential, but they need not 
be secret, which only surrounds them with doubt and suspicion. To 
decentralise, and to obviate the above disadvantages, I would 
suggest that squadron leaders should report on their officers below 
the rank of captain. These reports should be read over to the 
officer himself, in the presence of the commanding officer, the second 
in command, the squadron leader, and the Adjutant, and should 
be signed by these four officers and the officer himself. Captains 


and field officers should be reported on by the commanding officer 
and the second in command, the/eports being read over and signed 
by them and the officer himself. 

Training of Officers, — It is to be hoped that soon there may be 
at least one officer per squadron who has passed a course of riding 
at Canterbury, and so qualified, not necessarily to drill all the 
recruits of the squadron, as that should be done by the troop 
leaders, but to assist the squadron leader generally, especially in 
the equitation and. training of selected N.CO.'s and men as in- 
structors, and of "young horsemen," or horses requiring special 
•care and time in training. 

Later, when certain schemes have had time to produce their 
effect, every officer coming up for promotion to captain should be 
in possession of a riding certificate. Surely this is as important 
to a cavalry officer as the very necessary Hythe certificate and the 
rather ignored signalling certificate. 

If an officer joined the Army with the necessary certificates, as 
they do in Foreign Armies and in America, how much sounder 
that would be than his being withdrawn from his duties with his 
regiment at a later period of his service, in order to study subjects 
and gain certificates, which it should have been necessary for him 
to hold before taking his place as an officer competent to fulfil 
)his duties. 

Cadet School. — With this object it is hoped that before long a 
•Cadets' School will be formed at which young officers may be 
trained for a year after leaving Sandhurst, or passing from the 
Militia. Under this arrangement the Sandhurst College Training 
should be curtailed to one year, and devoted to languages and the 
usual educational subjects, as well as to military subjects — tactics, 
military law, topography, fortification, mobilisation, and organisa- 

The Cadet's school training should be on the same general 
lines for Cavalry and Infantry, the instruction suggested, such as 
musketry, pioneering, signalling, etc., being the same for both 
arms, and a knowledge of veterinary and mounted duties would 
not come amiss to Infantry officers, who, in our various small 
•campaigns, so often have to fulfil mounted Infantry and transport 
duties. The marks made on leaving Sandhurst to be added to 
those made at the examination on leaving the cadet school, and 
precedence given accordingly. Cadets, on being gazetted to their 
respective branches, to be antedated to time of leaving Sandhurst 
The school might even be universal, as in America ; Cadets joining 
from Woolwich would thus have the advantage of a general service 


The training together of young officers about to enter different 
arms of the Service would broaden their minds, and allow of what 
is at present unattainable, a free exchange of ideas and interests. 

All Cadets at the school should be in addition to the present 
numbers at Sandhurst, and supernumerary to the Army. 

One of the chief results obtainable from this alteration in the 
educational system of the Army would be the provision of a most 
needful reserve of young officers, who, in the event of hostilities or 
sudden requirements, could be at once posted to the dep6ts, 
Reserve squadrons, etc, of their respective branches. 

Pay, — The present system of paying the men and keeping 
accounts should be so simplified as to put the minimum of 
responsibility on the officer, whose whole time and attention is 
required for the training of his men. The system advocated is 
the only one which is really practicable on active service. The 
officer should be responsible only for paying out the money to the 
soldiers in the amounts settled by the Regimental Pay Office ; and 
the latter should be responsible for the list of payments due, and 
the keeping of all accounts. The N.C.O.'s, at present oppressed 
with a very complicated though lately somewhat simplified system 
of account keeping, would be free to carry out the many duties 
which fall to them. These duties on Active Service are full and 
sufficient for any man. 

So much for a few thoughts and suggestions on the subject of 
reform — in those things that more materially affect the individual 
officer. ^ But, above all, let us get clear of the old idea that all new 
ideas are innovations, and are to be treated with distrust To get 
the best officers we must encourage and foster by every means» 
individuality, freedom of thought, initiative, and action — and this in 
the end must tend to the increased efficiency of the Army. 

R. H. Carr-Ellisox, Lieut-Colonel. 



By "An Old Soldier." 

Before the assurance came from high authority that the Boer 
War was " virtually over," the civil section had been busy urging 
upon the Government the reorganisation of our military system. 
However much this may have been needed, it was hardly the time to 
do more than to organise into something like shape the material we 
had then available at home. But a new broom was demanded, 
and the Parliamentary ruler of our Army lost no time in taking 
the burden of this popular outcry on his shoulders. Perhaps if he 
had waited until the war was really over, and with more experience 
to guide him in weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the 
proposed change, he might not have so readily pledged himself to 
a scheme more or less forced upon him, when the public mind was 
agitated by a prolonged resistance, and could not or would not 
realise the difficulties that had to be surmounted before it could be 
brought to a complete and successful ending. 

The reason for this outcry was no doubt caused by several 
serious reverses ; everything had not gone so well with us as we 
had expected. For had we not sent to South Africa the flower of 
our Army, never better in discipline and equipment, and so many 
anxious to wipe out an old stain. Commanded by tried men ; who 
could beat that Army 1 Certainly not the Boers — ^such was the 
opinion of the country and of our military experts. 

The urgent need of adapting ourselves to meet a new condition 
of warfare was not apparently thought of. Only a few (and they 
were not considered worthy of attention), who knew from experience 
the subtle foe we had to deal with, would believe what an extremely 
mobile force, armed with a magazine small-bore rifle, in a country 
of vast extent could do. 

Our fighting organisation was not at fault. But we had to 
change our tactics to meet abnormal foes. A rough experience 
soon convinced us of this necessity, which should have been 
recognised from the beginning. It was a poor game to ask a 
man on foot to catch a man on a horse ; and it was late in the day 


before we were able to copy the mobility of our opponents. After 
a time of wearisome hunting and guerilla fighting, we at last 
subdued a very formidable foe. 

Subordinates cannot be blamed for mistakes made by those in 
authority. The bright side of the campaign is to be found in the 
bravery and endurance of our officers and men, the unimpaired 
morale of the troops after three years' arduous warfare, and the 
way our regimental system stood the great strain to which it was 
subjected. The British officer and soldier is good enough, the honour 
of the country could not be in safer hands ; no one is more ready 
ta learn, or to adapt himself to changing necessities of war ; only, 
he must be given the opportunity to train himself. If this is not 
given to him, he cannot be held responsible. Manoeuvres on a 
large scale are expensive, instructive only to a few, and can never 
be under war conditions ; they teach the rank and file nothing but 
what they could learn better in a few hours' campaigning. The 
generals and staff could equally well be taught their duties in a 
less expensive way. What is required, is ground always ready for 
the exercise of troops in the detail of fighting, and our regiments 
should have a full complement of serviceable men, so as to be 
something more than skeletons when required for active service. 

Men ignorant of the ways of modem war got hold of many 
'* regrettable incidents," as they were called, and these were made 
the most of. Under the influence of this clamour — it is hard to 
believe it could have been from any other cause — the order was 
promulgated to the world having reference to white flags and the 
Army Act — a general and most ungenerous imputation on a class 
of men whose courage was undeniable, and whose honour has 
never been questioned. Troops may get into positions, under 
present conditions, when to prolong the fight is useless ; all the 
bravery in the world won't save them ; they can be destroyed, but 
when the power to damage their opponents and the object of 
resistance is over, continuing is only a waste of life. Recent 
orders seem framed for the purpose of making an impression on 
the civilian mind. Every soldier knows the penalty of disobedience. 
Therefore why end with an unnecessary threat " of dismissal if not 
complied with ? " 

As science improves our fighting weapons, changes must take 
place, in formations and in many other ways, to meet them ; but 
such changes, too, do not necessitate a complete change of a 
system. Our cavalry, infantry, and artillery should be as perfect 
as they can be, and we should make every effort to keep our 
auxiliary forces in a state of ready preparation — not forgetting that 
they are voluntary, not compulsory soldiers. Far better to do this 


than to waste time in erecting a large and costly framework and 
making frivolous alterations. If each part of the machinery is right, 
it needs only putting together. All thoughtful men must allow, 
that of the lessons that have been taught us by the Boers, only a 
few can be applied to a European war. 

Appointments have had to be made for popular favourites, 
men whose names have been constantly before the public These, 
and a few fortunate War Office officials, were the first to benefit. 
Although some had no experience of war, they passed over men 
of long and varied ser\'ices, whose only fault was want of oppor- 
tunity. Work had to be done at home of the greatest importance, 
someone had to do it, and what greater privation to a soldier than 
to find this was his duty, and not with his comrades in the field ? 
To be a leader of a column or a force, which had a large superiority 
of numbers and armament over any adversary it could meet, re- 
quired keenness, energy, and power of command, but not necessarily 
a man of great military ability. The safety of numbers was very 
valuable to some at least. 

The mainspring of the Promotion Board was the Commander- 
in-Chief. He selected, the Board approved. If the Board had been 
conducted on the lines which are generally believed, viz. that each 
officer, taken in seniority, should have his claims carefully considered, 
before being passed over, the feeling of insecurity, which has no 
doubt existed, would not have been prevalent, and there would not 
have been so much diving into the depths to find suitable men. 

In the hope of giving a stimulus to recruiting, reins were 
loosened which before long must be tightened, and a great deal 
of the pomp and vanity of war, which is really so attractive to the 
soldier, has been struck out as a cause of irritation. Drill, steadi- 
ness, smartness bear considerably on esprit de corps. All these 
combine to make the groundwork of discipline and efficiency. 
When has this training failed us ? So deeply impressed were 
some of our leaders with Boer methods and Boer costumes, that 
" ceremonial " was to be considered a thing of the past ; it 
was said that it deadened a man's faculties and made him too 
much of a nonentity. Such faulty reasoning could not last long. 
Our premier military paper gauged the effect of a new regime at 
Aldershot by the appearance of the troops on the recent parade 
held there by his Majesty (trusting the writer will pardon the 
reproduction) : " To the expert eye . . . the first comment must be 
of unfeigned approval of the good work done by Sir John French 
since he assumed command, so plainly evidenced in the demeanour 
of the troops on the ground" (Army and Navy Gazette, July 11, 


A suitable climax to a campaign, carelessly entered into, having 
no general plan of action, but each commander fighting his own 
battle, ambitious to be the first to score, was the publication of the 
War Commission report. The world is so eager to see our faults ; 
it could not be supplied with sufficient copies. To collect in- 
formation for our future learning, it would have been good, but 
beyond that line it should not have gone. 

It has been very boldly stated " that there is no such thing as 
interest" A statement easily made and difficult to contradict, 
except by objectionable personalities. One thing, however, is as 
certain as that the sun sets, that unless a man has exceptional 
opportunities, he can rarely get on without it, in some form or 
other. It is only natural that as a man rises in his profession he 
should select those who have been with him in preference to others 
— who can blame him ? But so successful do some of thesQ^rot/g^/s 
become, that they make themselves believe that they have nothing 
to be thankful for — that their own abilities have only met with 
deserved recc^nition. It may be so ; but such is not the general 



By Commander Hon. Henry N. Shore, R.N. (retired). 

Is it not extraordinary that after the lapse of nearly one hundred 
years, and all the painstaking research that has been expended on 
the subject, there should still be uncertainty as to the actual scene 
— not only of the negotiations that led up to, but of the signing — 
of one of the most famous conventions in our military annals ? Of 
the fact, however, there can be no doubt The conflicting state- 
ments indeed that continue to find their way into print afford 
ample proof of the divergence of views which still exists on the 
subject In the latest edition of the ' Encyclopaedia Britannica/ 
for example, we read that " the Convention by which the French 
were allowed to leave Portugal unmolested was signed at Cintra, 
August 22, 1808." Whereas Sir Herbert Maxwell, in his recently 
published ' Life of the Duke of Wellington ' — a work which, 
one may reasonably suppose, would never have been offered to 
the public without a careful sifting of evidence and the most pains- 
taking verification of authorities — alludes to the famous Convention 
as " commonly, though erroneously, referred to as the Convention 
of Cintra.'* And he goes on to explain that "Byron, scorning 
topographical accuracy, depicted the imaginary scene of Britain's 
humiliation — the Palace of the Marchese Marialva, at Cintra,* 
although the treaty was really signed many miles from that place." 
But what does Byron actually say ? " The Convention of Cintra 
was signed in the Palace of the Marchese Marialva" is the note 
appended to the following well-known lines in 'Childe Harold's 
Pilgrimage ' : — 

" Behold the hall where chiefs were late convened I 
Oh \ dome displeasing unto British eyes I 

Convention is the dwarfish demon styled, 
That foil'd the knights in Marialva's dome : 

^ Any one who is interested in the historical associations of this once splendid Quinta 
will find many carious particulars in William Beckford*s 'Travels in Portugal,' 1787-94 
— ^a most fascinating book. 

▼OL.CL. 5 



Here folly dashed to earth the victor's plumes, 
And policy regained what arms had lost. 

And ever since that martial synod met, 
Britannia sickens, Cintra, at thy name ! " 

Now, it IS easy to sneer at Byron's contempt for " topographical 
accuracy ; " but it is certain that in the above lines the poet was 
merely giving expression to popular belief at the time of his visit 
(1809). And if he sinned in this respect, he sinned in good 
company. The Rev. W. Bradford, for example, who was " Chaplain 
of Brigade to the Expedition" during the years 1808-9, in a work 
entitled ' Sketches of the Country in Portugal and Spain,* tells us 
that "a Convention was concluded at Cintra between Sir Hew 
Dalrymple and General Junot, whereby the French were to be 
transported to the north of France in British ships." While, in a 
'History of the War,* published in 181 2, and compiled largely 
from materials supplied by officers on the spot, we learn that the 
Convention " was called, from the place of its conclusion, that of 

How, then, came doubts to arise on the subject ? Because Sir 
William Napier, in his ' History of War,' published many years 
subsequently, declared that "the armistice, the negotiations, the 
Convention, the execution of its provisions were commenced, con- 
ducted, concluded, at the distance of thirty miles from Cintra, with 
which place they had not the slightest Connection, political, military,, 
or local. Yet Lord Byron," he goes on to remark, " has sung that 
the Convention was signed in the Marquis c^f Marialva's house at 
Cintra ; and the author of * The Diary of an Invalid,' improving 
upon the poet's discovery, detected the stains of ink spilt by Junot ' 
upon the occasion." 

It would be natural to suppose that a writer who scoffed at 
Lord Byron's version of the affair, and laughed at Mathews' ' 
supposed discovery of Junot's ink-spots, was quite sure of his facts. 
But was Napier so 7 And is his own account of the transaction 
authoritative? Assuming, for the moment, that the Convention 
had no connection, " political, military, or local," with the place it 
has been called after, it may easily be shown that Napier's 
assertion as to its having been "commenced, conducted, and con- 
cluded at the distance of thirty miles from Cintra " is every whit 
as absurd as the statements he holds up to ridicule. It stands to 
reason that the Convention must have been commenced and con- 
cluded at one or other of the respective headquarters, or at some 
intermediate point between the two armies. Now, it so happened 
that the French headquarters, if not at Cintra, were at Lisbon, 


sixteen miles off; while the British were at Ramalhal, a distance 
not exceeding twenty miles from Cintra — if, indeed, they had not 
been advanced to Torres Vedras before the Convention was signed. 
So much for Napier's version of the affair. But he stultifies himself 
out of his own mouth ; as, for example, in another part of his 
history he informs us that the treaty was "finally concluded at 
Lisbon," sixteen miles off! In this matter, however, he is at direct 
issue with another, and equally celebrated writer. Southey, in 
his " History of the War," concerning which he tells us that " no 
history compiled by one who was not an actor in it has appeared 
with higher claims to authority," affirms that " the Convention was 
concluded and ratified by the British commander, not at Cintra, 
but at Torres Vedras." 

When great authorities differ, who shall agree ? 

In connection with Napier's ex-cathedral statements on the 
subject, it may be remarked that though he was not in Portugal at 
the time of the events which culminated in the Convention, he 
might easily have corrected his erroneous ideas concerning the 

To come back to more recent statements, we gather from 
' Haydn's Dictionary of Dates,' under " Cintra," that " Here was 
signed an agreement on 22nd August, 1808, between the French 
and English the day after the battle of Vimeira. As it contained 
the bases of the Convention, signed on 30th August following, it has 
been termed the Convention of Cintra ; " while one of the most 
popular and reliable 'Handbooks to Portugal,' in citing the 
Marialva Palace as the house wherein the Convention was signed, 
cautiously adds, " the fact, however, has been denied." The ' Times 
Gazetteer of the World,' moreover (1899), confirms the statement 
made in the 'Encyclopaedia Britannica' regarding the signing of 
the Convention of Cintra. While, oa the other hand, Mr. Oman, 
in vol. i. of his admirable ' History of the Peninsular War,* now in 
course of compilation, and which represents the latest opinion on 
the subject, tells us that " the Convention of Cintra, a designation 
which it is hard to understand, was first sketched at Torres Vedras, 
and was discussed and ratified at Lisbon. The only connection 
which it had with Cintra was that Dalrymple's despatch to the 
British Government enclosing the document in its latest form was 
dated from that pleasant spot." And he goes ori to explain that 
"the details were settled in Lisbon where Colonel Miirray^ took up 
his residence, sending back frequent reports to his superior' officer 
at Ramalhal." In confirmation of this statement may te adduced 
the fact that the Convention itself contained the following 
sentence: **Done and concluded at Lisbon this 30th day of 



August, 1808," to which was appended the signatures, "George 
Murray, Quarter-Master-General ; Kellerman, General de Division." 
As regards the position of the British headquarters, it may be 
of interest to note that they were removed to Ramalhal the day 
after the battle of Vimiera ; that on the 29th August Sir Hew 
Dalrymple established his headquarters at Torres Vedras ; and 
that on the 31st, at half-past seven in the morning, Lieut- Colonel 
Murray, with an aide-de-camp of General Kellerman, Captain 
Fanshawe, and Lord Fitzroy Somerset, arrived with the definite 
treaty. It was on the 2nd September that headquarters were 
established at Cintra. From that place, on the following day (3rd), 
Sir Hew Dalrymple penned his despatch giving a risumS of events 
since his landing, and enclosing a copy of the Convention which 
had been signed on the 30th August. 

In view of so many positive assertions, and equally emphatic 

denials, the scoffer might be tempted to exclaim, " A plague on 

your disputes : I don't believe there ever was a Convention of 

Cintra!" The controversy, in fact, reminds one of that famous 

one, in days gone by, which drew from Archbishop Whately his 

celebrated skit, entitled, 'Historic Doubts concerning Napoleon 

Bonaparte,' in which the author proved, on paper, that there 

never was, and never could have been, such a person as Napoleon. 

But how came it to pass — people may ask, and with good 

reason — that the celebrated Convention has been associated, these 

ninety years past, with a place it had no real connection with? 

And, furthermore, how are we to account for the circumstance of a 

certain well-known palace at Cintra being habitually shown as the 

scene of the concluding act of the drama, if, as Napier declares, 

the Convention was " commenced, conducted, and concluded at the 

distance of thirty miles from the place ? " Moreover,* how is the 

coincidence to be explained away that every person who visited 

Cintra subsequently to the conclusion of the treaty refers to the 

place as having been the actual scene of the signing ? 

I have already alluded to a ^History of the War,' published in 
1812, in which mention is made of the Convention ''called, from the 
place of its conclusion, that of Cintra," and in ' The Journal of a 
Regimental Officer,' published in 18 il, the author, describing a 
visit to Cintra in January 1809, within a few months of the signing 
of the treaty, mentions the Palace of the Prince Regent, latterly the 
country residence of Junot, as " the house where the Convention of 
Cintra was signed." General Cockbum, too, who visited Cintra in 
1 8 10, alludes to the signing of the Convention at the Marialva 
Palace as if it was a circumstance of common knowledge, and 
beyond dispute. And he tells us that he was shown the room, 


and even the spot," and mentions the ink-spots on the floor, 
which the Portuguese preserve and show." 

Now, surely the evidence of these writers, who had certainly no 
interest in inventing the story, carries as much weight as the state- 
ments of Napier and those who have followed his lead I What 
object, moreover, could the Portuguese have had in concocting the 
stoiy about the Marialva Palace and the ink-spots ? The legend 
would have been refuted and laughed to scorn by every British 
officer conversant with the facts, had no foundation existed for the 
story. Mathews was certainly not the first person to ''detect 
the stains of ink spilt by Junot upon the occasion," as asserted by 

Curiously enough, even the modem appellation of the building 
— Palace of Seteaies— has been connected, by rumour, with the 
Convention : " The name, I have been told," wrote a visitor in 1873, 
'* is also due to the signing of the Convention, of which, when the 
officers and soldiers who then filled the building were informed, 
they gave seven loud AiesI or hurrahs — not sharing, it would 
seem, in the vexation of Junot, and in commemoration of the event 
dubbed the mansion the Palace of the Seteaies." 

This much is certain, that Junot, following the example of 
every wealthy Portuguese fidalgo, would seek refuge from the 
summer heat of Lisbon amidst the shady groves of Cintra. It is 
equally certain, moreover, that he took up his abode in the best 
situated and most sumptuous of the Cintra quintas, whose owner,, 
curiously enough, was, at the time, a refugee in France, in conse- 
quence of his pro-French sympathies. And, as the Convention was 
negotiated during the hottest season of the year, what more natural 
than that the negotiations should have been conducted, in part, if 
not concluded, at Junot's summer Palace ? 

It is impossible for the present generation to realise the storm 
of disapproval with which the news of the Convention of Cintra 
was received throughout the United Kingdom. All echoes, how- 
ever, of that storm have long since died away, and now, to the. 
majority of Britons, the very raison ditre of the Convention is 
unknown. I shall venture, therefore, by way of enlightening them, 
to quote the most terse summing-up of the proceedings that has 
ever been offered to the public It is from the pen of Sir Richard 
Henegan, head of the Field Train Department of the Army, under 
Lord Wellington : — 

" No sooner had the force under Sir Arthur Wellesley left the 
Cove of Cork, than it was wisely remembered that only a Major- 
General had been placed in command, and that nothing short of 
the dignity of a Lieut-General could uphold the honour of the 


British name. Who was nearest at hand ? * Sir Harry Burrard. 
That Lieut-General was accordingly forthwith despatched to 
supersede the Major-General ; but this was not all. Scarcely had 
he set sail for his destination, when it was remembered that there 
was a senior Lieut-General to Sir Harry Burrard, and one, therefore, 
still better qualified to take the command. In consequence, 
another vessel was despatched to carry off from his governorship at 
Gibraltar this senior Lieut-General, Sir Hew Dalrymple, and 
land him on the coast of Portugal But here fortune did for 
England what her own wise rulers did not, and wafting Major- 
General Sir Arthur Wellesley first on shore, gave him an oppor- 
tunity of giving Marshal Junot a sound thrashing before the arrival 
of the two Lieut-Generals. 

"Sir Harry Burrard was the next to land. The action was 
nearly over, and as the smoke cleared off, the optics of the Lieut- 
General could discern the French running away, and the Major- 
General pressing on the pursuit But here the Lieut-General, 
assuming his authority, called out : * Halt, Major-General I I have 
in my pocket the warrant which gives me the command over you, 
^nd as I have scarcely recovered from sea-sickness, the men may 
rest until to-morrow.' Before the morrow came, the arrival of the 
senior Lieut-General had completed the trio of Commanders-in- 
Chief, and Sir Hew Dalrymple thus swallowing up the dignity of 
Sir Harry Burrard, as he had previously swallowed up that of 
Major-General Wellesley, the troops were ordered into inactivity, 
until new surveys of the ground and fresh information had 
enlightened the mind of the latest arrived Commander-in-Chie£ 

" Hence the Convention of Cintra ! " 

Henry N. Shore. 

- - - 

* Sec review of * The Diary of Sir John Moore,* p. 96 of this Magaane.--ED. U.S.M. 

By Major W. H. Chawner, 2nd Essex Regiment. 

A DISTINGUISHED regiment of the British Army bears on its 
colours the battle honour " Moro." 

This honour might with equal reason be granted to many 
another corps, yet there are British subjects ignorant of the brilliant 
military success which this word should recall — ignorant even 
whether the word " Moro " stands for town, fortress, or river. 

Indeed, a query on the subject usually elicits the reply from 
soldier or civilian — " A Peninsula battle." I venture therefore to 
offer the following short account to the readers of the United 
Service Magazink Moro or Morro, a fort guarding the entrance 
to the harbour of Havannah, was captured by the British from the 
Spaniards in the middle of the eighteenth century, and if the 
event does not rank with one of the " fifteen decisive battles of 
the world " it was a " heavy blow and great discouragement " to 
half Europe, and decided not a little old England's place amongst 
the nations. 

In 1761, three of the thrones of Europe, viz. those of France, 
Spain, and Naples, were occupied by members of the Bourbon 
family. They all cordially hated England, and made the secret 
treaty against her known as the " Family Compact." 

William Pitt was then Prime Minister, and learning of this 
treaty, advised King George III. not to wait till England's enemies 
declared war against her, but to strike the first blow by seizing 
Havannah and other valuable Spanish Colonies. Unfortunately, 
however, the young king was entirely under the influence of the 
Earl of Bute, his former tutor, who persuaded him to disregard 
the great statesman's advice. Pitt forthwith resigned, and Bute 
took his place. Three months afterwards Spain declared war 
(7th January, 1762), as Pitt had foreseen, and in March a powerful 
British armament was bearing down on Havannah. 

This city " was the key of the Gulf of Mexico and centre of 
Spanish trade. The appearance of the city at the entrance of the 
port is one of the most picturesque and beautiful in equatorial 
America. The strong fortifications that crown the rocks on the 


east side, the noble internal basin, where more than looo shipt 
might anchor, sheltered from every wind, the majesty of the groves, 
of palms which there grow to a vast height ; the city itself with its\^ 
white houses, all of the Saracenic and Gothic style, with quaintj 
galleries and deep red roofs, the pillars and pinnacles, towers and- 
domes, half seen and half hidden amidst the forest of masts and 
sails, seen under a clear and burning sun, all conspire to present a 
most imposing tout ensemble^ * 

This magnificent harbour was defended on the west by Fort 
Funtal, and on the east by Fort Moro, and the entrance was closed 
by sunken ships and a boom, behind which twenty Spanish men- 
of-war were anchored. Fort Funtal was connected with the town 
of Havannah, which itself was defended by a strong rampart and 
ditch seventy feet deep. Fort Moro had also a formidable ditch 
cut in the solid rock. 


To attack this fortress, defended by 13,500 Spaniards and the: 
same number of island militia, a British expedition, under Lord 
Albemarle and Admiral Pocock, sailed from Portsmouth on the 
6th March, 1762, with the following troops on board : 22nd, 34th, 
56th, and 72nd Regiments of the line, and two companies of J r 
" Protestant prisoners." On the way, this force was increased by 
troops picked up at Martinique, and by 200 negroes from Jamaica, 
and the expedition was now composed of 200 sail and 11,000 
soldiers, representing 22 regiments of the line.t 

This, the most formidable armament ever collected under British 
flag, reached its destination on the 5th June without mishap, thanks 
to the splendid seamanship of Admiral Pocock and his subordinates, 
who had to conduct a portion of it through 600 miles of narrow and 
dangerous navigation in the straits of Bahama.^ 

The troops were landed six miles east of Fort Moro, between 
two rivers, and were divided into two corps, of which the larger 
was to act against the fort, and the other was to cover the besiegers 
from the city of Havannah. 

It has been suggested with some reason that the main object < 
of the expedition, viz. the capture of Havannah, would have been 
more quickly effected by attacking the city itself, of which the ^ 
defences are very weak. ! 

It seems, however, that Lord Albemarle feared to direct his 
efforts against the city without first reducing the powerful fort 

* Cassell's < British Battles on Land and Sea.' \^ 

t Lord Albemarle's instructions authorised him to obtain 4000 additional troops from 

General Amherst's command in America, but these could not after all be spared. 

X There was an alternative and easier route, but the one chosen secured the only 

passage by which the French could send supplies to their allies. 




on the east, garrisoned as it was by the flower of the Spanish 
troops. The operations commenced, therefore, by a bombardment of 
Fort Moro. Three men-of-war took part in this, but at once came 
under such a hot cross-fire from Fort Puntal on the west side of the 
harbour that nothing more was attempted in that direction, and 
the rest of the operations were left to the troops. 

The chief obstacles to the besiegers were : First, the rocky 
nature of the soil, which made the process of sapping up to the 
work most laborious, and gave no means of filling sand-bags. 
Secondly, the dense woods through which the necessary roads and 
approaches had to be cut Thirdly, the scarcity of drinking water» 
all of which had to come from the ships* Soldiers and sailors vied 
with each other to meet these difHculties, and the operations appear 
to have been conducted throughout with great enei^y and ability. 

In a few weeks the roads were finished and formidable batteries 
erected, the sand-bags for these and for the saps being filled from 
the cotton cargoes of passing merchantmen bound for England. 

For some time the great depth of the ditch round the fort 
baffled all efforts of the miners to attack the parapet, but at length 
a way across was found in a narrow ridge of rock left to flank the 
ditch. On the 20th July a lodgment was effected in the covered 
way exposing the parapet itself to the attacks of the engineers. 
Success seemed certain, and the hopes of all ran high. So severe, 
however, was the labour entailed, and so hot and enervating the 
climate, that the besiegers had now no less than 5000 soldiers and 
3000 seamen temporarily Iiors de combat^ whilst many brave fellows 
actually died from fatigue. At this crisis the principal battery, 
which had taken 500 men seventeen days to erect, was set on fire 
and destroyed by the hostile artillery. It had been placed un- 
necessarily close to the fort, and the mistake probably added three 
weeks to the length of the siege. 

'* The hearts of the most sanguine began to sink when they 
beheld our Army wasting away, and remembered that the fleet 
anchored upon the open shore must be exposed to certain 
destruction if the West Indian hurricanes came on before Havannah 
was reduced." * 

Now was the time for the enemy to strike, and in truth he was 
not slow to seize the occasion. On the 21st July, 1500 island 
militia and negroes dashed out from the city to succour the fort. 
They were at once met by four companies of the ist Royal Scots> 
who were afterwards assisted by several other battalions ably 
brought up at critical moments by Colonel Carleton, brigadier- 

* Casseirs ' British Battles on Land and Sea.' 


general of the day. After a sharp encounter the enemy were driven 
back with a loss of 400 killed, wounded, or prisoners. Numbers of 
them were drowned in the harbour across which they attempted to 
escape. Our own loss was only fifty kors de combat. 

The success of this sally would have been equivalent to raising 
the siege, for the enemy would undoubtedly have destroyed our 
batteries. As it was, little progress could be made without rein- 
forcements. Yet the situation admitted of no delay, as has already 
been shown. To have awaited troops from home, in those days 
of slow communication, would have sealed the fate of the expedi- 
tion. Happily, Great Britain could already muster soldiers from 
many parts of the world, and was undisputed mistress of the seas. 
The heavy losses in men were made up by reinforcements from 
New York, which infused new life into the besiegers ; provisions were 
poured in from Jamaica, and the siege went on without interruption. 

The ruined battery was replaced by another at a more respectful 
distance from the fort, which, however, it could command as 
effectively as the first. The grip on the covered way had never 
been relaxed, and now miners began to attack the parapet 

On the 30th, at i p.m., several mines were sprung, and a breach 
was made which was deemed practicable, though it only allowed the 
attackers to pass two men abreast 

The storming party was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Stewart, 
9Cth Regiment, and consisted of detachments of the ist Royal 
Scots, the " Regiment of Marksmen," * and the 90th Regiment, with 
a support from the 35th Regiment. 

A forlorn hope, led by Lieutenant Charles Forbes, ist Royal 
Scots, mounted the breach amidst a storm of musketry, and after a 
sharp conflict swept the ramparts from end to end. Yet the assault 
was gallantly withstood by the Spanish commander, Don Louis de 
Velasco, and his brave garrison, who resisted to the last, and until 
their leader and his second in command had both fallen, mortally 
wounded. Then, having lost 150 shot or bayoneted, 400 threw 
down their arms, and the rest, trying to escape to Havannah in 
boats or by swimming, were all killed or drowned. 

Our own loss was 2 officers and 30 men. 

Don Louis' gallant defence was fully recognised by his sovereign, 
who created his son Viscount Morro, and ordered that in future 
the Spanish Navy should always possess a ship called " Velasco." 

As soon as the people in the city saw the fort had fallen, they 
turned their guns against it ; but in six hours they were silenced 

* The writer has up to now been unable to find any particulars as to the composition 
of this corps or of that of the Protestant prisoners previously noticed. He would be glad 
of any information on the subject. 


by the tremendous answeriog cannonade, and Havaonah, with its 
wealth, its forts and harbour, was ours. 

The treasure was at once shipped off to London, where, " pre- 
ceded by a troop of h'ght horse, with kettle-drums beating and 
French horns and trumpets sounding, in eleven waggons, surmounted 
by the Union Jack having the Spanish flag beneath, the captured 
gold and silver was conveyed through the streets of London, and 
carried to the Tower with great parade. Each waggon was escorted 
by four marines, with bayonets fixed, and the procession was 
concluded by a mounted officer carrying the British flag.'* * 

This disaster to the Spaniards was greatly due to their incredible 
Diligence in not preparing the place for defence, though they had 
a month's warning. They had hardly any shot to fit their cannon 
or cartridges for their muskets. Their fleet was retained at anchor 
in the harbour instead of going out to fight 

The foregoing is a slight and imperfect account of one of the 
most important operations ever undertaken by the British nation. 

Strange that to the majority of our countrymen it is almost 
unknown ! Modern history books- either do not notice it at all or 
dismiss it with a few lines. Yet by this brilliant feat of arms thirteen 
Spanish men-of-war fell into our hands, seventeen were burnt, and 
booty to the value of ^^3,000,000 was realised-f 

I cannot better conclude than by the following quotations, 
which show the value once placed on the capture of Havannah : — 

" It was a military achievement of the highest class. By its 
effect on the enemy's marine it was equal to the greatest naval 
victory, and in the plunder it equalled the produce of a national 
subsidy. The conquest of Havannah was perhaps the greatest blow 
ever struck by any nation. With it Spain lost her principal fortress, 
the West Indies and a large fleet." 

"The occupation of Havannah gave us the absolute command 
of the passage pursued by the Plate fleets of Spain, and seemed 
to lay the wealth and glory of that Empire at our feet." 

Hampden Chawner. 

* Cassell's < British Battles on Land and Sea.' 

t The seamen's and privates' share of the batta paid out of this only amounted to 
j£'4 each. This is said to have caused great discontent, and to have had a serious eflfect on 
recruiting, especially as regards the Navy. 

Note — For the materials of this paper the following works, etc., have been consulted : 
Bcatson's ' MUitary Memorials,' Hume's * History of England,' Russell's « History of 
Europe,* ' Pictorial History of England,' * Secret Instructions to Lord Albemarle,' 
dated 15th February, 1762, and Lord Albemarle's « Despatches.' The writer has also to 
acknowledge the courtesy of Messrs. Cassell & Co. in allowing him to draw largely on 
their interesting and popular ' British Battles on Land and Sea,' by James Grant. 



According to the Dangers Armee Zeitung the parties of the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, represented at the Reichsrat at 
Vienna, are responsible for the recruiting of 254 infantry battalions, 
24 cavalry regiments, 8 field artillery brigades, i mountain artillery 
division, 14 fortress artillery battalions, 9 pioneer battalions, and 9 
transport divisions. 

Those represented at the Buda Pesth Parliament are responsible 
for the recruiting of 196 infantry battalions, 18 cavalry regiments, 
6 field artillery brigades, 4 fortress artillery battalions, 6 pioneer 
battalions, and 6 transport divisions. The railway and telegraph 
regiments are recruited from the entire monarchy. As a general 
rule, then, 55 per cent, of the men raised each year come from the 
Austrian, and 45 per cent from the Hungarian provinces. 

The Navy and the XVth Army Corps (in occupation of Bosnia, 
and Herzegovina) are not included in these calculations. 


There will be no autumn manoeuvres held in Belgium this year. 
There will only be brigade and divisional manoeuvres in the 
manoeuvre camps, as well as mobilisation and cadre manoeuvres in 
the fortified towns, Antwerp, Namur, and LUttich. 


The Belgique Miliiaire announces that the War Department 
has just published the new organisation of the field forces of the 
Belgian Army according to the recent military regulations. The 
chief changes have been made with regard to the composition of 
the division, which consists, in addition to i reserve infantry 
brigade, of 2 regiments of 2 battalions each and of a divisional 
squadron of gendarmerie ; a decrease in its composition has been 
made of 2 cavalry squadrons and of a provision column. The 
cavalry divisions are composed of 4 regiments of 5 squadrons. 
The second provision column is done away with. An infantry 
company has no longer any waggons ; each battalion, in addition 
to its provision waggon, has two ammunition waggons and baggage 
van. Cyclists are attached to each staff, including those of 
battalions and detachments. 


The death of Field-Marshal Count Alfred von Waldersee^ 
which took place on the 5th March last, is a serious loss to the 
German Army, in whose service he had spent 54 strenuous years. 
The late Field-Marshal, who was the son of the former cavalry 


General, was born at Potsdam on the 8th April, 1832, and was 
p^iven his commission in the Guard Artillery Regiment in 1850. 
He served through the Austro-Prussian and Franco-German 
campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71 with great distinction. He held 
many important commands, and succeeded Field-Marshal Count 
von Moltke as Chief of the Great General Stall on the retirement 
of that famous soldier. In 1900 Count von Waldersee was ap- 
pointed to the chief command of the European troops sent to the 
Far East, on the occasion of the Boxer insurrection in China, and 
was nominated Field-Marshal by the German Emperor prior to 
his departure. His command lasted from the 27th September, 
1900, to the 4th June, 1901, and was, owing to his personal qualities, 
exercised to general satisfaction, in spite of the difficulties of the 
situation, and of international susceptibilities. 


The instructions with regard to the German Grand Manoeuvres 
have been recently published. The so-called Imperial Manoeuvres 
will be carried out by the IXth and the Guards Army Corps, the 
two opposing army corps having a precisely similar composition ; 
both will consist of 3 divisions, with a balloon park and machine- 
gun sections. The operations will take place in the Southern 
Mecklembourg district. 

Three provisionally constituted cavalry divisions will carry out 
special manoeuvres in the camps of instruction at Alten-Grabow, 
Miinster, and Senne. The Ilird, Vllth, and XlXth Army Corps 
will execute attacks on fortified positions, all three employing 
heavy field guns. The Vllth (Munster) Army Corps will, through- 
out the operations, carry out firing under service conditions. 
Lai^ge pontooning operations will take place on the Oder at 
Custrin, and on the Rhine at Neu-Brisach. Finally, it should be 
noted that special manoeuvres will be held, in which the various 
transport battalions will take part, bearing on the composition of 
administrative convoys on a war-footing, and on the organisation, 
command, and supervision of convoys in time of war. 


The composition of the German Infantry is as follows: 175 
raiments of 3 battalions, 41 regiments of 2 battalions, 18 Jaeger 
battalions; total 625 battalions. It has in addition 15 machine- 
gun detachments attached to Infantry or Jaeger battalions. The 
budget for 1904-5 provides for the formation of a i6th machine* 
gun detachment Not including doctors, paymasters, and one- 
year volunteers, the budgetary effective of the German Infantry 
amounts to 12,521 officers, 45,707 non-commissioned officers (all 
re-engaged men), and 334,302 men. 


The Kolnische Zeitung says that the completion of five ships of 
the Wittelsback type strikingly demonstrate the great energy of 
the German naval dockyards, and proves how enormously those 
establishments have developed. Each of these vessels was built 
in three years, whilst smaller ones, of the Kaiser type, took four 


years from the time they were first placed on the stocks to their 
being put in commission. Battleships built a quarter of a century 
ago, of inferior displacement and tonnage to those of the WitUls* 
bach class, took eight years to build. Thus the Baden was com- 
menced in 1876 and completed in 1884; for the Bayern the dates 
were respectively 1874 and 1882, and for the Wurtemberg, 1876 
and 188 1. 


From the ist January of this year the Japanese Army has 
entirely re-organised its administrative personnel on a new basis. 
Whilst there formerly existed two separate corps, viz. officials of 
the Army Service Corps and Administration officers, there is now 
only one. The two corps which formerly existed have been dis- 
banded and merged into one. 

At the head of the Administrative Services is a general officer 
of the army, on the active list, with the rank of lieutenant-general, 
with officers of various ranks under him, and with non-commissioned 
officers and officials to assist the officers in their secretarial work. 
All the administrative personnel wear a grey stripe down their 
trousers and a grey band round their headdress as a distinctive 

Formerly, Army Service Corps officers were recruited from 
captains and lieutenants of all branches of the Service, and from a 
certain number of officers from the Administrative branch, who 
went through a course at the School of Administration. The 
officers of the Administration, on the other hand, were recruited from 
non-commissioned officers of all branches of the Service who had 
first been through a special course at the School of Administration. 
In future, candidates for the new corps will be taken from non- 
commissioned officers of all branches of the Service who have 
completed a course of secondary instruction, from one-year 
volunteers recommended by corps commanders, and from non- 
commissioned officers of the Administrative Services. The three 
lists of candidates will go through the same examination for fitness: 
Those successfully passing will first receive nine months' training 
with corps, and will then go through a two years' course at the 
School of Administration before appointment. 


The recruiting statistics of the Netherlands Army for 1902 are 
as follows — 

The number of young men who reached the age for military 
service amounted to 49,194, who were thus classified : — 

ITnfif ^tvr c^rvir#» ftOO SilOrt ••• ••• ... ... ... ••• ... O^O 

\on account of infirmities 4j55o 

T?^^^,^¥ f^^^ ^^^r:^^ /^s only sons 5t052 

Exempt from service |^^ ^^^^^^^ of brothers* services io;954 

Not permitted to serve (convicts, etc.) 68 

Deceased between period of drawing lots and enrolment 28 

Enrolled (508 in the Navy) 10,961 

Young men who benefited from the drawing of lots 16,931 

Total 49,194 



The Spanish contingent, which was enrolled on the ist March 
last, amounted to 48,000 men. In conformity, with the provisional 
measures of the regulations of the 25 th December, 1899, which 
raised the age for military service from 19 to 21 years, this 
contingent consists : first, of 24.000 men of the 1903 class, or 
two-fifths of the active contingent ; second, of 24,000 men of the 
1902 class, or two*fifths of this contingent, who were not enrolled 
last year. The remaining two-fifths, or 36,000 men, will be called 
out with the 1904 contingent. 

The budgetary effective for 1904 has been fixed at 83,000 men, 
an increase of 3000 men on that of 1903. 



Edited by Major^General Sir J. F. Maurice, K.C.B. With Portrait and Maps. 
In two volumes. London : Edward Arnold, publisher to H.M. India 
Office. 1904. Price 30J. 

All that a good advocate, pleading a manifestly just cause, can 
do for a maligned reputation, Sir Frederick Maurice has done for 
Sir John Moore ; and as it is now clear that a large majority of 
the jury — ^the reading public — is favourably disposed, the desired 
vindication is assured. *• Greatness in the eyes of contemporaries 
is measured by success ; posterity sometimes pays due homage to 
merit." Thus it has been written ; and the aphorism is peculiarly 
applicable to the case of Sir John Moore, whose career until the 
Gorunna campaign had been attended by an increasing and well- 
earned confidence in his consummate ability, shared alike by his 
superiors, his subordinates, and the bulk of his countrymen. Then 
came the occasion when failure to accomplish the impossible was 
laid to the charge of the great man who had done his best, and in 
so doing had actually ejected all that was in the circumstances 
practicable. By his daring enterprise, Moore had attracted 
against himself a concentration of the vastly superior forces of the 
enemy, and thereby afforded to the Spaniards the breathing-time 
which they so terribly needed for the reorganisation of their 
shattered powers of resistance. 

An incompetent Government, inattentive to the counsels of 
experts, and in this case relying upon the fatuous advice of a 
credulous and foolish politician, Mr. Frere, determined upon an 


expedition already foredoomed to extreme danger of wholesale 
disaster. The genius of the General to whom the actual opera- 
tions were entrusted indeed saved the British Army from destruc- 
tion, and achieved results of the highest importance ; but the 
childish optimism of the Cabinet having at the same time been 
rudely shattered, an unworthy attempt was only too successfully 
made to fasten upon the shoulders of the dead hero the blame that 
belonged to those for whose folly he had paid the penalty with his 
life. Canning, to his lasting shame; desired to make the con- 
demnation official, and his overtures to Lord Castlereagh upon 
this subject brought about the famous duel. Castlereagh had not 
behaved well to Moore, and he was not an immaculate person ; 
but such meanness revolted him, and his resentment of the 
suggestion does him credit Canning and others had, however, 
done their slanderous work only too well. The true facts were 
obscured, and Moore became a scapegoat, just as the erring yet 
by no means incompetent War Office has recently been sacrificed 
for the sins of the present Government. 

That Sir John Moore, had he been spared and permitted to 
conduct the Peninsular War, would probably have achieved all 
and more than was accomplished by Wellington, has long been 
the opinion of many ; but until now there has bcrcn no opportunity 
of seeing events through the eyes of Moore himself; and however 
decidedly the real greatness of the man may previously have im- 
pressed itself upon his admirers, the effect of reading his diary, 
together with the masterly comments of Sir Frederick Maurice, 
cannot fail to confirm the original conviction upon a doubly sure 
foundation. If Moore had a fault, it was that he was no politician. 
He was too honest for his day, and that which he conceived to be 
best in the interests of his country, that he invariably advocated 
quite regardless of himself. Yet even upon his own behalf he could 
speak his mind, as Lord Castlereagh had reason to know after the 
abortive expedition to Sweden, and when the imbecile jealousy 
agamst Moore caused the Government to appoint Sir Hew 
Dalrymple and Sir Henry Burrard to the command of the force 
despatched to Portugal. That Wellesley would have served 
loyally under Moore, and that these two great men understood 
each other is now happily established. With Moore in command, 
there would have been no Convention of Cintra, the victory of 

™n!? "^""ft ^^""^ ^^^"^ io\\o^sft^. up, and the unconditional 
surrender of Junot would have resulted. Yet Moore, chivalrous 

Rnrrof^^^'^^f^i "" ^'^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ excuses fof Dalrymple and 
Sn Jh i ^^^^J^,jarit of incapacity as he indeed was, Moore never 

reion. " fio^ ,^" • '^,^^'^ ^^ ^^^ existence of any « military 
we^eToth n^^^^^ ^l^^^^^ ^^ P^^^^^d- I^aliymple and Burrard 

the rd?s sudd^^^ ^f ^^^"g^ compelled to take 

ne?thS?niti^^^^^ '"^ ^^^ ~"^"^^ ^f operations that they had 
SX ¥h^^^^^^^^ participated in-always an occasion of obvious 


must now suffice to recall the fact already known, that the corps 
which were well disciplined, and which moreover fought continual 
rear-guard actions, lost far fewer men than the others — the latter 
were, unfortunately, the majority. The march was an undeniably 
severe one, but it was under the circumstances inevitably so ; 
and actually, as the figures prove, it was not severe beyond the 
limits that good troops could endure without demoralisation. 
That the majority were not good troops was no fault of Moore's. 
The Light Brigade has furnished a lasting monument to the 
practical abilities of its talented instructor ; so that to impugn his 
capacity to train troops is beyond the power of even his most 
prejudiced detractors. The pity is that Sir Frederick Maurice 
has, to his infinite regret, been unable to procure any evidence 
relating to the system followed by Moore at Shorncliflfe when 
building up the incomparable efficiency of the 43rd, 52nd and 
Rifle Brigade. 

Space prevents any attempt to describe the earlier events of 
Sir John Moore's career, or to refer to his boyhood. From first 
to last, from the day when his skill and courage, as a subaltern in 
command of a picquet of twenty men in the American War of 
Independence, saved the day at Penobscot, to later times when he 
was the right hand man of Dundas and Abercromby or encountered 
the unprovoked jealousy and animosity of the foolish Sir Gilbert 
Elliott in Corsica, the genius for war and commanding personality 
of the man never failed to manifest themselves. A " born soldier," 
he let no opportunity slip, and spared no pains to still further 
improve himself by brilliant service and careful study. The story 
of this great leader of men, as it has now been presented to us, is 
of absorbing interest ; a nobler subject for a biographer could 
hardly be found, nor a biographer who could have proved himself 
more thoroughly fit for the task. Had not Sir Frederick Maurice 
already won bis spurs upon the field of literature, the admirable 
manner in which he has put together and explained the career of 
Sir John Moore would have itself sufficed to establish his reputa- 
tion. Every soldier and every thoughtful Englishman should read 
this book and learn for himself how Moore has been misunderstood 
and misrepresented. 


Prepared in the Historical Section of the Great 

General Staff, Berlin. 

Authorised translation by Colonel W. H. H. Waters, R.A., C.V.O., late 
Military Attach^ to His Majesty's Embassy at Berlin. With Maps and 
Illustrations. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W. 1904. 
Price 1 5 J. 

The scope of the present narrative is confined to the period com- 
mencing with the events immediately connected with the outbreak 




of hostilities and ending with the surrender of Cronje. There is 
no attempt to follow the operations as a whole, but the leading and 
especially important incidents are described and criticised in order 
to procure from them the greatest possible number of lessons. It 
is indeed true that in the majority of cases we have learned, from 
the Boer War, what not to do^ or how not to do it, rather than, more 
directly, how war should be made ; yet there were sundry bright 
exceptions, and the German staff has done them full justice. For 
example, the prompt and correct decision of General French, and 
the signal success which attended his daring charge from Klip 
Drift against the Boers opposing his advance on Kimberley, have 
obtained the praise and admiration that so brilliant an exploit 
most clearly deserves — and the lesson conveyed has been duly 

Accustomed as we have become to the foul abuse so liberally 
heaped upon us by the Continental press, it is now gratifying to 
find our exculpation recorded unmistakably in the pages of this 
official account of the war. Not only is it admitted that the 
general conduct of our troops was " chivalrous and humane," but 
in the case of the occasionally severe measures adopted after the 
struggle had become inevitably embittered, it is frankly allowed 
that the circumstances were of a character that " not only explains 
much of their severity, but also justifies it." 

That we should hitherto have received but scant courtesy or 
justice from foreigners is not, however, very remarkable, when we 
reflect that so many of our own countrymen were at such pains to 
libel our gallant soldiers ; and that even an ex-Cabinet Minister, 
his sense of decency smothered by party passion, did not scruple 
to dilate upon our " methods of barbarism." 

The adverse criticisms of the German staff upon the military 
conduct of the actual operations of the war are confined chiefly to 
the delinquencies of the British Government, Lord Roberts, Sir 
Redvers Buller, Lord Kitchener, and our system of training. The 
Government is blamed for its obstinacy in declining the excellent 
and often-repeated advice of Lord Wolseley; Lord Roberts is 
charged with failure to understand the strategical situation ; Lord 
Kitchener with tactical incompetence ; and Sir Redvers Buller with 
lack of skill and moral courage. The evidence is judicially ex- 
amined and the verdict given with perfect impartiality. We cannot 
by any method of reasoning dispute the justice of the conclusions 
arrived at. The charges made may be summarised as follows : — 

1. Had the Government listened to Lord Wolseley instead of 
yielding to its fears of an unpatriotic opposition, we should have 
been ready instead of unready, and an actually inferior enemy 
would not have enjoyed that local superiority at the outset, with 
all its strategical advantages, moral and physical, that our lack of 
preparation placed at his disposal. 

2. Lord Roberts failed to grasp the obvious strategical fact 
that the destruction or capture of Cronje's force represented the 
real key to the entire problem, and that no half-measures, such as 
merely dislodging that force, could possibly meet the case. The 
actual surrender of Cronje was brought about almost entirely by 


the fatuous proceedings of Cronje himself, and, so far as we our- 
selves were concerned, was wholly fortuitous. The famous ride to 
Kimberley was valueless ; it produced a certain moral effect, 
counterbalanced, however, by an awful waste of horseflesh. There 
is no such thing as bad strategy ; there can only be strategy or 
the absence of it ; and in the case in point the latter is regrettably 

3. With regard to Sir Redvers Buller, it is abundantly clear 
that the battle of Colenso was fought upon an unjustifiable supposi* 
tion that all would be plain sailing, and without the slightest 
attempt to prepare against the unexpected. The key of the 
position, Hlangwane Hill, was so lightly thought of that the orders 
to Lord Dundonald were merely that he should " endeavour " to 
occupy it. The word " endeavour," when used in orders for battle. 
Is usually a silly one. Lord Dundonald could not, and General 
Barton would not, take the hill — Ainc ilia lachrymcB. The battle 
was lost ; but,* as the Germans tell us, it is undeniable that " it was 
the General and not his gallant force that was defeated." A 
cursory glance at the map is sufficient to expose the absurdity of 
the plan of operations, and a comparatively brief study of the 
actual proceedings to suggest that success might not improbably 
have attended a renewal of the contest in a wiser fashion. 

4. Lord Kitchener, who has been ridiculously blamed by 
British critics for his decision to attack at Paardeberg, obtains no- 
more than justice in his honourable acquittal upon this account at 
the hands of the Germans. But strategically sound as the delivery 
of the attack most undoubtedly was, and equally certain as it is 
that it ought to have been renewed, the fact still remains that there 
was entire absence of method ; that Lord Kitchener lost his head,, 
and that he commanded, very inefficiently, all the units under him, 
one after another, but never his force as a whole. The strictures 
upon Lord Kitchener's tactical deficiencies are, indeed, severe, but 
it is impossible to deny the justice of them. 

5. For the imperfect results, due to our lack of sound training, 
the Germans offer all the excuses that we ourselves could urge — 
and they are many. The pity, however, is that although conscious 
of our past shortcomings, we have up to the present made no 
appreciable improvement This, however, may come, and there 
is at least a reasonable prospect of better times in the future. 

The charges made being unanswerable in themselves, any 
attempt to deny the justice of them would be useless. Yet we 
must also look at the other side of the picture. Lord Roberts, 
indeed, was more fortunate than skilful in the Paardeberg campaign ; 
but this must not cause us to forget that, in spite of all the faults 
he may have committed, he has claims upon our admiration and 
gratitude, as a nation, that have not often been surpassed in our 
history. The superlative courage and splendid readiness to accept 
full responsibility uniformly displayed by Lord Roberts throughout 
his career clearly mark him as one of the greatest amongst our 
rather small number of great soldiers. That Lord Roberts made 
mistakes cannot be denied ; but it has been truly said that " the 
General who has made no mistakes has never made war." Again, 


in the case of Lord Kitchener, it is upon the whole more profitable 
for us to remember his businesslike management of the Omdurman 
campaign than to trouble ourselves about his tactical failings at 
the battle of Omdurman itself, or at Paardeberg. Gifted with a 
great intellect, boundless energy and indomitable resolution, Lord 
Kitchener will for all time be a commanding figure in our 
history. It is not a small thing that a man to whom circumstances 
denied a practical military education should have worked his way 
to the top of the military tree. Tactically inferior as Lord Kitchener 
is to many of his contemporaries, he is undeniably the greatest man 
now on the active list of the Army. That he would have been a 
more competent general, had he served as a young man in the 
cavalry, artillery, or infantry, is likely enough ; yet the fact remains 
that he has achieved greatness in spite of every disadvantage. 

To read the German account of the war in South Africa is a 
wholesome lesson to us in many ways, and if the criticisms are 
occasionally severe, they are adways just Our operations are 
criticised, on the evidence, with the same impartiality that the same 
writers would display when discussing their own manceuvres ; and 
parallels for many of our errors are frequently quoted from the 
records of German mistakes in the Franco- German War. Praise 
is given us where we deserve it, and without stint 

The translation is generally excellent, and the author is to be 
congratulated upon it ; but the omission of the account of the 
engagement at Driefontein is inexplicable, because this was 
emphatically the most instructive as well as the best conducted 
action of the whole war. The absence of the map of Paardeberg 
is also very regrettable. 


Twelve Lectures delivered in the University 

OF London. 

By Emil Reich (Doctor Juris). London : George Bell & Sons. 1904. 

Price 5J. 

That this is a very valuable work is as certain as that it is easy to 
find fault with it Regarded generally, it will by most readers be 
accepted as an exceedingly able epitome of modem European 
history, military and political. Cause and effect are shrewdly dis- 
covered and every page conveys its lesson. The career of Napoleon 
very naturally obtains special attention, and four chapters are 
devoted to events connected with the rise and fall of probably the 
most remarkable man who ever lived. Upon questions of policy, 
as affecting the interests of the various Powers involved in the 
long series of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the 
author makes many thoughtful remarks and displays exceptional 
insight as well as knowledge. But Mr. Reich is not found proof 


to the temptation to pose as a strategical critic, and, as the result 
of his efforts in this wexy dangerous direction, he lays himself open 
to hostile criticism. For example : the influence of the ''Spanish 
Ulcer" is rejected as a powerful factor towards the downfall of 
Napoleon, and greater, or indeed supreme, importance is ascribed 
to an alleged lack of loyal perseverance upon the part of the French 
people themselves. As to the latter contention, there is doubtless 
some truth in it We all know that many possibilities presented 
themselves at the close of the memorable campaign of 1814. We 
may differ as to whether even a Napoleon, supported ever so enthusi- 
astically, could actually have saved the situation ; but that the people, 
tired of war now that it was once again waged upon their own soil, 
threw over the Emperor before the cause of their country had been 
irretrievably lost is undeniable. Let this, however, pass, and let us 
for a moment consider the author's views in reference to Spain. 
His argument amounts to this : that Wellington was not after all 
a very great general, and that whatever the comparatively slight 
influence upon the European situation at large exercised by the 
war in Spain, it was achieved by the Spaniards themselves and not 
by the British. Now, it is undeniable that had not the Spaniards 
been in arms, Wellington's small army would have been powerless 
against the vastly superior forces of the enemy ; but it is alsa 
certain that had the British failed to intervene, the Spaniards could 
neither have had breathing time to organise and reorganise their 
resistance, nor could they have obtained the sinews of war. More- 
over, it should be evident that had Napoleon been free from the 
incubus of maintaining so great an army in Spain, the Moscow 
disaster would in itself have been greatly mitigated, and its effects 
consequently rendered far less ruinous. Had the final stages.of the 
retreat been covered by French instead of by less than half-hearted 
Prussian, Austrian, and other contingents, the complete dibdcle 
would probably have been averted. For instance, had any capable 
and loyal French marshal, with an equal force of French soldiers, 
been substituted for Schwarzenberg and his 30,000 Austrians, 
Tschitschagof would scarcely have been permitted to gain the rear 
of the retreating army. No ; the Spanish ulcer was a very real 
sore upon the strategical body of Napoleon, and Wellington's 
British troops formed the core of it. To take now another example. 
Mr. Reich gravely blames Wellington upon account of failure to 
move from Quatre Bras to the assistance of Blucher at Ligny! 
The distance from Quatre Bras to Sombreffe is seven miles, and 
superiority at the former place was not attained until dusk. Even 
had Wellington been strong enough to contain Ney, and at the 
same time to detach a sufficient force to have any effect on the 
battle of Ligny, the inexorable factors of time and distance must 
effectually have prevented him. Apart, however, from such 
military imperfections, resulting from the temerity of the author in 
venturing beyond his depth, the * Foundations of Modern Europe ' 
is a highly interesting and instructive work. 


A Treatise on International Law. 

By William Edward Hall, M.A. Fifth Edition. Edited by J. B. Atlay, 
M.A., Barrister- at-Law. Oxford : Clarendon Press. 1904. 

The moment is peculiarly opportune for a new edition of this 
standard work. Inasmuch as Mr. Hall died more than nine years 
ago, at a time when the fourth edition was passing through the 
press, Mr. Atlay has had a number of modern instances to con* 
sider in the preparation of the new edition. Foremost among 
these is the Chino-Japanese War, then come the Spanish-American 
War, the South African War, and the Hague Peace Conference. 
The lessons drawn from all of these, besides the minor struggles 
of the same period, have been added in due place to swell the 
weight of authority. But it is open to quarrel with Mr. Atlay in 
that he has not given us as much new material as he might have 
done. As the fifth edition is slightly less bulky than the fourth, 
mere lack of space cannot be held responsible ; the omission seems 
to be due rather to the respect with which Mr. Atlay treats Mr. 
Hairs memory. It is to be hoped that in a sixth edition, and it 
is quite possible that one will be necessary after no long delay, 
Mr. Atlay will carry on the work more boldly. It will, no doubt, 
in time be necessary to swell the bulk of the book to two volumes, 
and there is no need to shrink from contemplating such an event. 
To give one or two instances of points on which further discussion 
is desirable. There is the vexed question of the supply of coal to 
belligerents, there is the question of the raising of loans for them 
by neutrals, and there is the exceedingly doubtful state of the law 
with regard to submarine cables in time of war. On the last- 
named of these three, practice, as exemplified by the United States 
Naval Manual, is not in accord with theory, as illustrated by the 
rules framed by the Hague Court some eighteen months ago. 

It is impossible in a short review to indicate in how many 
respects the knotty problems of the present war can be resolved 
from this book. But it is proposed to return to the subject in the 
next issue of this magazine and to publish an article quoting the 
dcctrine of this book where it illustrates current events. 

'MODERN navigation; 

By Wm. Hall, B.A., Chaplain and Naval Instructor, R.N. London : 
University Tutorial Press, Ltd. 1904. Price 6s, 6d. 

This book professes to be primarily a text-book for students, and 
secondarily a hand-book for navigators. It puts practice first and 
theory afterwards. Thus more than two-thirds of the book are 


devoted to dead reckoning, observations, and notes on the use of 
charts and instruments. The remaining third part is devoted to 
mathematical theory, with a chapter on the phenomena of tides. 
The idea of "position lines" is introduced at the very first, as 
being the foundation of modern methods. The manner of the 
book is concise and clear, the definitions are numerous and good, 
and there is no attempt to gain more than a practical accuracy of 
computation. " To use more figures than are necessary," says Mn 
Hall, " is an unpardonable sin." Students and teachers alike will 
agree with him. 



Vol. XXIX., No. 4. December, 1903. 

Edited by Philip R. Alger. 

There are three great questions with which the naval mind is 
exercised at present all the world over. These are : the need for 
a General Staff, the power and prospects of the automobile torpedo, 
and the probable outcome of the war between Japan and Russia. 

Inasmuch as the papers contained in this volume were written 
some six months ago, it may appear at first sight that they have of 
necessity been left by the rapid progress of events in the Far East 
But this is not so. Where theory is sound, sound practice does but 
emphasise it. And that has so far been the case with regard to the 
latest American theorising both on naval administration and 
torpedoes. The very long paper, or, more strictly, the two lectures, 
by Mr. Brooks Adams, on " War as the Ultimate Form of Economic 
Competition," deserves more than a purely professional audience. 
These lectures throw an important light on the inevitable policy of 
the United States with regard to all economic questions, and are 
concerned as much with the future of northern China as with the 
Monroe doctrine. To be forewarned is, or ought to be, to be fore- 
armed. We have already been warned that the most formidable com- 
petitor in northern China will be found in America. Most of us close 
our ears, presumably because some one in St. Petersburg repeated 
the truism as a taunt. But Mr. Adams puts it forward as a scientific 
proposition, and from the history of the Seven Years' War, the 
War of Independence, the War of 18 12, and the American Civil 
War, he proves it up to the hilt. His paper should be read and 
pondered upon. It is possible indeed to cavil at some of his pre- 
mises, and it is possible to question some of the lines of argument 
he has followed. But this objection rises probably from a need for 
compression which has at times rendered the author somewhat 
obscure. From his conclusions, however, it is not easy to dissent, 
and a careful study of them is recommended to all students of 
Imperial politics. 


The rest of the volume is concerned chiefly with historical or 
technical subjects. The professional notes are as welcome as ever. 
Lastly, there is a reprint of a short paper on ** The Admiral's Flag/* 
which appeared in this magazine. 

' Break ! ' How the Navy prepares for War. 

By Tre-Pol-Pen. Illustrated. The Westminster Press. Price \s. 

This vivacious little book is the first of a new series. The object 
is to familiarise the public still further with the details of naval life, 
lower-deck life, and in this way presumably to help on the great 
cause of naval recruiting. The book is well designed for the 
purpose and deserves to succeed It is readable, well illustrated 
from photographs, and accurate in all essentials. The substance is 
of a nature similar to the letters of correspondents before the 
manoeuvres begin. It treats of such necessary events as steam 
trials and pay day, and is chiefly concerned with modem evolutions 
— always from the point of view of " first ship." 


By Major G. W. Redway. London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Triibncr & Co., 
Ltd., Dryden House, Gerrard Street, W. 1904. Price is. 6d. 

Several plain guides to Topography have recently been published 
and all have merits of their own sufficiently great to give them 
claims to favourable consideration. Major Redway's book is 
certainly entitled to a high place on the list ; it is thoroughly 
practical and the explanations are particularly clear. Interpolated 
amongst the examples worked out are many questions that have 
been set in examinations, including one in which the examiner is 
shown to have been at fault. Such an illustration is very useful, 
because it prepares candidates against the perplexities that must 
arise in the event of encountering an ambiguous or wrongly set 
question. In the present day, when garrison classes are no longer 
available, the real value of a book on Topography depends very 
much upon whether a student who has no previous knowledge of 
the subject could teach himself without other assistance. In the 
present case, a reply in the affirmative may most confidently be 
given to this important question. 



Messrs. W. and A. K. Johnston have published an excellent map 
of the theatre of war, mounted on pasteboard and supplied with a 
box containing twenty-four steel pins with " flags." The scale is 
85 miles to i inch, and the price 3^. 6rf. Six reference maps are 
printed on the unoccupied space and at the foot. Officers and 
others who" wish to follow the operations cannot do better than 
purchase this map. Cheap folding editions, printed on paper and 
cloth, are published at is. and 2s. respectively. 


Of the 1ST Battalion Sherwood Foresters, Derbyshire 

Regiment, 1899- 1902.' 

Printed by Noronha & Co., Goverament Printers, Honkong. 1904. 

Tins is merely a preliminary issue, interleaved, and intended to 
furnish the foundation of a revised edition that is to follow ; yet 
even as it now stands the narrative has considerable merits and is 
of much general as well as particular interest Some parts are a 
trifle confused, and there are a few inaccuracies which the regi- 
mental readers of the volume will no doubt point out to the editor. 
For example, the story reads as if the criticisms directed against the 
previous lack of tactical preparation at the Bushman's Hoek camp 
had reference to Sterkstroom — as indeed it just as well might — and 
that the Derbys had proceeded to the former place on their arrival. 
This is but an unimportant matter, yet it will serve the present pur- 
pose as well as any other. Meanwhile, the fact remains that the 
Derbys in South Africa were a battalion of exceptionally fine 
physique, in admirable order, and had for their CO. one of the 
best, if not the very best, all round soldier in the Army. The 
record of work done will prove that the battalion acted worthily of 
its advantages. 


By Captain Reginald F. Legge, Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment, 
Adjutant, 2ndV.B. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. With an Intro- 
duction by Major-General Sir Alfred Turner, K.C.B. Illustrated with 
Plates. London : Gale and Polden, Ltd., 2, Amen Comer, Paternoster 
Row, E.C. Price is, 6d, (net). 

This little book is replete with sound common sense, and furnishes 
ample proof that the author not only understands his subject, but 


has the gift of teaching. Captain Legge has many original ideas 
upon eveiy branch of musketry training, and officers and non-com- 
missioned officers who take a proper interest in the efficiency of 
their companies should make a point of reading what he has to 
tell them. The chapters are ^ Lectures," and the style of them so 
attractive that it is impossible to help envying those who had the 
good fortune to listen to them from the author's own lips. Sir 
Alfred Turner praises the book highly, but not a bit more highly 
than it deserves. 


Of Service in the Anthracite Coal Strike, 1902.' 

By Stewart Culin, Private Second Troop Philadelphia City Cavalry, N.G.P. 

George W. Jacobs & Co., Philadelphia. 

The Author of this narrative is so evidently a man of superior 
education and attainments, that his views upon the variety of 
questions, which he gives freely, are of real value as well as 
interest. He discusses the inhabitants of the strike district, who 
appear to have come chiefly from Central Europe, and sees in their 
regeneration a great work standing sadly in need of accomplish- 
ment. The lesson to ourselves is that if only it is known that 
troops will really shoot, if such be necessary, the occasion for 
strong measures is seldom provided. At Shenandoah, where the 
mere handful of cavalrymen rode freely through the streets, not 
a sign of violence was ofiered to them, even though they arrested 
on the passage a man who ventured to insult them. They under- 
stand dealing with mobs in the United States better than we do 
at home — they don't let the mob get out of hand. At the first 
sign of disturbance in go the cartridges, and the mob knows what 
will happen if it is refractory. Therefore the mob climbs down 
promptly, and bloodshed is avoided. 


The Military Novel suppressed by the German 


By Lieutenant BiLSE. John Lane, the Bodley Head. London and New York. 

1904. Price dr. 

This is not a nice book, and it is little wonder that it should have 
been " suppressed ; " at the same time it may have good effects in 
Germany by procuring attention to the evils resulting from the 
state of affairs described, and the adoption of measures calculated 

RE VIE IVS. 107 

to remove the cause. Curiosity, or a morbid appetite for un* 
pleasant disclosures of disgusting moral depravity, will no doubt 
add many more to the already numerous readers of the narrative, 
but it is to be recommended that those gentlemen who desire to 
read it should be careful not to leave it lying about where it can 
be accessible to their female relations. It may safely be said that 
to have read the book through would be sufficient proof of at least 
a serious want of refinement in any woman. 


Campagne de Chine de 190a' 

Par le Gdn^ral H. Frey, ancien Commandant-en-Chef des forces fran^ais au 
P^-tchi-li, de Juillet k Septembre, 1900. Avec 5 cartes en couleur et i 
carte dans le texte. Paris : librairie Hachette et Cie., 79, Boulevard Saint- 
Germain, 1904. Price"/ francs 50 centimes. 

The above work enjoys the twofold advantage of being written 
by an officer of high authority and of appearing at an opportune 
moment. General Frey, as Commander-in-Chief of the French 
Expeditionary Force, was intimately associated with the campaign 
of the allies in China ; the work is, in addition, most opportune in 
appearing at a time when most of the great Powers, who at that 
time found themselves fighting side by side in generous rivalry, 
may possibly find themselves opposed to one another in the same 
Far East These are, however, not the only merits of this book, 
which is as full of anecdotes as of history. It initiates the reader 
into the motives of certain events, undertaken by the allies, which 
have been hitherto unknown ; it also gives the General's opinion 
of the relations existing between the various contingents, and that 
officer's appreciation of their good qualities or their defects. In 
this regard it may be as well to mention that the General's 
relatively poor opinion of our native troops was not shared, at all 
events by the American contingent. Whatever, however, one's 
private opinion may be on some of its minor details. General 
Frey's book will undoubtedly be read with interest and profit by 
military men of all nationalities. 

The Log Series, — The commission of H.M.S. Renown is the subject 
of volume 8, and a worthy addition to the number. This " Log " 
has special interest owing to the fact that the ship had the honour 
of conveying the Duke and Duchess of Connaught from Malta to 
India for the Delhi Durbar. There are also a number of amusing 
yarns, " Captain Bobby's Anchor," and others, by "Tre- Pol-Pen." 
The story of old Renowns is, moreover, excellent. Altogether 
this is an excellent " Log," and should greatly help the good work. 
It should not be forgotten that every "Log" sold means some 
little help towards the " Log " room of the Union Jack club. The 
Publishers of the series are The Westminster Press (Gerrards, Ltd.), 
411a, Harrow Road, W., and the price 4r. 3^., post free. 


Questions and Answers on the Royal Military College Text Book of 
Military Administration, compiled by Captain H. R. Gall, and 
published by Hugh Kees, Ltd., 124, Pall Mall, S.W., price 2s., can 
be entirely relied upon for the purpose intended. The young 
officer who has mastered the contents of this little volume need 
have no fears about passing his examination. Such books are a 
necessary evil The system demands " cramming," and such being 
the case, what we must do is to select the books best suited 
to the occasion — therefore Captain Gall's preceptor is to be 

Notts on Mounted Infantrymen, by Captain Llewellyn Saunderson, 
the Rifle Brigade, cannot be too strongly recommended. The 
Author does not labour matters already fully dealt with by many 
other writers, but teaches what to do and how to do it from the 
point of view of a Company Commander who is teaching his 
Company to be efficient M.L It is assumed that the men have 
been properly instructed as Infantry soldiers, and require merely 
to be taught to use their knowledge in mounted service. We ar<5 
given the art of Mounted Infantry tactics explained by an officer 
who clearly understands tactics and M.I. The result is conse- 
quently excellent. The price is is., and the publishers Messrs. 
Gale & Polden. 

Cyclists in Action — published by Forster, Groom & Co., price is. 6d — 
by Lieutenant A. H. Trapman, 26th Middlesex (Cyclist) V.R.C, is 
the title of a little book containing a great deal of useful information. 
But the Author apparently labours under the too common error of 
regarding cyclists as a distinct arm of the service. Cyclists are 
merely a variety of Mounted Infantry, superior to any other so 
long as they are working on even moderately good roads, but not 
so when compelled to move across country. Occasions may arise 
in war where 200 Cyclists would be of greater use than 2000 
Infantry ; others where an equal number of Infantry, unencumbered 
with cycles, would be preferable to Cyclists ; and others where a 
dozen M.L, provided with ponies, would better serve the object in 
view than many times their number of Cyclists. For all classes of 
Mounted Infantry, the essential qualification is that the men shall 
be perfectly trained Infantry soldiers, and beyond this there is 
nothing to learn except how to utilise, to the best advantage, the 
accelerated means of locomotion actually employed. 

The Volunteer Annual, 1904 (Metropolitan Corps), published by 
Adam and Charles Black, price is. 6d., is an exceedingly useful 
book of reference for London Volunteers and Imperial Yeomanry. 
It contains the year's work, etc., by corps, up to October 31st, 1902, 
and all needful information as to new regulations, etc., etc. An 
alphabetical list of the officers is placed at the end, with the usual 


April, 1904] 



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Mag u IRE, LL.D. ^r. 6d, net. 

TION. By Captain H. R. Gall (late Sth Fusiliers). 2s, net. 


Captain H. R. Gall (late 5th Fusiliers). New Edition, y, net. 

THE CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA, 1877-78. By F. V. Greene 

(U.S. Army). Sx. 6(/. net. 

THE ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY. By the late Lieut-Colonel Tovey,R.E. 
New Edition, Revised and Edited by T. Miller Maguirr. LL.D. 6s. net. 

THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870-71. By Colonel LoxVdsdale 

Hale, R.E. [Nearly ready. 


The following hare recently been published at Od. each. 

MANCHURIA. By Colonel G. F. Browne, D.S.O. 


Ballard. R.N. 

Maude, late R.E. 



First Impression already exhausted. Second Impression in the Press. 





Prepared in the Historical Section of the Great General Staff, Berlia. 
Translated by Colonel W. H. E. WATERS, B.A.y C.V.O., 

Late Military Attach^ H.B.M. Embassy, Berlin. 

With Maps and Plans. Demy 8vo, IBs. net 

" The most valuable work in which, since its close, the war has been discussed. It stands alone because it is the 
only work in which the war has been surveyed by trained and competent students of war, the only one of which the 
judgments are based on a familiarity with the modem theory of war. . . . The best work that has yet appeared on 
the South African War." — The Momtng PosU 

" All students of military history, to say nothing of the wider public, will delight in the German official account of the 
Boer War. ... It is pleasant to be able to say at the outset that throughout the book no trace is to be found of that bitlei 
Anglophobia which for a long time was only too rife even in the best military circles abroad. . . . The translation is most 
«zcellently done, and the accompanying plans are among the best we have yet seen." — TA^ Giohe. 

"Colonel Waters has set the work out into lucid and vivid English, and the maps, illustrations, and general equip* 
ment of the work are masterly. ... A most valuable book.'* — Pail Mall Gazette. 

"Colonel Waters' translation deserves the highest praise which it is possible to give." — The Standard, 



With Illustrations, numerous Maps, and a Portrait of the Author, etc. 

Demy Svo, 21s. net« 

"The keen spirit of the author communicates itself to his writine, and the book, though written in an orduarycoa* 
versational style without attempt at elaborate literary graces, yet enthraU the reader by its spirit, its sweep of narrative, 
and the vigour of its descriptions. The relief of Kumassi in 1900 has already been well described ; but we hive been 
waiting for the complete story of that intricate forest war. This Sir James Wilfcocks has given us, and much besides ; for 
there are many excellent accounts of sport, and, since his experience of savage warfare is almost unrivalled, what he has to 
say of the organisation of native levies and the tactics to be employed against a barbarous foe is a valuable contributioo to 
military &ctitncK." —S^ctator. 




Of the Bengal Educational Service, Member of the Asiatic Society, Bengal, &c. 

With Map and Illustrations. Demy 8vo, IDs. 6d. net 


The ''Log'* Series. No. 8. " a welcome series."— i?a//j'^x/««. 


Containing the Uking of T. R.H. the Duke & Duchess of Connaught to India. Dedicated to Adm. Sir J. A. Fisher, G.C.B. 
By Chas. Mitchell. With numerous Articles by " Tre-Pol-Pbn." Fully Illustrated. Price 48. ; post free, 4i. 3«. 

" Tiie Fleet " Series. No. 1. 

" BREAK ! " How the Navy prepares for War. EngS^^SSJS^vS'im.y 

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No. 906— MAY, 1904. 

Offences of striking Superior Officers. 

By " Ward-Room." 

Although the amount of serious crime in the Navy, as revealed 
by the Court Martial returns for 1902, is not large, yet there is a 
point which gives rise to serious thought in the large proportion 
that the offences of striking or attempting to strike superior officers 
bears to the whole number. 

Three hundred and twenty-one men were tried for various offences 
during the year, and of this number no less than 172 were Vied 
for these grave offences — 53*8 per cent, of the whole of the serious 
crimes detected in the Navy. 

This matter would not bo so grave were it not that it is feared 
that this is a growing offence, to some extent encouraged by the 
comparative leniency of the punishments awarded. I say com- 
parative leniency because, although the sentences at times amount 
to five years' penal servitude, they often do not exceed a few 
months' imprisonment with hard labour, with or without dismissal 
from the Service. 

It is perhaps difficult for the civilian mind to grasp the gravity 
of these crimes, because ashore, although there are class distinc- 
tions, there is equality between all men in the sight of the law, 
and there is not the same necessity for the maintenance of discipline 
such as exists in an armed force, particularly in the confined limits 
of a ship. Ashore a man may take the law into his own hands, 
and the infliction of a small fine or an injunction to keep the peace 

meets the case. There are, indeed, instances where one gains 
VOL. cu 3 



rather than loses in self-respect and the esteem of a general public 
by resenting personal affronts by physical force; the person 
assaulted always having the option, so far as his strength admits, 
of retaliating in the same manner, and perhaps punishing his 
antagonist Bat theie are offences of assault on shore which meet 
with general disapproval and reprehension, such as assaults on 
women or on persons incapable of defending themselves, and these 
offences the law can deal more severely with than by the infliction 
of a fine. 

The position of a superior officer on board ship is very much 
that of a person who cannot defend himself, or is incapable of 
retaliation, for though he may be quite capable, physically, of 
administering severe punishment to his assailant, his hands are tied 
by discipline and therefore it is but a matter of simple justice that 
the force which ties his hands should defend him and mete out a 
strong and deterring punishment to the offender. 

It will be generally admitted that however reprehensible it may 
be for an inferior to strike a superior, it would be far worse for a 
superior to so far forget his position and his duty as to strike an 
inferior. This gives piotection to the inferior, a protection that is 
so rarely withdrawn and so severely dealt widi when it is that it 
may be left out of consideration. 

Eveiy one knows who his superiors are. A superior officer in- 
cludes all officers, whether commissioned, warrant, or subordinate, 
and also petty and non-commissioned officers. There is no room 
for doubt on the subject, and the marks denoting rank are clearly 
visible to eveiy one. Equally, there is no doubt as to the law on 
the subject, for the Naval Discipline Act, originally drawn up by 
sailors for the control of sailors, is a model of what such an Act 
should be, and enacts by Section i6 — 

*^ 1 6. Ev^y person subject to this Act who shall strike, or with 
any i^'eapon attempt to strike, or draw or lift up any weapon 
against his superior officer being in the execution of his office, shall 
be punished with death or such other punishment as is hereinafter 
mentioned ; and eveiy person subject to this Act who shall, other- 
wise than with a weapon, attempt to strike or use or attempt to use 
any violence against his superior officer being in the execution of 
his office, shall be punished with penal servitude or such other 
punishment as is hereinafter mentioned ; and every person subject 
to this Act who shall strike or attempt to strike, or draw or lift up 
any weapon against, or use or attempt to use any violence against 
his superior officer not being in the execution of his office, shall be 
punished with penal servitude or such other punishment as is 
hereinafter mentioned*'* 


The section requires a short explanation, dear as it is to those 
acquainted with the Act. 

A distinction is drawn between a person " in the execution of 
his office " and one who is not in the execution of his office. To 
translate the phrase into ordinary English, a person when in the 
execution of his office is " on duty ; " and he is always on duty so 
long as he is on board his ship, even when asleep in his cabin or 
hammock and not performing any of the functions of his office. 
It is impossible to be on board and not on duty in the sense of 
the Act He is also on duty when sent on any specific service 
away from the ship, but when absent on leave he is not on duty, 
although he may still be in uniform. 

To entail the death penalty it is necessary that the superior 
officer should be actually struck either with a weapon, or wiUi the 
fist or feet, or that an attempt should be made to strike him with 
a weapon, or there should be evidence of such being the desire or 
intention of the inferior by his lifting up or drawing a weapon 
against his superior. The only point of any doubt is as to the 
definition of a weapon, but that would probably be judged by 
results. For instance, a feather pillow would probably not be con- 
sidered a weapon under ordinary circumstances, but if it inflicted 
injuries to an eye it might reasonably be considered as such, for an 
offender is responsible for all the results of his offence, though such 
results may not follow as an ordinary sequel to his act 

No man who stands in danger of the death penalty can be tried 
summarily. He must go before a Court Martial ; but it will be 
noticed that it is only to the offences mentioned in the first para* 
graph of the section that the death penalty attaches, and con- 
sequently an attempt to strike a superior on duty without a weapon, 
or the striking or attempting to strike a superior even with a 
weapon, when not on duty, can be tried summarily and a maximum 
punishment of ninety days' imprisonment awarded. But generally 
speaking, all offences of striking are dealt with by a Court Martial, 
because the offences committed when the superior is not on duty 
are often premeditated and more subversive of discipline than if 
they had been committed in the heat of the moment on board. 

There is more than one cause for these acts of insubordination, 
and perhaps the principal one is the daily allowance of spirit It 
is not that the ration of grc^ is excessive, but that it is served out 
at a time which, in the opinion of many officers, is unsuitable. The 
men have been hard at work all day since about 5 A.M. and have 
just had what until recently was the only real meal of the day, 
their dinner, and on top of that have had their tot of grog. In the 
hot weather the combination of heavy meal and spirits tends to 


drowsiness, and when the hands turn to again after the dinner- 
hour, there are some of the men who are not in a condition to be 
roused up roughly by a not too tactful ship's corporal. He, of 
course, has his duty to do, and does it without thought as to the 
temperament of the particular individual he is dealing with. A word 
or two passes, or the man is slack, and is taken on the quarter deck 
before the officer of the watch, and his temper becomes excited. He 
may be a very good man, but has not sufficient hold over his temper 
and hits the corporal, his superior officer, who has reported him. 

Perhaps the man's own tot of grog is not responsible for this, 
but it is often the custom that the cook of the mess shall have more 
than his share of grog, and this, especially with young men, is a 
very undesirable practice. Not much harm would be done if the 
time for serving out grog were altered to a later hour, for then, 
the work of the day being over, the men would not be so liable to 
be called on for duty, and consequently would not have the same 
incentive to commit this and other offences of a similar if not so 
serious a type.* 

Many cases no doubt occur among young men, recently entered, 
who have not yet imbibed the spirit of discipline, and who forget in 
the heat of the moment that the conditions and rules of their life 
have altered since they joined the Navy. And there are others 
who would be insubordinate under any circumstances. 

One thing is certain, and this is that the hasty blow is very 
frequently repented of, and every one is sorry for the young man 
of hitherto unblemished character who is forced to appear before a 
Court Martial which has no option but to award an exemplary 
punishment in the interests of discipline. 

For every poison there is believed to be an antidote if it can be 
found, and it is a pity that an almost effectual antidote which we 
possess ready to hand cannot, under existing regulations, be used. 
The Naval Discipline Act and the Summary Punishment table 
provide for the award of corporal punishment The Act limits its 
award to men below the rank of petty officer except in the case of 
mutiny, and the maximum number of lashes that can be given is 
forty-eight by sentence of Court Martial and twenty-five in the 
case of summary punishment by a commanding officer. 

It is, perhaps, not generally known that a pattern " cat " is 
supplied to all ships, even though the award of corporal punishment 
is suspended, and has been for many years, by Admiralty orders. 

♦ This seems to be no new idea, as I find in Tucker's * Life of St. Vincent,' vol. ii. 
p. 198, the following note : " Sir George (Grey) used also to slate that it was an in- 
variable rule with Lord St. Vincent never to inflict punishment after noonday, nor after 
the ship's company had received their allowance of grog." 


The limitation of the number of lashes and the necessity for 
using a "cat" of uniform pattern has taken away many of the 
objections to corporal punishment, the greatest of which was the 
brutality with which it was inflicted in times past, when a sentence 
of a thousand lashes was not unknown. 

Naval literature seems to be singularly reticent on this subject, 
and it is not often that a description of the punishment is found. 
A writer in Macmillans Magazine for November, 1902, gives an 
interesting extract from a little-known book called ' The Life of a 
Lower Deck Sailor,' written, I believe, in the early years of the 
last century : — 

" In the harbour of St John's one of the crew of the Surprise 
was whipped through the fleet for theft, and the poor wretch, to 
drown his suflerings, had drunk a whole bottle of rum a little before 
the punishment. After he had been flogged alongside of two 
ships, the captain noticed that he was drunk, and gave the 
order to stop the punishment until he became sober. He was 
rowed back to the Surprise^ his back swelled like a pillow, black 
and blue ; some sheets of thick blue paper in vinegar were laid 
on. Before this he had appeared insensible, now his shrieks rent 
the air. When better he was sent to the ship abreast of which 
his punishment had been stopped, and it was there renewed and so 

In 'Snarley-yow' the thiefs cat is particularly described as having 
three knots in each tail, and was probably a more cruel instrument 
than the one used for the punishment of ordinary breaches of 

In the " Historical Notes," published in the Gibraltar Directory ^ 
some instances are given of floggings in the Army : — 

"Margaret Doe, by sentence of General Court Martial, for 
making a disturbance in her quarters and cutting the throat of 
Alexander Stewart, three hundred lashes by the drummers, one 
hundred every other day at Landport, the Parade, and Waterport, 
and afterwards, with a rope round her neck, to be drummed out of 
the Garrison." 

" A bombardier, by sentence of Court Martial, reduced to serve 
as a Mattross and to receive three .hundred lashes with a cat with 
nine tails for playing the quack and giving opium pills to a soldier 
contrary to orders." 

" Private Thomas ... to receive a thousand lashes with a cat 
of nine tails, the last fifty of which are to be given by the hands of 
the common hangman between Southport and Waterport; he is 
afterwards to be drummed out of the Garrison with a halter about 
his neck." 


It is easy to understand the popular outcry against such punish- 
ments as these, but it is not so easy to understand why, after the 
punishment had been so immensely reduced to the limits now im* 
posed by the Naval Discipline Act, there should have been any 
objection to corporal punishment. We know some of the aiguments 
used. It was said to brutalise both those who received and those 
who inflicted such a punishment It was supposed to be merciful 
to the man to take this power of repression from the hands of 
authority. Unfortunately, these arguments fail in practice. It can- 
not brutalise the man who is already so brutalised as to make a 
cowardly attack on a practically defenceless man who is but doing 
his duty ; it may be bad for the man who has to actually inflict 
the punishment, but it is going rather far to say that it brutalises 
him ; and when we come to the question of mercy, which is the 
more merciful, to give a man one, two, three, or even four dozen 
hashes, and then to have done with the matter, or to give him 
several months' imprisonment with hard labour, and then to throw 
him on the world branded as a criminal, and probably with no 
means of earning his living ? 

Many of the oflences of striking could be very well dealt with 
by the '' cat," and the services of the offender retained ; and at the 
same time the fear of physical pain would have an excellent 
deterrent effect, especially on cowardly natures, and on those 
youngsters who commit this offence purposely with the hope of 
effecting their discharge from the Navy, a boon which may be 
granted to a man of excellent character on payment of a consider- 
able sum of money. 

It is certainly a pity that the brutality of the past should be a 
bar to the merciful administration of corporal punishment in the 


By Lieutenant Lionel H. Hordern, R.N. 

T -rtr 




NG Cross, S.W. 


'90 . 

United Service Magazine, 

nt year, to commence with the 

read M. de Thierry's January 
.-4.U3J. considered the 

Dther Country for 
heir wishes in the 
of my reply was 
As to the word 
icd it himself, not 
le same sense, 
rints only, and to 

nation, but to loiiu «• 

with us, as Mr. Norwood Young su^^. 

pinion "we" and 

•ot is on the other 

that pays for its 

ig." This general 

ich pays some one 

>therwise it would 

cself, would, I sup- 

lestion then arises, 

y'sview. "They" 

re mine, "want to 

this they are quite 

racter nor sense of 

words, the Colonies 

hey may develop a 

as nations. There- 

;s, as M. de Thierry 

t is quite right they 

tions. Presumably, 

th us in one British 

^s, allied, I suppose, 

'hat separate navies 


and armies will lead to this, and that as the ^' national character '' 
becomes accentuated there would arise a desire for further " respon- 
sibility/' until separation became a fact, is one of the arguments I 
have urged in favour of adopting the alternative course. This 
alternative course is that we should all consider ourselves as one 
nation, and have one Navy and one Army, so that we may develop 
a common national character and a sense of common responsibility. 
And yet M, de Thierry says that it is I who consider " we " and 
" they " as separate breeds ! Though I am in favour of the one 
course, which, on his own showing, is the only one which will bind 
us into one nation, and he is in favour of the only policy which will 
ensure our growing into separate nations! I argued that the 
tendency in the Colonies seemed to be towards separate armies 
and navies of their own. M. de Thierry states that this is their 
desire. I suggested that this was done in case they might one day 
wish to become independent nations. M. de Thierry denies that 
they want independence, but agrees that they want, and in his 
opinion rightly want, to become nations. It seems to me that, 
notwithstanding his denial, his arguments go to prove I am right. 

What seems to me, judging from their actions, to be a tendency, 
M. de Thierry and Mr. Norwood Young, who claim a far more . 
intimate knowledge of Colonial views, say is a fact, namely, the desire 
for separate nationality and separate defensive forces. (If I refer 
to naval rather than to military forces, as M. de Thierry complains, 
it is because the latter cannot be much use without the Navy, 
and because the South African war has focussed Colonial attention 
on military to the neglect of naval preparations.) But if their 
statements are right, why do not the Colonies make a start in this 
direction ? True, Canada is said to be building some revenue 
cruisers, and Australia started a naval force with some vessels we 
gave her, and bought another, but this was many years back, and 
they haven't made much progress, while the fleets of the world 
have increased enormously in the mean time. America, Germany, 
and Japan — two of them, at least, nearer to the Colonies than to 
the United Kingdom — have in the mean time created large modern 
navies, while Germany has openly stated she means to challenge us 
at sea, so that there is far more need now for an increase of naval 
strength in the British Empire than ever before. It cannot be 
because the Colonies cannot afford it, for Canada officially adver- 
tises her " light taxes " amongst her many other advantages ; one 
of the Australian Agents-General says, that the people in his State 
hardly know the meaning of the word taxation ; and another, that 
his State debt has been only incurred for such objects as any 
commercial undertaking would go in for. All, I think, pay their 


members of Parliament, some have old-age pensions, and the total 
cost of these luxuries must be considerably over a million a year, 
or say three times what they pay for their naval defence. It can- 
not be because they do not see the necessity of doing anything 
so long as we will do it for them, because this would imply that 
they do not desire to possess any ** national characteristics " at all. 

It seems to me — I speak with all deference to the superior know- 
ledge of M. de Thierry— that it is, at all events, possible there are 
two political parties in each of the Colonies, one holding the views 
I have advocated, one fleet, one flag, the other holding the views 
of Mr. Norwood Young, M. de Thierry, and Mr. Matheson, i.e. 
strongly "national" as opposed to racial, and that these two 
parties each fear to take active steps to carry out their views, either 
because the electorate are insufliciently informed, and, therefore, 
uninterested in the question, or because each fears to lose votes by 
being the first to advocate the increased expenditure which either 
course would involve. If I am right in this, it seems to me the 
United Kingdom, in the interests of the Empire, should take steps 
to bring the question to the front The British race are enthusi- 
astically loyal, but they want organisation and a lead. They look 
to their parliaments, but in vain, for the " national " aspirations of 
M. de Thierry and his friends block the way to Imperial Union, and 
debates on the colour of the parish pump are of more immediate 
interest to the majority of politicians. 

We were abused, and rightly abused, by the Colonies, for our 
inadequate preparations before the late war ; we were accused, and 
rightly accused, of having " muddled through," and having spent 
far more both in life and money than would have been the case had 
we been properly organised beforehand. The Colonies promptly, 
and with the most splendid Imperial feeling, responded to the call 
on that occasion. The larger feeling of race patriotism swept 
away the local patriotism advocated by M. de Thierry, and well 
was it for the Empire it was so. But, after all, it is a very different 
thing to spring to the call in time of stress, and to make the 
deliberate and costly preparations which are required in time of 
peace if the enthusiasm which war calls forth is to be effective. 
We now see the results of leaving preparation too late. The South 
African war has made us think. It cost us some two hundred 
millions, and added enormously to our taxation, while it seems 
to have had no financial effect on the Colonies. We now pay 
some thirty shillings per head for our Army and Navy, which 
have to defend the Colonies as well as ourselves, and some ten 
shillings more per head is raised by taxation to pay the charges 
on a debt incurred for past wars, so that the cost of defence is to 


us a very real burden. We ask the Colonies, who realised our 
fault before we did, to join in making preparations for the future, 
now in time of peace ; but they make little or no sign of any 
intention of doing so. If they fail now the result will be inevitable 
when next a war occurs, and it will be unreasonable of them to 
expect then that the whole of the loss shall fall on us. The 
present Russo-Japanese war has shown how quickly a fleet may 
be disabled, and how impossible it is to replace that fleet in time. 
Surely this should be a suflicient object-lesson to the Colonies that 
expense and preparation are absolutely necessary in time of peace, 
so far, at all events, as a navy is concerned. It should prove that 
they cannot improvise navies after war is declared. 

The whole scheme of Colonial defence is founded on the 
assumption that the British fleet shall prevent any attack in force 
on the Colonies, and that, therefore, they need only make prepara- 
tion locally to repel small forces of the enemy. This scheme was 
just and right while the self-governing Colonies were poor and 
struggling communities, but now that they are rich and powerful 
States, with revenues, trade, and population about one-third of that 
of the United Kingdom, we suggest they should take their share in 
the Navy, which is really their main defence. And, according to M. 
de Thierry, they say no, we want our own little squadron, all we 
have to do is to look after our own local defence, and we expect 
you, for your own interests, to do the rest. Some of those of M. 
de Thierry's way of thinking even go further, for they say that we 
ought to give the Colonies the necessary ships, and I am not sure 
they don't want us to pay the crews also — of course at the local 
rate of wages. 

If we are to hold together, the scheme of defence must be one 
for the Empire as a whole. The ships, forts, and men to man 
them, the striking army, the coaling-stations, docks and repairing 
yards, have all to be fitted into one plan. If each part of the 
Empire is to provide only for its own local defence, the whole must 
fail. No Colony could hold its own if the rest of the Empire were 
to look on and do nothing, and it could do nothing unless the 
highways of the sea are kept open. " But," say those individuals 
who think with M. de Thierry, ** the United Kingdom must keep 
open the sea for her own purpose, so the Colonies needn't bother 
about it She must protect her trade or starve. She couldn't 
reduce her fleet by a single ship, even if the Colonies didn't exist, 
and, therefore, they cannot fairly be expected to pay for that." 
This argument, as I showed before, though Mr. Norwood Young 
has misunderstood, is capable of being used the other way also. 
If we did not exist, the Colonies would have to maintain armies 


and navies of their own, and the cost of these would be enormously 
greater than the small sums they have hitherto paid for defence. 
The point is, that if the Colonies had not our fleet to fall back 
upon, or rather to bear the main brunt of attack, they must have 
large fleets of their own. Therefore the present arrangement, by 
which one fleet and army does duty for the whole Empire, is an 
economical one ; but the whole of the economy goes to the Colonies. 
Would they think this a fair arrangement if our positions were 
reversed ? 

I have argued, as Mr. Norwood Young does, that the adoption 
of the fiscal policy favoured by the Colonies, and proposed by Mr. 
Chamberlain, must involve greater risk in time of war, and, there- 
fore, that they should show some sign that they are prepared to 
take their share in the extra cost involved in adopting it Mr. 
Young implies that they would do this if we would let them do it 
in their own way, but I think it would be more efiective if the 
Colonies said so themselves, and I cannot see why we should be 
expected to help them to adopt a course which we do not believe 
in, when they are perfectly able to do it by themselves if they wish. 

If there are to be separate navies there must be some agreement 
as to their use, something corresponding to a treaty of alliance. 
Such a treaty implies two parties, each with its own interests to 
look out for. Neither we nor any of the Colonies would agree that 
its fleet should be at the disposal of any one of us who chose to go 
to war. We could not have as many foreign ministries as fleets, 
there can be only one foreign ministry if we are to be an Empire, 
and either the various fleets must be attached to it, so that it may 
negotiate efiectively — in which case they had much better be one 
fleet — or they must be used as and when the various States inde- 
pendently decide. In the latter case, as there could be no certainty 
of any particular fleet being available when wanted by the rest of 
the Empire, it would be necessary for us all to provide an extra 
number to make up the deficiency. If there were diflerent fleets 
there would be different types of ships built by each State to suit 
its own local wants, there would be no homogeneity, and the value 
of the whole would, therefore, be lessened ; there would be different 
systems of training, different ideals, and probably different rules by 
each State as to where its ships should serve. Besides, no nation 
would make an alliance without some guarantee that the ally would 
maintain an efficient fleet of a definite strength. Our alliance with 
Japan is an example — ^we do not join her unless she has to fight two 
Powers ; hence her fleet must be able to cope with one, and her 
foreign policy does not necessarily drag us into war. Notwith- 
standing this alliance, we keep a large fleet in the China Seas, and 


so does she, and the total of the two fleets is much larger than 
would be necessary if Japan was part of the Empire, with one fleet 
between us. The closer the connection between two countries, the 
greater the saving. 

An alliance can hardly be perpetual ; different national ideals 
must exist, and difficulties which are not really of vital importance 
often seem to be so in peace time. Even an alliance so close that 
one sovereign presides over both countries is an unstable arrange- 
ment so long as the feeling of separate nationality is fostered 
by separate parliaments. We tried it in the United Kingdom with 
Scotland and Ireland ; Canada and Australia have both tried it ; 
Norway and Sweden, Austria and Hungary, may be cited as 
existing examples. In the stress of war these details are forgotten, 
and the two nations become one ; but the longer the peace, the 
more the rifts become accentuated. War is a heavy price to pay 
for unity. To be really binding, then, the connection between two 
countries must be so close as to stand the strain of peace — the 
laying down of a foreign policy, and the costly defensive prepara- 
tions needed to ensure it, are probably the most important of these. 

I think there is a good deal to be said against what M. de 
Thierry calls the "payment of ship-money." If it is looked upon 
in the Colonies as a hiring of the United Kingdom to defend 
them, it must be bad for both ; but I think we, at all events, look 
upon it as a slight recognition of what they owe to the Navy. We 
would, of course, far rather that they joined us in maintaining 
and directing a common navy. We have offered to share with 
them the finest Navy in the world. M. de Thierry says they 
do not want this, they want brand-new little navies of their own 
instead. But whatever they really do want, they have neither 
accepted our offer nor made a start on their fleets. Instead, they have 
preferred to pay, in some cases, a small subscription, and in others 
nothing at all ; but I have never heard that they look on this as the 
equivalent of the protection they receive, or that they consider it a 
forced payment, as was ship-money in the old days. 

The main evil is, however, that it still leaves one-fourth of the 
white population of the Empire disfranchised in external affairs 
Would M. de Thierry think it a good bargain to be disfranchised if 
he could save his pocket ? Would he consider any one worthy of 
belonging to the British race who held such a view ? Not in such 
a spirit has the race progressed until it has overflowed to lands in 
all parts of the world. It is not the people, it is those of their 
leaders who think with M. de Thierry who are responsible for this. 
How can such men claim to talk of the Empire, when it is with 
them merely a collection of separate States. 


II.— Council or Parliament. 

May I point out that I referred to representation in a reformed 
Imperial Parliament, and not in the present House of Commons, 
in which the local affairs of the United Kii^dom take up far too 
much of the time, and overshadow the interests of subjects such 
as a body representing the Empire should mainly have to deal 
with, and of which, probably, the most important are Foreign 
Policy and Defence. 

It is easy to say this body should be a council It is com- 
paratively easy to form one, but it is far more difficult to say what 
should be its powers and duties. I believe it is past the wit of man 
to give any body which can properly be called a council any power 
to carry out its decisions in a democratic community — and what will 
its advice be worth.' It would almost seem that the very in- 
definiteness associated with the name is the reason why one hears 
its formation advocated as settling the question of the unity of the 
Empire, and I suppose it assumes as many forms in men's minds as 
it has advocates. The first question I would ask M. de Thierry, 
therefore, is what kind of council he advocates^-or, rather, do the 
Colonies want ? 

There are certain objections which apply to any kind of council. 
Presumably it would be a comparatively small body — a, Committee 
of the Privy Council seems to be the favourite form — but how are 
the various States to be represented ? Whom would the Colonies 
trust in matters involving peace and war, such as Foreign Policy 
and Defence ? Would their Prime Ministers come over frequently 
to discuss these matters ? Would they trust any one appointed to 
represent them if he lived over here, such as an Agent-General, for 
instance ? Of course there are other questions than these important 
ones ; but if these are left out, it would hardly seem to be worth 
while to form a council at all. Then, again, the decisions could 
hardly fail in every case to be those of the Government of the United 
Kingdom, and the only debates would really be for and against 
that policy. Even if some sided with us at one time and some at 
another, the result would seem likely to be merely to bring the 
United Kingdom into a sort of general antagonism to the Colonies, 
though it might perhaps bring the latter closer together. Even if 
we all agreed on some special question, there could be no certainty 
of the policy being carried out, for it might be the very cause of 
turning out our Government, and so bringing in another opposed to 
the Colonial wishes. A council would thus almost of necessity be 
subordinate to the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It does not 
soem as if the Colonies would be any better off than they are now, 


for at present they have a very strong unofficial voice. Then, again, 
a council would not conduct its business in public, its debates 
would not be reported, and consequently there would be no 
educational value, no public interest roused, and no public opinion 
to carry things through ; this could only arise afterwards, when its 
proceedings were debated in the various parliaments, where purely 
local considerations might easily outweigh the conclusions reached. 
No minister, therefore, would dare to bring forward x>r support a 
matter unless he felt sure of being able to cany it through his 
Parliament, and the result would be a kind of stagnation. 

If we go a little further, councils may be divided into two classes ; 
they may be advisory merely, or they may be executive. As an 
advisory council is that favoured by those who are the strongest 
advocates of this system of a central body, we will consider it first. 
Taking again the two main questions. Foreign Policy and Defence, 
how is the council to work ? These two questions are so bound up 
together that I do not see how it is possible for them to be dealt 
with except by the same body. Suppose the council all agree on 
a Foreign Policy, and that with the best will in the world they 
apportion the corresponding cost of defence to meet it between 
the various States, how can they ensure that each State will 
accept the share allotted, or that, if they do, they will carry it out 
as the council desire ? And supposing that even one State declines 
to agree, who is to make good the deficiency ? Of course, if there 
should be a difference of opinion, which is much more probable, as 
to what each State ought to do, it would be a foregone conclusion 
that the decision would not be carried out And if the council 
cannot ensure the necessary preparation to carry out its Foreign 
Policy, how can it have a Foreign Policy at all ? In a council of 
this kind the representatives must be responsible to their respective 
Parliaments, and even questions of Foreign Policy would, in con- 
sequence, have to be debated in each of these Parliaments. What 
chance is there of agreement ? A policy advocated by Canada 
might be opposed by Australia, and vice versa. Our weight would 
be preponderant in either case, and, though we might gain the 
goodwill of whichever we supported, it could only be for a time. 
The nation with whom we were negotiating would see at once 
where the weakness lay, and instead of avoiding a war, we should 
probably precipitate it, although all the time one or more States 
would disapprove. It is all very well to argue that such a council 
wotild make for peace, but it would almost inevitably be peace at 
any price, for the enemy would assuredly count on our disagree- 
ment, and would say plainly he meant to gain his point or fight. 
Let us take the latest examples. The alliance with Japan was 


necessary to our Eastern interests, and as important to Canada, 
New Zealand, and Australia as to ourselves. But suppose the 
question to have been debated in the various Parliaments, how 
many of them would have voted in favour of so novel a departure 
as an alliance with a non-white Power ? And yet if this had not 
been effected, it must, ultimately, if not immediately, have required 
a large increase in the Navy. Would the Colonial Parliaments 
have been prepared to vote an increase, or would they have left 
it to us to do this who did approve the alliance? Take the 
Alaska Boundary question, and admit that the other States 
agreed with us and not with Canada, that it was wise to get this 
onstant source of friction out of the way. We may agree that 
our hands would have been strengthened, but it would not have 
facilitated the settlement, for it would have shifted the soreness of 
Canadian feeling from us to the Empire at large, which would have 
been far more serious. Or if this question had really come to one 
of peace or war, though Canada and the United Kingdom might 
have both been prepared to make enormous sacrifices, would 
Australia or New Zealand or South Africa have been equally 
prepared ? If, again, the New Hebrides question became acute^ 
would Canada or South Africa be willing to vote the necessary 
credits i 

If, on the other hand, the council is to be executive, that is, to 
have power to carry out its decisions and the responsibility which 
should attach to them, we are met with the difficulty that it 
would be as difficult to form as an Imperial Parliament For, 
in the first place, we must come to some agreement as to what 
is the fair proportionate share which each State should bear, 
both now and in the future, and, in the second, we must invest 
the council with the power to carry out its decisions without 
any popular opinion behind it. To arrive at a fair propor- 
tionate share on any basis such as population, trade, or shipping 
seems to me impossible. The only fair basis is that of ability to 
bear the necessary taxation. This might be got over by giving 
the council the power to fix the rate for certain taxes — say income 
tax and excise — ^and to say how the sums thus raised should be 
expended. But this practically gives the council the power of 
taxation, and the council represents only one party — the Govern- 
ment — in each State. There would be no wholesome discussion, no 
chance of the minority making its voice heard, and I do not believe 
that any of the States would be inclined to give such exceptional 
powers to a council. 

However, as M. de Thierry assures us the Colonies want a 
council, let us see how far they have got "If you want our aid 


call us to your councils/' is the strongest expression I can call to 
mind, and this was promptly met by Mr. Chamberlain's ^ We do 
want your aid. If you are prepared to bear any proportionate 
share in our burdens, we will gladly consider any proposal you may 
make." This answer, however, does not seem to have been what 
was required, for we have heard no more of the matter, and, instead, 
have been told that separate treaty-making powers are desired — as 
a further step, I suppose, towards M. de Thierry's "national" 

This really is the crux of the whole question — so long as local 
or State nationality overshadows Imperial or race nationality, so 
long is any scheme of unity impossible. We, in the United 
Kingdom, for instance, though we are proud to be English or 
Scotch, Welsh or Irish, put loyalty to the Flag first. We have one 
Parliament controlling one Army and one Navy. We do not appor- 
tion the cost to each nationality, but we join in a common system 
of taxation to provide them, and we have a common system of 
representation to share the responsibility for our actions. Responsi- 
bility in democratic communities is very largely founded on taxation 
— on the pockets of the individual. Taxation without representation 
in such communities is always resented, and is now impossible. 
Representation means the election of two parties with different 
views, who debate and decide by a majority, and who do this 
publicly in the face of all men. How can a council cany out 
these ideals ? It seems to me that true unity can only be assured 
by an Imperial Parliament — a body elected by the race and repre- 
senting both the majority and the minority. Parties in such a 
parliament would not be formed according to the locality of the 
representative, but according to one of the two ideals of govern- 
ment which all of us have. Each State would be divided on these 
lines, and the representatives, whether in the minority or majority, 
would find other representatives from each of the States by their 
side. There would be community, not division of interests, and 
separate nationality would be sunk in the larger patriotism of the 

I am quite ready to admit that the attainment of this ideal 
must take some time ; but I think we should keep it before us, and 
should not take any step which will lead us away from it To my 
mind, an Imperial -Council would not only fail to fulfil what is ex- 
pected, but would postpone this ideal, if it did not do worse, for it 
would keep alive all the existing local jealousies. 

In place of a council, I think it would be far better to develop 
the existing Colonial Conferences, which it has now been arranged 
to hold every four years. These might be called, what they really 


are, Imperial Conferences, and be attended by our own Frime 
Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Secretary of State for India, 
and meet more frequently, say every two years. If the members 
will not consent to their speeches being published, we must, I 
suppose, go on making it a secret meeting, but more publicity a great educational advantage. Then I would suggest 
that at the same time there should be a meeting of members of 
Parliament of all the States, both Government and Opposition, the 
more the better, who. should discuss Imperial questions in public, 
so that the debates might be published and the people interested. 
The effect of such public discussion would be to clear away many of 
the suspicions and misapprehensions which now exist, and to teach 
us all to understand one another better. Public interest would be 
aroused and public opinion formed, not on "national'' but on. 
Imperial lines, and a beginning might thus be made which might 
lead to a real unity and a true Imperial Parliament In such a 
conference there would be no division on "national" lines, for 
each State would have both parties represented, and, speaking 
generally, these two parties disagree on most things. We should 
instead get two Imperial parties with opposite views, but the nation* 
ality would be that of the race and not local. 

It would be far easier to carry out such a scheme than to create 
a council, for it would be merely the development of an existing 
piece of machinery, and I believe it would be far more effective in 
uniting the Empire. A desire for a true Imperial Parliament would 
grow up, a desire which a council without powers of taxation could 
never create, and until the various States are prepared to "take up 
the white man's burden " the responsibility for external affairs 
would remain with the United Kingdom — as it should do so long 
as she has to pay the piper. 

Lionel H. Hordern. 





By L. G. Carr Lauchton. 

Richard Gibson, erstwhile parser in the Nav>% illustrates the 
above-quoted old proverb by a yam about the Bryer^ a small man- 
of-war belonging to the Commonwealth of England. Inasmuch as 
Prince Louis of Battenberg, now Director of Naval Intelligence, 
makes no mention of this ship in his list of " names formerly borne 
by British men-of-war/' the Brytr may be said to lack formal 
introduction. Built as a private ship, she was one of the many 
small craft employed by the Ro3ralists after the death of the king, 
and, like many of her fellows, fell into the hands of the Common- 
wealth. There is no record of her capture, but from her name it 
seems practically certain that she was one of the ships taken in the 
neighbourhood of the Scilly Islands at the time when Blake was 
besieging Rupert in Kingsale. At any rate, she was taken from 
the Royalists in the year 1649, and was brought into the Navy. 
She was rated as a fifth-rate, and was assigned a maximum 
establishment, for "war at home," of 100 men and 22 guns. For 
" war abroad " she was supposed to carry 18 guns and 80 men : and 
on a peace establishment her crew numbered 65. Her length by 
the keel was 70 feet, her beam 26 feet, and her draught of water 1 1 
feet Her tonnage is variously stated as 180 and 250 tons burden. 
At a time when the '' great ships " retired into port before the autumn 
equinox, there was plenty of employment in the winter months for 
the smaller fry of the Navy ; and doubtless the Bryer had her share 
of duty on the winter g^ard. Her only exciting service, however, 
seems to have been in 1658, the episode referred to by Gibson, and 
later on, in 1665, when she was one of the ships engaged under Sir 
Thomas Teddeman in the attack on Beigen and the Dutch East 
India ships which lay there. On the latter occasion the fighting 
was veiy hot, and the Bryer lost her captain. In 1666 she was 
disrated and made into a fire-ship, with 12 guns and 40 men. She 
survived the four days* battle and the St James's Fight, possibly 
because she was not with the fleet, and in the following year, the 
record year of naval n^lect, she passed from the Navy List with 
the entry, " given to Mr. Golding.** It does not appear that the 
name has ever been revived. 


So much for the ship herself. Gibson relates how in the 
Spanish war, '' before the year 1658/' Captain Parker commanded 
this ship in the Channel. He had on board only '' about 65 souls, 
of which 15 boys/' so that the little ship must have been very 
seriously undermanned. The 22 small guns appear to have been 
sakers, minions^ and fowlers, ue. 6-, 4-, and 2-pounders, and the 
height between decks was about 5 feet After being five months off 
the ground the ship was very foul and went to Plymouth to clean 
and refit But there was then no dockyard at Plymouth, and the 
resources of the port were limited, so the commissioner there ordered 
the Bryer to sea again for fourteen days till he should be ready for 
her. When Parker had got 1 2 leagues south of the Eddystone, the 
wind being easterly, a sail ^as seen from the top-masthead east of 
him standing out of the Channel. The Bryer stood the same way 
as the stranger, W.S.W., into the sea. In two hours the sail came 
up so much, though both ships were under the same sail, that they 
could see her hull from the deck ; and in another hour they could 
see her making preparations to board. On this Parker ordered the 
six lowest ratlines of the shrouds to be cut away, and the shrouds 
below the other ratlines, as well as all ropes hanging over the ship's 
side, to be tallowed. This was then the established method of 
keeping a boarding-party from sending men aloft to cut down the 
yards. The device was effective, but not novel, and is related of 
various commanders, including the great De Ruyter, who when in 
a merchant ship once beat off a Dunkirker by the help of a few 
tubs of butter. Parker's next move was decidedly original. He 
ordered half a dozen baskets of minion, falcon, and saker shot to be 
brought up on the quarter-deck. Next he ordered a select quarter- 
master to the helm, and told his company that as long as he 
was able he would conn the ship himself. He then ran out 
his maindeck guns, and directed that not one of them should 
be fired until he rang the ship's great bell, placed on the 
fore part of the quarter-deck (this signal was another commonplace 
of the time), and that after the lower tier was fired eveiy man 
between decks should forthwith hasten upon the upper deck, 
leaving only one man to every gun on the side engaged to make 
fast the gun and close the port so that the enemy could not get 
aboard that way. Before this was done the enemy spread his 
colours, the Ragged Staff, that is, the flag of the Spanish Nether- 
lands. So after hailing each other the ships began firing, the Bryer ^ 
however, not using her maindeck guns as yet. The enemy ranged 
up on the port hand and tried to luff across the Bryer' s bows : but 
Parker luffed too and blanketed her, and the ships fell gently 
aboard of each other. Then the Bfyer gave all she could, from 



bdov with iDund and bar shot, finDm the upper-deck guns with 
iDond and bags of scrap-iroo, and with muskets, half-pikes, brown 
bills and pcde-axes repulsed the enemy from entering her in the 
waist. It was only in the waist that she was particularly vulnerable, 
for her opponent the Fox of Ostend, was a flush-decked ship, and 
therefore could not reach her forecastle or quarter-deck. But the 
Bryer profited in another way from that high-charged quarter-deck, 
for from it her men were busy flinging the small round shot out of 
their hands ** so fast that no one Fleming could abide to stay upon 
the Bryer s main chains, or their own chains, gunwale, or their 
decks^ but to avcud that storm of gunshot jumped down into their 
ship's hcdd. . Upon which the Bryer^s men entered the Fox, took 
her, and brought her into Pl3anoutlL" 

The prize was 14 feet longer and 4 feet broader than her captor, 
safled 2 feet to her i, mounted 18 heavy saker guns, and had a 
crew of 1 50 men. She was, in fact, one of the celebrated Ostend- 
built corsairs, from which the Constant Warwick^ and a few other 
ships in our service were copied. Such ships were the parents of the 
frigates of the Seven Years' War. They were fast, owing to their 
length, and they were weatherly, owing to their absence of super- 
structure. But they were for that very reason less suitable for 
boarding tactics than high-charged ships, as Parker was at pains ta 

Parker's action afibrds one of the earliest instances of a just 
appreciation of the value of rapidity of fire, and — ludicrous as such 
primitive methods may seem to-day — his happy inspiration had its 

" This stratagem," concludes Gibscm, '' of flinging of round shot 
from off* the Bryer, a two-deck ship's quarter-deck, into the Fox 
that had but one deck, with early taking away all occasion of easy 
getting into the Bryer, who having all hands upon the upper deck 
in time, prevented the Foxs taking the Bryer. And made good 
the proverb, the policy (ofttimes) goes beyond strength." 

L. G. Carr Laughton. 


The Editor regrets that the MS. of the article promised by 
Mr, Carr Laughton in his review of International Law, 
published last month, was not received until too late for the 
current issue, and is consequently held over until June. The 
article is entitled, " Belligerents and Neutrals." 



By General Sir Richard Harrison, G.CB. 

Fiscal Policy is one of the burning questions of the day, and, 
when under discussion, it is apt to be all absorbing. 

Yet there are other subjects of exceeding interest to the tax- 
payers of this country, and among these, one has been brought into 
great prominence by the Report of the Royal Commission on the 
late war in South Africa. 

This subject may be described as follows : — What should we 
spend on our Navy and our Army, and what organisation would 
give us the best value for our money ; in other words, what should 
be the scheme of defence for the British Empire. 

It will be remembered that, on his return from South Africa in 
the spring of 1903, Mr. Chamberlain stated that in the interest of 
the Empire it was necessary to make a careful inquiry into the 
present working of our fiscal system, and that he advocated such 
changes being made as would enable preferential tariffs to be 
established with our Colonies, and would give us power to retaliate 
should foreign Governments ever become fiscally hostile to us. 

This statement of opinion was the cause of great excitement 
throughout the country, and has led to the breaking up to a certain 
extent of the Ministry of which he was a member. 

In order to give that Ministry a free hand to deal with the 
question, he resigned his post in the Government, and we have had 
the somewhat strange experience of a late Colonial Secretary 
explaining to thousands of eager listeners the details of a scheme 
which he has prepared ; which, he believes, will not only consolidate 
the Empire, but bring additional employment and prosperity to 
every part. 

However, it is not my purpose to deal now with this fiscal 
question, I only allude to it, as far as seems necessary, in its relation 
to our immediate subject — Imperial Defence. 

Not long ago I found on a bookstall a new edition of a book 
which I had read as a child, in which a very good description is 
given of a system of local defence. The book is called 'The 

* Given in substance as a Lecture to Volunteers at Bristol in December, 1903. 


Adventures of Robinson Crusoe," and it relates that when that 
somewhat remarkable man found himself stranded on a desert 
island, his first care was to defend himself against attacks from 
possible enemies ; and so he built works of fortification, and armed 
them with the best weapons that he could procure. His next care 
was to provide food for his garrison, without which all his other 
arrangements would have been of no avail. 

The book describes what trouble and anxiety was caused by 
this question of food supplies ; how Crusoe husbanded the few 
grains of corn that he recovered from the wreck of his ship ; how 
carefully he planted them ; how he watched them as they grew, and 
protected them from the beasts of the field and the fowls of the 
air; and how, when at last they bore fruit an hundredfold, he 
gathered the harvest into his habitation ; ground the grain and 
made the bread that kept him alive until he was rescued. 

The story is well told, and might serve as a lesson to many a 
worker in this country of ours. 

Buti I wish to apply the lesson generally, not to individuals ; 
and so I say that as Robinson Crusoe acted on his desert island, 
so the British nation, wishing to hold its own among the Powers of 
the world, must not only establish such armed forces as are 
necessary to keep off all intruders, but must so arrange that 
sufficient food and clothing and other necessaries shall be supplied 
to all parts of its territory, and that the arts of peace shall continue 
even when the Empire is threatened by war. 

What does this mean ? 

Surely a carefully prepared scheme — an Imperial scheme of 
defence — which shall give to Navy and Army their proper places, 
and their due proportion in the general system ; which shall, for 
economical reasons, supply no more than is required ; and at the 
same time shall, for reasons of security, ensure that the whole 
machinery of defence is amply sufficient for the purpose for which 
it is intended. 

What such a scheme might consist of I will now attempt to 

Statements have frequently been made regarding what is 
required to efficiently guard the British Empire from foreign 
aggression : notably in the Army^book which was published in 1893. 

Speaking generally, it is as follows : — 

1st. An Imperial Navy, which, by a more or less complete command of the 
sea, guards against serious attacks from over the water and protects commerce. 

2nd. Garrisons and fortifications, etc., for naval bases and coaling stations. 

3rd. Local defence forces. 

4tlu Imperial forces to act in conjunction with the Navy in bringing a war 
to a successful termination. 


A few words seem necessary in regard to each of these heads. 

No one, I suppose, will deny that the first and most Important 
item for consideration in a scheme of defence for a scattered Empire 
such as ours should be the Navy. 

By it alone the water-ways of commerce, which are so essential 
to the welfare of all parts of the Empire, can be protected in time 
of war. By it alone can any security be given to the due arrival of 
food and other necessaries for the workers in the crowded cities of 
the British Isles. This leads us to a further consideration of the 
question that I have already dealt with to a certain extent in my 
allusion to the story of Robinson Crusoe, viz. the supply of com. 

Now, this question is not only vital to every scheme of defence, 
but it is also the crux of the fiscal problem. Where does our corn 
come from ? Can we ensure its safe delivery in time of war ? 
Can we in any way improve the supply ? 

Every one knows that in these islands of ours, and especially 
in England, we grow a very small proportion of the grain that is 
required to feed man and beast ; and that by far the larger pro* 
portion comes from the outlying parts of the Empire and Ixom. 
foreign countries. 

In a Return just published by the Board of Trade for 1902, we 
find that the principal present exporters of wheats whether in grain. 
or in flour, are Russia, the United States, Argentina, Canada, India, 
and Australia, and of these by far the largest are the United States, 
from which we import no less than fifty-nine million hundredweights . 
per annum, followed by Canada with eleven and a half million, and» 
then by India with nearly nine million. 

When we take into account barley, oats, maize, and other grains^ 
in addition to wheat, the United States still remain at the head 
with sixty-five million hundredweights ; but Russia mounts up to 
second place with thirty-two million, Roumania follows with twenty- 
six million, and then Argentina with nearly eighteen. Other 
countries mentioned in the Return are Denmark, Germany, 
Belgium, France, Austria, Turkey, Bulgaria, Egypt, Chile, New 
Zealand, etc., and there are others which bring us various kinds of 
meat and sugar. 

Many valuable lessons regarding supplies can be gathered from 
these tables. But, for our immediate purpose, it is enough to note 
that the British Isles are dependent for a large proportion of their 
food on North and South America, nearly all the nations of Europe, 
on Morocco and Egypt in Africa, on India in Asia, and on Australia 
and New Zealand, and that our Navy has to protect the water- 
ways leading from our ports to all the ports in those countries from 
which the goods mentioned are shipped. 


Whether or not we can ensure the safety of our supplies in time 
of war must depend on circumstances. If several of our chief 
markets were closed to us, there seems little doubt that, whatever 
the strength of our Fleets, the supply must decrease, and the price 
would go up. Possibly we might get an increased supply from our 
Colonies, or from such countries as were taking our part. But in 
any circumstances the danger is a great one ; and it is distinctly 
the business of statesmen to foresee it, and take all possible pre- 
cautions in time of peace to avert it. 

From a defence point of view, the first point to consider seems 
to be which lines of supply can be most easily protected by our 
Fleets, and the more numerous the sources from which graun can 
be discharged into these lines the better. 

The choice of these lines is purely a Naval question. But the 
diversion of supplies from one line to another seenas a matter for 
policy, fiscal or otherwise. Thus Mr. Chamberlain's scheme aims 
at transferring the bulk of our supply of grain from foreign 
countries to our Colonies. 

The next question is how can we best store up a reserve of 
grain in such parts of the Empire as are not self-supporting. 

This means something more than storing so many bushels in 
granaries. A special Royal Commission is, I believe, dealing with 
this important question, so I will say no more about it now. 

Let us turn again to the fleet, and see what would be its duties 
in time of war. 

They would, I presume, be somewhat as follows — 

(a) To guard all important lines of commerce from attack by an enemy's 

(fi) To attack an enemy's fleets, and endeavour to drive them into their 

{c) To attack, in conjunction with military forces, the harbours on which an 
enemy's fleet is based. 

{d) And to support the military forces in any action on an enemy's coast. 

A consideration of these duties, together with the duties 
required in time of peace, should determine its strength in 
commission and in reserve. 

The popular idea of strength is to have a number of battleships 
and cruisers equal to those possessed by any two other Naval 
Powers. But such a calculation is apt to be misleading. It 
does not go far enough. No doubt we should obtain, by means 
of our Intelligence Departments, the best possible information 
regarding the Navies of other nations, and consider what are 
the probable combinations, for and against us, under various 


This done, we should also study the lessons taught by history, 
and then estimate carefully what squadrons would enable us to 
hold our own in every sea in which we have interests to guard. 
Should the result of this process show a sufficiency of Naval 
strength on our side, we might rest satisfied with keeping it up. 
But should it show an insufficiency of strength, it is clearly the 
business of the Government of the country to increase it. 

Again, a scheme of defence should not only state generally 
what should be the strength of the Navy that we require, but it 
should also say how the men are to be obtained, and with what 
weapons our ships and sailors should be armed. For in these 
matters there may be competition with Army Services. 

At present the systems of recruiting for the Navy and the 
Army are altogether different. The Naval system is to take boys 
between the ages of 1 5 and 1 8, train them in harbour ships, and 
then engage them for 12 years as seamen, with the option of 
extending their service for another 10, and then receiving a pension. 
For the Army, with few exceptions, recruits are taken from the 
young men of the country between the ages of 18 and 25, and 
engaged for service at home for 3 years with the colours, and 9 
years in reserve. Then extra pay is offered to as many as are 
required for Indian and Colonial service, to induce them to extend 
their term to 8 years ; that is to say, for 5 years in addition to 
the 3 at home. 

In regard to recruiting; now that so many more men are 
required than was formerly the case, for the Navy as well as for 
the Army, and also that there is a wish to extend to the Navy some 
system of ''Reserves,'' a careful inquiry into the whole business 
seems advisable. 

In regard to stores a similar inquiry would, I think, be useful. 

Let me sum up what, I think, an Imperial scheme of defence 
should do as regards our Navy. 

It should not only satisfy itself that the number of ships of all 
sorts that we possess are sufficient for our Imperial needs, and that 
all the arrangements for mobilising our fleets are satisfactory, and 
that the systems of enlistment and of obtaining stores are as good 
as they can be ; but it should also lay down a peace distribution 
of the fleets in commission, and have secret schemes prepared 
for such changes as might be necessary to meet all probable 
eventualities in case of war. This having been all settled, the 
administrative business of the Navy and its training should remain 
in the hands of the Admiralty. 

It has been argued that, as Naval bases and coaling stations 
are required solely for the support and sustenance of the Navy, 


they should be under Naval management But there are reasons 
s^ainst this. As far as I know, the Navy don't wish it. And, if 
the whole business of defence is regarded from one standpoint, all 
parts of the chain being kept equally bright and strong, it would 
probably be better in every way to leave the arrangement alone, 
viz. the Army being held responsible for the passive defence of 
localities, and the Navy for the active defence, being prepared to 
strike a blow at short notice in any required direction. 

The principal Naval bases and coaling stations are as 
follows : — 

The Thames, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Cork, Gibraltar, Malta, 
Aden, Bombay, Trincomali, Singapore, Hong-Kong, the chief 
harbours in Australia and in New Zealand, Mauritius, the Cape, 
St. Helena, Sierra Leone, St. Lucia, Jamaica, Bermuda, Halifax, 
and Esquimau. 

Each of these has a scheme of defence of its own, founded on 
the Imperial conditions that have been assumed so far. And in each 
scheme there is a statement showing how the Imperial conditions 
affect those of the locality. Then to each a garrison, which was 
thought sufficient to carry out the prescribed r6le, has been allotted ; 
the distribution of that garrison in peace and war, the arrangements 
for all issues of war-like and other supplies, and the measures that 
have to be taken when war threatens, are detailed with considerable 
care. And finally each scheme is sent annually to headquarters for 
observations, with a view to such revision as from time to time may 
be required. 

An Imperial scheme of defence, such as I am now contemplating, 
would, I presume, having laid down the size and distribution of the 
Imperial Navy, also state whether any changes should be made in 
our existing Naval bases and coaling stations, and whether the 
garrisons provided for them are sufficient. And it would prescribe 
how and by whom the efficiency of these stations should be 
maintained. It should also, I think, state whether any commercial 
harbours should be defended, and if so to what extent. 

Local defence forces are the troops that each portion of the 
Empire keeps for purely local defence, and in certain cases as the 
nucleus of an Imperial force. An Imperial scheme should take 
stock of these, and of the conditions under which they serve. 
And it should indicate any changes that might be considered 
desirable from an Imperial point of view. But it would, I think, 
be contrary to the traditions of our Island Empire, and of the 
system under which the various States comprising it are bound 
together for mutual protection, for it to lay down too dictatorially 
the strength or conditions of service of such forces. 


Finally, Imperial troops acting in conjunction with the Navy 
are necessary in order to bring a war to a successful conclusion. 

These are, at present, chiefly raised in the British Isles, and 
in that part of the Empire they are more or less mixed up with 
the local defence forces. Moreover, the great proportion of the 
garrisons of our Naval bases and coaling stations, as well as the 
European Army in India, is supplied from the same source. 
Consequently an Imperial scheme of defence, in considering what 
forces it can put into the field in support of the Navy, must take 
into account the military system existing in Great Britain and 
Ireland (or, as it may be called, the scheme of defence for the 
British Isles). 

How do we now stand ? 

I have shown that, for the defence of the Empire, we require 
a Navy holding all important seas, and controlling all important 
water-ways of commerce. And, as a support to this Navy, that 
we require a certain number of fortified harbours, where repairs 
can be undertaken, and stores lodged in safety. And that, in 
regard to an Army we require, besides local defence forces, an 
Imperial force able to act in conjunction with the Navy in canying 
out rapidly executed expeditions against an enemy's coasts. 

Now, all this requires a good deal of money. It cannot be done 
without it, and so here again defence becomes mixed up with fiscal 

Evidently our forces on sea and land should be sufficient for 
any duties that they might be' called upon to carry out. At the 
same time, there should be no waste, and the only way to prevent 
this is to have a general scheme of defence which should define all 
that should be provided. The preparation of such a scheme would 
be the business of the great Council of Defence of the Empire. 

I have also alluded to subsidiary schemes that must be made 
for the various countries, large and small, that in their aggregate 
make up the Empire, viz. : — 

One for the British Isles, 
„ for India, 
„ for Canada, 
„ for Australia, 
„ for New Zealand, 
„ for East Africa, 
„ for West Africa, 
„ for South Africa, 
„ for Bermuda and the West 

One for St. Helena, 
„ for Gibraltar and Malta, 
„ for Cyprus and Egypt, 
„ for Aden, 
„ for Mauritius, 
„ for Singapore and Pinang, 
„ for Hong Kong and Wei-hai- 

and one for the Pacific Isles. 

Some of these places, being naval bases and coaling stations, 
have schemes already ; others have not. But all, no doubt, require 


looking up, especially when a new general scheme is set on foot. 
And an organisation must be established which shall at first con- 
struct schemes and afterwards keep them up to date. 

The most important of these schemes will be the one for the 
British Isles, because, as I have already said, it has so much to 
provide for. In fact, on this scheme hangs the organisation of the 
Army. And its construction should, I think, be the duty of the 
Military Intelligence Department. 

A few words are necessary in regard to it, to show what we 
have got and what we ought to have. 

In these days, thanks in a great measure to " the Volunteers," 
the Army is much more in touch with the people than was the 
case years ago. A soldier is no longer looked upon as a thing 
apart, not fit to associate with, as was the habit in the early part of 
last century. 

We have, then, first the Regular Army, enlistment for which is 
now very simple and easy. Secondly, we have a Militia which 
springs from the old constitutional force of the country, and was 
established on a firm footing at the time of the Restoration. Its 
theory is conscription, but its practice is voluntary engagement. 
It is raised primarily for home defence, but it can be used abroad 
if it volunteers, as was the case in the late war. Then we have 
the Yeomanry and the Volunteers, the former being the remnant 
of the Volunteer force raised in the country in the early part of 
last century, and the laUer started generally in 1858. 

Let us see how the Forces we have got are distributed, and 
then we will consider what the Royal Commission says about 
them, and finally what changes seem necessary. 

The counties into which the British Isles are divided are grouped 
together for Army purposes in military districts. These districts 
contain not only a certain number of units of the Field Army 
(depending on the location of barracks and of the ground for 
military exercises), but also in some cases coast fortresses, and 
troops detailed for local defence, and also dep6ts. 

The infantry depdts are the regimental centres for auxiliary as 
well as regular troops. All the recruiting as well as discharge 
work is done at them, besides the training of recruits. They have 
never quite carried out the intention of those who founded them, 
which was that they should form battalions for Home Defence 
when the regular battalions had left the country for some foreign 
war, the reason being that their barrack accommodation was not 
sufficient for the purpose. 

Let us take a district as an example of the present distribution 
of troops. The Western District comprises the counties of Cornwall, 


Devon, Somerset, Gloucester/ and Monmouth, and all South Wales. 
The regular troops are quartered at Devonport, Exeter, and Milford 
Haven ; and there are infantry depdts at Bodmin, Exeter, Taunton, 
Bristol, Cardiff, and Brecon. This district is still at the time of 
writing part of the Army Corps which has its headquarters at 

The s}rstem of preparation for war that has existed hitherto was 
to collect tc^ether in brigades and divisions the troops forming the 
Army Corps and to equip them with such stores as they required. 
When they moved, off, the troops detailed to garrison the fortresses 
and to form columns for local defence would have been ordered to 
take their place, and the depdts would have had to take up the 
whole work of training and supplying drafts. 

It will readily be understood that in a business like this the 
most careful arrangements are necessary. The work, as far as it 
went, was done very satisfactorily in the late war. But to carry 
it out completely for the whole country, as would have to be done 
in case of war with one or more maritime Powers, a good many 
details have still to be settled. 

Let us see what the Royal Commission on the war in South 
Africa say in the matter. 

The instructions given to them were " to enquire into the military 
preparation for the South African War, and the supply of men, 
ammunition, and equipment, and the transport by sea and land, 
and abo into the operations up to the taking of Pretoria." 

These instructions the commission considered hardly precise 
enough, and so they assumed that their business was to discover 
inefficiency and defects in the administration of the Army as far as 
they were disclosed by the war, and, if they found that such 
existed, to indicate, if possible, the causes that produced them. 

How far the Royal Commission have carried out their instruc- 
tions, or the business that they assumed they were meant to do, 
can be determined by any reader of their report. A great deal of 
evidence has been collected, and, when it is divergent, the views 
are compared. Now and then the opinion of the Commission is 
indicated. But there is no definite statement on which action can 
be taken, and the proposals for changes which might lead to 
improvement are not many. 

For instance, in discussing the question of the Reserve of Stores, 
they say th^t " the maintenance of proper reserves for the Army 
is so vital that no system can be recognised as adequate which 
does not give an assurance on which the nation can more safely 
rely " than has been the case hitherto. 

Among the recommendations of the Commission, however, there 


is one which is very important, and this is to alter the existing 
organisation of the infantry battalion and to adopt in its place the 
foreign organisation of four large companies instead of eight small 


They also strongly advise that behind the regular forces 
organised for war there should be a large force of auxiliary troops. 
Their words are as follows : — " The true lesson of the war, in our 
opinion, is that no military system will be satisfactory which does 
not contain powers of expansion outside the limit of the regular 
forces of the Crown, whatever that limit may be." 

Personally, I agree with the Royal Commission that the lessons 
of the South African War in regard to the effect of fire point to 
organisation in small units. This was recognised many years ago 
in Germany, and led to the adoption by that astute military country 
of the infantry organisation that they now have. The same organi- 
sation was subsequently adopted by all the other European nations 
except ourselves. 

In regard to " powers of expansion," it may be remarked that 
the Royal Commission makes no suggestion. It doss not hint at 
any arrangement by which an expansion might be brought about. 
For my part, I can only hope that .our country will not adopt any 
entirely new plan, but make the fullest possible use of the forces 
that have grown up in our islands under the voluntary system, and 
that are now growing up in our great self-governing States over 
the sea. These forces we call Regulars, Militia, Yeomanry, and 
Volunteers. Each has its own peculiar system of service ; and it is 
absolutely essential, unless you wish to kill the hen that lays the 
golden eggs, to carefully safeguard these systems when changes are 
made in arrangements for training or mobilisation. But, this being 
done, there is nothing to prevent an organisation being established 
which will provide a sufficient Army for the Empire's needs. 

The mother in the fable, when offered by the fairy three 
wishes on behalf of her son, chose, ist impudence, 2nd impudence, 
and 3rd impudence ; and the fairy commended her choice, saying 
that no doubt if her son had sufficient impudence he was bound to 
succeed in life. 

So now I would say that what the British Empire requires for 
her forces is, ist organisation, 2nd organisation, and 3rd organisa- 
tion. You cannot have too much of it, if it is not only worked out 
theoretically, but also put into real practical use. 

In our case it could be taken up at once by our reformed In- 
telligence Department, the officers detailed for the duty being 
relieved (for a time, at all events) from all administrative work. 

It is for the Government, under the advice of the Great Council 


of Defence, to say in the first instance what should be the strength 
of the military forces to be maintained in commission and in 
reserve. And the details of a scheme could then be worked out by 
selected officers. 

I said in an earlier part of this article that the Navy must be 
made sufficiently strong for its duties. So must the Army. But 
to render these forces of insurance thoroughly reliable, enough 
money must be spent on them. 

It was stated, I think, by Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, when he 
was Chancellor of the Exchequer, in one of his last Budget speeches 
during the war, that to enable sufficient forces to be maintained 
the basis of taxation required to be broadened. Here, again, comes 
the fiscal question. How shall this be done with the least detriment 
to the country ? 

Mr. Hofmeyer, the South African politician, proposed some 
years ago (I think at the Conference in London) that every part 
of the Empire should levy a tax on foreign imports in addition to 
any existing ones, the proceeds to be given to Imperial Defence. 
But this scheme did not meet with favour at the time. An 
alternative one would be for the United Kingdom to maintain the 
Navy and the Army as she does now, and for the Colonies to give 
in return to the Mother Country as much preference in their 
markets as they can. Another alternative would be to adopt a 
part or the whole of the scheme propounded by Mr. Chamberlain. 

Whatever may be done, however, in this direction will have to 
be threshed out in Parliament That is to say, it is a political 
question rather than a military one. 

Richard Harrison. 

P.S. — Since writing the above, the committee presided over by 
Lx>rd Esher has issued a most able and comprehensive report 
dealing with the question of Army government and Army 
staff. When the recommendations of this committee have been 
carried out, and the occupants of the new posts that have been 
created have settled down to their work, there should be a better 
prospect than ever before of a general plan or scheme of defence 
being established which would act as a guide to all subsidiary 
plans throughout the Empire. 


(A Study in Strategy.) 
By Captain C. Ross, D.S.O. 

Romanticism in the Struggle for Existence. 

''The only sound principle of action in a great State is political 
egoism, and it is unworthy of a great State to fight for any matter 
which does not concern its own interests/' Such was Bismarck^s 
expressed conviction ; the opinion of a man who was, perhaps, the 
most successful statesman of modem times, and whose methods 
and teaching have remained to this day as the model on which 
German action is based and the German nation directed. It was 
under his leadership that Prussia became the dominant power in 
Germany, and thereafter the dominant nation on the Continent. 
Some consideration would undoubtedly be due to his views even if 
those views were unsupported by history ; but it is the case that 
the study of the broad outlines of history, and the motives which 
have actuated nations in their struggles with each other, not only 
afford good reason for the belief that his view is the correct one, 
but that it is the only rational view which can be accepted by the 
practical man. Whatever may be said by the moralist or the 
humanitarian, it is yet the case of all nations, that in their dealings 
with one another, they have been, and are, essentially selfish ; that 
they are not, in the present any more than they have been in the 
past, actuated by any motive save that of pure egoism. 

For example, at the commencement of last century the final 
partition of Poland took place ; three great and civilised nations 
took part in this act, which, from the point of view of pure morality, 
can only be termed a crime. In 1854 Great Britain and France 
assisted Turkey against Russia. The motive which actuated the 
two former countries was the desire to check the advance of Russia 
in an undesirable direction ; it can hardly be maintained that the 
Crimean War was due to a philanthropic desire to assist a weak 
nation which was unrighteously attacked by a powerful neighbour ; 
the motive by which Great Britain and France were actuated was 
undoubtedly purely selfish. The unprovoked attack on Denmark 


committed by Austria and Prussia was made in pursuance of 
Prussia's ambition ; and so similarly the wars between Prussia and 
Austria, and between Germany and France. It was Russian 
ambition which urged the war with Turkey in 1878, and it was the 
desire to check the Russian advance to the eastern Mediterranean 
which was responsible for Great Britain's intervention in the final 
stage of that war. It was ambition which drove the Boers to 
attempt the expulsion of the British from South Africa in 1899. 
In all these instances one can feel sympathy for Denmark alone ; 
for in the case of Poland and Turkey it was general demoralisation 
and degeneration, while in the case of Great Britain it was simple 
imbecility, which invited attack. In the Austro-Prussian and 
Franco-German wars, again, the losers, Austria and France, were 
merely awaiting a favourable moment at which to attack Prussia ; 
no sympathy is due to them for the fact that their adversary 
proved to be the smarter nation. If history speaks true, it would 
seem that there is no such thing as morality in the national struggle 
for existence ; that there exists the pretence at morality alone ; a 
pretence which has for its object to gain material assistance. It 
would seem that sentimental, philanthropic, and humanitarian ideas 
as between nations are beautiful but impracticable, and that the 
struggle for existence is too stern a reality for the display of 
romanticism. Let us, before we deal with the practical interests of 
Great Britain in the present war, try to arrive at the rights and 
wrongs of the struggle, if rights and wrongs there be ; let us 
glance at the true causes of the war ; let us see if the actions of 
the two combatants support the teachings of history ; and, lastly, 
let us investigate the extent to which either one is worthy of 

It is said that Russia has, from first to last, been actuated by 
ambition pure and simple, and that she was determined not only 
to obtain possession of the greater part of China, but to close every 
door to other nations, and to reserve to herself the full benefit of 
the wealth she might successfully filch from the moribund empire. 
There seems no good reason to doubt that this statement is, so far 
as it goes, perfectly true. As is well known, Russia has for the 
past hundred years sought to obtain possession of the Dardanelles 
through which to gain egress to southern seas, and thus to compete 
on fair terms in the commerce of the world. She has failed ; but 
in the mean time her rapid extension through Central Asia has 
brought clearly within view the possibility of gaining her ambition 
in the Far East A few years ago China was an obsolete nation — 
an anachronism — a country of vast and undeveloped, but also of 
undefended, wealth; a ripe plum, ready for the plucking. As far 

▼OL. CL. _ jQ 

(vol. xxor. raw nxns.l 


back as 1894 Russia had fixed her attention on Fekin and Port 
Arthur ; she had no real adversary to fear, for the antagonism of 
Great Britain was hardly worthy of the name, and so long as 
China remained powerless for good or evil, an unwieldy, unorganised, 
ill-directed, and inert mass, Russia could afford to bide her time 
and consolidate her power step by step as she advanced slowly 
but surely towards her object. And such was the condition of 
affairs when Japan, armed to the teeth, sprang suddenly into full 
life and vigour ; and, attacking and defeating China, took possession 
of Port Arthur. It is entirely absurd to suppose that Russia could 
have been expected to stand idly by while the booty on which she 
had set her mind, and which she had come to regard as already 
her own, was quietly seized, from under her very nose, by a neigh- 
bouring nation, upon which she had looked with all the contempt 
of the European for the Asiatic. Her prestige, upon which so vast 
an empire must always depend, would not admit of it ; and if only 
for this reason Japan must be forced to relinquish Port Arthur. 
But there were other and equally cogent reasons. Japan must not 
be permitted to gain a footing on the mainland ; for, of the same 
race as the Chinese, it was to be expected that she would quickly 
gain a dominant position in China ; and the danger was to be feared 
that she might organise and direct the yellow races and convert a 
thing of no importance into a gigantic force, which would not only 
check Russian designs in the Far East, but would, beyond doubt, 
in time, enter into competition with Russia in Central Asia, The 
future welfare of the Russian Empire would seem to have demanded 
the expulsion of the Japanese from Port Arthur and the mainland. 
But, more than this, if Russia intended to gain full value from the 
possession of Port Arthur, Japan could not be permitted to remain 
master of so important a strategic position as Corea. We all know 
how Russia, gaining the assistance of France and Germany, forced 
Japan to evacuate Port Arthur and Corea, and thereafter seized 
Port Arthur herself. 

And now let us turn to the motives of Japan. The country is 
small and overcrowded ; the population is rapidly increasing ; an 
outlet for the surplus population is not only desirable, but is an 
absolute national necessity, an essential to the very existence of 
Japan as a nation. Such an outlet can only be obtained in Corea 
or on the mainland of China. And Japanese ambition must also 
be taken into account. It must surely be clearly recognised what 
a tremendous hope for the future is held out by a Japanese domina- 
tion of the yellow races ; all things would be possible to such an 
Empire, and the history of Japan within the last fifty years has 
demonstrated her capacity to weld together and organise these 


yellow races into one great nation, provided she can obtain a firm 
footing on the mainland. 

Hence we see two nations each urgently desirous of the same 
thing, and, as history teaches, war, or what is practically war, com- 
menced ; the outbreak of hostilities was merely a matter of time 
and of strategy. Each conibatant made preparation to its utmost 
capacity for the decisive phase of actual hostilities ; Russia by the 
fortification of Fort Arthur, by the construction of dockyards and 
of a railway, and by the strengthening of her fleet and her army ; 
Japan by the construction of dockyards and the perfecting of her 
armed forces. There is no doubt that Japan would, in 1895, have 
attacked Russia had the latter been single-handed rather than 
evacuate Port Arthur and Corea ; but Russia supported by Ger- 
many and France was too strong, and Japan was thrown on the 
defensive; Great Britain's attention was turned to South Africa, 
and her assistance could not be counted on. It was necessary for 
Japan not only to await the convenience of Great Britain, but to 
isolate Russia before she could attack the latter country with any 
hope of success. With the victory of Great Britain in South Africa, 
however, followed by the rapprochement between Great Britain 
and France, Russia became isolated ; and hence we see the out- 
break of hostilities at the moment at which all the strategical 
advantages lay with Japan ; we see the delivery of a sudden and 
unexpected blow by which Japan has seized the temporary com- 
mand of the sea ; we see the whole available land forces of Japan 
pushed to the decisive attack on land ; and we also see the most 
strenuous efforts of each combatant to prove itself in the right and 
by its promises to gain the goodwill and sympathy of other 
nations. Goodwill and sympathy, though valueless in themselves, 
may lead to active assistance in case of necessity. 

Which of these two nations deserve sympathy ? Each one, 
notwithstanding its assertions to the contrary, fights for its own 
hand ; for it can hardly be believed that Japan has really 
jeopardised her existence from a philanthropic desire to assist 
China or to maintain the "open door" in the interests of Great 
Britain and the United States; the victor in the struggle will 
quickly, it is certain, a few years hence, forget that it received 
sympathy if its interests lie in such forgetfulness ; each one is 
most practically selfish in its dealings with the other, and each 
one is utterly unscrupulous in its dealings with the unfortunate 
bones of contention which are too feeble to defend themselves — 
the Corean and Chinese Empires. It is true that each nation 
states its intention to guarantee the integrity of China ; but — 
well, we shall see ; the motive of such statements is too obvious. 



It would really seem that our sympathy is due to China and 
Corea ; but why sympathise with such degenerates ? The practical 
man seldom displays much sympathy for long with the confirmed 
drunkard ; it is success and strength, not imbecility, which breed 
sympathy, save in those whose sympathy is valueless, the weak- 
headed. The display of sympathy by one nation for another is a 
question of policy, or rather of strategy ; for the display of generous 
sympathy, if carried to excess, is likely to force the hand of the 
Government and to plunge a nation into war without due prepara- 
tion ; it is, consequently, a source of grave danger to a state, and 
as such should be carefully guarded against, not only by the 
leaders of a nation, but by the people and the Press, The display 
of sympathy is one of those strategical problems on which the 
welfare, or it may even be the very existence, of a nation may 
depend; and these problems should be argued out closely and 
dispassionately, the sole object being to ascertain the direction 
in which the national interests lie, and to avoid the possible 
commission of a grave strategical error which may well jeopardise 
the safety of a nation. These are facts which, however unpalat- 
able, no nation of modern times can with impunity disregard ; 
they are facts with which men trained to the study of strategy 
and the art of war have for long been familiar ; but they are un- 
pleasant facts, and for that reason alone are apt to be disregarded 
by the inexpert leader; while the untrained but all-powerful 
populace of a democracy which, lacking education in the art of 
war, habitually permits its heart to run away with its head, not 
only refuses to be guided by and determinately closes its eyes to 
such facts, but even denies their very existence. Hence we see a 
great burst of sympathy throughout Great Britain and the United 
States for Japan ; while a similar display of sympathy for Russia 
takes place in France. These rival sympathies contain the germ 
of war between Great Britain and France; and that leader, or 
those organs of the Press, or even those irresponsible men, who, 
actuated by motives of philanthropy, morality, or even of religion, 
advocate, in defiance of the dictates of strategy, the display of an 
excessive sympathy for one or other combatant, unwittingly 
accept the grave responsibility for a possible war the magnitude 
of which cannot be foreseen, but which might, and probably would, 
result in the ruin of their own country. Charity begins at home. 

The question which Englishmen should ask themselves is this : 
" Is it to the advantage of Great Britain and the British Empire 
that Russia or Japan should win this war ? " 

The Situation of Great Britain in the. World. 

Great Britain is one of many civilised nations which maintain 
armed forces, whether on land or sea or both, more or less highly- 
organised, trained, and equipped with arms of precision. Of these 
nations there are five of the first rank — Great Britain, the United 
States, Russia, Germany, and France. Each one of these goes in 
more or less constant fear of the others, for their interests are, 
generally speaking, conflicting, and the possibility of war is 
never very far off. There is not much to choose in strength 
and resources between these five nations, and any two combined 
would, in all probability, be more than a match for a third. 
Hence we find them forming alliances either with one another or 
with nations of the second rank, generally as protective measures, 
but sometimes, it may well be, with a view to aggression. Great 
Britain is, however, differently situated to the others ; her 
territories are scattered throughout the globe, separated from 
one another by wide expanses of sea ; some of her possessions, 
peopled by inferior races, are held by the sword ; while others, 
the great self-governing Colonies, peopled by men and women of 
her own flesh and blood, are by degrees rising into prominence 
as young and vigorous nations. Great Britain and these 
Colonies are, yith the exception of consanguinity, bound to one 
another solely by what may be termed moral ties — ^similarity 
of speech, religion, traditions, customs, and sport. While by no 
means under-estimating the value of these moral ties, it must be 
admitted that they are somewhat unsubstantial compared with 
those more practical ties which result from a common commercial 
or military interest. There would not seem to be any very great 
devotion on the part of the great Colonies to Great Britain as the 
** Mother Country;" but there undoubtedly exists a feeling of 
pride in the ideal of the British Empire ; and it seems possible that, 
with this ideal in view, the Colonies would rally to the assistance 
of Great Britain if she were attacked by a great and powerful 
nation or by a combination of such. There is one exception, how- 
ever, that of South Africa. It is without doubt the case that the 
majority of the Dutch population of the country would welcome 
any opportunity which might arise or which might be made to 
sever all connection with Great Britain and the British Empire ; 
and it is, moreover, the case that all the Colonies, even if they 
possessed the will, could afford but little assistance to Great 
Britain in a European war, for, with the exception of Canada, 
none of them maintain armed forces worthy of the name. 

It can hardly be denied, indeed, that the British Empire 


lacks cohesion ; and when it is considered that the great self- 
governing Colonies are in no sense bound to obey orders 
or suggestions dictated from Great Britain, it will also be clear 
that it lacks one single and undivided controlling power, and, as a 
consequence, unity of purpose or continuity of policy. The whole 
fabric is, in fact, an empire in embryo ; a vast, ill-built, and -rambling 
edifice of which Great Britain is the corner-stone; one which, if 
intelligently directed, may be welded into a force of vast power ; 
but which may equally be shattered at any moment by a single, 
well-directed blow, or which may even collapse of itself. If, there- 
fore, war be the ultimate arbiter of the fate of nations, it is clear 
that the British Empire, as at present constituted, is not a factor 
of any very great significance in the world ; and that foreign 
nations have to reckon, not with the British Empire as a whole, 
but with the small, if rich, nation in the British Islands themselves. 

The question therefore arises : " Is Great Britain in a fit 
condition to wage a war for her existence ? " 

Success in war in modern times depiends on three essentials — 
good leadership, national organisation, and national discipline. 
Japan is at the present moment giving us a startling object-lesson 
in the display of these three qualities. Great Britain is the only 
nation of the Empire which maintains armed forces ; her Beet is, 
^o far as material strength in ships goes, the most powerful in the 
world ; but the Boer War of 1899 showed most clearly not only 
^hat her land forces were entirely insufficient in numbers and ill- 
organised — in effect, not organised with a view to war — ^but that 
the leadership of the nation was unscientific to a degree and 
organised on a faulty principle, while an entire lack of national 
-organisation and discipline was displayed. Bad national leader- 
ship, which renders efficient preparation for war and the conduct 
•of war in accordance with the dictates of strategy impossible, must 
injuriously affect the sea forces equally with the land forces ; and 
it is day by day becoming more apparent to the British nation as 
a whole that, under the present system of leadership by the party- 
politician, the nation can hardly, with good reason, hope for 
success in any great war in which she may unfortunately become 
engaged. The Boer War also rendered clear to the people that 
under her present system of leadership the nation was quite as 
likely as not to slip unexpectedly and unawares into a great war. 
It is, indeed, undoubtedly the case that Great Britain, the corner- 
stone of the British Empire, by reason of lack of efficient leader- 
ship, national organisation, and national discipline, is not in a fit 
state to enter upon a struggle with any of the other nations of the 
first rank ; and for that reason alone she invites attack. 


Thus the strategical objects of the British nation can be stated 
as follows :— 

(i) To introduce the necessary reforms In the system of 

(2) To introduce national discipline and organisation. 

(3) To consolidate the Empire. 

It is, evidently, desirable that the necessary measures should 
be introduced before the advent of war ; and the efforts of the 
British nation must therefore, for the time being at least, be 
directed to the maintenance of peace ; but the evident desire for 
peace at any price is in itself sufficient to invite attack, and that 
nation which would avoid war would do well to strengthen its 
position and its armed forces, and to put itself into a condition of 
such perfect readiness for war as will render a gratuitous assault 
on the part of any other power a matter of extreme danger to 
the assailant. But reforms, of whatever nature, in a popularly 
governed nation demand time, and this is more than ever the case 
when, as in the present instance, prejudices, the growth of centuries, 
must be combated and eradicated. That an excellent commence- 
ment has been made is the case ; for the War Office Reconstitution 
Committee has ably laid down the means by which a moderately 
efficient system of national leadership may, without an absolute 
change in the Constitution, be ensured ; while the political agitation 
in favour of fiscal reform points the way to the first step in the 
consolidation of the Empire; and the efforts of the national 
Service League give grounds for hope that national organisation 
and discipline, together with the necessary number of trained men 
for the armed forces may be secured. The rapidity with which 
the recommendations of the War Office Committee have been 
adopted augurs well for the future ; but, at the same time, it should 
not be forgotten that Cabinets come and go; and that nothing 
can really be accomplished without the consent of the people at 
large ; and that such consent involves the education of the masses, 
not only in the elementary principles of the art of war, but in the 
strat^ical situation of the nation. And the question arises : Will 
foreign nations permit Great Britain to carry her objects into 
effect ; will they not rather — those of them to whom an organised 
British Empire would constitute a very real threat — strike while 
Great Britain is as yet unprepared ? The answer to this question 
is to be found in a consideration of the objects of the other Powers, 
and of the threats conveyed by the past policy of those Powers 
against Great Britain. 



The British people has been taught to regard Russia as its 
bitterest opponent ; and it will be as well to discuss the position 
of the Russian Empire in the world, in the first instance. 

Russia's main object in the past has been to obtain an outlet 
to a southern sea, and there are three parts of the world in which 
she has endeavoured to do so — through the Dardanelles, in the 
Persian Gulf, and in the Yellow Sea, through China. It is obvious 
that the greatest advantages were to be gained by the possession 
of the Dardanelles, for not only would she hold a strategic position 
of immense strength, but she would strike at once into the very 
focus of the world's commerce on one of the chief trade routes of 
the world. Next in value to the Dardanelles would come the 
Persian Gulf, as being nearer to the centres of commerce than the 
Yellow Sea. But aggression in the direction of the Dardanelles 
was checked by the hostility of Great Britain and France as well 
as Turkey, and her advance in that direction was, for the time 
being, stopped by the formation of the autonomous kingdom of 
Bulgaria. Turning her attention to the Persian Gulf, she again 
came face to face with Great Britain; and, consequently, her 
expansion took place on the line of least resistance, that \s, 
towards the Far East. Here she has been checked by Japan, and 
her defeat, if she meets with defeat, will assuredly raise Japan to 
such power as will render any future advance in that direction a 
matter of impossibility; and she will, in all probability, again turn 
her attention to the line of least resistance, which will probably be 
Persia. If, on the other hand, she be successful in this present 
war, she will gain her immediate object, and will yet be fully 
employed in China and Corea for many years to come, until she 
has, in fact, finally disposed of Japanese intentions and ambitions. 
Then, and not until then^ will she be in a position to turn her 
attention to the Persian Gulf. It may well be, however, that 
neither Russia nor Japan will gain decisive victory in this present 
war, in which case the peace which will ensue will be but an 
armed peace, an intake of breath, so to speak, for the renewal of 
the struggle. In any case, it will be seen that, for the present at 
least. Great Britain has but little to fear from Russian aggp'ession^ 
for it is absurd to suppose that Russia will deliberately attack 
Great Britain while engaged with Japan, unless she can thereby 
obtain the assistance of both France and Germany ; and, even so, 
it is by no means clear that she would have much to gain by such 
a general conflagration. It would thus seem that there is but 
little to be feared from Russia in the near future, except in the 
event of her decisive defeat by Japan. 



If Japan meets with defeat in the present war, she must struggle 
to the last for her very existence ; if a decisive result is not 
obtained, she must prepare for the next outbreak of hostilities 
with Russia ; if successful in her present venture, she, like Russia, 
will be fully employed in Corea and China for at least twenty 
years, or it may be for half a century to come. If ultimately 
successful against Russia, and if she succeeds in organising the 
yellow races, then her next move must unavoidably be directed 
against Australia and the British Empire, if the latter is still in 
existence. It will thus be seen that neither danger nor assistance 
is to be expected from Japan in the near future. It is, indeed, 
doubtful whether Japan, as the ally of Great Britain, could afford 
any very material assistance against a combination of Germany, 
France, and Russia ; for in such a war the decisive point must, of 
necessity, lie in the North Sea, the Channel, the Atlantic Ocean, 
and in Great Britain ; and Japan's assistance would be confined to 
guarding the interests of Great Britain in the Far East and the 
Pacifia In such a case, Japan would rapidly consolidate her own 
ix>wer ; she would gain vastly in prestige, in which Great Britain 
would lose ; she would, in fact, serve her own interests in a primary, 
while guarding British interests in a purely 6econdary, degree. 


Whatever may be said to the contrary, there appears no good 
reason to doubt that the French mind is as keenly set on the 
recovery of Alsace and Lorraine as it ever was, and that this is 
still not only the ruling idea with the French populace, but that it 
is a main object of French strategy. It is, indeed, inconceivable 
that a great nation, with glorious traditions such as those of the 
French, could tamely acquiesce in the dismemberment of its 
territory ; for the loss of Alsace and Lorraine must mean much the 
same to the French nation as the loss of Kent would mean 
to the British. Any further increase of strength to the German 
nation would not only constitute a grave threat to the French 
nation, but would force the French to finally discard all hopes of 
the recovery of the lost provinces ; while, on the other hand, a 
pow*crful and consolidated British Empire would be calculated to 
keep German ambition within bounds, and for that reason alone 
would bring nearer the possibility of the recovery of these pro- 
vinces. It is, however, true that the expansion of French power 
in North Africa, which has made such strides of late years, must 
infallibly be regarded with some distrust by Great Britain, and 


that a powerful British Empire would undeniably act as a check 
upon such expansion. There are not wanting men, moreover, who 
maintain that the true interests of France lie across the seas, and 
that she would do well to finally discard all thoughts of continental 
expansion in favour of a colonial empire ; in other words, to enter 
into competition with the British Empire, and to grant Germany 
a practically free hand for her designs in West and North-Westem 
Europe. That this idea has been promoted by the Germans with 
their own objects in view is, of course, patent to all men, certainly ta 
the French themselves. It is, indeed, difficult to say which is the true 
interest of France, continental expansion or over-sea expansion ; 
and the answer would seem to lie in another question : ** Which 
would constitute the greater danger to France, a German Empire 
which should embrace Denmark, Holland, Austria proper, and 
Bohemia, or a consolidated British Empire ? Notwithstanding the 
expansion of France in North Africa, her past strategy, except in 
the case of Egypt, does not in one single instance point to an 
aggressive policy directed against Great Britain or the British 
Empire ; and it is an open secret that during the Boer War she 
might, had she willed, have obtained the assistance of Germany, 
and probably also of Russia, against Great Britain. The fact that 
she refrained, when she might have entered upon the struggle with 
an almost certain hope of victory, points clearly to the recovery of 
Alsace and Lorraine as her ultimate objective ; and also to the fact 
that her strategists recognise that the defeat of Great Britain would 
lead to the overwhelming strength of Germany, which would, of 
necessity, in the end, result in another attack upon France. 


In a discussion of the probable objects of Germany, the history 
for the last fifty years of Prussia, the corner-stone of the German 
Empire, must not be lost sight of; it must not be forgotten that in 
1864 she, with Austria, attacked Denmark, her real object being to 
acquire territory for the construction of the Kiel Canal ; that in 1866 
she attacked Austria in order to gain the leadership of the German 
kingdoms ; and that in 1870 she attacked France in order to render 
possible a German Empire. This Empire now holds an exceedingly 
strong strategical position, which will, unless improbable contin- 
gencies occur, be greatly strengthened in the near future. Dominat- 
ing Denmark and the Baltic on the one side, she also holds a strong 
position on the North Sea ; while on the other side her territories 
extend to within 1 50 miles of Venice and the Adriatic. Austria 
proper lies between her and the Adriatic, and in the forthcoming 


disruption of the Austrian Empire — a disruption which is practi- 
cally certain to occur on the death of the present Austrian Emperor 
— ^she will without difficulty absorb that country, which is peopled 
by Germans, in the German Empire. By this means she will gain 
access to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and will be in an 
excellent position to enter, single-handed if necessary, upon a 
struggle with Great Britain. Such a struggle is the next and most 
logical step towards the attainment of the German ambition as a 
world-power and " Lord of the Atlantic." It is hardly necessary 
to recapitulate the various incidents in German strategy of the last 
few years which show that she has definitely entered into the lists 
with Great Britain, and that she will, with or without allies, when 
she is fully prepared, strike for her legitimate ambition, even as she 
did at Denmark, Austria, and France. Suffice it to say that, from 
the date of the German Emperor's telegram to Kruger to the date 
of Germany's late attempt to separate Canada from Great Britain, 
her effiDrts have been directed secretly, as is clear to every student 
of strategy, to the isolation and enfeeblement of Great Britain and 
to the disruption of the British Empire — the first step in scientific 
preparation for war. She has latterly, moreover, thrown aside the 
mask of secrecy ; she now makes little or no secret of her intentions 
and ambitions, as is exemplified by the extraordinary projected 
increase of her navy, which can have but one object in view, as well 
as by the utterances of the German Emperor. During the Boer 
War she was not sufficiently strong at sea to venture single-handed 
with the smallest hope of success on a struggle with Great Britain ; 
she could only afford to do so provided she could obtain the assist- 
ance of France and Russia, and it is an open secret that this she 
endeavoured to effect At the present time, again, she is still 
endeavouring to form such a coalition ; she has, without doubt, 
attempted to work on the excitable and chivalrous feelings of the 
French people through Russia ; for in the sudden outburst in the 
Russian Press of vituperation and baseless accusations against 
the British Government, which were calculated to rouse the fiery 
indignation of the French nation, the ally of Russia, is clearly to 
be recognised the hand of Germany. Russia can, at the present 
juncture, gain nothing either by a rupture with Great Britain or by 
digging Great Britain and France into the present war ; France, 
similarly, has nothing to gain by a rupture with Great Britain ; 
while now, as formerly, Germany, who could strike in with decisive 
effect, has everything to gain and nothing to lose by a war between 
Great Britain and France. This action of Germany is merely in 
accordance with the methods adopted by her as against Denmark, 
Austria, and France, and is strikingly similar to those she adopted 


against Great Britain in the Boer War. It is probable that she 
views with concern the present efforts of the British people to re- 
organise the Army, and especially the system of national leadership, 
to form a General Staff, and to introduce national service ; for her 
great hope of success lies in the inept and imbecile leadership 
which IS inseparable from a party Government which is backed by 
an ignorant, ill-disciplined and unorganised nation. Hence her 
obvious efforts to force on a crisis. 

The United States. 

The policy of the United States would, of late years, seem to 
have been dh-ected into its true channel ; there is no longer that 
playful and puerile desire to "twist the lion's tail." Americans 
have apparently awakened to the fact that the national life is 
not all "beer and skittles," but must be taken seriously. The 
dominant feature of its strategy is a deliberate and carefully 
thought-out scheme of preparation for the day when the completion 
of the Panama Canal shall place what will almost certainly be the 
most important trade route of the world, as well as a "decisive 
point " of the utmost strategic value, in her hands, and raise her 
at once to the position of the dominant power of the world. The 
Monroe Doctrine strikes two ways ; for the very fact that the 
outside world is debarred from interference with the American 
Continent of necessity must oblige the United States to see to it 
that no excuse for such interference shall be given ; and it is thus 
the case that her whole attention will, in all probability, be fully 
engaged for many years to come in America itself. It is true that 
Canada must always be a possible cause of a rupture between the 
United States and the British Empire; but while the main 
attention of the northern country is turned inwards towards its 
own development, and the eyes of the southern to the south, 
towards Panama, there is but little fear that any bone of contention 
can arise between the two nations of such vital importance to 
either one as cannot be settled by compromise, but must be referred 
to the stern arbitrament of war. 


It would thus seem that, of all the great nations of the world, 
Germany is the only one whose interest and ambition demand the 
downfall of the British Empire, and whose object it will therefore 
be to prevent the attainment of the British objects. With this 
object in view, and taking into consideration Germany's habitually 
offensive strategy, we may rest assured that she will do her utmost 


to obtain the assistance of an ally in order to strike a decisive 
blow at as early a date as possible. And that ally must be 
France, for Russia is at present too heavily engaged to be in a 
position to render assistance ; and Germany could not venture to 
attack Great Britain while there existed the possibility that France 
would declare against her. The present entente cardiale which 
exists between Great Britain and France seems at first glance to 
remove all possibility of a combination between Germany and 
France, but it must be remembered that friendly feeling is apt to 
change to hatred just as rapidly as hatred changes to friendly 
feeling ; and though the present friendly feeling may be prolonged, 
and, in spite of German intrigue, develop into an alliance, yet 
alliances, as history has so often shown, may be broken or evaded, 
and only, in reality, hold good so long as they serve the interests 
of both of the allies. We may be certain that Germany will seize 
every opportunity, will take instant advantage of any false move, 
will, indeed, make opportunities, to plunge Great Britain and 
France into war. If Russia meets with defeat in the present war, 
Germany will assuredly endeavour to rouse continental feeling 
against Great Britain as the nation which has given life to a 
Frankenstein in the shape of the " Yellow Peril ; " but before that 
moment arrives there will be many other efforts of a nature 
similar to that we have just experienced to embroil Great Britain 
and France ; and it is more than probable that Germany will, in 
the end, succeed, for, in her strategy, she is acting on the offensive, 
with all the advantages of initiative and secrecy in her favour, 
against a nation acting on the passive defensive and to which 
secrecy is impossible. But even if Germany fail, for the time 
being, in her object to embroil Great Britain and France, she will 
yet, in a few years to come, gain such an increase of power on 
land, through the absorption of Austria, that it would be suicidal 
for France to assist Great Britain, which has no army as armies 
go in these days. The French, considering their own interests, will 
ahnost certainly stand aloof, and, notwithstanding any treaties of 
alliance, remain neutral, or, it may even be, assist Germany. 
Alliances are only of value if formed in view of the delivery of a blow. 
There can be but one opinion as to the correct strategical 
course for Great Britain to adopt. Germany cannot, single-handed, 
attack Great Britain before 191 2 ; but every day's latitude granted 
to her in which to perfect her arrangements and to strengthen her 
navy is one more nail hammered into the coffin of Great Britain 
and the British Empire; for it must not be forgotten that 
Germany is — as her past history has clearly proved — an un- 
scrupulous nation, directed by the scientist, and which gains its 


objects by war ; and that, having definitely decided on her object, 
she will not discard that object unless forced to relinquish it by 
defeat in war, bot will employ every trick, every artifice, within 
the rai^e of the human mind, every possible means, moral or 
immoral, to gain it ; and if she seems to give way, or even makes 
a display of firiendliness, we may rest assured that it will be as a 
temporary measure only, its object being to hoodwink her 
adversary, and thus to bring about a more favourable opportunity 
at whidi to deliver a decisive blow. That man can only be termed 
a fool who, with a loaded revolver in his hand, permits his enemy 
to charge the magazine of his rifle. The proper strat^cal course 
for Great Britain to adopt would seem to be — 

(i) To push forward the reforms in the national s)rstem of 

(2) To introduce some form of national or universal service. 

(3) To consolidate the Empire so far as is possible. 

(4) To form, if possibly an offensive and defensive alliance with 

(5) As the only safe means of defence to attack Germany as 
soon as possible. 

But an offen^ve and defen^ve alliance with France is, probably, 
possible only provided Great Britain be prepared to put 500,000 
to 1,000^000 men in the field to assist in the struggle on land. It 
is to be feared, however, that Great Britain, with her national 
policy, in every case, dominated and warped by the childish 
interests of political parties and of party politicians, will fail to 
seize her present opportunity, and will inevitably be attacked by 
Germany, probably in alliance with the great Powers of Europe, 
at some date in the near future, and will suffer defeat 

In the mean time, however, it is not to the interest of Great 
Britain that Russia should suffer decisive defeat in the Far East ; 
and neither is it to her interest that Russia should gain a decisive 
victory ; but it is to her interest that Russia should find ample 
employment for her energies in the Far East for many years to 
come; and this will best be accomplished if Russia retains 
possession of Manchuria with Port Arthur, while Japan retains 
possession of Corea. And it would seem that the British people 
and the British Press will be wise to refrain from the display of an 
excessive qonpathy for Japan. The avoidance of such a display of 
sympathy is by no means contrary to the spirit of our alliance with 
Japan ; it is merely a measure of ordinary precaution ; for the 
display of such sympathy is to g^ive Germany the opportunity she 

C Ross. 


By Major P. A. Silburn, D.S.O., Permanent Staff, Natal. 

The strength of the European armaments of to-day is regulated 
by the various responsibilities of the Governments possessing them 
— ^plus the defensive power of the Government or Governments 
whose interests, geographically,!diplomatically, or commercially, are 
likely to clash. 

The strenuous efforts made by some of the greater Powers to 
become supremely defensive but increases the suspicions of their 
neighbours, and the result is an ever-increasing warlike activity 
detrimental to alliances that would alone mean a lasting peace 
among the dominant races of the world. There lacks that con- 
fidence among neighbouring nations necessary to fix the maximum 
strength required to safeguard each country's interests ; the result 
is that the larger Powers are draining their strength in a nervous 
anxiety to raise and maintain armaments totally disproportionate 
to their responsibilities or their requirements, the object to be 
attained being lost in ambition to eclipse a probable enemy, not so 
much in actual fighting power as in the amount of bullion expended, 
thus transferring the sphere of offensive operations from the battle- 
field to the apparently less, though more deadly field of taxation. 
In one or two cases an available and equally effective means, 
because, perhaps, less expensive, is neglected, in this unreasonable 
anxiety for a heavy Naval and Military Budget, forgetful it would 
seem that such a course must sooner or later defeat its own object. 

None of the Powers exemplify this suicidal course more vividly 
than does Great Britain. Created and developed by the sea and 
held by sea power, it would have been logically thought that by sea 
power she would elect to exist. Her policy for the last few years is, 
however, in direct contradiction to this. An annually increasing 
Army vote has culminated in being almost equal to that of the Navy. 
The fundamental cause of her very existence is, in the future, to be 
relegated to a secondary position as a means of defence. It needs 
but a glance at past Budgets to note with concern the growing 


interest given to the Army, necessarily to the detriment of the 

Beyond the necessary calls upon our Army in India and a small 
-war in Somaliland, it is beyond human understanding upon what 
ultimate object such a stupendous sum as that provided for the 
Army in this year s Budget can be expended. An Army of 
240,000 kept on continual pay for what ? Invasion ? That alone, a 
Navy can repel. Once the Navy fails in this, no Army can save 
Great Britain ; and as for the Colonies, it depends upon themselves, 
their strength and their hinterland resources, what becomes of them 
should the Navy fail. It must, however, be acceded that the ever- 
growing Imperial needs include an Army of a certain strength, 
equal to or perhaps stronger, though not necessarily as expensive, 
as that for which the British taxpayer pays almost as much as for 
the Navy to which he really owes his immunity from invasion and 
conquest It is a matter of reasonable doubt, however, whether 
such an Army cannot be found by other and fairer means than 
that of the exorbitant taxation of one section of the Empire. 

Should Great Britain be shorn of her Colonies, her own existence 
would still demand a Navy of the- strength it is to-day — the needs 
for an Army, on the other hand, would be reduced. It must, there- 
fore, appear an anomaly that what contributions are made by the 
Colonies to Imperial Defence are given directly to that institution 
to which they themselves are less directly in need. The Colonies, 
however, of course recognise that the true safety of the Empire lies 
in protecting its most vital part, and that that protection is the Navy, 
which by maintaining the command of the sea, furnishes the only 
means of securing the forty odd millions of inhabitants of the 
United Kingdom from starvation. 

It has been openly said by members of the Government 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer in his Budget speech, 1903) that the 
Colonial contributions are disappointing, but has it ever seriously 
occurred to these Ministers that if the whole question of Imperial 
Defence had been carefully considered by them, or preferably by a 
committee of experts with fair Colonial representation, that a far 
more equitable means of Colonial contribution to Imperial Defence 
would have long ere this been forthcoming, and that the land forces 
of the Empire would have been federated into an Imperial Army, 
the cost of which would have been equally borne by every British 
-subject ? 

The Colonies have of necessity a stronger Military than Naval 
sentiment, and they are in a position to train a very laige percentage 
of their manhood to arms, and to give that training over an area of 
country unobtainable in Great Britain. Owing to Colonial life being 


analogous to campaigning, this training calb for little expense, 
when made compulsory by Acts such as are in force in most of the 

However fondly hopes may be cherished of the Colonies being 
able to contribute in personnel to the Navy, such must by circum- 
stances surrounding Colonial life be doomed to disappointment,, 
except, perhaps, in the case of Newfoundland. Upon the other 
hand, Englishmen, as apart from Colonials, like all islanders are 
naturally seamen, and every man recruited for the British Army in 
England is a man lost to the Navy. 

The late war illustrated to the world at large the value of 
Colonies governed by local responsibility. Burke's advocacy of 
governing Colonies as free countries has been amply justified. And 
it further proved how fallacious the belief that in time of trouble 
for the parent country those Colonies enjoying self-government, and 
therefore practically autonomous, would give no assistance beyond 
that of sentiment The value of the Colonies in Imperial Defence, 
however, was acknowledged long before the term " Imperial " was 
thought of, for as far back as 1756 (the Seven Years' War) we find 
that 25,000 Colonial Militia were supplied by our North American* 
Colonies and upon far more generous terms to the Mother Country 
than were the Colonial contingents used in the late war, for they 
were actually raised, clothed, fed and paid by the Colonies. Little 
was heard of this practical illustration of loyalty. With the close of 
the war, the prowess of the Colonials was forgotten by English 
statesmen ; though from odd passages in history we find that these . 
New Englanders did yeoman service. The time had not then 
arrived for any attempt to federate the land forces of the one or 
two Colonies, then possessing them, with the land forces of the 
United Kingdom. The Colonies were rapidly forgotten, and there 
were those who strongly advocated their abandonment The second 
opportunity that occurred for federation was during the Soudan 
campaign, 1885. Most of the Colonies offered assistance, and a few 
troops were actually accepted from Australia. It was stated by 
those who should have known better that this acceptance was a 
precedent Those Colonials upheld the reputation gained by the 
Canadians over two centuries before. They were thanked for their 
services, and that was the end of it, as far as the Empire was 
concerned. The practical sentiment evinced even then promised 
development into a Federated Army. Two and a half centuries 
have elapsed between the first Colonial contingents that served in 
Empire-making and the last Colonial contingents serving in 
Empire-keeping, and during that period nothing has been done by 
the authorities at home to bring the latter any closer to the British 

VOI* ci« II 

[vol. xzix. nbw sskibs.] 


Army than the fonner were. It would have been thought that 

when the Anny Estimates began to overhaul the Naval, British 

statesmen would have commenced to study the complex forces ct 

the Emjnre beyond the seas, with the object of bringing them 

together for the purpose of federation into an Imperial Army, 

obtaining a greater Navy and giving l^hter taxation in the United 

Kingdom, and a more just taxation to the Colonies. A juster 

taxation to the Colonist, because there is no room for doubt that he 

is more lightly dealt with in taxation, whether direct or indirect, 

than the less fortunate inhabitant of the United Kingdom ; though 

he is a partner in the privilege of temporary safety that the latter 

obtains by payment of an undue proportion of its cost. Whilst 

the increase in taxation was confined to the growing needs of the 

Navy, the British taxpayer had nothing to complain of, for his own 

existence demands an unrivalled Navy with or without Colonial 

appendages. It is a debatable question whether British sea-borne 

commerce would be much less than it is to-day were the Colonies 

foreign possessions. The Navy, then, is the effect of the United 

Kingdom, as it is the cause of the Empire. Can this be said of 

the Army ? How many wars within the last century has England 

had that have not been in the interests of colonisation — or shall we 

say Empire-making ? But has not the goal yet been reached ? 

Without fear of contradiction, we can say that the Empire has been 

made, and that there no longer exists the need for the Mother 

Country to keep the secondary instrument that assisted in its 

creation. Her duty to herself calls for her to hand over the 

responsibility of the greater part of its upkeep to those for whose 

safety it is still required, and who are now in a position to bear 

that responsibility with ever-increasing strength. 

There is just the fear of the same n^lect being shown to the 
Colonial forces to-day as was shown to the Canadians in 1763. By 
*^ neglect " is meant that the material at hand in those forces will 
not be made use of in the moulding of a Federated Army, will not 
be reckoned an Imperial asset until a crisis arises, and then, 
through neglect in oi^anisation and unity, their services may be 
valueless ; for it may not be that our future foe will be as neglectful 
of his opportunities as was the Boer. 

In our smaller wars the Colonials are not given an opportunity 
of training themselves for greater things, and then when greater 
things occur, the Colonial has not in the eyes of the authorities 
obtained that experience to fit him for anything but a subordinate 
position, and thus it is that he has not the opportunity of showing 
the higher qualities he may possibly possess. 

As a step in the direction of the federation now advocated, a 


proportionate share in the responsibilities should be allowed the 
Colonies. The argument against this is that the present Army is 
kept by the British taxpayer ; the Colonial contributes nothing to 
it, and it is then but fair to give the responsible positions to those 
who have to bear the burden. But now that burden is increasing 
in weight, in addition to that immovable and necessary load, the 
Navy, it is but fair to transfer part of it to those upon whose behalf 
it has been carried for so long, now that they are in the position 
to carry it with ease. It will, perhaps, be asked how this transfer 
of burden (we will not say responsibilities, for they must ever 
remain the same) is to take place without revolutionising our long- 
cherished system of Empire-governing. The principle should 
first of all be recognised that the Colonies contribute in personnel 
to the Imperial Army in proportion to their population, and that 
they share in proportion the privileges of Empire ; at present these 
privileges are barred them, unless they accept the alternative of 
casting aside their Colony (an int^^ part of the Empire) and 
adopting England as a domicile. This course is open to any 
foreigner. The Colonic by right of his relationship, the prestige 
he has given to the Mother Country by his enterprise in the 
exploitation of her possessions, and the wealth he sends to the 
Motherland, has, in the past, deserved better treatment than this. 
If the Colonies had been allowed to take their share (in proportion 
to their population) in Imperial control in and from the sphere in 
whidi they had been brought up, they undoubtedly would have 
considered it their unquestionable duty to have shared in the 
responsibilities of Empire ; it indeed speaks well for their loyalty 
and promises well for the future, for the crisis has passed, that they 
have stood the strain of indifference for two and a half centuries. 

To bring about the federation aimed at, there must, first of all, 
be a uniformity of ideas upon the subject To obtain this, localisa- 
tion must be neutralised to allow the Imperial idea to predominate. 
It has been argued that Colonials are not fitted by education and 
experience for the higher Imperial posts ; but do not Education 
and Experience stand for influence ? I quite fail to see why an 
Australian should not do good diplomatic service in Egypt armed 
with an Australian University degree in lieu of a Cambridge or 
Oxford one. Will a Canadian make a worse governor of an 
Imperial possession because he has been educated at a Canadian 
college ? or a New Zealander or South African command troops 
in India with less skill or courage because his education and ex- 
perience is Colonial ? I presume to think not. Give, therefore, to 
the Colonies a proportion of these ofiices, equal to the proportion 
they contribute to the Empire's defence. What their proportion 



should be the Colonials themselves cannot veiy well detennine — 
and who is to fix it for them ? Not the Imperial Defence Com- 
mittee, for it is hardly in sympathy with the Colonies ; its province 
goes no further than revising Colonial Defence Schemes submitted 
from year to year, and such revisions are made under War Office 
methods. The lines upon which each Colony should travel, to 
arrive at defensive federation, must be carefully laid out by a council 
of experts ; by experts is meant men intimately acquainted with 
the Colonies and their resources. The object to be achieved should 
be one of substance ; not a mythical one of sentiment, something 
of an unknown quantity as it has been in the past The term 
" federation " is of elastic definition ; whereas, prefixing ** defence," 
it should at least mean universal service, uniformity of trainings 
weapons, interchangeability and army rank of officers, an Imperial 
Intelligence Department with a proportion of Colonial officers, and 
a proportion of Colonial officers on the Headquarter^s Staff. 

At present there are not two Colonies in the Empire whose 
defence system is controlled in the same manner. One Colony has 
a portfolio of Defence, another a Council of Defence, a third a 
Defence Committee, and a fourth is controlled by a military 
secretary. In some of these cases appointments and offices are 
insecure, promotions dependent perhaps upon the wilfulness of a 
minister or a member of the local House of Parliament, here to-day 
and gone to-morrow. In many instances these very members are 
junior officers in the Defence Force they themselves control for a 
time, and the career of many good Colonial officers has been 
wrecked by the animosity of such individuals caused in inany 
instances by personal feeling. The fault is due to the restricted 
responsibility of the Colonies, which in many cases (notably those 
but recently elevated to responsible Government) is purely 

It is, perhaps, worthy of record here, as illustrating the low ebb 
Imperial parties can reach in the smaller Colonies, and showing 
the class of men Colonial politicians are recruited from, to quote a 
recent political crisis that occurred in one of our Colonies. There 
were two questions before this particular Colony, one a Militia Bill 
that marked a departure in Imperial Defence worthy of the 
Empire's attention, and the other question was whether or no a 
new railway should be built. The Government went to the country 
on the latter question, and was returned on that question alone. 
Few speeches were made on the Militia Bill then before the country, 
and two were against the passing of it into law as interfering with 
the liberty of the subject ! Now, this apparent apathy is due to 
ignorance, and that alone can be removed by the subject being 


raised from a local sphere into the atmosphere of Imperial politics, 
and this should be effected before indifference grows into real live 
antagonism caused by long neglect. The first step towards this 
wished-for federation will be the formation of an Imperial Council 
of Defence with Colonial representation. The second step will be 
the remodelling of the War Office on Imperial lines, and here 
again the Colonies would, with advantage to the Empire, be 
represented. When such departures are made, no doubt the 
Colonies themselves would be pleased to be relieved of the 
drudgery that at present falls to their lot, the sordidness of 
members of Parliament paying off personal grudges on brother 
officers by questioning their salaries in supply and numerous other 

A Federated Defence Force centred in an Imperial War Office, 
such as is here advocated, would in a very short time weld together 
the varied land forces of the Empire into one Army, and that Army 
would be strengthened by its common interests. The British 
taxpayer would have his burden lightened, and the safety of the 
Empire would be secured by the presence of troops in every 
possession controlled for the good of the Empire, 



By Lieut.-Colonel F. N. Maude, late R.E. 


The Campaign of Ulm, 1805. 

There are probably very few officers in the British Army who 
have not at some period or other of their military career been 
confronted with an examination question on strategy, couched 
somewhat in the following terms : — 

''What are the advantages conferred on an invader by the 
possession of a re-entering frontier ? Illustrate your answer by a 
sketch and description of the campaign of Ulm (1805)." 

The question recalls the skeleton map at the end of Hamley's 
' Operations of Wan* The Main, with its curious double S curves, 
running along the top of the page and meeting the Rhine almost at 
right angles to the west ; whilst from Bambei^, Wiirzburg, Mayence, 
and Strasburg dotted lines converge on the course of the Danube 
between Donauworth and Ingolstadt, convejnng the impression 
that the columns of the Grand Army had been quietly awaiting, 
secure behind the formidable obstacles indicated, the signal to 
spring upon their devoted prey, which in a climax of intellectual 
imbecility had elected to remain inert and lifeless under the walls 
of the celebrated fortress, which has given its name to the 

Probably ninety-nine out of every hundred further believe 
that Bamberg and Wiirzburg were two imposing entrenched camps, 
teeming with stores and provisions, which the "friendly" North 
Germans brought gladly to the French commissariat in exchange 
for coin of the realm, and from the pages of our text-books, and 
the ordinary acceptation of such words as " base," " frontier," ** lines 
of communication," etc., I confess I cannot see what other 
conclusion could be reasonably arrived at. 

Nothing, however, could be less like the reality than this 
picture, for, if the true development of the plan of campaign is 
followed— and, thanks to the labours of MM. Alombert and Colin of 



the Historical section of the French General Staff, it has now been 
rendered readily accessible to all — ^it will be found that the line of 
the Main, as a section of a friendly frontier, never played any part 
in Napoleon's conception of his design at all, and by the nature of 
things exercised no influence on the course of events. 

Pursuing the general trend of my investigation, viz. to make 
it clear that ''strategy" is the ''art of the leader," and consists, to 
quote Moltke's definition, in " the practical adaptation of the means 
at hand to the attainment of the object in view," I propose to 
devote some little space in the first place to making clear to the 
reader the nature of the " means at hand " to each of the two 
leaders engaged, for in no other of his campaigns with which I am 
acquainted did Napoleon control from the outset such an over- 
whelming superiority of force, both moral and numerical. 

Marengo had established his reputation on such a pinnacle that, 
henceforth^ his orders met with a readiness of unquestioned 
obedience in excess probably of anything known in history before 
or since. It was not merely that he had the right as Emperor to 
command ; but it was the trust and confidence of all ranks in his in- 
fallibility that procured for him a zealous service up to the limits of 
human capacity for endurance, which far transcends, in the energy 
it communicates to the motion of masses of men, the momentum 
imported by perfunctory obedience to constituted authority. 

This alone was a new factor in warfare of far more importance 
than changes in weapons or equipment. Yet, notwithstanding 
this new power, he came within an ace of failure, and it will be 
interesting as a contribution to prevailing fallacies as to Army 
Reform to study the material at his disposal 

The Grand Army had been formed on the shores of the Channel^ 
its units duly assigned to their respective brigades, divisions, and 
corps, but already its size was beyond the power of one man's 
control, and no adequate material for the formation of a " General 
Staff" as yet existed. 

There were, indeed, a considerable number of war-experienced 
men accustomed to the office work of the field, excellent as 
individuals, but not trained in the same school to view matters 
from the same standpoint, or to work in harmony with one 
another; but even these were insufficient in number, whilst no 
arrangements whatever existed for the education and subsequent 
selection of men to fill its junior ranks, and in default of such a 
school, selection tempered by favouritism produced a plentiful crop 
of the typical "brass hats," — men who, insufficiently taught to 
appreciate the true needs and capacity of the men in the ranks, 
issue orders which can only be obeyed at the expense of their 


fighting efficiency, or circulated them with such carelessness that 
they always arrived late at their destination. 

The actual composition of the Army as regards the rank and 
file was excellent From the inspection returns of the year 
XI IL, preserved in the Archives, it appears that 50,538 out of 
115,582 had already seen service, though this number was very 
unevenly distributed amongst the different arms of the service. 
The sappers coming first with jj per cent of their strength, then 
the light cavalry and the infantry, averaging 42*5 per cent 

The number of men over ten years of service varied consider- 
ably — in the 17th Line there were gi8 out of 95 1, in the 13th Light 
Infantry 540 out of 569, down to the 14th Line 267 out of 741. 

Generally, 25 per cent of the Army had fought all through the 
campaigns of the Republic, a second quarter had been through 
Marengo and Hohenlinden, and the remainder had been incor- 
porated since 1801. 

Nearly all the officers and non-commissioned officers had seen 
service, and in each regiment there were still some sturdy survivors 
of the old Royal Army, some with forty years' Colour service. 

The Hussars had retained their old traditions, they had 
received very few conscripts, but had kept up their numbers by 
voluntary enlistment, generally from Alsatians and other German 
families ; one half, however, of their officers were quite illiterate, 
and many did not even know the words of command in French. 
Marbot's description, written in 1799, is still substantially accurate 
in 1805. 

The other arms had become more republican ; particularly the 
infantry, who seem to have been a pretty rough lot from the 
unmerciful fashion in which they harassed their recruits. Hence, 
-desertion was pretty rife — from 5 to 8 per cent per annum. The 
old soldiers also deserted freely ; but this seems to have been merely 
a republican way of taking furlough, as they generally rejoined 
after a few months' absence — evidently the punishment must have 
been merely nominal. The complaints, however, against the want 
of physical development in the recruits are ceaseless, yet at that 
time the strain on the population was by no means excessive, 
though it soon after became so. 

The composition of the officers present with the Grand 
Army is of peculiar interest The total number was 5000; of 
these about 100 came from the new officers' school at Fontaine- 
bleau, aged from seventeen to twenty-one, 500 to 600 from the 
original volunteers of 1792, or from the conscripts raised since 
1785. These were mostly picked men, selected for their general 
standard of instruction and social position, like " de Fezensac," or 


for distinguished conduct in action, as " Dulong/' commanding a 
battalion at twenty-five; but mostly they are still lieutenants 
in 1S05. 

In spite of this element of youth in the cadres, the average age 
of the sub-lieutenants is thirty-two, and those of the lieutenants 
thirty-seven, whilst those of the captains and superior officers is 
only thirty-nine ; but there were more than ninety lieutenants over 
fifty years of age, and four over sixty. " Men were already 
beginning to grumble in the Grand Army, and it looks as if a few 
more years of peace would have destroyed it." 

''This is not its only fault It is very poorly trained to 
manoeuvres, almost all the professional officers of the old Royal 
Army have disappeared, and the few who remain have attained 
high rank, whence they exercise little influence on the instruction 
of their men," and drill has become exceedingly neglected. This, 
by the way, almost invariably happens in an army which has 
practically grown up on the battle-field and fought with almost 
constant success. Men feel that they are "good enough," and 
having never felt the need of iron discipline in disaster, object to 
ivhat they consider merely unpractical playing at soldiers. It is 
the " school of defeat " that turns out the better fighting men and 
leaders, and hence the curious swing of the pendulum that has so 
often occurred between races of approximately equal fighting 

The recruits were supposed to be drilled at the depots, but, as 
usual, all the most infirm and useless officers had been relegated to 
those positions, and the given instruction appears to have been very 
indifierent indeed. The cavalry were poorly mounted, and only 
here and there in the confidential returns is an officer mentioned 
as showing keenness or knowledge of equitation, proving how low 
the standard had fallen since former days. 

The Artillery and Engineers had suffered least from the 
Revolution, and the former remained to the last the ilite of the 
Army, but the Engineers as a body seem to have been about the 
standard of our military foremen of works, good at estimating and 
at the drawing-board, but with no broad grasp of the principles of 
their profession. 

The analysis of the ages and service of the 141 general officers 
is very interesting — unfortunately too long to give in extenso here. 
They vary from one of twenty-nine years of age to one of fifty- 
eight, but the mean is about forty. One-quarter had served as 
officers of the old Army, one-quarter in its ranks, and the re- 
mainder came chiefly from the levies subsequent to 1791. 

The most crying need of the Army, however, was horses, both 


:r 'Sg^ar'T -^z:^ .■!;>- i-jj:^ "i TiTT' ^.ra^sias. In scx had to take the 
1. a -m — sr . • i - ^cs := * avs isl :fic way; and bad not 


lit kTr^i I m 

QQ the 15th 

T a^rfrd to above 
lhh. s. zaKiazz:^ mfrrarrit of the reality of'i.esn f ::ir!?:.:r 31 nwan* sl Xi trarspoct would be re- 
in ^jm;!;!!. 'irriir sowe was provided, and it was 

7 n ILsr r-is "^isEL rae : l :^ , \m\ ^ z£ war against Austria 
SOS -rgr7 ^ a:^:!^ rise si c£xt was made to siq^ly the 

zzeuzjusool z£ a. ,:r''-aLt widi Ac " Compagnie 
^nv >iiTg ic 3: b t % afc5es of waggons, of which. 

good by reqniatioii, and as the 

'jcs w^ 3ZI25C iiT ■ «^i-ar . t^ drr¥eias taken by ibfce firom Alsace 

30 ;cpQct=r:y of desotii^ taking, of course^ 

supply and transport 
1:^ almost from tibc first entry into Germany 
ti^ troops b^ to Ihe on the uj i mtiy, with the usual consequences 
&aX djyipliae wait to pieces^ and scenes which recall the horrors 
of the Thirty Years' War marked the progress of the French 
coIiunnsL The diaries of French officers, of men like Thi^bault and 
de FezcnsaCy show how they loathed the whole business ; but they 
were powerless to check the evil ; and we find even that iron soldier 
''DavODt," whose corps was always the best disciplined in the 
Army, writing imploring letters to the Emperor begging for 
permission to shoot some of the marauders. 

The matter is of so much importance for my general argument 
that I transcribe almost verbatipi the pages on this subject from 

M. Colin's work.t 

After directing attention to the extraordinary inclemency of 

• 'Studien t\xt Kricgsgeschichtc a.'Taktik.,* Part III., p. I3t note. General Staff, 

t ' La Campagne de 1805,' IntrodttcUoOi yoL iii. p. 5* 


the weather^ a continuous downpour of rain, snow, and sleet, which 
lasted almost without interruption from about the 6th to the 25th 
October,* breaking up the roads and rendering marching almost 
unpracticable, he continues : '' The troops, exhausted by these un- 
interrupted marches, rarely found sufficient food, and a regular 
distribution of rations was a most unusual event" It was all very 
well for the Emperor to issue orders (7th October) recalling that 
"one should always have four days' bread in reserve ;" but where 
was the bread to come from ? 

On the 9th October, General Bourcier writes : " It is with the 
utmost difficulty that my Division has so far been able to provide 
itself with subsistence. For several days they have had neither 
bread nor meat, and only most scanty supplies of forage, particularly 
of oats. The villages I have had to occupy have been completely 
cleared out by preceding columns." 

"The same day Suchet was still able to issue bread to his 
Division, thanks, no doubt, to the measures taken by Soult (his 
corps commander) ; but the remaining Divisions of the 4th Corps, 
from his own report, had to go without ; and, worn out by the awful 
weather, had to halt at Augsburg to receive two days' rations." 

"The troops are exhausted by fatigue," wrote Vandamme, 
''and suffer particularly from want of food. It is most urgent 
that we should at last receive some issues of provisions." 

Fortunately a convoy of 4000 rations and a magazine of corn 
and oats fell into their hands about the following day. 

On the same date Marmont also wrote: "The troops would 
have marched at once, and should have slept at Pornbach if the 
cruel hunger from which they suffer had not rendered it indis* 
pensable to halt in order to distribute to them some provisions. 
They are to receive a third of a ration of bread and some potatoes, 
after which they will resume the march and, I hope, make good 
three leagues on the road to Pfaffenhofen." 

Next day he writes to Berthier : " I have the honour to recall 
to your recollection our want of food ; it is extreme." 

This state of destitution in which most of the corps now found 
themselves does not appear to have astonished the Emperor, for 
in answer to Marmont's complaints Berthier writes on the nth 
October : — 

" In all the letters which M. le General Marmont writes to me, 
he speaks of ' provisions.' I must repeat to him that in the War 
of Invasion now being prosecuted by the Emperor there are no 

* From personal knowledge I can state that such weather in this district in October 
is absolutely unprecedented, October there is usually almost as perfect as in the Indian 


magazines ; it is the duty of the generals commanding the corps 
to provide themselves with the means of subsistence in the country 
they traverse. The General Marmont has received the orders to 
provide himself with four days' bread and biscuit in advance ; he 
cannot, therefore, count on anything but the resources he procures 
for himself, as all the other Corps of the Grand Army do likewise, 
and no one knows better than General Marmont the manner in 
which the Emperor makes war." 

This letter deserves study, as it reveals in the clearest manner 
the " driving force " Napoleon knew how to apply. As M. Colin 
points out, " it would be indeed a difficult task to reconcile a satis- 
factory system of supply with the extreme mobility absolutely 
essential to the methods of the Grand Army," but be this as it 
may, the fact remains that the extreme privations undergone by 
the troops brought in their trains maraud, pillage, and the break- 
up of discipline. 

Davout writes on the nth October to Berthier : — 

" I have the honour to represent to your Excellency that it has 
become absolutely necessary to take prompt measures to put a stop 
to the marauding and pillaging, which have reached the limits of 
excess ; the inhabitants of the districts see with the keenest anguish 
that at the moment when their Prince and Army are making 
common cause with us, they are receiving worse treatment than 
when allied with Austria against us. I have the honour to solicit 
your Excellency to procure for me the authority of his Majesty to 
shoot a few of these scoundrels — terrible examples are necessary 
to stop this evil, which is constantly growing." 

To this he received no reply — and the' fact, taken in conjunction 
with Berthier's letter to Marmont, reveals only too clearly the 
Machiavellian insight of the Emperor. Hunger was the " driving 
force " — what matter if the inhabitants suffered, the weakly men 
amongst the troops died ? The survivors had to hunt for their 
dinners like wolves in a pack ; thus, and thus only, could " mobility," 
the secret of his " strategy," be imparted to the mass. 

Even in the Guard, M. Colin thinks matters were not much 
better, and cites a letter from Captain Bugeaud, afterwards the 
celebrated " P^re Bugeaud," written to his sister, in support of this 
view. I translate it literally, as it seems to me hardly sufficient to 
support the charge. 

" Judge for yourself whether when 10,000 men arrive in a village 
it is easy for each to find something to eat. What troubles me 
most are the vexations and acts of theft committed on the 
peasants ; their poultry, their wood, their lard, all is taken with or 
without their leave. I do not do these things myself, but — when 


I am very hungry I tolerate in secret and taste my share of the 
spoil." Personally I would not condemn the Guard on such 
evidence, but the whole tone of the correspondence above cited 
prepares one to accept the better known accounts of Thidbault 
and Fezensac. The former in his Memoires (vol. iii. p. 427) 
writes: "The night following our departure from Memmingen 
struck a heavy blow at our discipline, and it was not long before 
we experienced the results. The men of the Corps who hitherto 
by their good conduct had shown themselves worthy of having 
been members of the Camp of Boulogne became pillagers, and even 
began to rob the peasants of their money. They had a saying, 
' The enemy is like a sheaf of corn, the more you beat him the 
more he shells out,' and this extortion of money by violence 
became a settled habit" 

Fezensac sums up the whole story of these sufferings and dis- 
orders in the following passage, which to my mind conveys a 
picture of facts governing Napoleon's strategy absolutely indis- 
pensable for the student's guidance. 

** This short campaign proved for me an epitome of all which 
were to come after it. The extremity of fatigue^ the want of food, 
the terrible weather, the disorders of the marauders, nothing was 
wanting, and in one month I tasted a sample of what was to be my 
destiny during the whole of my career. The brigades, even the 
regiments, were sometimes dispersed. The order to reunite arrived 
late, because it had to filter through so many offices. Hence the troops 
were marching day and night, and I saw for the first time men 
sleeping as they marched. I could not have believed it possible. 
Thus we reached our destinations without having eaten anything 
and finding nothing to eat. It was all very well for Berthier to 
write : ' In the war of invasion, as the Emperor makes it, there are 
no magazines ; it is for the generals to provide themselves from the 
country as they traverse it,' but the generals had neither time nor 
means to procure regularly what was required for the needs of 
such a numerous army. It was an authorisation of pillage, and 
the districts we passed through suffered cruelly. We were often 
hungry, and the terrible weather intensified our sufferings. A 
steady, cold rain, or, rather, half-melted snow, fell incessantly, and we 
stumbled along in the cold mud, churned up by our passage 
almost up to our knees — the wind made it impossible to light fires. 
On the 1 6th October the weather was so infamous that not a soul 
remained at his post. One found neither sentries nor pickets ; even 
the artillery remained unguarded. Every one sought shelter as 
best he could, and never again, except in Russia, did I see the 
Army suffer so much, or in such disorder. . . • All these causes 


developed insubordination and marauders* When in such weather 
the troops entered a village, it was hard to get them out again — 
hence the number of stragglers roaming about the country became 
considerable. The inhabitants were exposed to ill-treatment of 
all descriptions ; and the wounded officers^ left behind, who tried to 
assert their authority, were openly defied and threatened by the 
marauders. All these details are unknown to those who read the 
history of our campaigns, one sees only a valiant army whose soldiers 
vie with their officers for glory, and the price of suffering paid for 
the most brilliant successes is forgotten." M. Colin concludes : 
•' Such was the condition of the Grand Army in October, 1805, 
and thus we must picture it, in following day by day its forced 
marches and its victories." 

Resuming now the thread of events. Though after the 
publication of Captain Desborde's ' Frojets des debarquements et 
invasions sur L'Angleterre,' there can be no doubt of the reality of 
Napoleon's designs against England in the beginning ; the progress 
of diplomacy, doubtless instigated from this side of the Channel, 
and which found expression ultimately in the alliance between 
Russia and Austria, soon compelled the Emperor to frame an 
alternative line of action, and that this was conceived in its broad 
outlines at an early date is shown in his letter to Luchesini, the 
Prussian Ambassador, dated 27th November, 1803, '^^ reply to an 
attempt on the part of that country to induce him to consent to 
the neutralisation of the Southern States. In this he states : *' It 
is on the road from Strasburg to Vienna that the French must 
force peace on Austria, and it is this road that you wish us to 

To this idea he clung all along, until, having set his troops in 
motion on the 25th August, in the expectation of reaching the 
Inn before the Austrians, news reached him on the 26th which 
pointed to the preparations of the latter being far more advanced 
than he had supposed, and led him to transfer the weight of his 
forces more to his left than he had at first intended, to meet any 
possible interference of the Russians coming from the frontier of 

In this first project for his " strategical deployment," based on 
the information then to hand, it was anticipated that Bavaria could 
be occupied and covered before the Austrians could mobilise, and 
his ruling idea was an advance on as broad a front as possible, 
for convenience of subsistence, beyond the line Wurzburg-Uhn, 
both of which he counted on reaching before the enemy, and no 
destination was assigned to the Bavarian Corps under Wrede, 
as it was impossible to foresee what might happen to it In all 


probability it would be found in peaceful occupation of its own 
cantonments^ ready to act as an advance guard to the French 
Army on the march towards the Inn. 

Actually the sudden irruption of the Austrians very nearly 
overwhelmed it long before the Grand Army arrived, and it was 
only by a clever ruse that Wrede succeeded in withdrawing it 
northwards, ultimately concentrating it around Bamberg. 

In all this there is no trace of a notion of the advantage of a 
"re-entering base," over which successive generations of our Staff 
College students have ever since stumbled. 

As for Wurzburg, or its existence as a fortress capable of 
serving as a base in any sense to the troops which merely 
marched through it, the idea is ludicrous to any one who has ever 
seen the place. It was at the time a rather substantially fortified 
mediaeval " schlosz," overlooking a small German town of perhaps 
8000 inhabitants, and, owing to its situation, overlooked by high 
mountains within easy range of its exposed masonry, the place 
had no military value whatever. Nor had it occurred at this time 
to the Emperor to utilise the Main as a line of supply, for it was 
not till the i6th September that he at last despatch^ an officer, 
** Desalles " by name, to find out amongst other things whether 
the Main was navigable, and if so, how many days it required to 
work up the stream from Mayence ; it was only some days later 
that he leamt that, even when the weather was favourable, it 
usually took from eight to ten days to make the transit — ^but that 
the water would be at its worst within a fortnight It is, therefore, 
to the last d^ree improbable that a single boat-load of stores 
reached the place till after Ulm had fallen ; and though orders were 
subsequently issued to provide bakeries, eta, in great numbers, 
it was days before these could be built, and when built the local 
bakers professed themselves quite unable to understand the use of 
these new-fangled French ovens. 

As pointed out above, the Bavarians went to Bambei|; because 
they had to, no other line of retreat being open to them ; but 
Bemadotte's Corps (the 1st) had been for some time at Gottingen, 
and ultimately did actually march through Wtirzburg. The two 
facts together probably led to the idea that Napoleon from the 
first had included this march in the scope of his design ; but 
curiously though the facts are as stated, Bernadotte did not march 
by the straight road connecting the two points, as one would have 
anticipated, but actually moved due west from Gottingen till he 
struck the great road from Cassel to Frankfurt, and would have 
entered that town had he not found it already occupied by Davout's 
columns. To avoid confusion, he was switched off by Berthier on 


to the Hanau-Aschaflrenbarg road, and had to make such severe 
marches over difficult roads that, thoi^ he reached Wurzburg on 
the ass^ed date, his men were so done up that they had to be 
given three whole da}rs of rest It seems to me, therefore, that 
at this date no importance whatever can have been attached to 
the flanking position at Gottingen, first, because it flanked nothing 
— the Austrians were not yet in Ulm — and, secondly, if it had been 
important, Bemadotte's orders would have been far too precise to 
admit such freedom of movement 

The truth would appear to be that Bemadotte's position in 
Hannover was, under the circumstances, an element of weakness 
rather than of strength. He had been sent to occupy that country 
as an act of war against Great Britain, and his presence not only 
gave umbrage to Prussia, but was intensely resented by all the 
North German States. 

Feeling was so strong against the French that his corps was 
very nearly in the position of a besieged garrison, his officers had 
to be ordered to move about in civilian dress to avoid possible 
insults to the uniform which it would be impossible to ignore and 
unwise to attempt to resent, and he evidently felt, when at length 
the orders to move arrived, that any attempt to move through the 
difficult defiles due south to his objective might lead to acts of 
hostility which would not only compromise his own safety, but 
add enormously to the risks attending the whole operation. Under 
these circumstances he considered it wiser to fall back straight 
towards the main Army, as the inhabitants were far more likely 
to welcome this as a sign of evacuation, and would facilitate his 
withdrawal instead of opposing it. 

F. N. Maude. 

{To be continued.) 


A Suggestion. 
By Major J. L. J. Clarke. 

However well the Army Corps system may be adapted for 
purposes of peace administration, I think it is pretty well agreed 
that an Army Corps, constituted as it at present is, does not, for 
several reasons, provide the best possible organisation for our 
requirements on active service in the field. 

An Army Corps in our service comprises the following units ; — 

Infantry, 25 battalions. 
Cavalry, 2 regiments. 
Artillery, 26 batteries. 

R £., 9 companies. 

A«o.0>, 14 If 

R.A,M.C., 16 „ 

or a total, in round numbers, of roughly 

36,000 officers and men, 10,000 animals, 1400 vehicles. 

It is organised into three Infantry divisions and corps troops, 
which latter consist of one battalion Infantry, one regiment and 
one squadron of Cavalry, one brigade each of Horse and Field 
Artillery, besides R.E., A.S.C., and R.A.M,C. units. 

An Infantry division is divided into two Infantry brigades and 
divisional troops, which latter consist of one squadron Cavalry, 
two brigades of R.F.A., and R.E,, A.S.C., and R.A.M.C. units. 

An Infantry brigade comprises four battalions of Infantry with 
a supply column, bearer company, and field hospital. 

In studying the foregoing component parts of an Army Corps, 
the following defects become at once apparent : — 

(a) The very small proportion of mounted troops (exclusive of 
Artillery) in proportion to the Infantry. 

(6) The entire absence of any Mounted Infantry. 

(c) The apparently arbitrary manner in which units are divided 

and sub-divided ; for instance, as regards Infantry there are three 

divisions in an Ariiiy Corps, but only two brigades in a division. 

Then there are four battalions in a brigade, but eight companies 

iit a battalion. As regards Artillery, there are three batteries in 

a brigade, and three sections in a battery. As regards Cavalry, 
VOL.CL. 12 




there are four squadrons in a regiment, and four troops in a 
squadron. Then there are the Cavalry brigade of three regiments, 
and the Cavalry division of two brigades, but these do not form 
component parts of an Army Corps. 

{d) The total number of troops — viz. 36,000, under the command 
of one General, and forming one tactical unit — ^would appear to be 
too great, and the unit consequently too unwieldy a machine for 
effective use in the field. 

Now it appears to me that our field organisation should aim at 
the production of a force constituted so as to provide — 

(i) A compact mixed force of all three arms of the service, with 
an adequate proportion of mounted troops and gims, but not to 
exceed in total numbers 12,000 men. 

(2) This force to be divided, for purposes of command and 
administration, into lesser units, in which the different arms of the 
service would be separate. 

(3) The force to be so organised that a detached force of all 
three arms of the service could easily be formed by placing one 
or more of the smaller units of each arm together under the 
command of one ofHcer. 

(4) All divisions and sub-divisions of the force to be co- 
ordinated, and I cannot help thinking that three is the best for 
tactical purposes, and in accordance with our present drill-books. 
The division of a force into three parts in the field gives a pivot 
or centre portion with bodies on either flank for deployments and 
line formations. In small column formations it gives a first line, 
support, and reserve. In attack formations on a large scale it at 
once, without any splitting up of units, provides the first, second^ 
and third lines of the attacking force. In outposts it facilitates 
the formation of the picket line, the supports, and the reserve. 
In reconnoitring and patrolling it gives a centre pivot, and point» 
and flankers. Moreover, I think that the division into three would 
also be advantageous from an administrative point of view. 

Now in order to formulate the foregoing suggestions I would 
put forward the following proposals ; — 

(i) The Army Corps as a tactical unit to be abolished, and in 
lieu thereof a mixed force of all three arms to be established as 
the largest unit in the field. This force to be called a " Field 
Division." A force comprising more than one "Field Division'* 
could then be styled a " Field Army." 

A Field Division might be composed as follows : — 

{a) Three Infantry brigades. 

{b) One Cavalry brigade. 

(c) Three Field Artillery brigades. 

(d) Three Field Companies R.Ei 
{e) Divisional Supply Column. 
(J) Divisional Field Hospital. 


(2) Carrying on the principle of division by three, an Infantry 
brigade would consist of three battalions, supply column, and 
bearer company. 

A battalion would consist of three companies (but these would 
be over 200 strong, and answer to the double companies of the 
Indian Army and continental systems). A company would be 
divided into three sections. A section into three sub-sections. 
A sub-section into three groups. A group to consist of six men 
(three in the front and three in the rear rank). 

A machine-gun with each company would provide a machine- 
gun section of three guns to the battalion. 

(3) The Cavalry brigade to consist of three regiments of 
Cavalry, one brigade of three batteries of Horse Artillery, one 
battalion of M.I., supply column, and three bearer companies. 

Of the above, a regiment of Cavalry to be organised in three 
squadrons, each squadron containing three troops, and a troop to 
be divided into three groups of twelve men each. 

To each Cavalry regiment a pom-pom section of three guns to 
be attached, capable of being split up to admit of one gun being 
detached with a squadron acting independently if need be. 

A battery of Horse Artillery to be divided into three sections 
as at present ; and an ammunition column for the brigade. 

A battalion of Mounted Infantry to consist of three companies. 

A company of Mounted Infantry to be divided into three 
sections, and each section sub-divided into three sub-sections. 
A sub-section to be divided into three groups, each consisting of 
three men. In action the centre man of each group would take 
charge of the led horses of the flank men. 

(4) Each brigade of Field Artillery to consist of three batteries, 
each divided into three sections of two guns as at present, and an 
ammunition column. 

(5) A Field Company R.E. to be divided into three sections, 
so that a section could be detached as an independent unit with a 
small mixed force if required. 

(6) Army Service Corps and R.A.M.C. units furnishing supply 
columns, bearer companies, and field hospitals to be similarly 

The next point to be considered is how can the above proposals 
for field organisation be adapted to fit in with existing conditions, 
and with peace administration, without involving too heavy an 
expenditure? That considerable difficulties would be met with 
must be admitted, but I do not think they would be insurmount- 
able. Let us consider the following points seriatim : — 

(i) First of all it must be borne in mind that it is not necessary 



for all the units composing a " Field Division " to be permanently 
quartered in the same station or district, but it should not be 
difficult to arrange for them all to be accommodated in one 
'* command'' In Germany, the units composing a territorial Army 
Corps are, as a rule, scattered in various garrisons within the area 
allotted to the Army Corps, and are concentrated by brigades, 
divisions, etc., for the annual training and manoeuvres. A similar 
system could be adopted by us with advantage. 

(2) Under the present scheme, outlined by the War Office 
Reconstitution Committee, the ist Army Corps is to be retained 
and completed, by placing Salisbury Plain and the troops there 
under the command of the general officer commanding that Army 
Corps. I would suggest that out of the troops now quartered at 
Aldershot and Salisbury, two complete "Field Divisions" be 
organised — ^the remaining units quartered there would be available 
for lines of communication or other duties in war-time ; in peace 
they could be brigaded with troops from other commands, or with 
auxiliary forces for manoeuvres and training. The existing Schools 
of Instruction, etc., at Aldershot not to be interfered with. This 
plan would involve more barracks being built on Salisbury Plain, 
as that would appear to be the best place for the Cavalry of the 
2nd Field Division ; it is believed that the building of these barracks 
has already been contemplated, but abandoned for the present 

(3) As regards the other " Commands " the Northern, Eastern, 
and Irish, might, I think, furnish one Field Division each without 
involving enormous expenditure, but it is doubtful whether the 
same would apply to the Western Command. 

(4) From paragraphs (2) and (3) it will be seen that five 
" Field Divisions " would be provided, each consisting of from lo 
to 1 1,000 men, to be stationed in the United Kingdom. These, 
in conjunction with the regular troops, Artillery, Engineers, and 
Infantry, required for protection of lines of communication, defence 
of coast posts, important garrisons, etc, might well suffice for a 
Home Standing Army. 

(5) No mention has been made hitherto of the auxiliary forces, 
because the field organisation I have outlinedis primarily intended 
for foreign expeditions or campaigns abroad, carried on by our 
r^ular forces without the assistance of the auxiliary forces. Should 
it be considered necessary, however, it would be possible to extend 
the organisation so as to form " Field Divisions," consisting of 
Militia, or Volunteers, and Imperial Yeomanry ; but the Field 
Artillery would have to be supplied from the regulars. For home 
defence, in any case, the fullest possible use would have to be made 
of the auxiliary forces, because it would be just when our Field 


Army was engaged in a campaign abroad, and our Navy possibly 
fully occupied in maintaining command of the sea, that an attempt 
might be made to invade our shores. 

As the establishment of the regular forces in the United 
Kingdom, proposed by this scheme, would, numerically, be 
considerably weaker than at present, it would be imperative to 
maintain a thoroughly efficient auxiliary force for home defence, 
whose organisation might well be based on similar principles to 
those adapted for the Field Army. 

(6) The next consideration is the field organisation for our 
regular forces abroad. Apart from South Africa and India, the 
garrisons of our foreign stations are mostly in the nature of 
defensive forces, consisting of Garrison Artillery, Engineers, and 
Infantry, and there does not seem to be any necessity to alter the 
present conditions, except in the minor details of organisation. In 
South Africa, however, I think the forces might well be organised 
into two field divisions over and above the troops required for lines 
of communication, garrisons of coast ports, etc 

(7) As regards India, the Army Corps system has never been 
introduced, and in all the frontier wars mixed divisions of all arms 
have^been employed, with the British and Indian forces combined^ 
with very good results. I would, therefore, only suggest such 
changes in the composition of an Indian division as might be con- 
sidered applicable to the requirements of field organisation in that 

(8) In conclusion, I would summarise the proposals contained 
in this "suggestion" as follows : — 

{a) Abolition of the Army Corps as a Service unit. 

{b) Establishment of " Field Divisions " as the fighting units 
of the regular Standing Army — and possibly also of the auxiliary 
forces. Five of the former to be stationed in the United Kingdom,. 
two in South Africa, and in India as may be required. 

(c) The division and sub-division of all units in a field division 
into three smaller units, and so on. 

{d) The introduction of the " Double Company System " in 
the Infantry. 

{e) The inclusion of a battalion of Mounted Infantry in a field 
division as a component part of the Cavalry brigade. 

{/) Reorganisation and greater efficiency to be effected in the 
auxiliary forces, consequent upon the reduction in numbers of the 
Regular Army. 

J. L. J. Clarke. 


By Captain T. Fetherstonhaugil 

When the financial side of the question has not to be considered, 
it is easy to put forwardjsuggestions and to propose reforms. But 
when the Army estimates seem to increase at a quicker rate than 
the British people learn to realise the importance of having their 
defensive forces at least equal in power to the capabilities of the 
offensive forces of other nations when landed on our shores, this 
matter has to be seriously considered. So I will commence these 
few suggestions that I submit to the criticism of wiser heads than 
mine, by considering where we can reduce expenditure. 

First I would ask, do we require the large number of volunteers 
that is now shown to be under arms ? And would we not get 
more value for our money if we reduced this number by one-third, 
and spent the money thus saved by increasing the military value of 
the remaining two-thirds ? 

Only those who are charged with the preparation of the 
<:ountiy's schemes for defence against invasion have the data at 
hand for determining the number of men required, but if the 
existing number is really necessary, most people will allow that the 
Volunteer Force requires a great deal to be done for it to make it a 
reliable force for the purpose it was raised. If it be conceded that 
the numbers can be reduced, let us consider the advisability of 
doing so, for under the present system the country, in many 
places, is over volunteered. To begin with, officers cannot be 
obtained, and it is little use enrolling men when you cannot get the 
officers to instruct them. The question of how we are going to 
find suitable officers, trained in accordance with the requirements 
of modem scientific warfare, for the non-regular forces on whom 
we rely so much for our home defence, is the most serious one of 
any, for, given an adequate supply of officers, we can always raise 
men in our country, but an armed mob is as dangerous to us as to 
any other country. Now, the supply is nothing near equal to the 
demand. In a former article in this magazine I submitted a 
suggestion that the Government should offer premiums for military 


knowledge, and so make it a subject in secondary education ; but 
we need [not consider this here, for we are deaUng with the 
volunteer when we have caught him, not when we hope to catch 
him. A volunteer ofScer should not only have sufficient leisure to 
attend to his duties and to keep himself abreast of the requirements 
of the times he lives in, but he should have an assured social or 
business position. The position of an officer in a corps recruited 
from one district or town is of more importance than in one 
generally recruited, for obvious reasons, and a volunteer officer has 
not only to be respected by his men, but by the whole district his 
men come from, if the work is to be carried out without friction, 
and the sometimes baneful effect of local influences to be guarded 
against. In theory we recognise that, given merit, a cook's son can 
be as good an officer as a duke's son ; but do we carry that out in 
practice ? 

Most volunteer commanding officers will allow that, if they 
were relieved of certain financial anxieties, they could do without a 
lot of their men, and by so doing have a more efficient corps. To 
begin with, money might be saved by having only a service dress, 
which would dispose of the element that volunteers for the sake 
only of sporting an attractive uniform. Dress may affect recruiting, 
but the military value of a man whose martial ardour can only be 
roused in this fashion is open to question, especially when his 
training has often to be carried out under unattractive conditions 
and his efficiency as a fighting man greatly depends on his own 
efforts and enthusiasm. Then the pot-hunting element might be 
got rid of, and we may hope that the raising of civilian rifle-clubs 
will facilitate this. Practically this element has little military value, 
for it refuses to shoot under service conditions, and discourages 
young volunteers, who, when they see that valuable prizes can 
only be obtained by spending more money on weapons and more 
time on the range than they can afford to give, soon lose heart. 
Also the young generation is beginning to recognise the un* 
practicability of the usual form of prize-firing. As many of the 
volunteers who only regard their corps as State-assisted rifle-clubs 
are physically unsuited for active service on account of age, they 
would be far better off in these civilian rifle-clubs. The more 
a battalion is weeded out, the higher rises its reputation as a 
workmanlike unit in the estimation of its district, the more eager 
are its members to improve themselves, and the more ready are 
employers to let their men have reasonable facilities for getting to 
drill ; so its institutions are more willingly supported by the public ; 
greater efficiency, both individually and collectively, with a corre- 
sponding greater self-respect, is obtained ; and employers feel, when 


their men go to them and ask for time off to attend to volunteer 
duties, that they can accede to these requests, feeling that by doing 
so they are performing a patriotic duty towards their country by 
assisting to supply it with well-trained soldiers. Therefore, do not 
let us be afraid of losing men by increasing the work, but rather 
put the pressure on until we substitute a smaller force of armed and 
trained men with a proper complement of officers for an armed one 
that is acknowledged to be short of officers, and spend the money 
saved out of the total the country is prepared to give in perfecting 
the training of the units, the organisation of the transport, the 
provision of signallers, and on any of the other things that go 
towards building up a useful, mobile citizen army for the defence 
of these shores. 

A large volunteer force makes great demands on the employers 
of labour, which is another reason why the active part of it should 
have a numerical limit Employers lose money by giving their 
men time off, and they receive no rebatement of taxation that 
would help to equalise what should be the common burden. 
Consequently they may well argue that their contributions towards 
the defence of the country are greater than of those who do not 
employ men. If the Volunteer Force is to flourish, ;it must be on 
good terms with these, for it is so greatly dependent on them, and 
it is manifestly unfair that their goodwill should be too severely 
tried, and that it should sometimes be put out of their power^ 
without incurring serious financial loss, to do what we may be 
thankful many of them regard as a patriotic duty which they feel 
they have a moral obligation to perform. 

It is very generally recognised now that the volunteer brigades 
should have an adequate staff independent of the regimental 
districts. The system of giving the commands of brigades to the 
officers commanding the regimental districts in peace-time cannot 
work well in war-time. In the event of a general mobilisation, these 
officers would have their hands far too full of important duties to be 
able to command a brigade as well, and in peace-time they are 
filling the places that the officers who are to command the brigades 
in war-time should be in, if they are ever to be given an opportunity of 
getting a personal acquaintanceship with their commands. And one 
does not have to go far to find suitable brigadiers. In the Regular 
Army few colonels of battalions can hope to attain general officers' 
rank, for the supply of experienced men in the prime of life far 
exceeds the demand for generals. We lose the value of a great 
deal of experience in letting these pass out of the service, and we 
are not well enough off for senior officers in our non-regular forces 
to do so. If volunteer colonels can be found who have been able 


to acquire sufficient knowledge of war as to be able to command a 
brigade in the field, by all means make use of them — ^but can we do 
this ? We could find no better men than the ex-colonels of regular 
battalions, who are still active and energetic, and are on the retired 
list through no fault or wish of their own, but whose interest in the 
service is as keen as ever. But to make use of these, as well as to 
teach a brigade to manage its own affairs, the control of the 
volunteer brigades must be divorced from the regimental districts, 
for no man likes to serve as junior to one whose senior he has once 
been, as might easily happen if ex-colonels of regular battalions 
took the commands of volunteer brigades in districts to which their 
old battalions belonged. Horse allowance with jf 200 a year in 
addition to their pensions would be well spent on employing these 
officers, and many a useful man would not* be allowed to become 
rusty in undesired non-employment. 

The brigade major should be an officer on the active list, who 
has been an adjutant of volunteers, and who might be appointed 
to this post after an interval of at least two years' regimental duty, 
when his work as a volunteer adjutant had been satisfactoiy. 
This would form an extra incentive for adjutants to work well, and 
there would be no difficulty in getting good men, once the work is 
made such as a good man will take up. An army like ours, which 
has such a large part of it abroad, loses many useful men on 
account of their being unable, for private reasons, to soldier abroad 
in peace-time, for many leave the service every year for this 
reason, therefore appointments of this kind will serve the country 
well in two ways. 

Most of the brigades already have bearer companies, but they 
should have supply and transport companies as well. There should 
be no regimental transport beyond that required for a machine-gun 
and S.A.A. cart, or S.A.A. mules. The battalions have quite 
enough to do to train their rifiemen, without having odd jobs, 
however necessary, put on to them, and the work will be far better 
done if a brigade transport organisation were adopted. 

To enable the brigade staff to work its brigade as an indepen- 
dent unit, I would separate the volunteer brigade district entirely 
from the regimental district, as before proposed, and give the 
general officer commanding the " training district " a staff officer for 
volunteers only. The brigade would work as like a regular brigade 
as circumstances permit, and whilst the brigadier would carry out 
the inspections of the battalions, the general officer commanding, or 
a staff officer deputed by him, would inspect the brigade as now. 

Volunteer battalions differ so much in the circumstances under 
which they work, that it is impossible to force an inflexible 


organisation on them without seriously handicapping them. So 
different are these circumstances made by the manner in which 
their members gain their livelihood in civil life — ^whether the 
battalion is in a town where it is all together, or in the country, 
with many outlying companies and sections ; the proximity of 
ranges and drill-grounds ; and the existence of suitable spots for 
the annual camps — that it would almost seem that we ought to have 
two classes of volunteer corps and brigades, urban and rural So 
it is only possible, without going to a greater length than is suit- 
able to a short magazine article, to discuss the point on broad lines, 
bearing in mind that the more elastic the organisation is, the more 
suitable it will be for training the pick of the population. In our 
reduced Volunteer Force we want to have the best of the available 
young men. 

There is littie doubt that volunteer work makes more demands 
on the time of young tradesmen, and their like, than it is possible 
for many of them to support, and that many leave for that reason. 
The week in camp, although a very valuable part of the annual 
training, causes many resignations through sheer inability of men 
to get away to attend it. But it would cause some to make extra 
efforts to attend, did they know that there was a time when, after 
a certain length of service, they would not have to go to camp and 
could still remain volunteers. For this reason we might permit 
25 per cent, to pass into a reserve after attending five yearly 
camps, and only call on this reserve to fire its musketry course, 
perform ten drills per annum, and attend the annual inspection. 
As to who was placed in this reserve should be left entirely to the 
volunteer commanding officer, and no volunteer should be allowed 
to consider that he had a right to enter it after five trainings. 
Also commanding officers should have power to transfer a man 
either from the reserve to the active list, or vice versd, when 
qualified, provided the strength of the former does not exceed 
25 per cent of the whole. In this way commanding officers would 
be given a means of retaining a useful man temporarily too hard- 
worked to conform with the requirements of the position of an active 
volunteer,* and of getting rid of an unsatisfactoiy one, by simply 
refusing him entrance to the reserve even when qualified. This 
reserve should be made up in a separate section in each company, 
and should participate in all the privileges of an ordinary volunteer, 
so that men should consider that they are on a good job when they 
enter it. By this means, I submit that many good men will be 
kept in the ranks, and, although attendance at camp be not com- 
pulsory, enough men would attend, where they could, to keep the 
whole reserve up to the mark. 


The Secretary of State for War has been pretty firm about 
insisting that the regulation regarding the attendance in camp of 
volunteers should be complied with, and we may hope that he will 
continue so regarding active volunteers, for it is the most useful 
part of the training they get, but there are ways in which battalions 
might be assisted in carrying out those regulations. Brigade 
camps are necessary to allow the brigade staff to practise their 
field duties, and battalions always benefit by rubbing shoulders 
with one another ; but every brigade should have its permanent 
camping area in its own district, and every battalion its own 
camping ground in this area, to which it should go year after year, 
so that it could erect'permanent cook-houses, canteens, mess-rooms, 
etc, and by doing so remove one of the chief causes of expense 
that fall on corps in going to camp. It is difficult to find a piece of 
ground in most districts on which a brigade can be camped in the 
regulation formation and trained as well, and there is less difficulty 
in finding four battalion camping grounds, each within about a mile 
of a central fifth, headquarter one. As for officers and men getting 
to know the ground too well, there is little danger of that, for they 
have plenty of time to forget between the last day of one training 
and the first of the next. The chief disadvantage of sending a 
brigade to a place constantly occupied by troops is that in these 
places it gets too much done, for it ; and a most important part of 
its training is that which makes it feed itself, look after its own 
sick, and run its own transport, as it is forced to do when it camps 
by itself. The chief disadvantage of a brigade camping at home 
is that the picnic element is apt to show up too much, but a little 
firmness soon overcomes that, and the people of a district must be 
given a chance of seeing the brigade if their interest in it is to be 
maintained ; also it is a matter that affects the recruiting of the 
Army as well. The time at the men's disposal has to be considered, 
also the burden put on the employer's shoulders when extra time 
has to be asked for to get to some far-away place. The easier for 
the men to get to the annual camp the better ; for the provisional 
camps at odd times of the year are unpopular with them, and if 
they go to camp, many will either go only with their battalion, or 
not at all. 

When we come to the question of the officers we come to that 
aspect of volunteering which requires most consideration, but, in 
my humble opinion, the difficulties can be overcome. We may 
hope that eventually officers will join their corps with a certain 
knowledge of the soldier's craft learnt in the days of their youth, 
but this has not come to pass yet, and we have to consider what 
we can do for them now. There is only one way of catching 


volunteer officers, and that is to make the attractions of their 
volunteer life and work at least equal in interest to what their 
lives would be if they devoted them to the ruling British passion 
of participating in, or watching, games. This at once brings us to 
the question of training them, and we want to obtain our material 
when it is young and enthusiastic, and as it learns and grows older, 
to foster its enthusiasm until military thought and work has become 
a habit of life. To commence with, the recruit officer should have 
done at least a year's time in the ranks, both to teach him the 
ways of reasoning in the lower ranks and to give his superiors an 
opportunity of judging his capabilities. During the first two years 
of his officer's service, or when an aspirant to a commission, he 
should be required to join a class held in the brigade district or at 
some dep6t taught by one of the adjutants in the brigade, who are 
in a better position than most regular officers for getting to know 
what a volunteer requires to learn. This course of instruction 
should last for five weeks of five working days a week, Tuesday 
morning to Saturday evening, leaving Sunday and Monday for 
private affairs, three consecutive weeks to be compulsory, the remain- 
ing two to be put in at the candidate's option, either following the 
first three, or during the last two weeks of any class held before 
the termination of his first two years' service. The young officer 
should be required to know his company drill before he joins the 
course, and the day's work would be made up of two hours' drill» 
and as many hours of tactical instruction, both theoretical and 
practical, range-finding practice, control of fire, and other necessary 
things, as can be put in. At the termination of the course examine 
him, give him his outfit allowance, and award him Certificate A. 
if ordinarily efficient, and A.T. if he shows good tactical ability. 
But do not stint the instructor of means of making this course an 
interesting one, for he has not only to teach his pupils enough to 
pass an examination, but has to rouse their interest so much that 
they should carry away from the course a feeling that ihey are 
riding a hobby that will ever keep open to them further possibilities 
of interesting employment Give him books, maps, models, 
instruments, and a comfortable room to work in. Make the class 
live in barracks, so that they may learn the proper bearing of an 
officer, and become acquainted with the barrack life routine they 
may some day have to live under themselves, and let the final 
examination be conducted by the brigadier, the brigade major, and 
an adjutant. 

Before appointment to the rank of captain, require the officer to 
attend a school of instruction, at some military centre where the 
three arms can be seen at work, for a fortnight ; and require some 


evidence of tactical ability from him before he goes. Ordinary 
drill should not be included in this course, for the battalions should 
be made responsible that their officers know this, but a great deal 
of the work that is now done at Hythe, except that to do with 
machine guns, which is better left to specialists, could be in- 
cluded. Range-finding, the theory of musketry, the employment 
of rifles in the hands of a company, the leading of a company in 
action, the principles of the defence of a position, should be gone 
into as far as time permits, and a few hours spent in an armourer's 
shop would not be time wasted. As the time that volunteers can 
afford to spend on attendances at classes is so short, the instruction 
should be directed more towards explaining away difficulties and 
showing the officers what they cannot see in their own homes than 
in driving into them what is in black and white in the drill-books. 
At the termination of a fortnight have a practical examination, in 
fact, the written part of it would not lose in value if it were 
confined to drafting orders, and award Certificate B. or B.T. where 
the tactical knowledge is extra good. 

Before an officer obtains the command of a battalion he should 
be required to attend at least two manoeuvres, and to be favourably 
reported on as a suitable man by the brigadier and general officer 
commanding-in-chief. After each series of manoeuvres he should 
be called on to criticise them before a board of regular field officers, 
and to answer a few questions on the employment of a battalion 
with a brigade. As before, award Certificate C. or C.T. 

Insist on an officer being in possession of Certificates A., B., C, 
and before he is recommended for the volunteer officer's decoration, 
for this decoration should not only be a mark of long service, but of 
good service and ability also. At present it is possible that this is 
not always the case. When officers are at the classes, give them 
the pay of their rank, and treat them liberally in the matter of 
allowances. Do away with the Hythe course, for ordinary musketry 
is no more a specialist's concern than marching is, but keep machine- 
guns, signalling, surveying, advanced field fortification, and transport 
work for those who care to specialise. Have the B. Certificate classes 
in each army corps, or whenever convenient for the volunteers, 
provided troops of the three arms are present, and put an officer 
specially qualified for tactical and musketry ability on to conduct 

But in addition to having courses of instruction we must, as 
well, institute something to keep the officers' interest up at home 
and to afford them facilities for instructing themselves. This 
might be done by brigade tactical societies, under the personal 
supervision of the brigadier, the brigade major, and the adjutants. 


The State should assist these societies by awarding grants of money 
for the purchase of books, maps, instruments, etc., and by the 
provision of lecturers, who would supplement the instruction of the 
brigade staff with lectures on special subjects. But this society 
should not confine its operations to the headquarters of the 
brigade, and should travel, when necessary, to wherever a few 
officers can be got together, either for practical field work, or for 
theoretical work in a drill-hall by night. The brigade major 
should regard the working of this society as his special province, 
which might with advantage in its membership include selected 
non-commissioned officers as well as officers, and officers of the local 
corps of artillery, yeomanry, and militia. 

It may be asked, how is all this instruction going to induce 
officers to study systematically and to compete with games and 
sports for their attention ? It entirely depends on the instructors, 
and the facilities given by the Government Select instructors, 
who, as well as being capable men, will go at their work in the 
proper spirit. Pay them well, for a man who not only is a capable 
man himself, but has the gift of making others capable men, is 
worth extra pay, and let the Government regard the volunteer 
officer in a more liberal way. Plenty of instructors will be forth- 
coming once the regular officer is shown that service in the 
volunteer force is a road to advancement, which is not the feeling 
in the service at present 

The permanent staff did its work well as long as only drill 
sergeants were required, but now men who can teach field 
work are absolutely necessary. The great fault of the present 
system is that service in the volunteers is looked on as a suitable 
finish for the military career of deserving old non-commissioned 
officers. It practically leads to nothing, so men think that their 
career is about done, and all that they have to do is to keep the 
pot boiling until the army gets tired of them. This is not a 
feeling that is conducive to efficiency, and prospects of advance- 
ment should be opened out to them. Undoubtedly the sergeant- 
major should be a warrant officer, and again these warrant officers 
should be promoted, as required, to the rank of quartermaster, with 
pay at ;^ioo a year. A quartermaster with clerical experience, 
who would also act as secretary to the finance committee, is badly 
needed in most corps. Also the permanent staff should be younger 
men when they join the volunteers, and they should be sufficiently 
well educated to be able to give good theoretical, as well as 
practical instruction to the volunteer non-commissioned officers. 
Both they and the adjutant should be given facilities for keeping 
themselves up in their work: the former by a better annual 


training in the depdts, or, better still, with a regular battalion ; 
the latter by being given opportunities of attending staff rides and 
manoeuvres, or special courses under a staff officer for instruction 
which should include battalion and brigade drill 

The volunteer system of finance has few friends, and we may 
well consider whether it suits its purpose. It assumes that if a 
volunteer does so much work he is worth a certain amount to his 
country, so the Government gives that amount to the corps that 
has raised him. But actually the number of so-called efficients in 
a corps is little criterion as to the military value of that corps. 
Any who have worked with volunteers can call to mind efficients 
who are worth much more than the grant they have earned to their 
country, and others who are not worth twopence. It would surely 
be more suitable for the Grovemment to first convene a Board, 
composed of military and financial members, under the presidency 
of the general officer commanding the army corps, to consider, 
first, whether it is advisable to have a corps in a certain district, 
considering the supply available of prospective officers and men, 
and the opportunities of training them ; the most suitable strength 
for the battalion ; the cost of maintaining it, taking into considera* 
tion the buildings and ranges at its disposal and those required, 
the facilities for getting the corps together for drill, etc., and all the 
many items that eat away a corps' income; the strategical con- 
sideration of the position of the district, and anything else that the 
state of the times requires that attention should be paid to. Then 
let the Government decide whether the investment is worth the 
money. If it is, contract with the colonel for an efficient battalion 
at such a strength at so much, and let the efficiency of the battalion 
be judged on by the result of the annual inspection. Unless a 
general has to decide on the general efficiency of a battalion, it is a 
little difficult to understand what it is inspected for, and the country 
would have a better assurance that it has made a good bargain had 
it the evidence of a skilled soldier judging by what he saw in the 
field than reams of paper evidence could give it. If the battalion 
is judged non-efficient, inquire into the causes for this, and either 
get rid of the colonel, or reduce the strength of the battalion until 
it represents what the district can give with efficiency. By all 
means have a fixed minimum of drills, etc., to be performed, but 
do not punish the corps for the sins of a few. Rather make it 
compulsory for colonels to prosecute volunteers who fail to carry 
out their engagements in the civil courts, except in certain cases 
which should be reported to higher authority before exemption be 
allowed, and so give the colonel the full support of the weight of 
the law, for although he has this now, he often finds it expedient, 


in consideration of his personal popularity, which is of great 
importance to the well-being of his corps, not to act up to his full 

The present sj^tem is unfair in many ways. The cost of 
maintaining no two corps is the same, although they draw the 
same amount for the same number of efficients ; so one located in 
London is treated the same as another in an out-country district, 
with no r^^d for the difference in the price of living, the rents 
that have to be paid, and the means of access to ranges and drill- 
grounds. As a nation, we should be too dignified to have to ask 
individuals to subscrilie towards the provision of necessaries for our 
f^hting fences. By all means ask for subscriptions to supply 
luxuries, but the funds of the State should furnish the necessaries. 
Once aboUsh the capitation grant, and the strength of the force 
will come down, but it will increase in efficiency, and the public 
purse will save, for, if we are to trust to the force in the hour of 
danger, we must see that we do not spend our money on next door 
to useless men, as many so<alled efficients are, and we have learnt 
the oost of raising troops in a hurry at a moment of emergency, 
and the foUy of doing sa 

Many are of opinioQ that volunteers should be paid for the 
wort: they da But let us hope that it is still possible to hold 
before our peq[)le the ideal that a sufficient quantity of us are 
ready to come fcHward to defend our inheritance without other 
remuneration than the sense of having fulfilled a duty towards our 
native land and towards our forefathers who have done so much 
fi>r it When, ho>vever, this is not recognised as a common duty, 
the State should insure that those who take it on them as a personal 
dut}* should not be prejudiced thereby in earning their livelihood. 
Therefore^ any nnandal estimate for the expenses of a corps should 
provide for the pro\nsion of a subsistence allowance for the members 
of it when prevented by their volunteer duties finom earning their 
daily wages, as during the annual camp, the word " subsistence " to 
refer to their ci\il work, and the amount to be based on the rate of 
wages and the expanses of living in the district the battalion is 
drawn faxn. In this the officers should be included, for the struggle 
fcMT existence is often more severe in the young professional classes 
than in others lower in the social scale, and to make the sjrstem 
perfect* emplo\*ers should be relieved of a portion of the burdens 
the State puts on them when the State shares with them the 
;^r\^\>e of their emplc^xxes. This wxmld add greatly to the expenses 
of maintaining the force* but we must remember that the troops 
\\x shall l(u\>e K^ meet if our shores are invaded will be the picked 
men of the nation they belong to^ and in the men we send to meet 


them we must have our very best, or we shall never avert disaster. 
The best of our men are not loafers, or those whose leisured life 
admits their affording a week off whenever agreeable to themselves, 
even if sufficient of these exist, but the men who do a man's work 
every day of their lives, and are morally and physically braced by 
industrious daily habits to support the responsibilities that are 
placed on them by their country. Therefore let us insure that we 
get these men in our reduced Volunteer Force. 

If any one does me the honour of considering any of these ideas, 
which I submit with all due deference, I hope they will do so 
bearing in mind that it is not the large armies that win battles, 
when their numbers do not represent efficiency, but the small, well- 
trained ones ; that it is better to pay any bill of costs to our own 
people in money alone than to a foreign power both in cash and 
national ruin ; and that if our own people get our money, we still 
have the interest of it represented by a manly national spirit, with 
peace and security ; but if the stranger gets it, it is lost for ever, and 
with its going will commence the decadence of our race. Let it 
not be said of this generation that it squandered its inheritance 
through unwillingness to find the time and money to guard it. 

T. Fetherstonhaugh. 






By Captain C. Holmes Wilson, R.F.A, 

The recent publication of the French drill regulations has led to 
criticisms in regard to the condition of our own. It has been 
stated that our drill-books require revision. The situation, how- 
ever, appears to have been imperfectly understood. The adoption 
of Q.-F. guns of necessity entails some alteration in the details of 
the existing drill. These guns have been adopted abroad ; they 
have not, however, been issued to our own Army jret. Con- 
sequently there can be no need for criticism when there is nothing 
to criticise. As, however, it is likely that our artillery m\l soon be 
rearmed, the following general remarks may possibly be of interest 
to those who have not already studied the subject for themselves. 

Fire Effect. 

The special characteristic of the Q.-F. gun is, of course, the 
rapidity of its fire. The rate of fire has been increased, but the 
character of the effect so produced has not been changed. It 
happens that the adoption of Q.-F. guns coincides with a period in 
which there have been general modifications in the tactics of all 
arms. The changes so produced cannot, however, be mixed up 
with those necessitated by the employment of these guns. It is 
clear that, though the rate of fire of the gun has been increased, 
its power has only been added to in regard to the special areas 
with which it may have to deal. The increase in the rate of fire 
makes it possible for a battery to produce a greater effect against a 
given target than it formerly did. It does not, however, make it 
possible for this effect to be transferred to another target that is at 
a totally different part of the field of battle. It is true, of course, 
that it may be possible for one battery, armed with the new gun, 
to produce as great an effect as, say, two armed with the old gun, 
and that one may thus be set free to act elsewhere. On the other 
hand, presuming the conditions to be dealt with to be constant, if 
we adopt such a line of reasoning we shall be asking one of the new 
batteries to do what was formerly expected of two of the old. 
There would then be no increase of power ! 


Various theories have been adduced as to why Q.-F. guns 
should be more powerful than ordinary guns. For instance, it is 
said that a great effect may be produced in a short time. The 
truth of such a statement must, however, largely depend on the 
nature of the object shot at It would be an easy matter to draw 
up a system to deal with fixed conditions ; unfortunately, however, 
it is the conditions to be dealt with, and not the systems dealing 
with them, that vary, consequently we must be ready to adopt 
ourselves to circumstances. Does such an adaptation, however, 
mean the adoption of a system in which more is to be thought of 
covering an area in which an enemy may appear, than of hitting 
the enemy when he does appear ? 

S3^tems are too frequently considered from the point of view 
of the firer without due consideration being paid to the feelings of 
the object fired on. It is true that demoralisation may be pro- 
duced by sudden and effective action, and that sudden and 
effective action may be secured by a surprise. To effect a surprise, 
however, (i) the range must be known, or (2) the l>atteries must 
range rapidly. This at once raises the question of rapidity as 
opposed to accuracy. If the range is known, a rapid fire can be 
opened at once. If, however, the range is not known, a long 
bracket must be used, and if a long bracket is used, effect can only 
be looked for through distribution. It has been said that dis- 
tribution for depth was attempted through the use of the ricochet 
of the shot in the days of smooth-bore guns. The greater pre- 
cision of modern weapons then led to an attempt to gain effect by 

The French have now adopted systems in which they seek effect 

through distribution. Cases will, of course, arise in which systems 

embodying distribution must be used. On the other hand, if it were 

always possible to open direct fire, at once, on any part of the field, 

there would be no need for distribution. The enemy could be 

followed up by an overwhelming fire, the effects of which would be 

greater than those produced by any rafale. This would, however, 

necessitate rapid and accurate ranging, and the constant alteration 

of the range when found. If this were feasible we should then have 

what we may call a "direct-firing rafale^ I believe it to be 

possible, but as the questions involved are intricate, I shall discuss 

them, in detail, later. 

The power of the Q.-F. gun lies in the rapidity of its fire and 
the fact that it can deal with any situation quickly. If, however, 
the gun is placed behind hills and cannot be used without the 
the manipulation of various instruments, a large proportion of this 
power will be lost Consequently, excepting certain circumstances 



in which an observing station must be used, everything should be 
sacrificed to the possibility that may occur at any moment of having 
to open a direct fire over the sights on any part of the field. Such 
a procedure cannot possibly involve any risk. Shields have been 
fitted to the guns to protect the detachments.* Thus as far as 
safety is concerned, the guns may be placed near the crest From 
such a position they can be run forward when the moment for 
decisive action arrivesL Whereas if they are at the bottom of a 
slope they must adopt indirect laying and distribution, by which 
no effect may be secured, whilst a large proportion of the ammuni- 
tion fired must be wasted. 

There are, however, occasions on which other methods must be 
used. For instance^ speaking generally, it is clear that the best 
fire is that which produces the maximum of effect in the minimum 
of time. Arguing on this assumption, there is a growing tendency 
to seek results through sudden bursts of a rapid fire. The points 
in favour of this procedure appear to be these — 

1. The opportunities offered for obtaining decisive results will 
be few and fiur between. 

2. If they are to be made the most of, they must be dealt with 

We have already said that when the range is not known the 
best means of doii^ this is by using a long bracket, and distribut- 
ing for length and breadth within the limits of the bracket so found. 
The question as to whether the same procedure should be adopted 
when the range is known has already been discussed. 

It is, however, evident that most of the foreign systems have 
been framed with a view to firing on moving objects. Again, it is 
clear that as far as standing targets are concerned, there will be 
little difference in the method of dealing with them, except in 
regard to effecting a surprise or attempting to obtain great results 
in a short time. Thus, though we need not adopt the French 
regulations in their entirety, some change will soon be necessary. 
Then, again, there are other points at issue; thus, though the 
advantages of a direct fire are great, it may, in certain cases, be 
undesirable to place the g^ns too near the crest In addition to 
this, if a surprise is to be effected, the guns must evidently be 
concealed. In such cases the only means of dealing with an 
area that the enemy is likely to cross, will be to cover it with a 
storm of shells. To do this some method embodying distribution 
must be used. Then, again, woods or cover can only be searched 

* Unless the protection thus afforded is likely to prove effective, there can be no 
object in adding to the weight behind the teams.— C. H, W. 


by distributing the fire over the area where the enemy is supposed 
to be. In all cases, however, the greatest eflfect will be produced 
by opening a carefully prepared fire suddenly. Consequently, to 
sum up, a long bracket and distribution will be required — 

1. When ranging rapidly. 

2. When, with a view to efiecting a surprise, it is not found 
practicable to lay over the sights. 

3. When the guns are too far down the crest to be run up on 
an emergency. 

4* When searching woods or cover. 

5. When for any reason it is not desired to expose the guns. 

6. When observation is difficult. 

To do this it may be necessary to keep batteries in observation 
of areas. It is, however, evident that there will be few modifica« 
tions in many of the systems already in use. It would be foolish 
to attempt to lay down rules to deal with every emergency that 
may occur. Given a few general principles, the officers on the 
spot must be left to deal with the situation as they think best 
Thus rules must only be looked on as a guide, or there will be a 
return to the red tape, from which all are so anxious to be free. 


No regulations can deal adequately with every situation that 
is likely to occur in war. The tendency of the age is to decentra- 
lise responsibility. When a great battle is likely to become a 
series of small actions, it is impossible to say that the artillery 
should do this or that when the front involved may be a matter of 
several miles. The adoption of Q.-F. guns and the extension of 
the line of battle has, however, led to a cry for the dispersion 
of the artillery. As we have already said, the increase in the 
rapidity of the fire of the gun cannot be made an excuse for the 
distribution of its fire over an area on which it cannot possibly 
have any increased effect. The fact that it has become necessary 
to extend the infantry over a wide front cannot be made an excuse 
for a similar distribution of the artillery. Such action presumes 
the adoption of a semi-defensive attitude. In fact, it differs from 
the pure defensive only in this. The commander of the force that 
has distributed his troops and scattered his artillery is uncertain 
of his own intentions, and can only hope to win the action by a 
counter-attack. Such an attack must be supported by a mass of 
guns, and unless a reserve artillery has been formed, there will be 
no guns to support it. Then, if we recommend the scattering of 
our guns where we know that the enemy may concentrate his, 
we expose them to the risk of being beaten in detail; It may, 


of course, be necessary to hold one portion of a long line, whilst 
the remainder is pushed forward to make a decisive attack ; under 
no other circumstances, however, should preparations be made for 
the adoption of a purely defensive attitude, such as dispersion 

The general points at issue, however, appear to be as 
follows : — 

1. The rate of fire of the gun has been increased* 

2. The nature of the fire, however, remains the same. 

3. Consequently the means of its application cannot be 

That is, if we wish to produce a decisive effect we must aim at 
obtaining a concentration of fire. Is this primary principle then 
at variance with the dispersion of the guns ? In the eighteenth 
century battalion guns were used in the intervals between 
brigades. The artillery so employed produced no effect, because^ 
on account of the short range of its guns, its fire could not be 
concentrated on any particular part of the field. Now the range 
of the gun has been increased, and the line of battle has been 
extended. The extension of the fighting line has, however, 
increased out of all proportion to the range of the gun. 

Consequently the conditions remain the same. The following 
conclusions may thus be reached : — 

1. The degree of dispersion must depend on the nature of the 

2. The artillery must, however, retain the power of concentra- 
ting its fire on a given spot for the decisive attack, and no cry for 
dispersion should interfere with this. 

However strong or however long a line may be, it is bound to 
be broken at the spot against which the enemy concentrates a 
superiority of fire. If the artillery is scattered along this line it 
will run the risk of being destroyed in detail. 

It may be argued that the concentration of the artillery will 
leave the other arms without guns, and that they will run the risk 
of being overwhelmed. This is undoubtedly true, but the danger 
would be the same, if not greater, if the guns were scattered. 
Speaking generally, any force adopting a semi-defensive attitude 
must run such risks. A battle can only be won by offensive action, 
and in this action the mass of the artillery, or a greater portion of 
it, must be concentrated for the decisive attack. In these days an 
attack cannot be developed hurriedly, the force attacked has, 
consequently, timely warning of what to expect, and the guns can 
be moved under cover to concealed positions near threatened points* 
To take up positions from which enfilade fire can be brought to 


bear on the enemy is, of course, most desirable. But this will 
evidently not always be possible, especially when the line is one 
of great length. 


Definite results can only be secured by decisive action, and 
this action may frequently be accompanied by a great loss of life 
Consequently, as far as cover is concerned, it should only be used 
when it confers an advantage on those using it in regard to the 
main object in view, viz. the annihilation of the enemy. It is, 
however, of course true that the adoption of some form of 
protection may prove the surest road to success. Before the 
adoption of Q.-F. guns and shields, batteries sought protection by 
hiding behind the folds of the ground. With the use of Q.-F. 
guns, fitted with shields, cover will be used as a means of conceal- 
ment with a view to effecting a ^surprise ; the protection will be 
given by the shields. In this connection we must, however, re-- 
collect that the shield will not protect all the personnel^ and that 
it will be necessary to find a place of safety for the teams, etc 
The rapid rate of fire of the gun makes it possible for artillery 
to attempt a surprise. If batteries are to effect a surprise, a 
certain amount of concealment must, however, be presumed. The 
necessity for this concealment is accentuated by the fact that it 
will be impossible for artillery to come into action in the open, 
in the presence of guns already in positioa Consequently the 
use of cover has a twofold advantage in the earlier stages of the 
fight It has been rightly said that this phase of the action may 
be divided into two periods, both critical, namely — 

1. The period during which the guns are unlimbering and 
coming into action, and 

2. The time intervening between the moment at which the 
first shell is fired and that at which an effective fire is established. 

It is evident that the risk attending the first period can be 
decreased, if not removed, by concealment, whilst in the second 
the risk may be diminished, though not removed. 

The principal question involved is, however, where should the 
guns be placed ? It is clear that if they are to be concealed they 
must be behind the crest. Are they, however, to be in a position 
from which the target can be seen over the sights, or are they to 
be so far down the slope as to necessitate the use of an observing 
party ? There are three points to be considered. 

1. A moving target can only be dealt with by direct fire. 

2. It may, consequently, be necessary to push the guns on to 
the crest line at any stage of the fight, to repulse a counter-attack. 


If this means moving them a great distance it will involve 
considerable risk and a great loss of power. 

3. If changes of target are to be made, the danger angle must 
be observed, the line must consequently be preserved, which will 
mean that some guns will be exposed more than others. 

The question consequently resolves itself into this — 

1. The guns must go forward to the crest at the decisive st^^es 
of the action. Thus the nearer they are to i^ the more readily 
will they be moved. 

2. How are they to be brought into action ? 

3. At the present time we have no rapid means of effecting a 
change of target from concealed positions. 

By the use of the reverse slope we must presume that the guns 
will ascend an incline. It is thus evident that the position most 
easily occupied will be that in which a man on a horse cannot be 
seen from the target Such a position will, however, usually be 
found some distance behind the crest, and from it a rapid change 
of taiget will be difficult, if not impossible. This difficulty is, 
liowever, said to have been solved in France by the use of the 
coUimateur. If such b the case, this will probably become the 
•normal position for guns when concealed. 

Much will, however, depend on the nature of the ground. 
As the power of the gun depends on the rapidity of its fire, its 
use must be as direct as possible. Too much emphasis cannot be 
>laid on this. Consequently the choice of positions involving the 
^use of observing parties should be avoided. Then, again, it is 
^very unlikely that ground will be found which will afford facilities 
Sot concealment to both sides, and give an observing station to 

In the future, the risks run by the personnel will be minimised 
by the use of shields. For instance, the French system with 
waggons up, taken in conjunction with the shields, forms a small 
fortress for the detachments^ and largely eliminates all need for 
seeking other cover, beyond that necessary on coming into action. 
In fact, this method of employing the waggons may be said to be 
the direct outcome of the use of shields. The shields protect the 
detachments, but they would not protect the numbers that had to 
supply ammunition from the waggons, if the latter were placed in 
rear of the guns* This difficulty is, however, overcome by placing 
the waggon which is bullet proof alongside the gun. That the 
necessity of having a large supply of ammunition with the guns, 
is also recognised in principle by the Germans, will be seen from 
the following. In paragraph 357 of their regulations we read, 
** In preparing positions a most extensive use is to be made of 


earth coven . . • It is of the greatest importance to place a large 
supply of ammunition in readiness in the immediate vicinity of 
the guns." Thus the strength of the position is increased through 
the use of cover, and the supply of ammunition is facilitated by 
previous preparation. The guns then practically form a small 
redoubt, and have sufficient shells at hand to produce a decisive 
effect By the time that this reserve of ammunition has been ex- 
pended) the batteries will either have secured some great advantage 
that will facilitate the bringing up of further supplies, or they will 
have suffered so heavily that it will be a question as to whether it 
would be wise to reinforce them by giving them more ammunition. 
If, then, for '^ earth cover " we substitute the shields and waggons 
as used by the French, we have the system, in its simplest form, 
available for use in either the attack or the defence. It is, 
however, evident that the details must depend on the nature of 
the equipment used. 

C. Holmes Wilson. 


By Major H. R. Mead, Indian Army. 

Ix perusing the narrative o( the Boer War contained in the 
'Times History/ one of the first tfaii^ to arrest attention is 
the fireqnenqr with whidi n^ht operations were undertaken by 
British commandeiSL 

The present paper is an attempt to analyse the conditions 
which led to the adoption of this method of fighting; to note the 
specific objects whidi it was expected to attain, and finally to seek 
the causes which generally conduced to success or failure. 

It may be noted to start with, that these operations were 
confined to the British, and that the Boers did not on their side 
attempt anythii^ of the kind. 

Further, we may observe that on the British side four different 
and independent commanders^ acting in three separate theatres of 
tiie war, all had reoourse to n^t attacks. 

These facts naturally lead us to inquire what were the particular 
causes which prediqiosed them to this method of fighting. 

Analysis of C\uses pr£disposixg British Commanders 

to resort to night attacks, 

In order to trace out these causes, it wili be necessary to consider 
what training for war had previously been given to the troops 
ei^ged in this struggle; and how such training had been evolved 
from experiences of former wars» and from the views held by either 
side as regards the tactics to be pursued in %hting under modem 

Now, the experiences gained by tiie British in fighting other 
than sava^ tribes in the Peninsula, Crimea, and India, all pointed 
to the ba}\>net beii^ the final decider of a conflict, whether in the 
defciKx or in attack. 

The British wene also guided to a large extent by continental 
opinion as regards the tactics to be emplo>*ed, and this was natural, 
a:» the latest wars of any magnitude between civilised nations had 
taken place on the Continent 

rhc gtrneral theor>- which was held on the Continent, and 


consequently accepted by England, as regards the attack and 
defence of positions, was roughly as follows : — 

The attack, to be successful, must gradually collect in larger 
numbers opposite, and within assaulting distance of those points 
of the defence which either offered special advantages to the 
attack or were weak points in the defence, and from these positions 
should drive the enemy out at the point of the bayonet 

On the other hand, as regards the defence, it was held that a 
passive defence would not lead to victory ; but that counter-attacks 
prepared, indeed, by the fire of artillery and infantry, but carried 
the bayonet, were necessary to obtain decisive results. 

It was recognised that, in the attack, the great problem to be 
solved was how to get the assaulting lines, or columns, sufficiently 
close to allow of the attack with the bayonet being carried out 
without suffering undue loss ; and the usual solution to this problem 
was a heavy covering fire of artillery and infantry directed to 
keeping down the enemy's fire^ under cover of which the attacking 
troops were to advance. Naturally these ideas had their effect on 
the. training to which the soldier was subjected. 

Since the view was taken that the great object to be obtained 
from the covering fire was a hail of bullets, evenly distributed 
along the position, which would keep down the enemy's fire, it 
followed that, to attain this end, strict discipline and fire control 
were essential, and it was considered that this end was better 
attained by volleys than individual fire. The annual course of 
musketry was based on these ideas — individual firing was merely 
used to teach the recruit, keep the trained soldier in practice, and 
serve as a preliminary to the second period of collective firing. 
This collective firing consisted only of volley firing at different 
ranges, with the exception of some five or ten rounds directed to 
rapid independent firing. 

It will thus be seen that in the British service individual 
marksmanship under anything like war conditions was at this time 
at a discount ; the rifle was looked on as a weapon to be used 
collectively to pump lead to cover a certain area of ground, and 
the bayonet was relied on to gather the fruits of victory. 

On the other hand, the Boers, who were not even armed with 
bayonets, were totally untrained in volley firing, and by their 
previous habits and experience were led to look on the rifle as 
their one weapon, whether for attack or defence. Hence in their 
case, individual marksmanship was everything, and collective fire 
merely meant the application of their fire to a common object. 
It must also be remembered that, as the result of previous en- 
counters, the Boers had undoubtedly conceived an undue contempt 


for the English soldier ; and in consequence the British commanders 
were impressed with the great importance of wiping out the memory 
of these previous defeats, and at the same time striking a heavy 
blow at the morale of the enemy. 

The opening actions of the war more or less confirmed both 
sides in their previous appreciation of the tactical requirements of 
the fight To the British, Talana and Elandslaagte seemed to 
prove the possibility of success by assault of Boer positions, though 
their eyes were opened somewhat to the loss which modem weapons 
could inflict during the advance ; whilst the Boers, on the other 
hand, though they had learnt to respect their foes, had on the 
whole come off cheaply, owing to the British deficiency in mounted 
troops, and had in addition learnt to take up still more widely 
extended positions, which would allow of further development of 
their fire action. 

At this period, therefore, the main point considered by the 
British was how they could approach within assaulting distance 
without suffering undue loss, and a method was suggested by the 
memory of the successful solution of this problem by Lord Wolseley 
in the attack of the entrenched position at Tel-el-Kebir. Further, 
from what was known of the Boer state of discipline and organisation, 
it was unlikely that their outpost work, particularly at night, would 
be efficiently performed, and night operations were therefore in a 
special deg^ree likely to be successful if undertaken against them. 

To sum up : the British, looking to the assault as the final 
deciding factor of the contest, and seeing their main difficulty lie 
in getting their troops into a close enough position from which to 
deliver it, were naturally led to attempt night attacks, which we see 
were not entirely new to them ; whilst the Boers, relying on their 
individual marksmanship, which was dependent on daylight, were 
not likely to attempt anything of the sort. 

Specific Objects expected to be attained by Night 

Operations under Review. 

Having thus, in a general way, established what causes pre- 
disposed the British to resort to night attacks, we may now com- 
mence to examine the various operations in detail, in order to 
discover what were the specific objects expected to be obtained 
in each case. For this purpose we have the following operations :— 

Moj^Tsfontein, under Lord Methaen, on the western side. 

Belmont, r% ^% »• » » 

Stormbci^* « General Gatacre, in Cape Colony. 

Willow i;range, ,, „ Hildyard, in NataL 

Nicholson's Kek, „ „ White, in NataL 


Of these the first two, carried out under Lord Methuen, are 
instances of night operations being resorted to, simply to avoid the 
losses incidental to direct attacks of entrenched positions. 

Maggersfontein and Belmont. — It will be noted that they are not 
even designed to surprise the enemy. So much so was this the 
case^ that at Maggersfontein the position was shelled the previous 
day, thus not only the fact of an attack being imminent was 
advertised, but also the point of attack. 

These also may be described as major operations, the whole 
force at Lord Methuen's disposal being in each case employed. 

The other three cases, quoted above, differ in that they ai« 
more of the nature of raids or enterprises carried out by small 
forces, or by portions only of the forces at the disposal of the 
commanders undertaking the operations; they were, moreover, 
designed to effect their objects by surprise. 

Stormberg. — Gatacre, who was in command at the time of com- 
paratively few troops, was charged with the defence of a large 
frontier, and found it absolutely necessary to take the offensive, in 
order to stem the Boer invasion and prevent disloyal colonists 
rising and joining the enemy. 

He saw his opportunity in the isolated Boer force laagered near 
Stormberg, and so planned the operations which terminated so 
disastrously, utiUsing for this purpose such troops as could be 
collected together at short notice. 

Willow Grange. — General Hildyard found a force of Boers had 
come down south from Ladysmith and were threatening his and 
General Barton's lines of communication, so he resorted to a night 
attack, in order to capture a big gun which the enemy had brought 
down with them, and the height (Brynbella) on which they had 
placed it. 

In this case the night attack was only part of major operations, 
which he had determined on ; and its execution was entrusted to a 
subordinate commander (Colonel Kitchener). 

NicholsofCs Nek was also designed as part of major operations 
which were to take place the next day in connection with it. 

The intention was with this force to seize the position on 
Nicholson's Nek overnight, and thus be on the spot to cut off the 
Boers* retreat when they should be driven back by the attack 
which was planned to be carried out by the main force in the 

But though these operations differ thus in various points from 
those carried out in the western theatre of the war, still, at Storm- 
berg, at any rate, there is the general scheme of getting the troops 
by night within assaulting distance of the position to be attacked. 


and thus avoiding losses ; whilst at Willow Grange the key of the 
position is to be captured at night and used as z. point d'Appui for 
further operations, and here again the avoidance of losses is one of 
the reasons for resorting to night work. 

On the other hand, Nicholson's Nek stands alone in having for 
its object the seizure of a post within the enemy's lines, which could 
only be effected by night and through the agency of surprise. 

Failure of the Night Operations in Each Case. 

Now, in all these cases the night operations were failures. 
Three of them, indeed, are recc^nised disasters ; whilst in the case 
of the other two the objects sought for by the night operations 
were not attained. 

Thus at Belmont the attack which was planned to take place 
at dawn was carried out in full daylight, and at Willow Grange 
the gun which it was sought to capture was carried away by the 
Boers earlier in the night, and though the position was occupied, 
no use of it was made in the next day's action. 

It should be instructive, therefore, to examine these actions and 
determine where the causes of failure lay in order to understand 
whether they are inherent in operations of this nature, or whether 
they can be eliminated by previous arrangements or training. 

Causes of Failure. 

The first point that such an examination brings to light is that 
in four out of five cases the operations were not concluded in time, 
so that daylight appeared before all the arrangements were com- 
pleted. This was owing to various reasons, thus : — 

Maggersfontein, — The night chosen was a stormy one, with 
heavy rain, which delayed the march. Then it was found that 
thick bush prevented deployment till three or four hundred yards 
beyond the point which had been previously selected. 

The result was, the column was caught in the act of deployment 
when day broke. 

Belmont. — The troops were late at the ganger's hut, which was 
the point selected for the rendezvous and for the deployment to be 
carried out Further, the distance from that point to the position 
was under-estimated by something like looo yards, so that the 
actual attack was carried out by day, and practically all advantages 
of the night work were lost. 

Stormberg, — The troops were surprised by daybreak whilst still 
wandering in close order, but the causes which contributed to this 
were more complicated than in previous instances just quoted 


Suffice, it for the present that there was delay at the start and 
from want of exact knowledge of the ground to be crossed over. 

NicJiolsofis Nek. — The column was delayed owing to the R.I. 
Fusiliers not being able to get their mules loaded up in time for 
the start, so that when they eventually arrived under Trechengula 
at 2 A.M. (being then some two miles from the Nek), the commander 
despaired of making the position he had been designed to hold 
before daylight, and therefore took up the preliminary position on 
the bill, where his force was afterwards attacked and captured. 

Willow Grange. — The one exception is Willow GrangCi in 
which operation the troops were in time to seize the hill under 
cover of darkness. 

Want of Knowledge of Ground to be traversed. 

It may be noted that at Maggersfontein and Belmont want of 
exact knowledge of the ground to be traversed, as already stated, 
aggravated the delay, and so contributed to the failures which 

Failure to notify Plans to those concerned. 

Another cause which contributed to the failures at Stormberg 
and Willow Grange may be found in changes of plan, or the actual 
orders for the movements not being duly notified. 

In the first case it is related that several ofHcers were still under 
the impression, when marching across the lines of rail crossed by 
the path actually pursued by the column, that the advance was 
being carried out by the originally selected route passing through 
Goosen's farm, which had been abandoned owing to rumours of 
entrenchments and barbed wire. 

Again, later on, the guides, having brought the force at 3.45 
A.M. to the actual spot to which they had been ordered to lead 
them, were confused as to the General's plans, and thinking he 
required to go to another part of the ground, continued to lead on, 
till eventually day broke, and discovered the movements to the 

At Willow Grange the troops which should have co-operated 
with Colonel Kitchener are said to have received no orders, and in 
consequence remained inactive at a critical period. 

Imperfect Reconnaissance of the Position to be 


At Maggersfontein and Belmont there seems to have been 
little done in the way of reconnaissance of the position, so that 
Lord Methuen was ignorant of where the enemy's flanks rested. 


This want of knowledge seriously affected the succeeding opera- 
tions ; particularly at Maggersfootein, where the Boers had ex- 
tended their left nearly to Brown's Drift on the Modder River, 
thereby threatening to outflank him on that side, and compelling 
him to gradually use up all reserves and spare troops till he had 
none left to re-establish the fight 

Miscellaneous Causes which contributed to Failure. 

Lastly, there were circumstances which were peculiar to one or 
other of these enterprises, and not of such a general type as the 

For instance, in the movements connected with the Stormberg 
affair, there was the incident of the tel^ram which went astray, the 
neglect to take the intelligence officer who knew the country, and 
the overtaxing the powers of endurance of the troops ; whilst at 
Nicholson's Nek there was the panic among the mule transport, 
which caused the loss of the spare ammunition, heliographs, and 

At Willow Grange the unfortunate reply by the naval guns to 
the Boer artillery warned them to retire the gun overnight. 

Were these Causes Preventable? 

These being, as far as we can ascertain them, the main causes 
which led to the failure of these schemes, it remains to be seen how 
far they are inherent in operations of this nature, and how, and to 
what extent, they may be guarded against. 

Firstly, as regards delays, whether caused by unavoidable 
accidents, such as the inclement weather of Maggersfontein, or by 
preventable circumstances, such as the slow loading up of the 
transport animals at Nicholson's Nek, or miscalculation of the 
distance to be traversed, as at Belmont, a general remedy seems to 
lie in allowing a greater margin of time when formulating the 

It would seem preferable, as a general rule, to start the troops 
directly the first shades of evening would cover their movements, and 
utilise the spare time, if any, in giving them a rest when in position. 

Secondly, there is no doubt that troops should be systematically 
practised in peace in night operations, including the marching to 
distant rendezvous so as to arrive at fixed times, in deploying in 
the dark, in passing obstacles, and in all the attendant duties, such 
as loading up of transport. 


Reconnaissance of the Position to be attacked. 

With regard to the reconnaissance of the position it is intended 
to attack, it is true that there may be, as in Lord Methuen's case, 
a woeful deficiency of cavalry or mounted troops, but in this case it 
would seem absolutely necessary that an attempt should be made 
to obtain the necessary information by means of individual scouts. 

There can be no doubt that there would be numerous officers 
and others keen on a job of this sort, and it seems curious that Lord 
Methuen, who would, no doubt, have jumped at such a chance of 
distinguishing himself when a young man, did not utilise the 
services of scouts. 

It may be noted, therefore, that the training of scouts in peace 
time to find their way about at night, and to observe and report, 
is an important point, and requires much more attention in the 

We also learn the extreme importance of examining the ground 
to be crossed over, so as to guard against unforeseen obstacles, and 
verify the distance to be traversed. 

This work should probably in any case be carried out by scouts 
in preference to cavalry patrols, as less likely to draw the attention 
of the enemy. 

Explanation of Plans to those detailed to carry 


It is, of course, essential that plans should be thoroughly ex- 
plained to all who have to do with their execution, and thUt any 
change of plan should be as widely notified as were the previous, 

Miscellaneous Causes of Failure avoidable with Care. 

As regards the other miscellaneous causes of failure, they are 
all avoidable by care being exercised in the conception and execu- 
tion of the scheme of operations, except perhaps in respect to 
unfortunate accidents of the nature of the stampede of the mule 
transport at Nicholson's Nek— though even here a thorough know- 
ledge of mule transport work would probably have mitigated, if it 
did not do away with, this particular source of failure. 

Leading of Columns by Night. 

We have not touched on the difficulty of leading troops by 

night across country. 

A fact which is most creditable to all employed in these 
V01-.CL. 14 

(vol. JnciX. NEW SERIES.] 


operations as guides, whether officers, local police, or farmers, is 
that in no case can they be said to have failed to lead the troops 
with reasonable celerity to the appointed position. 


On the whole, therefore, though our experience in night opera- 
tions in the early stages of the Boer War were not fortunate, still, 
they do not necessarily lead us to condemn their employment 
entirely in future. 

In fact, as far as minor operations of the nature of raids, or such 
enterprises as do not require the employment of large bodies of 
troops, and for which complicated preparations are unnecessary, 
are concerned, it seems certain that occasions will in future occur 
when commanders will find that night operations offer the best 
chances of success. 

But as regards night attacks on a large scale, such as at 
Maggersfontein or Belmont, when the attendant risks are great, 
and consequences of failure may be disastrous, it will be necessary 
to consider more carefully under what circumstances it may be 
really necessary, or profitable, to resort to them. 

If Time allows, approaching Trenches by Night 

is recommended. 

Putting aside the possibilities of being able to manoeuvre an 
enemy out of a position, it will often occur that time is not a matter 
of the first consideration ; in which case resort might be had to the 
construction of trenches under cover of darkness, by which means 
we should secure a slow but steady advance against the position 
each night, and the retention of the ground thus won during the 
day ; as happened at Paardeberg in a later period of the war than 
we are now considering. 

Successful Instance quoted which occurred in the 

Delhi Manceuvres. 

Another successful instance of this trench work at night occurred 
in the manoeuvres held in India in connection with the Great Delhi 
Durbar in 1902, when a portion of Brigadier-General Plowden's 
brigade pushed up entrenchments by night to within two or three 
hundred yards of a village in possession of the Southern Army, 
which caused the evacuation of this point the next morning, and 
with it the retirement of their whole line of defence. 

But supposing that time is a factor of importance, we have yet 
to consider what conditions would render the attack of a position 


by day so hopeless as 'to justify the resort to the risks of a night 

Experiences in this War have led us to alter our 


It must be remembered that the experiences of fighting gained 
in the Boer War have led us to alter or modify many of our 
former conceptions of the general problem of the attack. Especially 
is this the case as regards our appreciation of the value to be 
assigned to individual marksmanship, and of the enhanced results 
which may be looked for in the future, as a consequence of ^the 
intelligent use of fire and cover in action. So great an authority in 
infantry fire tactics, a soldier of such great experience as Sir Ian 
Hamilton, has brought out this point very clearly in his evidence 
before the War Commission, where he states ; " At some part of 
the line, however, it is almost certain that a brook, or ditch, or 
imperceptible fold of the ground, will give some trifling shelter to 
a further advance. Half a dozen private soldiers may find them- 
selves at this spot. If they possess sufficient training to recognise 
the possibilities of their position, together with sufficient new 
discipline, initiative, and enthusiasm to take advantage of it, they 
will creep on. They will be followed by others, and if, as a result, 
the enemy's line is* penetrated, even by a few men, the power of t/ieir 
modern armament will make their flanking fire so demoralising and 
effective that the position will either be abandoned forthwith^ or so 
much attention will be concentrated on the intruders that an assault 
may become practicable all along the line." 

The Holding Power of the Rifle and its Use 

IN THE Attack. 

Then, again, we have now learnt to appreciate the holding power 
of the modem rifie, and to understand that this power may be 
utilised in the attack as well as in the defence. Through its use 
we may keep the enemy fully employed and pinned to their 
position by comparatively few rifles at one point of the field, so that 
they are unable to move off to reinforce other points where our 
attack is being pressed in greater force. 

Under modern conditions, then, the commander who has under 
him the future soldiers of the empire, whose intelligence has been 
developed, and whose efficiency with the rifle has been increased 
to the uttermost, may reasonably find that the attack of a strong 
position by day can in the future be undertaken with better 
prospects of success than heretofore. 



la tns CCCB3CCL tDOL w aTC ssppofted by Sir Ian Hamilton, who 
t£de S5ea thst 'cnder skflfnl Icadii^ tbc attack has rather 
guied thaa lest by tbe cev oooditXMis.'' After laying down his 
iea5C 3e !> 5=r hcuiic^ th5s Tfcv. Sa- Ian HamiltDn pnxeeds to show 
bov Ec crcrrzstasocs whSdi are al iugcth er adverse to Ae attack, it 
cLzy be st£Z possLble to delfrer it with good chances of success. 

**Etc:: r the crcntiy is open, there will always be vmys of 
gctticg azross tbe £re-svept zone. If the worst comes to the 
tbr aiuc k may be dcl l% eie d in the afternoon, so that it 
Lbe men get within pouit-blank range. Or, failing 
srj:k iTZir cjrifiAllj recc'nnoitred grottnd will bring 


I: appearsL theKfore^ that there are dicnmstances which might 
j',2Stify cigbt marches and attacks by large forces as well as small 
eoes. Bet a ooamacier. before taking the risks^ which must be 
coas£^5erabIe even with troops well trained to this particular kind of 
vcrk» axxi notwithstancizg the exercise of every precauticMi, should 
w^ we£gh the drccmstanccs of the moment, and first convince 
hfrrwelf that the grocnd is too unfavourable to permit of an advance 
by day. and that tioie will not permit him to employ the slower but 
less rtsky operatioas of poshing forward trenches by night, before 
he 6r:allv commits himself. 

H. R. Mead. 


By "Red Coat." 

South Africa is held up as an almost ideal country for soldiers 
to settle in on the expiration of their colour service ; is it so ? 
What sort of a man is the soldier ? These are questions that do not 
generally get much thought about. Being what he is, is the soldier 
the sort of man that is wanted in large numbers in this country ? 
The average British recruit enlists at seventeen or eighteen, and is 
generally without any trade ; but at best, he is only partially trained 
to a trade at that age ; or, if he is an older man, he has probably 
enlisted for his daily bread, having failed to make his way other- 
wise. Of course, there are exceptions. If he is an agricultural 
labourer, he is most likely that and nothing more. The farmer 
wanted in South Africa is not a labourer, but a man with views on 
irrigation, planting, improvements in methods, improvements in 
breeds, and with the money to carry out his views — a most unusual 
combination in labourer or soldier. Artisans are wanted in South 
Africa, but the number of soldier-artisans is small ; unskilled labour 
is not much wanted. Many old soldiers, especially non-com- 
jnissioned officers, are well suited for employment as overseers of 
native labour, but it is doubtful if any large demand for this class 
of work remains any longer unsupplied. The inducements to a 
soldier to settle in South Africa are not very great, except the 
apparently high rate of wages ; but, then, three shillings in South 
Africa is no more than one shilling at home. He is not likely to 
be favourably impressed by the country in other ways. Now the 
war is over, the Colonial civilian does not over-appreciate the soldier, 
who sees on every hand that his own Government is less careful 
of his comfort and well-being than of the welfare of the repatriated 
or disloyal Boer. He is paid less and considered less than the 
Kaffir ; he is far from home and friends, and he has less liberty 
than any other class of man in the country. In many stations, 
even the public-houses are out of bounds for him. He is badly 
housed — very badly — and in every way uncomfortable. Bad tents, 
and crowded, are good enough for him ; but, for the repatriated 
Boer, are new tents d volenti. The climate of this country is very 


fine ; but try it in standing camp, the change and excitement of war 
over, when the dust-storms of sammer and the bitter winds of 
winter make day or night horrible. 

The British soldier is not a farmer of the sort wanted, though 
from the Imperial point of view the soldier-farmer settler, if he 
existed, would certainly be the most acceptable. Even if men 
willing to try farming were assisted with stock, implements, and 
loans, the number of ex-soldiers capable of employing such oppor- 
tunities to any useful end is infinitesimal It has been tried and 
has failed befcxe. After failure, the men would drift to the mining 
districts, or to the coast ports, in the hope of finding work. In the 
mines, unskilled white labour is not wanted ; in the coast ports 
much of the small trade is falling into the hands of foreign Jews 
and natives of India ; of both classes there are already too many 
in the country. The fact that so few men take their discharge 
here is proof that they do not like the country, that the country 
does not want the dass of men available in large numbers, and that 
the conditions of the country and of the men must change a good 
deal if this state of affairs is to be improved. 

Note. — *' Red-Coat " is a regular officer of knowledge and experience ; and that he 
knows sometbuig of the private soldier is undeniable — for the simple reason that he 
oblaiQed his commission from the ranks. Theoretically, it would of course be an 
exceUent thing for the Empire, if South Africa could be crowded with old-soldier settlers ; 
bat under existing conditions the prospects of success for such immigrants are very smalL 
A fiu* better 6ekl is open in Canada, where there is plently of work for farm hands, skilled 
or unskilled, and a free grant of i6o acres waiiii^ for those who care to have it after 
baring learned what to do with it The letter recently addressed by Mr. Preston, the 
Commissioner for Emigration, to Sir Howard Vincent, explaining the advantages of 
Canada for Biiti^ settlers, has, I trust, received the attention it deserves.— Ed. U. S. M« 



The Canadian Military Gazette announces that, according to a 
statement issued from Ottawa on the 27th February, the new 
Militia establishment on a peace footing, which has just been 
approved, gives a total strength of all arms as 4924 officers and 
42,334 non-commissioned officers and men, or a grand total of 
47,258. This, compared with the former establishment, gives an* 
increase of 1475 officers and 3021 men, or an aggregate increase* 
of the force on a peace footing of 4496. The mounted infantry 
do not appear separately in the new establishment, as they do in* 
the old, having been merged in the cavalry. The largest increase 
is, of course, in the infantry establishment, formerly 2576 officers 
and 28,791 non-commissioned officers and men, now 3781 officers 
and 3 1,476 non-commissioned officers and men. The establishment 
of the Corps of Guides is unchanged. 

The details of the changes of the various arms is as follows : — 

Officers. Men. 

Field Artillery 152 1,860 

Cavalry 599 4,607 

Garrison Artillery 221 2,125^ 

Engineers 36 73^ 

Infantry 3,781 31, 47^ 

Army Service Corps 40 808- 

Bearer Companies 27 312 

Field Hospitals 24 342 

Signalling Corps 18 72. 

Corps of Guides 25 


The Bavarian Army Corps will this year carry out their autumn- 
manoeuvres in conformity with the field service regulations ; thus 
the 3rd (Landau) Division will be moved into its own Army "Corps 
zone (the llnd) on the left bank of the Rhine. Special cavalry 
manoeuvres will ^he held in the Ilird Army Corps, under the 
Inspector-General of Cavalry. The following will take part in 
them : the ist, 4th, and 5th Brigades belonging respectively to the 
1st, IInd,and IlIrd Army Corps, and the Horse Artillery Brigade 
Division of the 5th Artillery Regiment, quartered at Landau. 
These units will together form a cavalry division consisting of 
28 squadrons in all, 5 of which are for each of the regiments of 
the 1st and 4th Brigades, and 4 for those of the 5th. After 
completing its special manoeuvres, the cavalry division will take 
part in those of the Ilird Army Corps; with that object it will 
be reinforced by a pioneer and a machine-gun detachment, the 


latter joining the division two days before the termination of the 


The following numbers, taken from the Internationale Revue 
iiber die gesamten Armeen und Flatten^ shows how strictly the 
regulations for public education are enforced in Prussia. 

Out of the 150,245 Prussian recruits enrolled in 1902, only 71 
were illiterate. The provinces of Pomerania, Schleswig-Holstein, 
Hanover, Westphalia, and Hesse-Nassau, did not furnish a single 
illiterate recruit. Silesia sent 11, Western Prussia and Posen each 
sent 18, and Eastern Prussia 19. Almost the whole of the illiterate 
recruits were Lithuanian Poles. 


The same journal gives the result of the entire German 
recruiting operations for 1902, According to it, 1,610,741 young 
men were examined. 574,425 of these were put back, 1337 were 
not permitted to serve, as bad characters, 41,245 were struck off 
the lists, 98,651 were drafted into the ist Levy of the Landsturm, 
81,389 were attached to the Ersatz-Reserve, 1384 were attached to 
the Ersatz-Reserve of the Navy, 16,407 were in excess of require- 
ments, and, finally, 220,558 were enrolled. On the other hand, 
30,262 volunteers had already enlisted in the Army, and 143 1 in 
the Navy. 

Amongst those called to the Colours, 209,201 were for the 
combatant, and 4413 for the non-combatant branches of the 
territorial service, whilst 3756 recruits from non-maritime, and 
3188 from the maritime portion of the population were enrolled 
in the Navy. 


According to the law of the 25th March, 1899, the German 
Field Artillery consists of 95 regiments (one of which, of 3 brigade 
divisions, is for the Artillery School), of 2 or 3 brigade divisions, 
and having a total of 202 brigade divisions. The total number of 
batteries is 583, of which 42 are horse artillery, 475 are field guns, 
and 66 are iO'5 cm. howitzers. Each Army Corps has a brigade 
division of 3 of these latter ; the Bavarian ones have 2 batteries 
only to a brigade division. 

Of the 42 horse artillery batteries, 22 are attached by twos 
into 1 1 brigade divisions, in excess in certain regiments, and are 
meant for cavalry batteries. 

The budgetary strength of the field artillery is — 

3062 officers. 

1 1,909 non-commissioned officers. 

53,311 men, not including one-year volunteers. 

33,624 troop horses. 


The Kolnische Zeitnng states that the German War Minister 
announced to the Commission on the Budget that the particular 
form of the new German field gun had been finally decided upon, 


and that the barrel recoil system had been adopted. The Krupp 
gun forms the basis of the new gun, which will, as usual, be 
designated officially by the year of its construction only. A full 
description of the gun is not yet, however, forthcoming. 


Die F/ot/e, the official publication of the German Navy League, 
in an article entitled "What do we learn from the Russo-Japanese 
War?" says that the recent events in the Far East strikingly 
demonstrate the urgent necessity for hastening the carrying out of 
the German naval programme. The two principles to be deduced 
from the conflict, the journal states, are that Russia, against her 
will, became involved in war, a misfortune that might readily 
happen to Germany, that battleships decide sea fights, whilst 
torpedo-boats only achieve results under specially favounrt)le con- 
ditions. The obvious duty of Germany, before it is too late, is to 
hasten the construction already authorised, and to add to the 
scheme for naval defence adopted in 1900, as since that time Great 
Britain, Russia, and the United States have increased their navies 
at a more rapid rate. 


According to the Journal de Genkve, the Swiss Military Depart- 
ment has recently adopted the proposals of the Committee it 
instituted to study the reform of infantry equipment. The Com- 
mittee proposed the following field kit : the Bordtfeldt hat, similar 
to that worn by the German troops of the China Expeditionary 
Force ; a single-buttoned kersey with turned-down collar, of blue- 
grey or green-brown cloth ; trousers of the same material ; putties 
instead of gaiters ; a poncho cloak, with simply a hole in it for the 
head ; a knitted woollen jersey to be worn under the kersey in cold 

The Committee have not yet come to any decision regarding 
the valise, but three models are at present under discussion. In 
addition to the jersey, the valise will contain the rations, a second 
pair of light trousers, slippers, and cap. The cloak will be carried 
on the valise, to which it can easily be buckled. The proposed kit 
and equipment is 4J kilos, or about 9J lbs., lighter than the old. 
The Committee urges that the trial of the new system should be 
made simultaneously by entire squads in all the divisions. 


A royal decree, published on the 20th February last, institutes 
an annual championship for officers' chargers, to be ridden by 
subaltern officers in Portuguese regiments, and independent units 
of the mounted branches of the Service. The championship 
includes a race of from 50 to 60 kilometres, to be ridden at a 
maximum rate of 12 and a minimum of 10 kilometres the hour, 
and of a race over obstacles. The number of riders taking part in 
each race is limited to one per regiment or independent unit. Cavalry 
corps are alone obliged to be represented. Only officers with horses 
at least 5^ years old, and of which they have been in possession 


for more than 6 months, are eligible to take part in the champion- 
ship races. 


In La France de Demain M. Ardouin-Dumazet discusses the 
Russo-Japanese War, and says that, with all its reservists, the 
Japanese Army has 7900 officers. 331,000 non-commissioned 
officers and men, and 70,000 saddle and draft animals. Her 
greatest effort cannot place more than 300,000 men on the main- 
land, and if they denude the whole of the Japanese islands of 
troops, it might be possible for the Russians to despatch a force 
from Vladivostok which would ravage a great part of Japan. It 
will, therefore, be necessary for the Japanese to maintain about 
100,000 men at home. It would be interesting to discover from 
what sources M. Ardouin-Dumazet obtains these statistics of the 
strength of the Japanese Army. He may possibly considerably 
modify his opinions with regard to its strength before the end of 
the campaign. It would also be of interest to learn how the author 
of the article considers that the Russians could fit out and despatch 
an expeditionary force against Japan whilst Admiral Togo retains 
command of the sea. 




By Sir William Lee- Warner, K.C.S.I. In two volumes. London: Mac- 
millan & Co., Ltd. New York : The Macmillan Company. 1904. Price 25 J. 

Biographies of great men have recently been pubh'shed with ex- 
ceptional frequency, and many of them have been of more than 
remarkable importance and interest. Amongst the latter it is 
unquestionable that the life of James Ramsay, Earl and afterwards 
Marquis of Dalhousie, is entitled to a high place ; firstly because 
Lord Dalhousie was a truly great man, and secondly because he 
has found a biographer worthy of him, a writer of distinction, and 
one who himself fully understands the merits of the weighty questions 
that are inseparably connected with the career of the very able and 
patriotic statesman whose services to his country have now been so 
admirably detailed. 

Lord Dalhousie was a politician only in the sense that a states- 
man must necessarily be concerned with politics ; a man of the 
highest honour and patriotism, he was incapable of paying the 
slightest regard to the interests of "Party." This was already 
manifest in his relations with Sir Robert Peel and Lord John 
Russell, and on his appointment to be Governor-General of India 


he put into words what had consistently been the rule of his 
political life ; he said, ** From the moment I assume the govern- 
ment of India, politics is a question unknown to me. Party politics, 
above all, have no existence in my mind." It would be well for 
the Empire had we a larger number of statesmen such as Lord 
Dalhousie. Of politicians we have enough and to spare. 

It was under momentous circumstances that the new Governor- 
General commenced his rule in India. His predecessor. Lord 
Hardinge, entertained optimistic views relative to the absolute 
security of the situation, and in the interests of economy had 
reduced the army, both British and native. That matters were 
less satisfactory than they were represented soon became apparent 
to Lord Dalhousie, and although it can scarcely be pretended that 
he actually foresaw so formidable an outbreak as the second Sikh 
war, it is undeniable that the massacre at Multan assumed from the 
first a gravity in his eyes far exceeding the estimate of it entertained 
by the Company authorities or by the officials around him. It has 
been urged against the Governor-General that he failed to act 
promptly, as he was urged to do by Edwardes and others ; but 
apart from the fact that he was strongly advised by the Commander- 
in-Chief, Lord Gough, to await a more favourable season, common 
sense was on the side of his decision — that delay was the least of 
two evils. To act in the hot weather, in the hottest territory on 
earth, impeded by swollen rivers and mud, was^ to risk failure ; 
and delay caused by failure would necessarily involve a more 
disastrous loss of prestige than a delay made solely in order to 
avoid such risk. 

Again, it has also been alleged that Lord Dalhousie restricted 
the action of Lord Gough, and subsequently, seeing his error, 
allowed him to proceed. The truth is nothing of the sort The 
Governor-General wisely restrained a man whose only claim to 
generalship was personal courage, from rushing to certain destruc- 
tion, totally unprovided with transport and munitions, and with an 
insufficient force. But when time had removed, or at all events 
reduced, the difficulties, the previous restrictions were removed, and 
the' Pyrrhic victory of Chilianwalla followed. For the absurdities 
of Chilianwalla the decisive victory of Gugerat furnishes no extenua- 
tion ; and the supersession of Lord Gough, by order from England, 
as the result of the condemnation of his proceedings by the Duke 
of Wellington, after reading that general's own report, seems to 
have been an entirely proper proceeding. 

There is but one charge in respect of his treatment of Lord 
Gough that can stand against Lord Dalhousie, and this is that, 
having realised the incapacity of the Commander-in-Chief, an in- 
capacity that had long been notorious, it would have been better 
to have removed him from his command forthwith than to have 
restricted him in the exercise of his military judgment A general 
to whom it was necessary that the Governor-General should 
represent the importance of using his artillery as a preliminary to 
falling on with the bayonet was clearly unfit to be entrusted with 
an army. Chilianwalla has few parallels in history, not even in 
South Africa, and Sobraon was little better. 


However, the Sikhs having eventually been subdued, Lord 
Dalhousie had to decide what was to be done with the Punjab, and, 
in spite of the objections raised by Henry Lawrence, he did the 
right thing ; he annexed the country. Lord Dalhousie realised 
that a great empire cannot stand still. The inexorable laws of 
Nature prescribe that the only alternative to growth is decay and 
death. He was no Jingo, the " Forward Policy " had no pleasures 
for him — quite the contrary ; but, upon the other hand, where the 
necessity was clear, it had no terrors for him. The event not only 
proved the correctness of his decision, from the general point of 
view, but actually exercised a great influence upon our ultimate 
success in repressing the great Mutiny. 

Curiously enough, just as Lord Hardinge left as a legacy to his 
successor the second Sikh war, so also was the relief of Lord 
Dalhousie followed speedily by the momentous crisis of 1857, with 
which Lord Canning was called upon to deal. Much has been said 
and written to show that Lord Dalhousie was himself at least partly 
responsible for this outbreak. The true facts seem to be that 
during his term of office the Governor-General had not fully- 
succeeded in preventing the dangerous growths of disaffection, and 
that, unfortunately, he was no longer present when his prompt 
decision and iron resolution might have crushed the first active 
symptoms so decisively as to have averted the spreading of re- 
bellion. It cannot be denied that sundry legislative enactments in 
reference to Oudh are open to criticism ; that in doing justice to 
some injustice was caused to others, and that the latter were men 
of influence. But this was merely a single item out of innumerable 
causes, and a bagatelle compared with the famous prophesy. As 
for the claim that Sir Charles Napier had foreseen the danger and 
uttered warnings against it, this is completely disproved by the 
documentary evidence furnished by Sir Charles himself. Sir 
Charles imagined and expatiated upon all sorts of dangers, but 
a mutiny of the Sepoy army was not amongst them ; and, fine 
soldier as he undoubtedly was, Sir Charles Napier was always 
an *• impossible " person, utterly intolerant of authority, and filled 
with a belief that no one except himself could ever be right. The 
more carefully the dispute with Lord Dalhousie is studied, the 
more certain it appears that Napier was hopelessly in the wrong. 

It would be easy to write at great length upon the policy of 
Lord Dalhousie in reference to the Punjab or Oudh; or, indeed, 
upon almost any page of this admirably compiled account of his 
public career at home as well as in India ; but space interdicts 
further additions to a notice that has already exceeded the usual 
limits. Suffice it, then, to conclude now with the assertion that the 
biography of a great statesman has seldom been better written, 
and that a nobler, a more interesting, or a more useful life has 
seldom been lived. To read these two volumes is in itself an 
education in the methods of a sound Imperial policy — the iron 
hand in the velvet glove. Prestige is the basis of peace, and only 
those who enjoy it can hope to strengthen their position without 
bloodshed, or make just concessions without being suspected of 
weakness or timidity. 




By T. Miller Maquire, M.A., LL.D., Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. 
London : William Clowes & Sons. Ltd., 23, Cockspur Street, S. W. 1904. 
Price 7s, 6d. 

Readers of the United Service Magazine have already enjoyed 
the benefit of studying the excellent historical series which now 
appears in a single volume ; but very many of them will doubtless 
be glad to refresh their memories by perusing again so excellent a 
collection of useful facts. Dr. Maguire does not dogmatise on the 
subject of mountain warfare, but seeks to present to his readers the 
actual methods and achievements of various leaders of men who 
have successfully grappled with the strategical and tactical diffi- 
culties which attend military operations in mountainous regions. 
Quotations are made from a great variety of works, many of them 
rare and inaccessible to the majority of officers — and this is not the 
least valuable feature of the book. The conclusion to which the 
thoughtful reader will probably arrive, if he has not already done 
so from previous study of the subject, is that the real difficulties of 
this class of warfare are chiefly strategical — offered, in fact, by the 
ground itself to the actual march. To the sound tactician who 
understands the "use of ground," the enemy, if not strong enough 
to be formidable on a plain, represents an obstacle far less serious 
than the steep gradients, rough tracks, and climatic influences. 
Possessed of numerical or other preponderance, sufficient to warrant 
offensive operations on ordinary ground, a good general has no 
greater difficulty in out-manoeuvring his adversary amongst 
mountains than elsewhere. The enemy cannot be ubiquitous, and 
the secret, of course, is to seize first the positions that have not been 
occupied by him, in order to use them for his subsequent dis- 
comfiture. To rush headlong, without method, to the attack of 
any position, mountain or otherwise, is to do what the enemy 
desires you to do, and to court disaster. To fight mountaineers it 
is necessary that, after providing ample protection for the baggage, 
a sufficient force may still be available to employ enveloping tactics ; 
but it depends very much upon the skill of the general, in using 
ground in order to conceal his weakness and use his strength, 
whether 5000 men will represent overwhelming superiority, or 
10,000 a state of dangerous weakness. Tactics, like strategy, in 
mountain ranges and elsewhere, is the science of using " stepping- 
stones ; " and upon the selection of these, and the manner of fixing 
foothold upon them, everything depends. 

The arrangement of Dr. Maguire*s essays is not chronological, 
but made conveniently so as to illustrate various principles, and alsa 
operations in particular countries. The historical area is, however, a 
very wide one, stretching from Alexandra the Great to Lord 
Roberts. There are also valuable interpolations relative to the 
strategical policy of the British Empire. 

The preface is characteristic of Dr. Maguire, and may be 



misundeistood by some wbo do not know him. Dr. Magaire is as 
fond or sport as anvixxly, and can admire a good performance 
in the hunting field or football groimd as fully as any man living. 
But he objects to those who do not work hard as well as play hard ; 
and still more to those who do neither. Altogether, this book 
deserves^ and will it may be hoped obtain, the careful attention of 
every keen soldier. There is something to be learned in every 
page of iL Dr. Maguire invites his countrymen to emulate the 
deeds of their ancestors — and soch surely represents a right worthy 
ambition for any Anglo-Saxon or Celt. 


Being the Narrative of the Surrender of Buonaparte 
AND OF HIS Residence on board H.M.S. Bellero- 
PHOX. WITH A Detail of the Principal Events that 
occurred in that Ship between the 24TH May and 
the Stu August, 1815. 

Bv Rear>Adiniral Sir Frederick Lewis Maitlaxd, K.C.B. A New Edition. 
Edited, vith a Memoir of the Author, by William Kirk Dickson. William 
Blackwood & Sons. Edinburgh and London. MCMIV. Price 15^. 

The naval career of Admiral Maitland is of itself safBciently 
interesting to command the attention of all who are accustomed to 
read for pleasure or profit the achievements of our gallant sailors ; 
but the memoir of even so distinguished an officer must necessarily 
be of secondary importance to the narrative prepared by himself, in 
which be furnishes the details of Napoleon's sojourn on board the 
Btlitrifkon during the voj'age from the Basque Roads to Torbay. 
and whilst the British Go\'emment was finally deciding the fate of 
the captured Emperor. 

In spite of some evidence that might have led him to a 
different conclusion, the captain of the BelleropJwn firmly adhered 
to the opinion that Napoleon would attempt his escape vi& Roche* 
fort, and his vigilance ^-as rewarded by the arrival of a flag of 
truce, under which General Sa\'aiy and Las Cases came to ascertain 
whether passage to the United States would be opposed. To such 
a question there could, of course, be but one reply, pending the 
decision of superior authority, and eventually, without awaiting 
that decision, Napoleon came on board the Bellerophon. Las 
Cases, with his usual disr^jard for facts, subsequently attempted 
to claim that Captain Maitland had promised the Emperor a 
fa\*ourable reception in England, and consequently that the exile 
to St Helena in\x)l\*ed a breach of faith. It is, however, abimdantly 
clear from the correspondence that the only undertaking made had 
reference to the " Household," to whom it was promised that they 
slunild not be handed o\'er to the French Government 

REVIEWS. 22 1 

Napoleon appears to have made a favourable impression upon 
Captain Maitland, whose treatment of his illustrious prisoner was 
irreproachable, and fully appreciated and acknowledged by the 
latter. The Emperor wished to present Maitland with a valuable 
snuff-box ; but this being courteously declined, there was substituted 
for it a glass tumbler, engraved with the crown and initial of the 
Empress Josephine, and which is preserved at Lindores, the home 
of the family. 

The entire narrative is of exceptional interest, and amongst 
other items it affords an evidence as to the height of the 
Emperor, regarding which there was some controversy a short 
while ago. Captain Maitland credits Napoleon with five feet seven 
inches, and he certainly had full opportunity to form a correct 
estimate. There are eight portraits and illustrations, including the 
tumbler already mentioned. Finally, and by no means least, there 
are a number of notes made by Sir Walter Scott upon the MS. of 
the original narrative, which has most unfortunately been lost. 
Altogether this book is one not only to be read but also to be 


By W. R. MORFIT, M.A., F.B.A., Professor of Russian and other Slavonic 
Languages in the University of Oxford. Fifth Edition, revised to date, and 
with Supplementary Chapters, Additional Illustrations, and Special War 
Map. London : Fisher IJnwin, Paternoster Square. 1904. Price 5^. 

The present time is obviously opportune for the publication of 
such a book as this. The history of Russia in its every aspect is 
traced from the origin of the nation to the present day, and in 
addition to a number of interesting portraits and other illustrations 
there are ^ery useful maps and chronological tables. The result 
is an historical work of exceptional merit as such, and, moreover, 
very pleasant reading indeed. A portrait of Peter the Great 
naturally stands for the frontispiece. Quite apart from the fact 
that the war with Japan specially directs attention to both countries, 
Professor Morfit's 'Russia* would at any time have commended 
itself — purely on its actual merits. 


By David Murray, Ph.D., LL.D., Late Adviser to the Japanese Minister of 
Education. Fifth Edition, revised to date, with New Illustrations, a Special 
War Map, and a Supplementary Chapter. By Joseph Longford, some- 
time British Consul at Nagasaki. London : T. Fisher Unwin, Paternoster 
Square. New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons. MCMIV. 

Even more interesting than the * Story of Russia ' is that of her 
opponent, which is carried from its mythological foundations, around 


which there clings a mantle of tradition, relative to the origin and 
works of deities^ far exceeding in richness the whole volume of 
Grecian and Roman legends. The antiquity of the East is wonder- 
ful, and has charms of its own beside which the mythical as well as 
the authentic histories of Western races seem puny as well as 
prosaic. Finally, in the case of Japan, there is the truly marvellous 
development of the last forty years, the real basis of which was the 
revolution whereby the power of the Emperor was restored, and 
that of the Shc^an extinguished, under conditions that do honour 
to the disinterested patriotism of the Japanese aristocracy. From 
a collection of semi-independent principalities there has been formed 
a powerful, because fully united, State, a factor in world-politics of 
now immense importance. There is not a page in this history that 
is not delightful and instructive ; but perhaps, so far as ancient 
history is concerned, the partly authentic and partly legendary 
records of the Empress Jingo who invaded Korea in A.D. 202, and 
of the long-lived Prime Minister Take-no -uchi, are the most 


CRICKET, 1833-1903/ 

By the Rev. R. S. Holmes. With an Introduction by the Right Honourable 

Lord Hawke. 

Yorkshire cricket has a great history, and it has found a most 
able historian in Mr, Holmes. The yam about the "playing 
fields " of Eton is, of course, only a yam ; but there is yet no 
doubt that to excel in manly exercises is presumptive evidence of 
qualification for war. What we require for our officers and men is 
the mens sana in corpore sano. The corpus is undeniably useless 
without the mens ; but what we need is a happy combination. It 
is possible to wreck the physical qualifications by over study, and 
it is very easy to render the most magnificent physique useless by 
neglecting the cultivation of the mind. We run, indeed, to both 
extremes, and unfortunately, as a rule, to the latter. But cricket 
is a school for the judgment, temper, and eye, and has in it much 
that is useful to the officer. Not the least of the advantages of 
being a good cricketer is the fact that by means of it a hold is 
gained upon the minds of the men. To have proved himself able 
to do something that requires a man to do it is an inestimable aid 
to gaining credit for being equally able to do other things. The 
officer who is admired of his men as a man can always count 
upon getting from them the supreme effort that often turns the 
scale, and thus a comparatively uneducated officer will often 
succeed, by means of courage and common sense, where the more 
highly gifted will fail miserably. 

Mr. Holmes' record of Yorkshire cricket is deeply interesting 
to all who love this queen of games, and the volume contains 

May, 1904.] 


Until June 30th 

You have an opportunity of entering: the Qrand Kodak Amateur 
Competition in which £1,000 will i>e given in Cash Prizes. 

£500 is to be distributed amonirst users of the KODAK N.C. 
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And £200 for films developed in the KODAK DAYLIGHT 

Ask your dealer for particulars of these Competitions, or write 
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The name *' Kodak" is as the Hall Mark on silver, an absolute 
Sruarantee. It stands for reliability and quality in Photosrraphic 
Goods. In purchasing your supplies insist on having the Kodak 
brand. Refuse all imitations. 

Cpown 8VO9 cloth, price 6s. 

The Peril of the Sword 

(Concerning Havelock's Relict of Lucknow). 


Author of " Jenetha's Venture," &c. 

A F£ir P/i^£SS NOTICES. 

TJu Timcsf—^^ Gives an interesting picture of the time." 

SL Jatne^s Gazette, — "A striking story. . . . Impresses by its realism, and attracts by 
its sustained interest.'* 

Morning Post, — ^** Has a refreshing flavour of adventure. . . . Boys would delight in it." 

Broad Arrow, — "There is no room for anything but praise of this stirring military 

Birmingham Post, — " An exciting narrative admirably related." 

T7u Globe. — " A Notable Book. A very interesting book." 


Publishers to His Majesty the King. 



By Sir William Lee- Warner, K. C.S.I. With Portraits and Map«. 2 Vols. 8vo, 25^. net 



Statistical and Historical Annual of the States of the World, for the Year 1904. 
Edited by J. Scott Keltie, LL.D. Crown 8vo, lOf. 6a'. 





Invented by Captain C. W. CARFRAE, Gordon Highlanders. 

i 8 

The Blocks are intended to illustrate Squad, Company, Battalion, and 

Brigade Drill. 

Price IDs. 6d. complete in Box. 



THIS DAY. Demy 8vo. Cloth. 6s. net. 


41 Its ♦ Past ♦ aimd ♦ Future. *► 

By Lieut.-CoIonel F* N* MAUDE^ p*sx*, late R.E*, 

Author of ** Letters on Tactics and Organisation," &c. 

extracts from Opinions of tbe Press. 

"Altogether the book before us is full of suggestive passages, and will, we believe, 
do something towards checking the attempt to kill the cavalry spirit." — The Broad Arrov;. 

"An excellent book." — T/te Daily Nenxjs. 

"This is a valuable book which all arms of the service can study with profiL'" 
The Scotsman. 

" It is an exceedingly able and strongly characteristic book, and if it does not become 
a recognised handbook on the question we' shall be surprised." — Clitoris Guide and Racmi 

" The appearance of this book will be widely welcomed." — Volunteer Service Gazette. 

'* One of the most instructive as well as one of the most interesting military' works or 
recent years." — United Ser-vice Magazine. 



many portraits of notable celebrities, some of which are repro- 
ductions from the cartoons published in Vanity Fair. Amongst 
the latter, Lord Hawke is naturally included ; and not the least 
attraction of the book is the preface contributed by the noble 
captain of the Yorkshire club. 


A Military Romance. 

By Captain Olivieri Sangiacomo. Translated from the Italian by £ 
Spender. London : David Nutt, 57-59, Long Acre. 1904. Price dr. 

This is a tale of a worthless youth who runs •* amok " with his 
rifle, and kills or wounds over a score of officers, N.C.O/s, and 
men. He is then tried by court-martial ; and the tragic element 
of the story is the fact that the President of the Court is apprised, 
previously to its assembly, by the mother of the culprit, that he is 
being compelled to adjudicate the case of his own illegitimate son. 
The Colonel dies of heart failure after recording the death penalty, 
and the criminal, chiefly knave, but partly fool and partly anarchist, 
is duly shot. Needless to say, the torch that had actually lighted 
the insensate fury of the wretched Garulli was jealousy — the cause 
being one Rosina. 

The following correspondence is published by request of Messrs. 
Graham, Morton & Co. : — 

H.R.IL The Princb of Wales, Leeds, 

Marlboroiigh House, London. March 28th, 1904. 


In a memorable speech some months ago you warned the 
engineers and manufacturers of this country to "wake up," 
complaining, and justly so, that many of us were sadly lacking in 
enterprise at that time. 

This speech made a considerable impression upon me, as I was 
making an exhaustive inquiry with reference to the design and 
construction of new engineering works to be built on the most 
modem and up-to-date principles, and also to cope with the 
American and German competition. 

I visited over fifty engineering works in the United States, and 
many in Germany, and the result of my travels has been the 
designing and construction of our large new engineering works 
in Leeds. 

vol. cl. 15-2 



One of the interesting features has been the rapid construction 
and equipment of the same. 

On the i6th May, 1903, the first sod was cut, and in the same 
year, 2nd November, 1903, the works were completed and in 
working order, including the offices, the time being only five and a 
half months. 

This is an engineering record feat, and has been recognised by 
the Timesy the Illustrated London News, the Engineer, and all the 
leading technical journals and press. 

I respectfully beg of you, therefore, to accept a souvenir 
illustrating this work, which has been done by a British firm in 
the short space of five and a half months, and which eclipses all 
American records. 

I have the honour to remain, 

Your obedient servant, 
{Signed) MAURICE Graham. 

Marlborough House, 

29th March, 1904. 


The Prince of Wales desires me to thank you for the copy 
of the souvenir illustrating what has been done by your firm in the 
design and construction of new engineering works, built on the 
most modern and up-to-date principles, which you have been good 
enough to send for His Royal Highness's acceptance. His Royal 
Highness has read your letter of the 28th inst. with much interest, 
and desires me to congratulate you in his name on the great 
rapidity with which your undertaking was carried out 

I am, Sir, 

Your obedient servant, 

Arthur Bigge. 

Maurice Graham, Esq., 

Pepper Road, Honslet, Leeds. 

In the new issue (being the 41st) of the Statesman's Year Book, 
edited for Messrs. Macmillan & Co. by Dr. J. Scott Keltic and Mr. 
J. A. Ren wick, a series of statistical tables and diagrams has been 
brought together illustrative of the conditions of British trade and 
shipping from i860 to the present date. Besides this compilation, 
so necessary for students of the fiscal question, may be mentioned 
a diagram showing the extent to which Belleville boilers are em- 
ployed in the various fleets. In the general revision to which thj^ 
book has been subjected, as usual, may be noted the first appeal 
ance of a section devoted to Panama as an independent State. 



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No. 907.— JUNE, 1904. 

'* Z\)C (Blorf OU0 fivBt of 3une/' 

Remember " The Glorious First of June I " 
Sing of Lord Howe in a rousing tune, 
With British cheers for the brave old man 
Who was sixty-eight when he led the van 
And thrust in the thick of that nameless fight, 
On " The First of June," in the morning light 

They were gallant foes he met that day, 

Yet through their line he broke his way ; 

And then as the crash of her broadsides shook 

His ship, he shut up his signal book ; 

" No need for signalling now," said he, 

** They can see where I am ; let 'em follow me ! " 

It has not a name that glorious fight. 
Fought on the ocean no land in sight ; 
But what of that ? — By whatever name, 
The grand result had been just the same ; 
For the prize of that splendid victory 
Sea-Power was, in supremacy I 

Remember Lord Howe and his fighting men 
And the place they won for England then, 
Still ours to hold let come who may 
From the comers four of the world to-day ; 
Not one nor many shall make us rue, 
Heart of Great Britain, if thou art true ! 

A. W. A. Pollock. 

VOL.CL. jg 


By L G. Carr Laughton, 

International law is a living and growing organism, and makes 
its most rapid developments in time of war. Every controversial 
point that arises during the course of hostilities helps either to 
consolidate or to modify the existing law. Further, the greater 
the powers involved, the greater is the value of the precedents. 
"The action of minor powers may often indicate the direction 
which it would be well that progress should take, but they can 
never declare actual law with so much authority as those done by 
the States to whom the moulding of the law has been committed 
by the force of irresistible circumstance." Whence it follows that 
the lessons of the present struggle are of the first importance. 

The war is rich in anomalies, arising out of the peculiar 
political conditions which brought the opposing powers into 
conflict. The anomalies, therefore, are not merely incidental, 
they are vital ; and, just as they have had an important bearing on 
the inception of the struggle, so they are bound to influence its 
course, and to be taken into account at the settlement 

In its ordinary meaning, the term "invasion," implies the 
invasion by one belligerent of territory belonging to the other. If 
the invading power is successful, it acquires, and may retain, 
sovereignty over the invaded territory. In any case, whether 
ultimately successful or not, it acquires, by the mere fact of 
temporary occupation, certain definable rights over the population 
of the invaded territory for so long a period as the invasion lasts. 

But in the present war the term " invasion " can have no such 
simple and well-defined meaning, as regarding the invasion of either 
Korea or Manchuria by Japan. In the former case the violation 
of Korean neutrality was subsequently condoned by the agreement 
entered into between Korea and Japan. Although the position of 
Korea, with regard to the struggle, is far from being rendered 
normal, yet it has been considerably simplified by the agreement. 
But, as regards Manchuria, there is no dominant factor, save 

Note. — Passages in inverted commas are quoted from the Sth edition of W. E. Hall's 
* International Law,' Clarendon Press, 1904. 


the somewhat doubtful neutrality of China, and the Japanese 
undertaking to respect the integrity of that Empire. The present 
position in law is, that Manchuria, the property of China, is 
occupied by Russia, a power friendly to China. Japan, also 
friendly to China, but not in alliance with it, is credited with a 
desire to expel the occupier from the territory in dispute. If 
Japan succeeds, to whom does Manchuria belong ? If Russia 
is victorious and can drive the Japanese out of Manchuria, how 
does this affect her position ? 

To take the latter question first On behalf of Russia it would 
be claimed that her position in Manchuria is the result of pacific 
penetration, undertaken for the safeguarding of undoubted 
interests. It is an axiom of international law that a State has the 
right to take measures to secure its existence. If it could be 
proved that the non-occupation of Manchuria would be fatal to 
the continued existence of Russia as a State, the Russian occupa- 
tion would be justified. This being the Russian contention which 
led to the war, it is inevitable that Russia, if victorious, would 
continue to rely upon it, and the absorption of Manchuria would 
be a foregone conclusion. Her position, therefore, would not be 
altered. She would have gained by war what she had hoped to 
gain without a breach of the peace. Nor does the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance modify the nature of Russia's position. Its legal aspect 
is the same as if no such alliance existed ; and the interest of the 
alliance lies rather in the moral support which it gives to the one 
combatant, and the discouragement which it must bring to the 
other, owing to the improbability of the success of Russia being: 
acquiesced in by this country. 

But there is the alternative supposition, that Japan may succeed 
in driving Russia out of Manchuria. There does not appear to be 
any exact historic precedent of such an event. In 18 14, Great 
Britain, acting independently of Genoa, cleared Genoese territory 
of its French invaders. The analogy is close, but there are im- 
portant differences. For instance, the French occupation had not 
been "pacific" ; no territory belonging to the Genoese State was 
left unoccupied, so that, during the Anglo-French hostilities, the 
previous owners oiF the territory were directly interested, and could 
not, like the Chinese Empire now, stand aside with a profession 
of neutrality. However, the instance is worth recalling. In this 
case it was argued, on the one hand, that '* Genoa ought to have 
been regarded as a friendly State, oppressed for a time by the 
common enemy, and entitled to reassume the exercise of her 
sovereign rights as soon as the enemy was driven from her 
territory by a friendly force." On the other hand, it was argued 



that, although ' the liberators could not dispose of the country 
wholly without reference to the native population, yet a State 
which was. unable, in the first instance, to resist invasion, and 
could not afterwards free itself from the invaders, had forfeited its 
right to exist as a State. For this reason, as well as on account 
of the sacrifices he had made, the interests of the liberator ought 
to be consulted in arriving at a settlement. 

At first sight the arguments seem to be irreconcilable. The 
reason for this is that they arc based on different conceptions of 
the occupation which had taken place. The former argument 
regarded it as temporary, and liable to overthrow ; the latter con- 
sidered that it had been so far consolidated that it amounted to 
conquest The practice is that, if the occupation has not amounted 
to conquest, the State automatically recovers its existence as soon 
as it is relieved of the presence of the invader ; but if there is 
doubt as to the nature of the occupation, the point is determined 
by the liberator. Such determination, however, would not be 
likely to occur, inasmuch as the liberating power, by its professions 
at the beginning of hostilities, foreshadows its own action in the 
event of success. Such is the case in the present instance. Japan 
has professed her intention to respect the integrity of the Chinese 
Empire, so that, in the event of the victory of Japan, the 
sovereignty over Manchuria will revert to China. 

A curious consequence of this state of affairs is pointed out in 
the Contemporary Review for April. Suppose the Japanese forces 
to succeed in clearing lower Manchuria of Russians ; then, as they 
advance north, it would be perfectly consistent for them to restore 
immediately to China the sovereignty in the recovered districts in 
their rear. China, by re-occupying them, would not only be com- 
mitting no breach of her neutrality, but would be vindicating it 
In May such a condition was already possible at Newchwang; 
but China seemed to be unwilling to accept it. 

From the first outbreak of hostilities, points for discussion 
began to arise. For instance, how far was Japan responsible for 
the war by her unwillingness to resort to arbitration ? It is clear 
from a letter written to the Times, 7th April, and quoting the 
words of Professor Martens, that Russia made overtures to Japan 
in December, 1903, urging that the points at dispute should be 
submitted to the arbitration of the Hague tribunal. This course, 
which was suggested by Professor Martens himself, was very 
favourably spoken of in influential Russian circles. But Japan, 
the Russian jurist complains, by her treacherous action, spoilt the 
whole plan. The indictment against Japan would be heavy were 
it not remembered that arbitration is a measure resorted to for 


the settlement of minor and incidental differences only, and not of 
differences which are vital to the life of the nations concerned. The 
mere fact that influential Russian opinion favoured the plan, goes 
far to show that Russia's aims in the Far East were not vital to 
her existence ; and, on the contrary, its decided rejection by Japan 
proves conclusively that that power was inspired by the firm belief 
that her vital interests were threatened. Viewed in this light, the 
tendency of the argument is to shift the blame from Japan to the 
shoulders of Russia. 

Again, the " treacherous action " of Japan refers, of course, to 
the sudden inception of hostilities. But formal declarations of war 
are long out of fashion ; the practice of dispensing with them is 
more than two centuries old, and it was largely confirmed by the 
custom followed by England itself throughout the wars of the 
eighteenth century. " When a cause of war has arisen, and when 
the duty of endeavouring to preserve peace by all reasonable means 
has been satisfied ... an act of hostility, unless it be done in the 
urgency of self-preservation or by way of reprisal, is in itself a full 
declaration of intention. Any sort of previous declaration, there- 
fore, is an empty formality, unless an enemy must be given time 
and opportunity to put himself in a state of defence, and it is 
needless to say that no one asserts that such quixotism is 
obligatory." Such is the case as between belligerents. But 
between belligerents and neutrals the case stands differently. The 
duties of neutrals in time of war are so onerous that it is due to 
them, as a matter of courtesy, that " a belligerent shall not allow 
them to find out incidentally, and, perhaps, with uncertainty, that 
war has commenced. As a matter of law they can only be saddled 
with duties and exposed to liabilities from the time at which they 
have been affected with a knowledge of the existence of wan 
Hence it has long been a common practice to address a manifesto 
to neutral States, the date of which serves to fix the moment at 
which war begins. A belligerent cannot expect States to take up 
the attitude of neutrality contemporaneously with the outbreak of 
hostilities." As between belligerents the first hostile act marks 
the beginning of war ; but as between belligerents and neutrals 
the beginning dates from the formal intimation made to neutrals 
by the conflicting powers. 

Nevertheless, there are cases in which States become affected 
by the non-neutral action of their subjects who are engaged, 
knowingly or even ignorantly, in carrying out a naval or military 
operation for an intending belligerent. It is under this heading 
that the false report as to British action at Wei-hai-wei comes on 
for discussion. However ignorant the intention of the neutral may 


be, there are occasions on which his action is of real help to a 
power intending to undertake hostilities, and consequently gravely 
prejudicial to the power against which it intends to operate. 
Usage, therefore, grants the threatened power a large measure of 
freedom of action with regard to such action by a third power. 
For instance, it allows him to anticipate the right conferred by a 
state of war and to board the ships of the third power at sea. The 
sinking of the Kowshing in 1894 for resisting this right of visit 
comes under this category. But, supposing that at the outset of 
the present war Wei-hai-wei had been used, as was pretended, by 
Japan, the case would not have been similar, for no Russian 
investigation of what was taking place there could have been made 
without a flagrant breach of British neutrality. The case falls 
rather under the heading of illegal expeditions, with regard to 
which it is necessary to prove consciousness on the part of the third 
power that an expedition was intended. A State can only be held 
responsible for such acts as it may reasonably be expected to have 
knowledge of and to prevent. " If the acts done are of common 
notoriety, as, for instance, was the Fenian raid into Canada in 
1866, the State is obviously responsible for not using proper means 
to repress them. If, however, attempts are made to disguise the true 
character of noxious acts, what amount of care to obtain knowledge 
of them beforehand and to prevent them may reasonably be 
expected 7 If a government honestly gives so much care as may 
seem to be proportioned to the state of things existing at the time, 
it does all that it can be asked to do." In the present case, it will 
be remembered, any hostile intention, so far from being of common 
notoriety was entirely unkn'own and came as a complete surprise ; 
so that even had Japanese ships issued from Wei-hai-wei for the 
attack on Port Arthur this country's complicity could not have 
been postulated, and the burden of proving it would have lain with 

It has been observed that, with the lapse of time, the tendency 
of States is to put on a stricter interpretation on their duties as 
neutrals. This war marks no exception with regard to Great 
Britain, whose declaration of neutrality is most stringent The 
right which neutrals guard most jealously is the immunity of their 
territorial waters from hostile operations, and akin to this right is 
their duty to see that their ports are not used as bases by the 
enemy. The only violation of neutrality that has taken place is 
in respect of Korea ; but Korea, as was noticed at the beginning 
of this article, was in an exceptional position. Both combatants 
violated her neutrality, in the knowledge that she was unable to 
vindicate it. Since the outbreak of war many Russian ships, but 


no Japanese, have put into neutral ports. The ships that were 
on their way from Europe to the Far East, in February, caused 
great anxiety for a time, as it was claimed that they were using a 
neutral port as a base, and blockading the Red Sea. It does not 
appear that such was the case, and the belief may have arisen 
owing to the fact that the practice of England in limiting the stay 
of foreign men-of-war in her ports to twenty-four hours is not 
common to all other nations. That Russian ships exercised their 
right of visit and capture of neutral ships in the Red Sea is 
undoubted ; but it is also noteworthy that such prizes, as were 
mad^ were not brought through the Suez Canal for condemnation 
at the Prize Court, established at Nicolaieff. It has not been 
publicly stated why this course was adopted by Russia, but 
presumably it was followed because prizes could not be brought 
through the canal without violating its neutrality. A prize taken 
from a neutral, until condemned by a Prize Court, is not the 
property of the captor. It is only conditionally his, and from this 
it might be argued that the actual act of capture is in progress up 
to the moment of the condemnation of the prize, so that to take 
it into neutral waters, unless driven in by accident or by stress of 
weather, would be to violate the neutrality of those waters. 

Both belligerents in this war have included coal among articles 
declared contraband. Coal has for some time been regarded as 
provisionally contraband, and is now far on the road to being 
considered absolutely so. The additional precedent will be of 
importance in fixing its status for the future. As regards loans 
to a belligerent, modern opinion has advanced in an opposite 
direction, and although loans are being floated in neutral 
countries for both belligerents, there has been no outcry against 
it It appears to be now recognised that such action constitutes 
no breach of neutrality. The reason for this is that " money is an 
article of commerce in the fullest sense of the word. To throw 
upon neutral governments the obligation of controlling dealings 
in it taking place within their territories, would be to set up a 
solitary exception to the fundamental rule that States are not 
responsible for the commercial acts of their subjects. Also it 
would burden States with a responsibility which they would be 
wholly unable to meet. Money is a merchandise, the transmission 
of which would elude all supervision. Payment might be made 
in bills, not one of which might enter the neutral country in which 
the contract is made." 

The law as regards the sale of ships to belligerents is in a 
state of transition, and, as was to be expected, the most severe 
restrictions in this respect are placed upon British shipbuilders and 


owners. Recently the state of the law was summed up as follows, 
'' An international usage prohibiting the construction and outfit 
of vessels of war is in course of growth, but it is not yet old 
enough, or quite wide enough, to have become compulsory on those 
nations which have not yet sonified their voluntary adherence to 
it." The difficulty with regard to ships not built primarily as 
men-of-war lies in the fact that few fast steamers are altogether 
unfitted to receive an armament of some kind. The extremes of 
practice with regard to Russia and Japan are to be found in the 
action of Great Britain and Germany. This country, having men- 
of-war under construction for Japan, has publicly announced in 
her declaration of neutrality that no ships will be allowed to be 
delivered until after the war. Germany, on the other hand, has 
sold to Russia one of the large and fast mail steamers of the 
Hamburg-American line, a ship fitted by her construction to be 
used as an "auxiliary" cruiser, as well as other ships of less 

With regard to the destruction by the Russians of merchant 
steamers taken from the Japanese, it may be said that such 
action is unusual but not illegal. " It is the practice for 
belligerents to guard the interests of neutrals, by requiring captors, 
as a general rule, to bring their prizes into port for adjudication 
whether the captured vessel and its cargo are in fact wholly, or 
only in part, the property of the enemy. Though the right of a 
belligerent to the free disposal of enemy property taken by him 
is in no way touched by the existence of this practice, it is not 
usual to permit captors to destroy or ransom prizes, however 
undoubted may be their ownership, except when their retention is 
difficult or inconvenient." 

In another instance, Russia's action is on a similar footing. 
She has armed, or is reported to have armed, bodies of convicts. 
Now, if she uses such troops for the ordinary purposes of warfare, 
her action is harsh and retrograde, though it is not illegal so long 
as the men are properly organised and commanded. But when 
employing a convict militia for the local defence of Sakhalin, 
Russia can, of course, plead the pressure of necessity and the 
absence of other means of defence. 

No events have occurred to bring questions of cable cutting to 
the fore, so that the state of the law in that respect has not 
attracted attention. But, inasmuch as the United States have, so 
recently as the 4th February last, withdrawn their Naval War 
Code, and thereby removed one authoritative pronouncement on 
the subject, it may be well to refer to the decisions arrived at by the 
Institute of International Law in September, 1902. In accordance 


with these a cable between two belligerent territories may be 
cut anywhere, save where it may happen to pass through neutral 
waters. A cable between a belligerent and a neutral territory may 
be cut, (i) In the territorial waters of the belligerent ; (2) On the 
high seas within the limits of an effective blockade, subject to an 
obligation to re-establish the connexion. 

The Russian threat to confiscate steamers having on board 
correspondents using wireless telegraphy, and to treat the corre- 
spondents as spies, has excited much indignation. The claim to 
capture these correspondents seems to be based on a determination 
to regard them as being so far in the service of Japan as to have 
become invested with an enemy character. The laws of contraband 
do not apply to their case. Also the claim to consider them as 
spies is irregular, even if the enemy character postulated for them 
be granted. They do not fall under the military definition of a 
spy, for there is no secrecy in their method of acquiring informa- 
tion. The real complaint against them, as it was against balloonists 
in the Franco-Prussian war, is that their information is forwarded 
in a manner beyond control. But it was decided definitely at the 
Hague that for the future balloonists, when taken, are to be treated 
as prisoners of war. In this instance, therefore, Russia is proposing 
to act with harshness similar to that which she has shown in stop- 
ping and searching the English mail steamer Osiris for Japanese 
despatches. All nations save Russia have long recognised the 
non-contraband character of the despatches of diplomatic agents, 
and it is hard to see what others can have been sought on board 
the Osiris. The incident will have its use if it helps to secure the 
confirmation of the law affecting this matter. 

A point remains which is of vast importance. It is that which 
regards the amount of coal which a belligerent ship may take on 
board in a neutral port. The question, which concerns violation 
of neutrality and has no direct reference to the contraband nature 
of coal, threatened early fn the war to become acute, but lapsed 
owing to the recall of the Russian ships which were on their way 
to the Pacific If a further attempt is made by Russia to reinforce 
her Far Eastern fleet the question will again arise. It is to be 
hoped that the present war may result in the adoption of some 
new and more suitable ruling on this point. The present rule is 
hopelessly obsolete and unsuited to conditions of modem warfare. 

L. G. Carr Laughton. 



By "Garrisox Gukxer." 

The exact position of the Royal Garrisoo Aitilleiy in the military 
forces of his Majesty's Empire is a subject which, as a rule, seems 
to be little understood by the other branches of his Majesty's 
Service. The officers of the Royal Navy seem more especially 
inclined to fall into error on this subject, and considering the fact 
that the Royal Navy and the Royal Garrison Artillery will have to 
co-operate in time of war, this is a great pity. It would be well 
to have the position clearly defined. 

The Royal Garrison Artillery comprises the Mountain Division, 
Siege Train Companies, Heavy Batteries, and Coast Defence 
Companies. The Mountain Artillety, the Siege Train Companies, 
and the Heavy Batteries belong to the Field Army, and their rdU 
is fairly clear ; but it is as regards the Coast Defence Companies 
that misconception is most common, and it is quite common to 
hear officers of other branches of the Service saying that these are 
useless, because immobile and locked up in forts which no enemy 
would ever think of attacking. While granting that Coast Defence 
Companies are immobile from the very nature of their duty, it 
should be borne in mind that they are auxiliary to the first line of 
defence, namely, the Royal Navy, and that their training and 
efficiency are of paramount importance to the nation. 

Without the Coast Defence Companies the local defence of our 
harbours and dockyards would be left entirely to the Auxiliary 

Even at the present, according to the Inspector-General of 
Garrison Artillery, 70 per cent of the men required to man the 
Coast Defences of Great Britain on mobilisation, are to be drawn 
from the Militia and Volunteer Artillery. 

Under modem conditions, as clearly exemplified in the Russo- 
Japanese War, torpedo raids may be expected even before the 
formal declaration of war, and unless Coast Defence Companies 
exist, and arc thoroughly alert, our ships repairing or preparing 


for sea in our harbours and dockyards, would be liable at the 
commencement of war, and possibly also later, to be treated by an 
enemy in the same way as the Russian ships at Port Arthur were 
treated by the Japanese. 

While granting that owing to the immobility of the Coast 
Defence Companies, it is well that a large proportion of the men 
required to man Coast Defences should be drawn from the auxiliaries, 
to carry that argument to the extent of saying that Coast Defence 
Companies are practically useless is fallacious, and as absurd as to 
expect an army in the field to do without supply depdts. The 
Navy must have harbours and dockyards in which to coal and refit, 
and these lose half their value if not safe from the fear of successful 
torpedo-boat raids. 

A certain part of the Coast gunner's work is very simple, and 
can be learnt in a very short time by men who have not been 
specially trained : as an instance of this, in certain Coast fortresses 
abroad. Infantry are 'trained in Artillery work, and very soon 
pick it up. But gun-layers, range-finding specialists, telephonists, 
district gunners, gun-captains, gun-group commandecs, and, above 
all, battery commanders, cannot under any circumstances be 
improvised, and for this reason a fairly large nucleus of Regular 
Coast Defence gunners must be maintained. 

It ma}^ be argued that all the above can be supplied by the 
Militia and Volunteer Artillery ; but while fully appreciating the 
value of these forces, it would not be safe to trust to their 
knowledge of the Q.F. guns required for use against a torpedo- 
boat raid, until they have received more systematic training than 
is possible under the existing regulations. 

The auxiliaries might, with advantage, be used for manning 
old type heavy guns, and also might well be used as ammunition 
numbers ; but the gunner in the Auxiliary Forces cannot, as a 
rule, get sufficient practice at laying to use automatic sights with 
advantage. Further, only in a few instances can the Volunteer 
Artillery become so thoroughly acquainted with the works, which 
they would have to man, as to be able to dispense with the services 
of a fair proportion of Regular district gunners, at any rate during 
the first few, and, therefore, the most critical days of a mobilisation. 
Then, again, few of the officers of the Militia and Volunteer 
Artillery get sufficient practice as battery commanders, and gun- 
group commanders, to be able to carry out these duties satisfactorily, 
without the assistance of a fair proportion of R.G. A. officers. 

The intention of the foregoing remarks is not in any way to 
belittle the services and valuable work done by many of the Militia 
and Volunteer Artillery, but to point out the need for the Coast 


Defence Companies of the Royal Garrison Artillery to those who 
are prone to think they are unnecessary. 

Few, who have not had practical experience o^ r^--*- ^^ *• 
work, realise what a strain the defence of a Coa: 
to attack, would involve on all ranks, and how eas. 


fire on a friendly vessel, or to allow a hostile boat 
There is little or no question that surprise attacli 
be attempted at night, dawn, or during foggy w( 
fact, of course, demands intense vigilance if the 

The old saying, that the rest of troops in c 
depends on the alertness of the outposts, might 
follows : The safety of a ship or fleet in harboui 
alertness of those manning the Coast Defences, 
pears that the training and efficiency of those wh( 
Coast Defences of the Empire, are of vital impoi 
line of defence. For this reason co-operation be 
Defences and the ships afloat should be complete 
hoped that the better understanding which appears 
recently between those in the Coast works and the 
tinue. It is within the last five years that Naval 
into a friendly port, during mobilisation and na^ 
without making a signal of any kind, and thus plai 
commanders in a very awkward position. It is wit 
trying to prevent the recurrence of this sort of thin; 
is in progress that the foregoing remarks have beet 

Ued service MAG^OSl. 

to cm9Uiui titk it 

and \^^^ 


)R A Common-Sense Organisation. 
Captain L. L. Hepper, R.A. 

mine upon a suitable organisation for our 

isary to rid ourselves of all preconceived notions, 

)urselves in the position of a country starting an 

ovo, and wishing to obtain a sound organisation 

id common-sense principles. That the growth 

ind the complicated natures of ordnance and 

dered cumbersome and unwieldy a system 

rs were called upon to serve indiscriminately 

s recognised some years ago, when the Artillery 

e mounted and dismounted branches. It was 

) separate those branches in which horseman- 

from those in which riding was not of much 

i the separation been to form two branches, 

catteries serving with an army in the field, and 

se those for service in coast fortresses against 

division would have been more practical and 

1, however, to the desire for active service, 
chief inducements to following the profession 
itain Artillery was given to the dismounted 
the anomaly of the largest and smallest guns 
Hcers of the same corps. This compromise was 
lises, doomed to failure. It was an attempt to 
Iter a corps needing high scientific attainments, 
my chance of service except in a European War, 

^u^ ^,G.A., who have lately gone to the Indian Army, may well 

^ ^use for reflection. Another development not forseen at 

l/'^e of the separation was the introduction of Heavy Batteries, 

fj^ were found to be necessary during the South African War. 

j^5e batteries were improvised for the occasion from Coast Defence 


and Siege Companies at home. Logically, one would have supposed 
that if it were necessary to have a more powerful gun than the 
15-pounder with an army in the field, a certain number of field 
batteries would have been re-armed after the war with the heavier 
gun in exchange for the lighter weapon, or that new batteries 
would have been formed. A distinguished officer of the regiment 
who propounded the question, " Is Field Artillery necessary ? " had, 
perhaps, in mind two natures of ordnance for field work, one a 
light and mobile Q.F. gun for Horse Artillery, such as a 6-pounder, 
and a heavy and powerful piece for the field, such as a 30-pounder, 
and had, I am sure, no wish to see the Field Artillery abolished. 
Instead, however, of this course being adopted, viz. making some 
Field Batteries into Heavy Batteries, it was decided to train some 
Garrison and Siege Companies as Heavy Batteries, and in the craze 
for economy, a Mountain Battery was converted into one. 

Presumably then, in war. Heavy Batteries and Mountain 
Batteries also if required, would be formed from Garrison Companies. 
Even if we had a sufficient number of the latter for Coast Defence, 
we might well question the wisdom of converting them in time of 
war into batteries for use with a field army, where the tactics and 
fire-discipline must be so different. The separation, then, though 
sound in principle and a move in the right direction, has resulted 
in Horse and Field Artillery on the one side, and Siege, Heavy, 
Mountain, and Coast Batteries on the other ; and the scientific rSle 
of Coast Defence suffers from the old disability, namely, the risk of 
unqualified officers and men having to fight a fortress against 
attack by sea, which I think most officers will agree is a function 
which requires a special and continuous study. The importance of 
providing an efficient defence for our dockyards and coaling 
stations, and a sound system of organisation for our Mobile Artillery 
must be my excuse for discussing what may perhaps be considered 
a chose jug^e. Only remarking that all upheavals must come from 
below, I proceed to sketch in merest outline what might be an 
improvement on the present organisation. 

There are two separate and distinct purposes for which guns 
are necessary in the land service. One is to accompany a field 
army and assist in the defeat of an enemy by attacking his troops, 
or reducing his forts and entrenchments, and the other is to defend 
our coast forts from attacks by hostile ships. For the former. 
Mobile Artillery is required ; for the latter, the guns are fixtures in 
the forts and are not intended to be moved outside ; I will deal 
with the latter first. 

Coast Defence comprises the use of the heaviest guns against 
armoured ships, the use of light Q.F. guns against torpedo-boats 


and lighter craft, the knowledge and use of mines, booms, search- 
lights, and electrical apparatus generally, and the working of 
position and depression range-finders. Neither in the system of 
fire-discipline or tactics is there any connection with the methods 
used in what I may call Mobile Artillery, or the Artillery of a field 

The Coast Defence gunner should be in close touch with the 
Navy; he should know all about foreign ships, the extent and 
thickness of their armour, and should be able to recognise the 
different classes. He should be hand-in-glove with the submarine 
miners. Surely, then, one would expect this to be a branch apart. 
Make a regiment of Coast Artillery, make it a corps eTilite, where 
the brains and mechanical skill of the R. A. will gravitate; if necessary, 
give them the pay which brains can always command, and I do not 
think that any difficulty will be found in getting officers to enter it. 
With regard to its duties, I would suggest that the Coast Artillery 
should be made entirely responsible for the defence of our dock- 
yards and coaling stations. In war time the Navy will presumably 
be occupied in protecting our commerce and harrying the enem/s 
fleets, and when our ships put in to repair and refit they should be 
guaranteed entire immunity from attack, and not expected to assist 
in the defence of the port. 

Turning now to the Mobile Artillery, what do we require ? 
We want Horse Artillery, capable of acting with Cavalry, and 
where a high degree of horsemanship is essential ; we want Field 
Artilleiy, which will primarily act with Infantry, and yet be capable 
of more rapid movement on occasion, and where a lesser degree of 
horsemanship is required. We want next the heaviest gun that 
can manoeuvre across country at a walk, we want Siege Artillery 
for the reduction of field works, and we want Pack Artillery for 
countries unsuitable for wheeled traffic. For the three last, which 
only move at a walk, a slight knowledge of horsemanship is all that 
is required. 

Let us, then, have two regiments, a regiment of Field Artillery 
to furnish Horse and Field Batteries, and a regiment of Foot 
Artillery to furnish Heavy, Siege, and Mountain. I do not say 
that this is a perfect organisation. Some might prefer to have 
regiments of Field, Foot, and Coast Artillery to comprise a certain 
number of batteries and companies each, as is the custom in 
Continental armies. 

This is a detail, however, and the main thing is to keep the 
three branches separate. It may be objected that the difficulty of 
dividing the two lists of officers into three would be an effectual 
bar to any re-organisation such as is here proposed. I do not 


apprehend any insuperable difficulty about this, and I think it could 
be carried out without any hardship to officers. The present 
Mounted list would become the Regiment of Field Artillery ; all 
the officers now serving with Heavy, Siege, and Mountain would be 
placed on the list of the Foot Artillery, and those serving with 
Coast Defence companies would form the regiment of Coast 
Artillery. For some years free interchange between the Foot and 
Coast Artillery should be allowed, until officers had settled down 
in the branch they preferred. Armament pay would only be drawn 
by the Coast Artillery, but I think there would be a sufficient 
number of candidates for the Foot Artillery. Officers on first 
appointments would be sent to the regiments for which they were 
most fitted, and one exchange or transfer might be allowed in the 
first three years of service. I venture to predict that a re-organisa- 
tion on these lines would conduce to increased zeal, efficiency, and 
esprit de corps. 

L. L. Hepper. 


By Arthur G. Burney. 

After the conquest, the constitutional military force of England 
consisted of the feudal troops (the persons who held lands im- 
mediately of the Crown, or their vassals) and the posse comitatus^ 
which included every free man above the age of fifteen and under 
that of sixty. 

In the reigns of Richard IL, Henry VII., and Henry VIIL, 
four military bodies were instituted, three of which are still exist- 
ing — the Sergeants-at-Arms, the Yeoman of the Guard, and the 
Artillery Company. The first has retained nothing of its ancient 
military character, and the Yeomen of the Guard and the Artillery 
Company very little of it 

It was an axiom with our ancestors that a standing Army was 
inconsistent with the liberties of the people, and this idea remained 
I in full force until the middle ages. 

I It was thought that the existence of a standing Army waa. 

\ inseparable from a military Government. 

Even so late as the latter part of the last century, we find' 
Burke writing: ''An armed disciplined body is, in its essence,, 
dangerous to liberty ; undisciplined, it is ruinous to society." The : 
English Parliaments persisted through the long wars between the 
Houses of York and Lancaster in refusing to grant standing, 
armies, declaring it to be of less importance to protect the Crown, 
from its opponents than to keep the Crown dependent upon the 

King Henry VII.'s small body-guard of some fifty archers was- 

regarded, even in those disturbed times, as a dangerous innovation,. 

and one incompatible with the constitution of the country. The 

same ideas prevailed in Ancient Rome whose armies were disbanded 

at the close of campaigns. Our ancestors had an instinctive dread 

that a standing army, once established, would become a permanent 

institution, and their fears were not diminished by the argument 

that once every year Parliament would have the whole question 

under its consideration, and would vary the size of the Army 

according to the state of afifairs both at home and abroad. 
VOL. cL. 17 

[vol. XXIX. NEW 8BSIES.] 


When trained armies began to take the field, it soon became 
apparent that militias were no match for them. It needed the 
reverses of the first two years of the second Punic War to teach the 
Romans that trained and disciplined forces could only be overcome 
by troops similarly prepared, and fourteen weary years of conflict 
had to be undergone before they were enabled to drive Hannibal 
out of Italy. 

So long as the discipline of their troops was maintained, they 
were everywhere victorious, but when it was relaxed, they suc- 
cumbed to the Saracens, who, in their turn, paid the penalty of 
neglect, and .were overcome by the Turks. 

One of the greatest dangers that ever assailed this country 
found her without a standing Army. 

At the time of the despatch of the Spanish Armada, the English 
Army was only the Militia. Queen Elizabeth, inquiring of one of 
her generals as to the efficiency of the Army, was answered that 
its bravery was undoubted, as every man hoped the Spaniards 
-would effect a landing, and he alone feared the result, doubting, 
not the courage, but the rawness of the troops. 

Then, and up to a much later date, it used to be urged that the 
•existence of our Navy rendered it unnecessary for us to have an 
Army at all. That the Navy was not always to be depended upon 
for guarding us against surprise was proved by the fact that during 
the reign of Queen Anne the French shipped 7000 soldiers in 
eleven frigates, of which we knew nothing until shortly before they 
put to sea. Had they been fast vessels, they might easily have 
landed the troops before our Navy could have interfered. In those 
times might was right, and the doctrine is far from being extinct 

There is still much force in the reply which King Henry IV., 
of France, is reported to have given to the Venetian Ambassador, 
who, endeavouring to accommodate some differences, pleaded the 
wisdom of the Republic. 

"True," said the king, "you have a hundred wise senators, but 
if I should send twenty thousand of my blockheads against them, 
I should not much fear their wisdom." 

It was in the reign of Charles I. that the Army, which was 
still only the Militia, first gained influence in the realm, and 
became a third power in the State. On the accession of that 
monarch the law imposed on every citizen the obligation of bearing 
arms either in the County force or in the trained bands of his 
town or city. One of the great struggles between Charles I. and 
the Parliament arose from his claiming to have exclusive control 
over the Militia. Apart from the Militia, no army existed in this 


country before the Civil War. Cromwell kept the Army on foot, 
and used it as a means of his own advancement, making it turn 
out the very Parliament that had raised it, as soon as he saw that 
both could not exist together. 

The military system of feudal tenure was not wholly abolished 
in England until the time of Charles II. No existing Corps can 
trace its direct pedigree beyond the reign of that monarch. 

One of the first acts of Charles IL after his restoration was, 
with the full assent of Parliament, to disband the Army. It was 
forthwith disbanded en masse, a few regiments only being excepted, 
one of which was the Coldstreams. These the king retained for 
service about his jierson, and shortly after increased their number 
to five thousand. 

Thus the Guards of the Sovereign constituted the whole Army, 
and no remonstrances of the Parliament could move the king from 
that position. 

James II., not content with the supreme control of five 
thousand troops, gradually increased their number, so that at last 
the force paid from the civil list amounted to thirty thousand men. 
This sealed his fate, and at the Revolution the Army was disbanded, 
and the Mutiny Bill passed. 

The 1 5th Article of the Bill of Rights had declared the illegality 
of a standing Army, and the Mutiny Act commenced with a recital 
of that Article — '* The raising or keeping of a standing army within 
the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of Parlia* 
ment, is against law." 

The Revolution has been cited as an instance of the protection that 
standing armies have often afforded to the liberties of nations. For 
had the Army been as true to the King as they were to their country, 
the Prince of Orange would not have met with so easy a success^ 
Again, during the last four years of the reign of Queen Anne, 
nothing contributed so much to keep the Ministry in check as the 
unswerving honesty of the Army. The Jacobite party used every 
effort to persuade its most influential officers to place the Pretender 
on the throne, and, failing of success, disbanded the Army, that 
they might do without them that which they could not accomplish 
with them. 

It was not, therefore, until the reign of William III. that Parlia- 
ment, by means of the Mutiny Bill, obtained control of the Army. 
Provisions for its pay and discipline had thenceforth to be submitted 
every year to Parliament The conclusion of the treaty of Ryswick 
revived all the old antipathy to a standing army. In addition to 
this the Exchequer was exhausted, and everything seemed to point 
to the necessity of a rigorous economy. So it came to pass that in 



the first session after the Peace, Parliament voted that all troops 
raised since 1680 should be disbanded, reducing the forces to 7000 
men. The Commons reluctantly consented to increase the number 
to 10,000. 

So great was the King's dissatisfaction with this that, on setting 
out for Holland, he left sealed orders that 16,000 men should be 
kept up, and this, in defiance of the resolution of Parliament, was 
carried out. This was not, however, to last long, as in the next 
session, which was the first of a new Parliament, the number of 
7000 was again resolved upon, and this time adhered to. It was, 
morever, entirely to be composed of natives of the British dominions, 
which, to the King's great mortification, necessitated the dismissal 
of the Dutch Guards and French refugees. Mr. Hallam, in his 
' Constitutional History of England,' thus expressed his disapproval 
of the reduction : — " The messages that passed between the King 
and the Parliament bear witness how deeply he felt, and how 
fruitlessly he deprecated, this act of unkindness and ingratitude 
so strikingly in contrast with the deference that Parliament has 
generally shown to the humours and prejudices of the Crown in 
matters of far higher moment The foreign troops were too 
numerous, and it would have been politic to conciliate the nationality 
of the multitude by reducing their number ; yet they had claims 
which a grateful and generous people should not have forgotten ; 
they were, many of them, the chivalry of protestantism, the 
Huguenot gentlemen who had lost all but their swords in a cause 
which we deemed our own ; they were the men who had terrified 
James from Whitehall, and brought about a deliverance which, to 
speak plainly, we had neither sense nor courage to achieve for 
ourselves, or which at least we never could have achieved without 
enduring the convulsive throes of anarchy." The disbanding the 
Army emboldened Louis XIV. to renounce his treaties. He 
declared the Pretender, set his grandson on the throne of Spain, 
and involved us in the long war of the Spanish Succession. The 
brilliant success of our arms tended in a great measure to increase 
the popularity of the Army as a profession, and did much to 
reconcile the public to the sight of a large body of troops kept 
continuously on foot. The prevailing uncertainty of affairs on the 
Continent seemed to render it hazardous to reduce their numbers, 
so that during the early years of George I. Parliament acquiesced 
in a vote for 17,000 men, independent of those on the Irish establish- 
ment, but including the garrisons of Minorca and Gibraltar. 

In the early years of the reign of George 11. there was con- 
siderable discussion about the reduction of the standing Army, the 
King having promised in his speech from the throne in 173^ ^^^ 


the forces should be reduced as soon as the interests of the Kingdom 
would allow it. 

In the debate in the House of Lords in 1733 on the Mutiny 
Bill, an attempt was made to persuade the Government to reduce 
the Army. This was strongly opposed by the Duke of Newcastle, 
who asserted that we had never made any reduction in our Army 
without encouraging our enemies, both at home and abroad, to 
make attempts to disturb the peace of the country. 

In 1740 the total of the land forces and marines in Great 
Britain was 35,804 ; in Ireland, 11,639 ; in the Plantations, 3,402 ; 
in Gibraltar, 4,075 ; in Minorca, 4,075, making a grand total of 
53,995. In 1762 the total in Great Britain and Germany was 
67,776, and in the Plantations and abroad 37,397. After the peace 
in the following year these numbers were reduced to 17,536 in 
Great Britain, and 28,406 in the plantations and garrisons abroad. 
In 1778 the forces in Great Britain numbered 20,057 "^^ii* The 
American War, however, largely increased the Army, and in 1780 
we find the estimates providing for a total of 179,500 men. This 
included 42,000 Militia and Fencibles, an increase of 15,000 on the 
previous year. At the conclusion of the American War the Army 
was reduced to about 40,000 men. 

In the spring of 1803 the British Government resolved upon a 
renewal of hostilities against the French Republic. They in- 
corporated the Militia to the number of 83,840, and raised an 
Army of Reserve amounting to 34,162 men. The total force of 
Volunteers amounted to 474,627. These formed the defensive 
forces, making a total of 592,629. If to those figures we add the 
150,000 of the regular Army, the 100,094 of sailors and marines, 
and the 160,000 forming the Army of the East Indies, we get a 
total of 1,002,723 of the forces of the United Kingdom in December, 
1803. From that date the increase of the regular forces was 
constant and progressive until 181 5, when the gradual reduction 
commenced. In 18 18, after the withdrawal from the occupation of 
Paris, our troops numbered 80,479. The number of soldiers for 
every million of inhabitants in Great Britain in 1789 was 1,240, 
and in 1819 it was 1658. In Ireland it was 4000 for every million 
in 1789 and 4,083 in 18 19. 

To the adoption of standing armies is attributed the necessity 
of having recourse to a national debt At the death of William 
III. the debt was ;f 16,394,702, of which above three millions were 
to expire in 17 10. During the reign of Queen Anne the national 
debt rose to ;^54, 145,363. The whole expenses of the War of 
the Grand Alliance were estimated at ;f65,853,799. During the 
reign of George III. the national debt rose from ;^88,ooo,ooo to 



£226fiOOfiOO at the end of the American War, to ;f 45 1,000,000 10 
1800, owing to the war of 1793, and to ;£'900,ooo,ooo at the end of 
the Peninsular War in 181 7, when the British and Irish Exchequers 
were consolidated 

Conscription has never found favour in this country. An 
attempt was, indeed, made during the War of the Grand Alliance 
in 1704 to recruit the Army by a forced conscription of men from 
each parish, but it was abandoned as unconstitutional In 1707 it 
was tried again with no better success. Recourse was then had to 
a temporary Act enabling a sufficient number of troops to be 
raised by parish officers amongst such persons as had no lawful 
calling or employment. The Act was renewed several times during 
the war and again in 1757, but has never been resorted to since. 

In 1647 daily pay in the English Army stood as follows:— 
Lord General ;£^io, Major-General £2, Quarter-Master-General ;fir 
Adjutant-General £1, Lieut- Colonel 15^., Major 9^., Captain 5^., 
Lieutenant 4^., Ensign 3^., Sergeant is. 6d., foot soldier id. 
Cromwell, anxious to curry favour with the Army, made consider- 
able increases to these figures. The pay of officers and privates 
fixed by William III. after the Revolution remained without 
alteration until the end of the next century. Meanwhile, the price 
of many articles of necessity had greatly increased. Shortly after 
the outbreak of the American War, the pay of the infantry private 
was raised to lod. In 1797 the division of officer's pay into 
subsistence and arrears was abolished, and the deduction of 5 per 
cent, for hospitals and agency from the pay of all officers below the 
rank of captain was remitted. At the same time, the pay of the 
private was raised to is. a day. The changes in connection with 
officer's pay greatly simplified the accounts of the Army. In that 
year infantry pay was settled as follows : — Colonel £1 2s. 6d., 
Lieut-Colonel 17^., Major i6s., Captain los. 6d.y Lieutenant &.ft/.i 
Lieutenant, after seven years' service, ys. 6d., Second Lieutenant 
Ss. sd, Sergeant- and Corporal-Majors 3^., Sergeants is. lod., 
Corporal is. 4d, Private is. To the pay of colonels must be added 
an allowance equal to the pay of as many men as there were 
companies in the regiment. In order to afford greater encourage- 
ment to corporals and privates to remain in the Service, the 
Government in 1806 granted an increase of a id. to their daily 
pay at the end of ten years' service and of 2d at the end of 
seventeen years. On comparing the rate of pay in 1858 in the 
English and French Armies, it was found that our non-commissioned 
officers received an average rate of £37 12s., and the French £24> 
our privates ;if 20 5^., the French £g los. 

The purchase system was established in the reign of Charles II* 


Half pay being only temporary, it was necessary to permit retiring 
officers to make some provision for themselves. Hence arose the 
sale of commissions. Under this system the pay and allowances 
of an infantry lieut-colonel in command amounted to £^6$ a year, 
nvhile the interest on sums paid for commissions and other deduc- 
tions for regimental expenses amounted to ^^380 12s. lid. a year, 
so that he not only served for nothing, but paid some £iS2l year 
for the privilege of commanding his regiment. 

From the time of Henry VI. to about the middle of the last 
century the soldier's clothing was provided by the commanding 
officers or captains of companies, and considerable profits were 
derived from the practice. Distinguishing uniforms in the Army 
were first introduced in the reign of Henry VHI., and their colour 
was either white and green or white and russet In 1599 an officer's 
outfit was reckoned at £^ os. lod. From the votes of the House of 
Commons in the 30th of King Charles II., 1678, the cost of the 
clothing of the Army appears to have been : foot £2 13^., Dr^oona 
£6 los.y Horse Grenadiers £i. 

The Committee of the House of Commons appointed in the^ 
reign of George II. to enquire into the state of the Army found 
that upwards of ;g'578 had been saved by a colonel after clothing 
his regiment. 

The nomination of chaplains also used to belong to the 
colonels of regiments, who sold the appointments. When this- 
system was abolished, colonels of cavalry received a compensation 
of £700 and colonels of infantry of ;6'500. In 1806 the total 
expense of the enlistment of a trooper was £\i 13J., of a foot 
soldier, intended for general service, £iy u., and of youths under 
sixteen years of age ;^io 15^. These sums included the reward of 
the recruiting party, the charge for surgical inspection, and the 
purchase of a trifling equipment necessary for the recruit 

In 1807 bounty became a direct transaction between the State 
and the recruit The highest amount to which the bounty ever 
rose was during the Peninsular War, when for men it stood at 
£21 17s. 6d if for life, and at jfiS 12s. 6d. if for a limited time. 
The recruit did not actually receive these amounts, as every expense 
connected with enlistment, clothing and necessaries had to come 
out of it The bounty continued to fluctuate according to circum- 
stances; thus in 1856, before peace was declared, it was £7; and 
only £2 in the following year. These figures were, however, 
exclusive of recruiting expenses, kit and equipment 

It was during the reign of Charles II. that the office of Secretary 
at War was created, and all the Army patronage was assigned to 
him. This continued until the growth of the Army necessitated 


placing the patronage in the hands of a non-political officer, the 
Commander-in-Chief. In 1768 the Secretaryship of State for War 
and the Colonies was instituted. In 18 19 the charges for these 
combined departments only amounted to ;^27,8S2. They were 
separated during the Crimean War. A fourth Secretaryship was 
created, and was conferred upon the Duke of Newcastle. 

With regard to the expenditure of the Commander-in-Chiefs 
department, that distinguished Frenchman, M. Dupin, declared in 
1820 that the public administration of Great Britain, from being 
the most economical had become the most expensive in Europe. 
He pointed out that when Lord Amherst was Commander-in-Chief 
of the British forces, his military secretary was only a head clerk 
•with a salary of \os, a day or £\Z2 a year. In 1813, in lieu of 
^his clerk, the Commander-in-Chief had for military secretary a 
lieut.-colonel in receipt of ;f 2500 a year. In 1794 the total 
expense of the Commander-in-Chiefs office in salaries and con- 
tingencies, amounted only to ;£"i029 for the year, while in 1814 the 
aggregate of charges was £9761. Thus in the lapse of only twenty 
years, the expenses of a single department had increased tenfold. 
In 1805 a Commission of Military Enquiry had been instituted by 
Act of Parliament for the purpose of examining into the expenses, 
and controlling the operations of military departments. The work 
of the Commissioners commenced in August, 1805, and continued 
without intermission until 18 12. During its session, nineteen 
reports were successively presented to the House of Commons, and 
the whole labours of the committee were subsequently contained in 
six folio volumes. Though it has met at different times with very 
adverse criticism, it brought to light, if not all, yet many flagrant 
abuses. One item of wasteful expenditure was the system of 
purchasing horses which was exposed by the Committee in their 
sixteenth report. In 1803 a contract had been made, without 
public advertisement, for the supply of horses. So disadvantageous 
to the Government was it, that they found themselves obliged, 
after purchasing from the contractor all the horses he had collected, 
to pay him ;if35,ooo to induce him to cancel the contract A 
further examination revealed the fact that if the Government had 
availed themselves of a clause in the contract which fixed the price 
to be paid for every horse dying in the Service at ;^2i, and had 
killed all the horses, they would have cost ;f45,ooo less than the 
contractor actually received for them. In spite of this, the same 
contractor was employed on several subsequent occasions, and new 
sources of profit were rapidly developed. One of these was the 
reduction of the allowance of forage, the horses being fed by the 
contractor. So stinted was the allowance, that the horses became 


unable to do their work, and the Engineers at Dover, finding they 
could not be used for heavy transport work, were obliged to hire 
others in the neighbourhood. In 18 16 the Government commenced 
to purchase horses for themselves. 

The investigations of the Committee revealed the great increase 
that had taken place in the expenditure of the barrack department. 
In 1797 the total expenditure for buildings and furniture amounted 
to ^^722,465, whilst in 1804 it had grown to ;Ci,700,6i3. 
Barrack-masters at first bought the greater part of the furniture, 
and made large profits by their transactions. In 1795 they were 
succeeded by one contractor for all barrack furniture, and in 1804 
the right of contracting for the supply of barrack furniture was 
resigned to the Commissariat. The excess of Army expenditure 
over the supplies granted appears to have prevailed for a very 
long period. In 1705 the excess was ;f 152,402, in 1706 ;f 299,760, 
and in 1707 ;f 135,242. The Navy contracted a debt of jf 606,806 
by issuing supplies to the Army from 1701 to 1708. By a com- 
parative statement of the expenses in 1792 and 1817, it appeared 
that at the latter of these periods, the troops quartered in Great 
Britain, and not encamped, cost for their subsistence £s sterling 
per man per annum above the pay fixed by regulation. 

In the early part of the last century, one of the most fruitful 
sources of extravagance lay in the large sums which were demanded for 
" expenses unprovided for." Had these been expenses which were 
not and could not have been foreseen, no objection could have been 
raised. Necessitas non habet legem. But they included many items 
which might easily have been calculated beforehand. The 
ordnance department was a great oflfender in this respect, so much 
so that in the four years preceding 18 10, the after charges for 
expenses unprovided for amounted to nearly ;£" 11,000,000 sterling. 
In 1818, the annual finance Committee appointed by the House of 
Commons thus expressed themselves in their ninth report — 

'•Your Committee having understood that strict orders were 
given by the Board of Ordnance, that the estimated sums should 
on no account be exceeded, consider these instances worthy of 
being laid before the House, for the purpose of showing how 
essential it is, not only to limit the particular sums originally 
allowed to specific Services, but to exact a strict compliance with 
such orders, by making something more than mere disapprobation, 
where any considerable excess has been incurred." 

The attention thus drawn to the subject was soon productive 
of good effects, for in 18 19 the charges for expenses unprovided for 
amounted to only ;f 20,000. 

Arthur G. Burney. 


By Colonel James Ferguson, 9th V.B. (Highlanders) 

Royal Scots. 

At a time when the requisites of a stable and sufficient system of 
national defence are being canvassed of new, when some advocate 
the simple British constitutional expedient of resort to the Militia 
ballot, and others a modification of Swiss models, it is not 
uninteresting, and may be instructive, to recall the ideas and 
practice of our ancestors in reference to the military duty of the 
individual to the State. The example of Scotland is specially 
illustrative, because it was a small country which had always to 
contemplate the probability of invasion by a neighbour able to put 
vastly superior forces into the field. There is a popular delusion 
that the whole burden of military service was originally borne, and 
afterwards shuffled off, by the landed proprietors of the country^ 
but this conception is very far from the truth. On the contrary, 
from the earliest times it would appear that liability to at least a 
modified form of military duty attached to every freeman. This 
varied in character, as it was imposed by the old Celtic institutions, 
by the strict specialties of the feudal tenure, and by the special 
constitution of the burghs. But whether it took the form of what 
was called " Scottish service," or of " knight service," or of the 
obligation of " watching and warding," it involved the duty on the 
part of every able-bodied freeman to bear his part in the defence 
of the realm. 

The oldest and most characteristic form of this national obliga- 
tion north of the Tweed was the form of service known as " Scottish 
service,'' which was probably the only form in existence before the 
introduction of feudal institutions, existed alongside of them, and 
can be traced, blended with and affected by the feudal ideas and 
jurisdictions, down to the time when these were finally abolished 
after the last Jacobite insurrection. 

It seems to have been associated with the old Celtic land 
measure called the davoch, which consisted of 416 acres, and in- 
cluded sixteen of the areas known as a husbandland (26 acres), and 



which Dr. Skene identifies as equivalent to the '' twenty houses/' 
or homesteads, in reference to which the earliest Scottish forces in 
Scotland were numbered. In the ancient Irish ' Tract on the Men 
of Alban/ in treating of the armed strength of the Scots in Kintyre 
and Cowal, it is said, " Twice seven benches to each twenty houses 
their sea muster." 

Among the obligations enforced in early Celtic times, which 
can be traced in Scotland, Ireland, and Wales, were those known 
among the Scottish Gael as " feacht" and "sluaged." 

^ Thefeacht and sluaged {expeditio and exerciius\^ says Skene in his ' Celtic 
Scotland,' ''consisted of a general obligation originally upon the members of the 
tribe, and afterwards upon the possessors and occupiers of what had been tribe 
territory, to follow their superiors and chiefs, as well as the * Ardri,* or sovereign, 
in his expeditions and wars. They are usually termed ' expedition ' and ' host- 
ing,' and in Scotland the burden was apportioned upon the davoch of land. • • • 
These obligations seem to have constituted what is called in charters Scottish 
service {servitium Scotticanum)^ and were of two kinds, internal and external, 
the one representing the feacht, or expedition, and the other the sluaged, or 



The feacht answered to the Welsh llwyd yn wlad, or hosting 
within the borders, and the sluagh or sluaged to the llwyd yn 
orwlad, or hosting beyond the borders. Thus we find lands granted 
" free from all exaction and service, internal and external " {sine 
omni exactione et servitio insirinseco et forinseco) ; or on condition 
of "rendering the external service only which pertains to five 
davochs of land," or free of " every service except the external 
Scottish service of our lord the king," or subject to the obligation 
of " rendering the external service in the army which pertains to 
the said lands." The class of the lesser gentry, known in the 
old Scots laws as Ogetheams, or Ochierns, translated in Latin as 
" libere tenentes " and in English as " freeholders," were " bound 
to yield certain services as suit and service in the court of the 
overlord and Scottish service to the King." 

In the period immediately preceding the War of Independence, 
the National Army was," says Robertson, in ' Scotland under 
her Early Kings,' " made up of all who held their lands by knight 
service, and of the great body of the people who were bound to 
Scottish service." Those bound to knight service were the feudal 
chivalry, of whom the Marischal of Scotland was specially the 
leader. They consisted of those holding lands which had been 
completely feudalised and were held by the strict feudal tenure of 
ward holding. They were bound to be fully provided with defensive 
as well as offensive armour, and by that time were probably 
universally mounted. They formed the force of cavalry which, 


under Sir Robert Keith, the knight-marischal, acted opportunely 
and with great effect against the English archers at Bannockbum. 

" All the feudal tenantry >>. proprietorsX^ says Robertson, " in Scotland 
wbose property reached a certain value, were bound either to furnish a force of 
this description or to serve in person as members of such an army ; but the 
great majority of the nation still held only by Scottish service, and rallied round 
the standard of their sovereign, armed with little more than the usual weapons 
of oflencc. The lowest member of this class seems to have been the tenant of 
a hnsbandland. who served as an archer or a spearman ; though within a few 
years Robert Bruce, probably from the exigencies of the period, obUged ' every 
man with a cow ' — evcr>' bordarius or free labourer with a cottage and a few 
acres of land — to serve in the royal army as a spearman, or an archer, with a 
bow and a sheaf of four and twenty arrows." 

He points out that the custom of Scottish service, which bound 
eveiy freeman to attend the ** hosting across the frontier " once 
every 3^ear in arms, swelled the ranks of King David's army at the 
Battle of the Standard with— 

** a body of men fierce and warlike indeed, and endued with that self-willed 
and reckless courage which has on more than one occasion been their bane, 
but often indifferently armed, and as undisciplined as they were unruly," 

that they gloried in fighting without defensive armour, like Earl 
Malise of Stratheam, and that the muster of the Highland clan 
in later times, including ** native men," as well as " Duine Vasal," 
answered to the old sluaglL 

" The arms," he sa)'s, ^ required for Scottish service, were probably those with 
which the clans fought on the North Inch of Perth — bows, axes, swords, and 
daggers, with the addition of the long Scottish spear." 

The obligation of Scottish service must have applied to the whole 
country, to the mass of the Highlands, and also to the Lowlands, 
except in so far in both cases as the tenure had been converted 
into a strict feudal holding, and the property was explicitly held 
by knight service, w^hich, in an Act of King Robert I., is explained 
as " service of ward and relief." Especially on the lands of the 
thanages, and in the Crown domains generally, the class of pro- 
prietors known as freeholders were numerous. 

The enactment of King Robert I. as to " armour for warfare " 
would appear to be appUcable rather to the general levy of Scot- 
land than to the feudal baronage and men-at-arms, who would by 
the conditions of their tenure be fully provided with complete 
armour. What the soldier king considered absolutely necessary 
for the defensive infantry of the realm, and useful for light-armed 
auxiliaries, is thus expressed — 

'* It is statute, that induring the time of weir, that ilk laik landed man haveand 
ten punds in gudes and geir sail have for his bodie, and for defence of the 
realmc, ane sufficient acton, ane basnet, and ane glove of plate, with ane speare 


and sword. Qhua has not ane acton and basnet, he sail have ane gude 
habirgeon, and ane gude iron jak for his bodie, and ane iron knapiskay, and 
gloves of plate. . • . Mairover the king commands that ilk man haveand the 
value of ane kow in gudes, sail have ane bow with ane schaife of arrows, that is, 
twentie-foure arrowes, or ane speare." 

A state of things closely analogous to, and probably the direct 
survival of the Scottish service of early days, is found as late as the 
eighteenth century, in what is probably the most purely Scottish 
district of Scotland, and from which sprang the last of her original 
Celtic dynasties, the house of Duncan, Malcolm Canmore, and 
Alexander III. In the ' Chronicles of the AthoU and TuUiebardine 
families/ the present Duke of Atholl has included a ' Roll of the 
Heritors, their Men and Weapons and Armour of 1638,' the — 

"hunting rolls of the names of ffewars, vassalls, woodsetters, and tennents 
within the Earldome off Atholl and Lordschipe of Balquidder being charged 
to attend the person of ane noble Lord, John, Erie of Atholl, at his hunting within 
the forest of Atholl, beginning the second day of Sept., 1667, viz. the fewar, 
vassal], woodsetter, and principall tennent himself in proper persone, with a 
sufficient able man, weell armed, out of ilk foortie-shilling land, and that by and 
attour the baggage men," 

and the 'Rolls of the Duke of AthoU's Fencible Men' of 1705 
and 1706. 

One example from the Roll of 1638 will indicate how both the 
obligation to produce men according to the number allocated upon 
the land, and the character of the weapons possessed, had remained 
the same or similar during hundreds of years. 

*' WiUiam Fergussone, of Bellezucone, himself and the men of his lands within 
the said parochin of Mulling, are in number . . • four. His awin weapons is ane 
swird and ane tairge, four gunes, twa pistols, ane bow and sheaffis of arrowis, 
with ane haberschone, and ane of his men hes ane gun, ane swird, ane tairge, 
and the other twa hes hot swirds." 

The "sufficient able man well armed out of each forty-shilling 
land " represented four men from each davoch, a forty-shilling or 
three-merk land being the same as a ploughgate, four of which 
constituted a davoch, and this proportion seems to be carried out ; 
while the fact that the man is armed, or the extent of the deficiency 
in his arms, is also noted in the rolls of 1705 and 1706. In 1703. 
an Atholl proprietor was summoned to attend the funeral of the 
Marquis of Atholl, " bringing alongst with you a pretty man out 
of each two-merk land, with his best arms and cloaths." 

The legislation of 1748, in abolishing not only tenure by ward* 
holding and the heritable jurisdictions, but also forbidding the 
stipulating for services used and wont in leases to tenants or 
tacksmen, not only broke the power of the chiefs and baronage^ 


but incidentally removed the ancient obligation of all ranks of 
Scottish freemen to personally defend their native land. 

The Scottish warrior for many generations was not only 
expected to appear with a certain equipment, but to provide his 
own food and commissariat for forty days. The early Scottish 
armies were habituated to privation and fatigue, and the staple of 
the provision that each man carried with him was oatmeal, which, 
with the assistance, no doubt, of living on the country when the 
hosting across the frontier was into England, sufficed to sustain 
them as rice now does the soldiers of Japan. 

In the treaty of 1363, which contemplated the succession of the 
King of England to the throne of Scotland, it was specially 
stipulated that no exactions should be made on the realm of 
Scotland other than those levied " in the time of the good kings of 
Scotland passed away," and that — 

'' he should not send the people of Scotland to labour in the wars otherwise 
than was the custom before, and that beyond the forty days for which they are 
bound to serve at their own expense, he should give them sufficient pay 
according to the estate of the persons and the quantity and manner of their 

James I. returned from his captivity in England impressed with 
the military value of the English archery, and of the necessity for 
constant preparation, while the national passion for football and 
other games, then as now, presented a substantial obstacle in securing 
sufficient attention to the serious business of national defence. In 
his first Parliament, '' it is statute, and the king forbiddes that na 
man play at the fute-ball," and enacted that " all men busk them to 
be archers fra they be twelve yeir of age, and that in ilk ;^io worth 
of land their be maid bow markes ; " and in his second Parliament it 
was ordained that "in ilk sheriflfdome of the realme be made 
weapon-shawinges four times in the yeir." In 1425 every gentle- 
man with ;^io worth of land was required to be armed with basnet, 
whole leg harness, sword, spear, and dagger, and gentlemen of less 
means " at their gudlie power, after the discretion of the Sheriffs," 
all other yeomen between sixteen and sixty years of age to be, 
sufficiently bowed and shafted with sword and buckler and knife, 
and all burgesses and indwellers within burgh towns to be armed 
in like manner. 

In 1429 it was enacted that every man who could spend yearly 
;£'20, or had £100 in movable goods, should be " well horsed and 
wholly armed as a gentleman ought to be," and that those of 
simpler condition, of ;^io of rent, or ;^S0 in goods, should have hat, 
gorget, or pesane, with rerebrace, vambrace, and glove of plate, 
breastplate, pans, and leg-splents— " at the least or better if he 


liked ; " that every yeoman of ;f 20 in goods should have a good 
doublet of fence or an habergeon, an iron hat, with bow and sheaf, 
sword, buckler, and knife ; and other yeomen of ;(rio in goods, bow 
and sheaf, sword, buckler, and knife ; that every yeoman who " was 
no archer " should have a good " sure " hat for his head, and a 
doublet of fence, with sword and buckler, or else " a brogit staff ; " 
and that every burgess having £^0 of goods should be wholly 
armed as a gentleman ought to be, and the yeoman of lower 
degree and burghers of j£'20, with a hat and doublet, habergeon, 
sword, buckler, bow, sheaf, and knife. 

In 1455 bui^esses were required to follow the host as it passes, 
and in 1456 it was enacted that — 

'' all manner of men between sixty and sixteen, should be ready on their best 
wise to come to the border for the defence of the land when any knowledge 
comes of the incoming of a great English host, and no poor man * unbodin ' 
(/>. unarmed with defensive armour) should be charged to come to any raid in 

Every man with goods to the value of twenty marks was required 
to be " bodyn at the least '' with a jack with sleeves to the hand, or 
else a pair of splents, a sellat or a "prikit hat/' a sword and a 
buckler, a bow and a sheaf of arrows, or, " if he could not shoot," 
an axe and a targe of leather, or of fir wood, with two bands on the 

In 1457 it was again decreed that the weapon-schawings should 
be held four times a year, " and that the football and golf be utterly 
cried down and not to be used." 

In 148 1 it was again ordained that all our sovereign lord's lieges, 
"baithto burgh and to land" {i.e. both in town and country), 
should be ready to come to our sovereign lord, "bodin in their 
best wise, with bows, spears, axes, and other abulziements of war," 
on eight days' warning, or sooner if need be, and with victuals to 
endure for at least twenty days after arrival ; that no spear should 
be shorter than five ells and a half, or at least five ells " before the 
bur," that the jacks should reach to the knee where leg-harness 
was not worn, or to cover the top of the leg-harness, and that 
every axeman without spear or bow should have a targe of wood 
or leather according to pattern. Similar warning as to assembly 
was given in 1483. 

In 147 1 six ells had been prescribed for the spear, and every 
yeoman who was not an archer required to have a good axe and a 
targe of leather, " to resist the shot of England." 

From time to time enactments as to the holding of weapon- 
schaws and the arms to be carried were repeated, " honest yeomen " 
that could afford it being in 1491 authorised to equip themselves as 


" men of arms," while it was again laid down that " in na place of the 
Realm there be used futeball, golf, or other sik unprofitable sportes 
for the common gude of the Realm and defense thereof." 

In 1528 orders for assembly were given to all fencible persons 
in Lothian and the eastern borders to attend King James V. in a 
tour ''for ordering of matters concerning the commonweal and 
pacifying of the country," and in 1549, under Queen Mary, the old 
obligation of every man between sixty and sixteen years to be 
ready, *' weill bodin in feir of weir," to join the host on eight days* 
warning, and with forty days' victuals, " for resisting of the said 
auld enemies, defence of this realm, and liberty thereof," was again 
insisted on, and this notwithstanding an act made before for raising 
one " furnished man " from every seven-mark land for two months, 
which was discharged. 

In 1574 the Parliament of James VI., proceeding on the wise 
principle and preamble, "Forsameikle as it is maist requisite 
that in time of peace provision be made and care taken for the war, 
when at God's pleasure it may happen," and referring to " diverse 
good and loveable Acts of Parliament " previously made for that 
purpose, ordained two weaponschaws to be held every year on the 
2oth July and the loth October, and ordered the weapons and 
equipment to be as follows : — 

" Every nobleman, sic as earl, knight, and baron, and every landed man, 
having three hundred merk of yearly rent or above, be armed in harness, light 
or heavy, as they please, and horsed according to their honour and estate. 
And all others of lower rent and degree have brigantines, jacks, steel bonnets, 
sleeves of plate or mail, swords, pikes or spears of six ells long, culverins, 
halberts or two-handed swords, and in the highlands haberschons, steel 
bonnets, hektons, swords, bows and dorlochs, or culverins." 

In 1598 and 1600, more explicit directions were given as to the 
armour to be worn by noblemen and gentlemen, and the number 
of stands to be provided for their households by Earls lords and 
barons of different rentals, the arms to be worn by burgesses, and 
the proportion of muskets to pikes and corselets. The change in 
military conditions is shown by the appearance of the light corselet 
and pike instead of the old Scottish spear, and of the "muskat 
with forcat bendrole " (bandolier). Yet side by side with these more 
modem ideas remained the obligation in certain charters, such as 
that in the Ratification in 1617 to Sir Gideon Murray, of— 

** finding for every ten pound land of his lands of Ballincrief two horsemen, the 
one with lance and the other 'with a carirge horse* to do service to his 
Highness's wars and armies when lawfully required." 

In the troublous times of the Civil Wars, both sides, in 
addition to raising special regiments of a more or less regular 


character, generally on the territorial system, for the maintenance 
and pay of which special contributions were demanded and 
exactions imposed, claimed general service under the old con- 
stitutional obligation of the Scottish people. Thus the Marquis of 
Huntly, as the king's lieutenant in the north, and the Marquis of 
Montrose later on, raised the Royal Standard at Inverurie and in 
Atholl respectively, and levied very considerable forces. The 
weakness of the Royal armies in Scotland was probably largely due 
to the feeling that the obligations attaching either to knight's service 
or to Scottish service were fulfilled by forty days' attendance with the 
king's host, for both the mounted baronage of the House of Gordon, 
and other gentlemen of the northern lowlands, and the Highland 
clans, showed a tendency to melt away afler a victory, the former 
on some point of jealousy or precedence, and the latter to carry 
the spoils of battle home to their glens. 

The appearance of these levies, and the twofold character of 
the inherited conditions under which they came to the field, is 
quaintly illustrated in a satirical poem written on the Earl of 
Glencaim's Royalist rising in 1653 — 

*' Huntley I also do require 
On highest pains with Cross of Fire, 
To bring the Gordons of his clan, 
And all his followers, every man, 
Mounted on horse and armed weell, 
With backe, and breast, and helm of steel, 
And that compleate and cleanly dight. 
To guard young Donald in the fight. 

*' And all the clans that's under Heaven, 
I charge you in young Donell's name, 
To come in all the haste you can, 
Compleately armed every man, 
Mut him's bowe, him's dorloche, and hlm*s durke, 
Him's shorthose and him's two deane shirte, 
Him's sworde, him's targe, and him*s shortegoune, 
Him*s kilted plaide and him's powder home, 
Him's black bonnett, and him's bullet bagge, 
And him's twa good streagarters about him's legge, 
Him's bodomless breiks and him's single shoone, 
Open beneathe and close aboyne, 
And twentie dayes meate and drinke." 

The Covenanting Parliament made an equally comprehensive 
claim. Thus in 1643 we find an Act ordering that — 

^ all the fensible persons within this kingdom between sixty and sixteen, of 
whatsoever quality, rank, or degree, shall provide themselves with forty days' 
provision, with ammunition, arms, and other warlike provision of all sort in the 
most substantious manner for horse and foot, with tents and all other furnishing 
requisite, and that the horsemen be armed with pistols, broadswords, and steel 
caps, and where these arms Cannot be had, that they provide jacks or secrets, 
VOL. cu 18 



lances, and steel bonnets or swords. And that the footmen be armed with musket 
and sword, or pike and sword, and where these cannot be had, that they be 
furnished with halbert, Lochaber axes, or Jedbargh staffs and swords." 

Upon Cromwell's invasion in 1650, the Estates limited the \e^, 
in these tenns — 

** Considering . . . that according to the law of God and nations, and the 
continued Acts and practices of the nation, all fensible persons betwixt sixty 
and sixteen are bound to rise in arms to defend the king and kingdom from 
invasion, yet the Estates of Parliament being desirous to avoid the confusion 
by the arming together of all fensible persons, have rather thought fit that a 
sdect number of horse and foot be in every shire put in companies, troops, and 

With the Restoration the Militia system was introduced, and in 
1663 the Estates made — 

** humble and hearty offer to his Majesty of 20,000 footmen and 2000 horsemen, 
soffidently armed, and furnished wiUi forty days' provision, to be raised from 
the several shires " in proportion, and to '^ be in readiness as they sludl be 
called for by his Majesty to march to any part of his dominions of Scotland, 
^gland, or Ireland for suppressing of any foreign invasion, intestine trouble, 
or insurrection, or for any other service wherein his Majesty's honour, authority, 
or greatness may be concerned, • . . and the Estates of Parliament do dedare 
that if his Majesty shall have further use of their services, this kingdom will be 
ready, every man between sixty and sixteen, to give and hazard their lives and 
fortunes as they shall be called for by his Majesty." 

Subsequently to this, there was "constituted and settled a 
Militia of horse and foot in many shires " by the King, with advice 
of the Privy Council — Ahorse being substituted for foot in some 
cases — and their constitution was ratified by an Act of Parliament 
in 1669, which provided that there should be allowed to every foot- 
man six shillings Scots, and to every horseman eighteen shillings 
Scots every day of the rendezvous, to be paid to the heritors and 
refunded to them by " the men tenants and servants for whom the 
footmen are put out and who are not listed in the Militia." Another 
Act relating to the Militia was passed in 1672, but in 1685 the 
musterings of the Militia were abandoned on the plea that ''it 
may contribute for the ease of the people to have the ordinaiy 
rendzvouses of Militia dischai^ed." 

In the year 1695, King William and Queen Mary, the Patent 
granted to the surgeons and apothecaries of Edinbui^h, gave them 
a special exemption from military service, declaring " earn compre- 
henderg omnes militias et evocationes (quae verba nunc valent usu) 
aeq. ac Exercitus Equitatus convocationes armUustria aliaqui!' 
After the Revolution the military strength of the country had been 
organised by the formation of regiments, more or less raised by 
noblemen and gentlemen in different localities, some of which were 
retained in service and passed to the wars in Flanders. But an 


indication of the ancient underlying obligation is found in an Act 
of 1696, which provided for the recruiting of the regular regiments 
by a resort to the machinery of the Act of 1663, ordering 1000 
men to be levied yearly as recruits, according to the proportions of 
the levy of 20,000 foot specified in 1663. The Commissioners of 
Supply, sheriffs, and magistrates of burghs were ordered " to first 
design and cause to be given the idle, loose, and vagabond persons 
liable by former Acts of Parliament to be seized by the sheriffs.'* 
The remainder were to be found according to the proportions of 
the shire — 

"and heritors," the Act proceeded, **shaU have power, and are hereby em- 
powered, to design and make choice of such young fencible men living within 
their respective bounds, and not having wife or children, and who earn their 
living by daily wages or termly hire, as shall satisfy for their part of the levy, 
or otherwise the tenants and fencible men shall have their option to offer and 
pay down for each of the said men that may fall to be put out by them the sum 
of ;f 24 Scots, so that the district shall either deliver a good man effectually or 
pay the said ;f 24." 

In the famous Act of Security of 1704, in which Scotland 
resolved that its Parliament should not be dissolved by the death 
of Queen Anne, and asserted its voice as to the conditions of suc- 
cession to the Realm of Scotland, there is a distinct echo of the 
old conception of national duty — 

" And for a further security of the kingdom, her Majesty, with advice and con- 
sent foresaid, statutes and enacts that the whole Protestant heritors, and aU the^ 
burghs within the same, shall forthwith provide themselves with firearms for all 
the fencible men who are Protestants within their respective bounds, and 
those of the bore proportioned to a bullet of fourteen drop running ; and the said 
heritors and burghs are hereby impowered and ordained to discipline and 
exercise their said fencible men once in the month at least." 

The Act of Security, with its distinct intimation of the determina- 
tion of the Scottish people, and significant indication of future 
possibilities, made the question of an incorporating union a clamant 
one, and stimulated the statesmen of the age to carry through the 
Act of 1707 on lines beneficial to both kingdoms, and honourable 
to the smaller but proud and independent northern nation. 

The old obligations of feudal and Scottish service remained, 
and contributed to swell the Jacobite armies in 17.15 and 1745, 
until in 1746 they were abolished. The old Scottish term of 
** fencible men," however, survived in the "fencible regiments,'* 
which were a main feature of home defence in the latter part of 
the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, — over 
twenty-five being raised in the Highlands alone — but were recruited 
by voluntary enlistment. The Militia had disappeared after the 
statute of James VII. discharging the rendezvouses, and about the 
time of the Seven Years' War an active controversy raged as to 



t&e pit)t«i e ty of its restontiGa. Ultunatdy it was revived in 1797, 
aad as Act passed oo the fines of tlie English Acts* providing (or 
the ccsicg of 6000 caen aod wIumIim in g the ballol sjrstem. 

For over 1200 jnears; firom the Umfin g of the historic Feigas on 
the siK3fcs of Afgvil dovn at least to the onioo of the Parliaments, 
if not to Ccrocipiy the cooccptioo of national military service, 
lUkkml in a CDcxSe hrfttin g his degree and capacity by every 
man of £t age; irmarnrd part of the institntkxis of Scotland 
Dovn to the cnion of the Cxovns it was a stem reality, and in 
years it vas brocght Ibrth as an ancient weapon from the 
2: ttaaes of dvil strife: Less than fifty jrears passed 
bUnim the ahc?i^tinn of the feodal military tenure and the in- 
trodnctiGn of the Militia baDot Less than two hundred years have 
passed since the Act of S e uuity more dian hinted at the potential 
daid on aZ fendble prrsnn^ Rifle dobs and mnnidpal rifle 
ranges wDcId in Scotland be just the application to modem 
condhSocs of the preocdent set by the Jameses» in their efforts that 
football and goa should aEow time for ardiery, and their careful 
pfo % aJon for ardiery butts at every parish kirk. Physical and 
military traici:^ in schools was foreshadowed by the instruction 
that "all men bask themsdres to be archers firom twelve years of 
age*** and Militxa trainings and Volunteer inspections and camps 
represent the ** weapoo-schawii^ " of the national army and the 
"* rendezvooses " of the Militia. The military spirit bred in the 
people was evidenced by the raisii^ of fifty r^ular battalions and 
sonoe twenty-seven fendble rqriments in the H^hlands alooe 
between 1740 and 1S04* not to spcsak. of Militia and Volunteers. 
There is no Scotsman who may not feel that — 

'^ Hi$ blood Ks fiEtched froa fioheB of wproof, 
FjLtbos tbat. like so Minj Akxandosa 
Hai« in tlMse puts firom mora to cpen fougfat." 

Sorely to a people with soch traditions, and with such an ifl- 
lieritance of national service rendered alike by peer and peasant, 
by burgher and yeoman, we may look for no unwilling response to 
an appeal jadidonsly made, widi doe rq;ard to the conditions and 
convenience in their dvil avocations of different sections and ages 
of the community, for soch measore of Volunteer service as may 
be required to place at least home defence on a solid and satis- 
factory basis, while the offer of the Scots Estates to Charles II. 
to find a force for service anywhere in his Majesty's dominions of 
England and Ireland as well as Scotland, may provide a precedent 
for still wider arrangements of voluntary service in view of great 
national emergencies. 

James Ferguson. 


By Captain N. Bellairs, R.G.A. 

" Educate, or govern, they are one and the same word. Education 
does not mean teaching people to know what they do not know. 
It means teaching them to behave as they do not behave. And 
the true ' compulsory education ' which the people now ask of you. 
is not catechism, but drill. It is not teaching the youth of England 
the shapes of letters and the tricks of numbers, and then leaving 
them to turn their arithmetic to roguery, and their literature to 
lust It is, on the contrary, training them into the perfect exercise 
and kingly continence of their bodies and souls." 

So wrote Ruskin forty years ago in 'The Crown of Wild 
Olive.' Since then the British nation has stepped far along the 
road to ruin in a wild debauch of so-called freedom. It is time to 
call a halt : to point out what lies beyond : to inculcate the value 
of discipline and the duty of handing down to our posterity this 
our British Empire, not only sustained but strengthened, since its- 
standstill is to retrograde.* 

How is this to be done.^ Have we the means of enforcing^ 
peace on a Continental nation ? Is the former spirit of the natio{> 
which bred our knights of old — those days of heroic acts, and not 
for lucre — still burning as of yore ? To the last question I answer 
unhesitatingly no; ten thousand times no. How is it to be 
expected. The manly qualities — courage, justice, and the like — 
deteriorate with the physical. Mental and physical deformity hunt 

♦ The strength of an Empire lies not in the size or wealth of its territories, but in 
the manly vigour of its citizens and in the efficiency of its warlike preparations. Nations, 
like plants, must either grow and develop or wither and die. Expansions of sovereignty 
and a virile policy sometimes result in war ; but weakness constantly invites encroach- 
ment or attack, and is, therefore, more dangerous. In Great Britain, the voices of her 
few Statesman fall upon deaf ears ; the nation hearkens chiefly to " politicians "—self-seek- 
ing rogues and vestry-minded lunatics. " Freedom *' is a frequent watchword of the 
Briton, especially when he is drunk — be it with liquor or eloquence. This vaunted 
freedom will shortly be in jeopardy ; because shouting and singing about it take the place 
of patriotic readiness to defend it. The apotheosis of the shadow has endangered the 
security of the substance. — Ed. U< S. M. 


in couples. But jroa wQI say that it is not a fact that the nation 
is deteriorating physically. Then you jadge against the weight 
of evidence, and in this connection, at the risk o{ being accused of 
generalising oo insoffident data, I qoote from a letter to the Times. 
It is written by a correspondent, who claims to have examined 
more than 100,000 £au:tory difldren in the course of his career. 

** The poor district Board School boy, at twelve, averages to-day 
3 indies less in stature, and 2 pound less in weight, than did the 
factory boy of the same age thirty years ago." 

And of these hoy% when they grow up, the best become 
railway porters, postmen, etc, whose numbers have enormously 
increased ; and for purposes of defence the Army chooses from the 
failures, where fcMrmeriy she got the pick. So it comes about that 
an unnecessary condition arises, and for our Army we have to 
compete in the open market, as to wages, for our men, and pay 
them higher on account of the moral stigma of being reckoned a 
ne'er-do-well — one who has sold himsdf to the devil. 

We arc fast approaching the condition of China ; self-absorbed 
-we see no use for an Army, except to police cheaply the Empite 
-at lafge, and have forgotten the world's history so far that we do 
not now recognise that all great nations were warrior nations. 
-China was not always sa It was to the interest of the corrupt 
mandarins, for thdr own personal ends, to cry down warlike 
j>ursuits, and it was done through the schools only too successfully. 
Huskin regrettingly wrote as follows : — 

" We talk of peace and learning, and of peace and plenty, and 
t)f peace and dvilisation, but I found that these were not the 
words which the Muse of History coupled together : that, on her 
lips, the words were — peace and sensuality — ^peace and selfishness 
— peace and death. I found, in brief, that all great nations learned 
their truth of word, and strength of thought, in war: that they 
were nourished in war, and wasted by peace, taught by war, an 
deceived by peace, trained by war, and betrayed by peace ;— 1^ * 
word, that they were bom in war and expired in peace." How 
true those words : " bom in war." Peaceful pursuits were no 
sufficient to admit Japan within the comity of nations ; it requirea 
a successful war with China, and a display of the military virtues, 
second to none of the European troops eng^ed in the naarch to 
Pekin, to bring this about. 

When one reads in the Royal Speech at the opening oi tn^ 
Houses of Parliament that the burdens imposed on the resources 
of the country by the necessities of naval and military defence ^ 
undoubtedly serious, and that the possibility of diminishing ^^ 
burden is being carefully considered, one recognises that tfl^ 


electorate — ^thc ultimate arbiters — must learn to consider main 
issues in the selection of candidates to whom they entrust their 
votes : to see that vivisection and such like questions are really of 
very minor importance ; in short, to think imperially. 

The remedy, before it is too late, is to discipline the nation by 
imposing compulsory military service upon its youth, between certain 
ages ; and pay the boys the wages of boys, for home service only, 
and more with a view to educate them than for purposes of defence. 
In time it would become a reflection in the eyes of the women of 
the country not to have passed through the mill. Class prejudices 
would become less marked. The hard-working poor man would 
learn to look less at the luxurious and idle rich one — the distorted 
image — and occasionally see that there were also hard-working 
rich men — the correct representation. And vice versA. He would 
(earn to take more interest in foreign affairs ; the value and 
necessity of markets, to provide regular employment and the 
wherewithal. In this connection also how Colonies f;ive us the 
sinews of war, now a matter of history, and the need for drawing 
closer the bonds of mutual self-interest. He would become thus 
reconciled to the doctrines ventilated by Mr. Chamberlain, so 
necessary to provide the funds for carrying out this proposition by 
broadening the basis of taxation. In truth, he would be a better 
citizen, which from a State point of view is the desired consumma- 
tion : — ^my interpretation to Ruskin's definition of education— 

" You are to spend on National Education, not to be spent for 
it, and to make by it, not more money, but better men ; — to get 
into the British Island the greatest possible number of good and 
brave Englishmen. They are to be your money's worth." 

At the present moment all eyes are fixed on Japan. We are 
bewildered with her wonderful progress — an advance which has no 
parallel in history. It seems worth my reader's while to endeavour 
-to fathom this success of an Oriental Power, this assimilation of 
civilisation recognised by ourselves in a treaty of alliance. 

Here the Constitution is nothing. There are five electors to 
every hundred males, whereas with us there are sixty-five. And 
ivhen it comes to a crisis, as lately, when a vote of censure was passed 
on the Government for not declaring war with sufficient expedition 
to satisfy it, the House of Representatives is prorogued. It has 
not been a success. 

We are dealing here with a despotism. Petrie Watson, in 
* Japan — its Aspects and Destinies,' says : " Japan was a despotism 
before her Revolution, she is a despotism after it She has but 
changed masters ; but whereas she had a man for tyrant, she now 
has Reason." Therein her power lies. 


A Japanese writer, J. Hitomi, gives us hb ideas in ' Le Japan. 
Essai sur les moenrs et les Institutions, 1901." He says : ** In the 
view of the ruling classes, religion is a secondary affair. The im- 
portant thing is to conserve the national morality which inculcates 
love of country, loyalty to the sovereign, etc." 

This is a mere matter of education, and Japan which is a group 
of islands like Great Britain, and presumably no more requires it 
than we ourselves, has conscription. 

Education must be practical Let us take this as our canon, 
and remember, with Baron Sone, the Japanese Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, that " The fate of nations is not dependent on a supply 
of philosophers." 

The Empire may be considered in the light of a modem 
fortress, to which foreign nations are laying si^e by peaceful 
strat^y (the zig-zag approaches and mining of warfare). The 
answer must be countermining by the defenders. This is Reason— 
the Japanese despot 

In a national emergency men constantly ask how they can be 
of use. We must teach them. We must go back to the seventeenth 
century, to quote from Lord Bacon, who truly saw on what our 
future destiny depended. 

" Walled towns, stored arsenals and armories, goodly races of 
horses, artiller>% and the like ; all this is but a sheep in a lion's 
skin, except the breed and disposition of the people be stout and 
warlike. Above all, for Empire and greatness, it importeth most 
that a nation do profess arms as their principal honour, study, and 
occupation." Bacon was no Chauvinist, but a philosopher. 

Within the memory of some now living, the natives of Madras 
were a spirited race ; to-day they have so far lost all aptitude for 
war that their regiments have lately been disbanded. Madras has 
not survived the peace conditions which prevail in that presidency. 

'' England expects that every man will do his duty." So 
signalled Nelson before the Battle of Trafalgar. Sir John Moore 
had such a high sense of duty that it was written of him that " as 
all the services one renders to a mistress are pleasant, he enjoys 
discomforts." And to return to our example of Japan ; Bennet 
Burleigh, who has been watching the transition from peace to war 
in that country, and has possibly unique experience, is so alarmed 
that he writes to the Daily Telegraph, in a letter from Nagasaki, 
dated i8th February, 1904, saying — 

" Their pride of race and courage are great, and it all means 
that we of the West must always prepare ourselves to be able to 
do likewise, and still 'go one better' to justify our traditions, 
ourselves and our fathers. Organisation and devotion to duty 


must be more than mere catchwords if the West is to keep the lead 
of the East." 

This essay is based on a different standpoint than invasion, 
about which readers may have their own opinion. We may, how- 
ever, mention two new factors which have not been dealt with by 
the experts. First, that submarines may render impossible the 
close blockade of the enemy's harbours on which all our naval 
strategy is based ; and second, the recent declaration of the United 
States in connection with the Russo-Japanese War, that under no 
circumstances would she allow food to be considered contraband of 
war. Also let us remember that within the last twelve years 
Germany has become a "world-power," a word coined by the 
present Kaiser, and that it is inevitable that, as the years roll on, 
her interests will clash more and more with ours, till they become 
vital, with the usual result— war. Already the Emperor William, 
in the course of a speech, is reported as having said : " Nothing 
must be done an}nvhere on the globe without the sanction of 
Germany's ruler." In the memorandum accompanying the Ger- 
man Navy Act occurs the following paragraph : — " Germany must 
have a fleet of such strength that a waj* even against the mightiest 
naval Power would involve such risks as to threaten the supremacy 
of that Power." 

Germany has become a commercial Power. She, like ourselves, 
would starve if her foreign commerce were cut off. Modem 
Germans are very matter of fact, strict utilitarians. Education has 
taught them to be ruled by the head, and not by the heart 
Already she has the second lai^est mercantile marine, and one can 
reckon on one's fingers the number of years when her battle fleet 
will be in the same position. Her policy is not merely ambitious ; 
it is necessary. She is setting to work on her fleet in the same 
calculating, methodical, and earnest manner that for many years 
she had devoted to the army before the war with France, and all 
with that object in view. When ready, a quarrel was sought and 
the neutrality of England obtained in a very dubious manner. 
France was made to appear in the wrong by diplomatic means. 
Similarly in time she will defy England. Germany is responsible 
for modem conscript service. 

And who will say that the same has had nothing to do with her 
success. Wolf von Scherbrand, in * Germany,' writes : — " Those 
habits of discipline, that sturdy and powerful digestion, that sense 
of order and cleanliness of person which distinguish the modem 
German of every class are in large measure due to his military 
training at the period of early manhood." 

Germany is being drawn to Russia. The holding of German 


capitalists in Russian secorities already amoants to twice the 
indemnity France paid her after tiie war. With her present 
system her vas^ persautul costs her a third of what ours does and 
is abundant. We have akeady reached our limit. Ships without 
men are useless. 

Even Adam Smith acknowledged that ''the necessity for 
defence was greater than opulence." But what economists fail to 
recognise is that it is "the man bdiind the gun** that counts. 
Under Germany's system, the Army holds the first place in the 
affections of every German family — socialists and agrarian alike. 
To-morrow their navy will be raised on the same pedestal. Are 
we mesmerised ? It is openly debated in the reviews whether we 
have not lost the art of Government Voluntary Service on the 
Continent had to give way before compulsory, and now the seas 
are invaded by it the same will follow there. But systems are not 
changed in the hour of stress to any purpose, and it is only by 
demonstrating the hopelessness of her task that we can destroy 
Germany's dream of becoming a world-power, which can only be 
at our expense ; then she will unwillingly accept the situation and 
view, sullenly perhaps, her emigrants flock to the United States 
and to British Colonies as heretofore. Stay ; she has one other 
alternative. There are large settlements of Germans in South 
America; the Republics of that Continent are notoriously ill- 
governed ; to raise an " Uitlander question " would be easy. Find- 
ing Great Britain prepared, she may — following the line of least 
resistance — ^brave the Monroe doctrine and defy the United States. 
The latter's policy notoriously outruns her preparations, and, to 
her, all I have written applies in an even greater degree ; but that 
is not our affair. 

Awake, England, awake and let us wage war no more with 
warped and untipped cues. Further, let me not be misunderstood. 
I am no Jingo. The issue of peace or war may not rest with us. 
The fact is that in the midst of peace we are at war, and, when 
self-preservation demands it, the weapons will be changed. Peace 
strategy is a preliminary to that of war. If the former is bad the 
latter is handicapped, perhaps fatally. The Boer War still lives 
in our memories — notoriously short In that day it will not avail 
us that our cause is just when might is right A house divided 
against itself inevitably falls. Unity is strength. Bene est tentare. 

N. Bellairs. 



By Major J. L. J. Clarke, East Yorkshire Regiment, D.A.A.G., 

3rd Army Corps. 

Much has been written of late about the want of initiative dis- 
played by the British officer both on service and at peace manoeuvres, 
and this has been applied more particularly to infantry officers. 
That these accusations are to a certain extent true, I think the 
majority of us will admit ; but at the same time, in justice to the 
British regimental officer, it is only reasonable to try and convince 
the general public that the fault lies with the system rather than 
with the individual. And the reasons are not far to seek. What 
is the system complained of, and what is the experience of the 
average infantry regimental officer under this system ? 

I think it is in the interior organisation of the infantry battalion 
that the fault chiefly lies. The battalion, at an establishment vary- 
ing from 880 to 1030 all ranks in round numbers, is divided into 
eight companies, the war strength of each of which is n6 all 
ranks. Now the coriipany in our service is not an administrative 
unit ; it is merely a component part of a battalion, and cannot be 
considered in any way as a self-contained or self-supporting unit. 
It has no fixed scale of transport, the consequence being that on 
service, companies or detachments of several companies, find them- 
selves very much " at sea " if sent off away from the headquarters 
of their battaUons. In the artillery and cavalry this difficulty is not 
nearly so much felt— with the former the battery has been for 
many years an independent and self-supporting administrative 
unit, and has been so organised and trained in peace that a section 
of two guns can at any time be detached and sent off on independent 
duty with ease. 

In the cavalry too, since the introduction of the squadron 
system, marked improvement in this direction is noticeable. It is 
easy to understand that this capability of independent existence 
and action in peace time as well as on service must be beneficial 
in its effects on the powers of command and initiative of battery 
and squadron officers. Is it to be wondered at, then, that company 


officers who do not enjoy similar advantages should sometimes be 
found lacking in these respects ? Then, again, with our present 
system a young infantry officer, more especially should he join a 
battalion on foreign service, will probably find himself in permanent 
command of a company before he has two years' service, and while 
he sticks to regimental duty, this will be his sphere of work and 
interest for probably another twenty years, by which time, if he is 
lucky and has successfully passed all examinations and avoided an 
unfavourable confidential report, he will be appointed second in 
command of a battalion — not a very encouraging outlook for any 
man to whom soldiering is really a profession, to find himself after 
twenty years or more of service doing exactly the same work, 
exercising the same command, and with no wider responsibilities 
(save, indeed, for undesirable financial ones in connection with 
regimental institutions) than he had twenty years ago — and his 
emoluments (out of India) in that period will have risen from 
£\QO to ;f 300 per annum ! 

A system in which one company of a battalion may be com- 
manded by Major A., with over twenty years' service, and another 
alongside, in barracks and in the field, by Lieutenant B., with 
under two, would appear on the face of it to have something wrong 
with it. This state of affairs will, I think, be admitted to be the 
rule rather than the exception, and, moreover, it is not calculated 
to inspire confidence and respect in the rank and file, who might 
be inclined in the one case to despise the senior for not having a 
higher position after so much service, and in the other to mistrust 
a system that places their military training in the bands of one so 

So much then for the drawbacks of our present infantry 
organisation. The question now arises : what is, or what are, the 
remedies ? I think the introduction of a double company system 
would meet some of the requirements, and would at all events 
tend to mitigate the evils of the want of initiative and resource 
complained of. 

In a former paper I put forward some arguments in favour of 
dividing, for purposes of field organisation, all units by three, and 
I propose to stick to this plan and show how it could be adapted 
in the case of the smaller infantry units. Working on this premise 
an infantry battalion would be divided into three companies, and 
each company subdivided as follows : — 

3 sections in a company. 

3 subsections in a section. 

3 groups in a subsection. 

6 men (three in front and three in the rear rank) in each group. 


This would give a strength of private soldiers of— 

6x3x3x32 162 

Then as regards non-commissioned officers I would have — 

I corporal or lance-corporal as group-leader to each 

group ••• ••• ••• ••! ••• •.. ,,, 27 

I sergeant or lance-sergeant to each subsection ... 9 

I company sergeant-major | f^^ ,^^ ^^^^ ^ 

I company quarter-master-sergeantJ 


For supernumeraries — 

I drummer \ 

I signaller > to each section 9 

I pioneer ) 
For machine-gun I company ammunition reserve, and 
transport, a section consisting of— 

I sergeant \ 

I corporal / ••• ... ••• ... ... •>. 10 

8 men ) 
As to officers, there would be — 

I major, commanding \ 

I captain, second in command > ... 5 ' 

3 lieutenants * (each commanding a section) ) 

Total of all ranks ... 224 

This organisation would, I am of opinion, provide a very handy 
unit for work in the field, and with a mounted officer in command, 
should not be too large for one man to control, even with the great 
extension and dispersion necessitated by the conditions of modem 
warfare. The colonel commanding a battalion would only have 
three units to supervise and give orders to instead of eight — an 
obvious advantage and one which would be much appreciated by 
the battalion adjutant ! 

Similarly in the company, the field officer in command would 
have, as a rule, an experienced officer to assist him in the captain, 
and would have three units commanded by officers to handle. I 
maintain this is preferable to the present system of half companies 
and sections, where the subalterns on the one hand seldom have 
opportunity to exercise their half companies independently, and 
where experienced section leaders are more often conspicuous by 
their absence than the reverse. As regards non-commissioned 
officers, it may be contended that the proportion indicated for the 
double company, viz. 40 for a total of 180 privates, or slightly over 
22 per cent, is excessive compared with the present establishment 
of 5 sergeants and 6 lance-corporals to 95 privates, i.e. 17 per cent., 
but I am sure the extra advantages of greater control, more 

* Second lieutenants on probation could be attached for instruction in number as 
migbt be required. 


personal supervision, and increased efficiency in training and 
instruction that would be gained by the additional 5 per cent of 
non-commissioned officers, would more than compensate for the 
extra expense involved. Has not every company commander in 
our service suflfered at times in the training of his company from 
paucity of non-commissioned officers and had to resort to the 
selection of old soldiers, etc., for the command of groups, scouts, 
patrols, etc., thus thinning the ranks, possibly already depleted by 
sickness, garrison, or regimental employ, etc., and consequently 
lessening the " fire power " of his command. 

Another distinct advantage, and a most important one of the 
double company system, is the provision of senior non-commissioned 
officers for the company staff. In lieu of the present much 
overworked and harassed colour-sergeant there would be the 
following : — 

(/i) A company sergeant-major to assist the company commander in the 
training and instruction of the company in drill, field work, musketry, and to 
supervise the discipline in barracks and in the field. 

{fi) A company quartermaster-sergeant to act as pay-sergeant, and be 
responsible for the welfare of the company as regards clothing, rations, barracks, 
tents, etc. On service and in the field this non-commissioned officer might be 
placed in charge of the company transport. 

(0 A sergeant to be in charge of the company machine-gun, and of the 
company ammunition reserve. 

ifi) A corporal to assist the company quartermaster-sergeant generally, and 
with especial regard to the company transport. 

I do not think it would be necessary to have non-commissioned 
officers in the double company to take charge of signallers, pioneers, 
and drummers — these would be found on the battalion staflf. 

Let us now consider briefly how the introduction of the double 
company system would affect the battalion, and what changes in 
the present organisation would be involved. 

1. I think the formation of a fourth, or reserve, company would 
be a necessity. It could be commanded by a captain, and would 
be composed of the band, regimental and garrison employed men, 
such as police, cooks, orderlies, etc, and the members of the 
battalion staff would be attached. The reserve company would 
accompany the battalion on active service, and form a base dep6t 
In peace time it would not accompany the battalion at manoeuvres, 
nor receive any training other than musketry. At peace manoeuvres 
the members of the battalion staff might be divided amongst the 
three service companies for purposes of discipline, rations, and 

2. Owing to the decentralisation attained by the double 
company system, the position and work of the lieutenant-colonel 


commandiog would be more akin to that of a lieutenant-colonel 
commanding an artilleiy brigade. His position would be en- 
hanced, and at the same time he would be relieved of a vast 
amount of responsibility and routine duties which at present 
absorb so much of an infantry commanding officer's time. In fact, 
to carry out conscientiously all the duties imposed on an infantry 
commanding officer by the existing regulations and instructions is 
almost a physical impossibility. 

3. The appointment of second-in-command might well be 
dispensed with, but the establishment of three majors as company 
commanders should be rigidly adhered to, and the anomaly of not 
allowing majors to be seconded for extra regimental employment, 
but of replacing them by extra captains should disappear. 

4. The work of both adjutant and quartermaster would be 
much less — the former would be relieved of all instruction of 
recruits (now to be done entirely in the company), and might also 
be relieved of pay duties. The latter would have a great portion 
of his present work done in the companies by the company quarter- 
master-sei^eant. Upon the other hand, those regimental institutions 
and shops, etc., that must be kept up, might be in charge of the 
adjutant and quartermaster respectively. The former officer would 
have charge of the band, and in fact his work and duties would be 
(a) in the field, that of orderly officer and galloper, {b) in the office, 
that of staff officer to his colonel. 

5. The battalion staff would consist of : — 






Provost- sergeant 

Battalion sergeant-major 


Battalion quartermaster-sergeant 



Sergeant-master tailor 


6. In order to avoid the three service companies of a battalion 
on home service becoming mere training schools for recruits, and 
the time and energies of the company commander, his officers and 
non-commissioned officers being too much occupied on the barrack 
square and in elementary instruction, I would advocate that the 
period spent by a recruit at the dep6t be considerably lengthened, 
and his instruction proportionately increased. If it could be 
arranged for a recruit to be instructed at the dep6t for periods of not 
less than four months,* with liability to be kept there for eight or 

^ My own experience with recruits at the depdt, led me to the conclusion that the 
regulation twelve weeks represents as long a period as can be profitably spent in so 
elementary a school. I found that recruits who just missed one draft did not advance 


tveelve months, and then sent to join the service battalion in batches 
three times a year, it would be possible to greatly minimise these 
disadvantages. Each service company would then get a batch of 
recruits once a year only, and it might be arranged also for time 
expired men to leave the colours in batches at stated periods 
instead of by driblets as at present 

7. Lastly, I would put in a plea for increase of pay to the 
regimental officer serving at home or in the colonies. Under the 
double company system the work and responsibility of the company 
commander will be greatly increased, and, therefore, it seems only 
fair that his emoluments should be correspondingly raised. By the 
abolition of the second-in-command and the reduction in the 
number of captains from six to three, no great extra expense 
would be involved by giving each of the three field officers in 
command of companies the higher rate of pay quoted in paragraph 
218 of the Royal Warrant, viz. i&. per diem, plus command pay 
at i^. per diem, this latter to be drawn by the captain for periods 
of absence of the major for any cause exceeding one month (as 
now in vogue in India). But even this slight increase of pay only 
means an income (exclusive of allowances) of slightly over ;f 300 
per annum, which can hardly be considered a handsome remunera- 
tion for an officer who has given the best twenty years of his life to 
the service of the State. 

J. L. J. Clarke. 

much beyond the usual twelve weeks' standard during the interval before the departure 
of the draft that followed. For improvement beyond a certain stage, the recruit requires 
to be exercised with fully trained soldiers. The real difficulty is that, as a rule, recruits 
are very badly instructed at the dep6ts ; they are rarely taught anything but ^r///— ood 
even that most imperfectly. — Ed. U. S. M. 

By Lieut.-Colonel F. N. Maude, late R.E. 


The Campaign of Ulm, 1805 {continued). 

Returning to the concentration of the Grand Army, which may 
be considered as complete on the 26th September. The rapid 
marching had told on all the troops. There had been much 
desertion coming through France, and the Cavalry and mounted 
arms not being able to forage, as in an enemy's country, had lost 
condition materially. 

Marmont's Corps, coming from Holland down the Rhine, had 
started short of horses, and though contracts had been entered 
into for supplying them along the line of march, the contractors 
were not very punctual in the carrying out of their engagements. 

Boots had been worn to pieces over the four hundred miles of 
country already traversed, and the new ones ordered to be in 
readiness at the frontiers had not yet arrived. Great-coats and 
other clothing were also deficient, and, as already mentioned, only 
six out of thirty brigades of transport were on hand. 

By the side of the whole list of deficiencies, the position of the 
French in almost the same districts, in 1870, seems comparatively 
luxurious, for each division then had more transport th^n one of 
Napoleon's Corps ; but the energy which compels obedience was 
lacking, with results familiar to all, and surely this energy, which 
overcomes all difficulties, gives a higher title to our admiration 
than the intellectual ability needed to solve war's very simple 
problems. "Im Kriege ist alles einfach — aber das einfache is 
schwer," wrote Clausewitz, which merely means that the wise 
commander adopts the simplest plan for the attainment of his 
purpose, because even then the difficulties of execution will tax 
his energy to the utmost. 

The condition of the Austrian Army at the outbreak of 
hostilities deserves more than a passing reference. Though her 
men had fought bravely enough, and fully justified the methods 

VOL. CL. jQ 



of their training regimentally, ten years of warfare with the 
balance very decidedly against them had seriously undermined the 
confidence of all ranks, and completely destroyed it as regards 
the civilian ministers. Every one was clamouring for reform, of 
course, on French lines, just as in England at the present moment 
the public are looking for salvation to the Boer meUiods ; and, alike 
in both cases, no attention whatever is, or was, paid to the advice 
of experienced soldiers who recognised the absence of the essential 
" driving force," which alone conditioned Boer or French successes. 

As I have already shown, "mobility" was the key-note of 
French efficiency. This mobility was derived from an almost entire 
absence of supply arrangements ; and this want of organised supply 
brought in its train a whole host of evils, even in an army having 
in its ranks a far higher average of intelligence and patriotism 
than were obtainable under the existing conditions of enrolment in 
any country in Europe. 

The civilians saw only the success ; the soldiers, who had done 
the fighting, alone realised the price at which it was bought, and 
were able to appreciate the consequences which blind imitation 
might bring in its train. Since, however, reform there had to be, 
they cast about for some one to carry it through. And to find such 
a man, they had to go outside the charmed circle of hereditary 
caste influence ; which in Austria, as elsewhere, taken as a whole, 
was conservative to the verge of imbecility. The Archduke 
Charles, though undoubtedly a man of conspicuous ability, was 
after all a creature of his time, and sought salvation mainly in the 
strategic shibboleths in which he had been trained ; though to do 
him justice, he could generally throw them overboard when the 
time came for decisive action ; and, of course, his followers, without 
his ability, were many times more narrow-minded than he. Good 
men of action, they had all been taught to fear, not accept, 
responsibility ; and with such men as leaders, not even Napoleon 
could have guaranteed success. 

The need for action was, however, imperative. Russia, backed 
by England, was clamouring for her decision, and since the Arch- 
duke refused to write anything but most despondent memoirs, the 
civilian ministers fixed their eyes upon a man whose previous 
career, extraordinary diligence, and apparent disregard of 
difficulties gave promise, to them, of brilliant success. But 
diligence is not synomymous with ability ; and a disregard ol 
difficulties, even when united with undeniable personal courage in 
face of the enemy as a young man, does not necessarily imply 
indomitable strength of character in riper years when in chief 


This man, whom they destined to be the country's saviour, was 
the unfortunate '' Mack," upon whose unlucky shoulders it is still 
the custom to fasten the burden of the sins of omission accumulated 
by a whole previous generation, too careless and pleasure loving to 
view war as it really was, and is — the struggle for the survival of the 

He had risen from the ranks, and made a most brilliant career, 
all the more remarkable when we consider the intense caste spirit 
of the Austrian nobility. But his industry and fatal facility of the 
pen had attracted the attention of the Emperor, and when it was 
found that he was ready to recast the whole army, almost in face 
of the enemy, his services were eagerly accepted. 

It must be admitted that his ideas were not bad. The needs 
of the moment were mobility, Artillery, and Corps commands. To 
secure mobility, he laid down that troops must live on the country, 
like the French, then they could dispense with at least one half of 
their trains, and the horses thus set free could be handed over to 
the Artillery. His idea of Corps commands was less satisfactory, 
for, as the event proved, he did not in the least understand what a 
Corps was, or what decentralisation means. To make a Corps or 
divisional command efficient, you must first have a staif trained to 
accept responsibility ; to invert the process, is merely to make 
confusion worse confounded. But there were no officers in Austria, 
trained to responsibility, and hence Army Headquarters still had to 
issue detailed orders to every battalion — the system which liad cost 
them, as previously explained, the defeats of 1796 and 1800 in Italy. 

The evil of the recourse to requisitions lay in this, that you 
cannot alter the spirit of a whole army merely by the publication 
of a general order — a point too frequently forgotten. It was all 
very well to tell the men to steal and rob, for that is, of course,, 
what it comes to in the end ; but the same men had been brought 
up to an altogether exaggerated conception of the rights of private 
property in the field, and needed a senior officer to stand over 
them, and tell them both when and what to steal, and how tO' 
find it. f 

With the French, plunder had become an instinct of self- 
preservation. Like Sikhs in an Afghan village, they knew exactly 
where to look and how to persuade ; they could suck more nutriment 
out of a square mile of ground than any other troops in Europe^ 
and they had as little sympathy with the poor Bavarian, or German> 
as the Afghan for the Hindoo. But the bulk of the Austrians were 
of German extraction, and, as such, more inclined to pity than to 
beat the unfortunate villagers upon whom they were directed to 



Ultimately things were brought into train. The Archduke was 
almost compelled to take a more hopeful view, and a plan of 
operations was mutually agreed to by Russia and Austria, according 
to which the former agreed to join the latter with 100,000 men on 
the river Inn about the middle of October ; and the Austrians 
undertook to operate with their main army south of the Alps, 
under the Archduke, and with a smaller force of 80,000 men 
between the Alps and Danube. A further army was to be 
mobilised by Russia, primarily to bring diplomatic pressure on 
Prussia to join the coalition, but ultimately to advance through 
Bohemia into the north of Bavaria, and it was the news of this 
concentration, somewhat distorted in transmission, that led Napoleon 
at the very outset of his movement {i,e, on the 26th August) to 
direct his troops from Boulogne and the Netherlands further north 
than orginally intended, towards Wurzburg. Generally, the plan 
may be described as an advance in echelon of armies from the left 

Mack was appointed what we should now call " Chief of the 
Staff"* to the Army of the Centre, responsible directly to the 
'Emperor, and the Archduke Ferdinand, aged twenty-five, was 
•sent with him, practically as the Emperor's representative, though 
nominally in chief command. It having been determined that the 
army was to live by requisition, it became necessary to assign it a 
district, other than their own country, upon which to live, and this, 
together with the desire to secure the support of the Bavarian 
Army, led to Ihe premature advance towards the Iller. But, as 
already stated, the Bavarian Army escaped, and the Austrians 
vdid not [take naturally to requisitioning, and thus from the very 
beginning an excessive strain was thrown on such transport as 
existed, which rapidly broke down under the strain of the terrible 
weather, from which both armies suffered. Hence the mobility of 
the^AustrJans fell off to an unusual extent, whilst similar sufferings 
from' hunger were inspiring their "enemy with almost wolf-like 
energy and celerity. The French knew from experience that 
forward movement could alone supply their necessities ; the 
Austrians from experience looked backward for their supply 
columns. This contrast must be borne in mind in judging the 
almost unexampled slowness of the Austrian manoeuvres. 

Reverting now to the actual course of the campaign, Napoleon's 
progress, from the date his Cavalry patrols picked up contact with 
the enemy, followed naturally and logically from the reports he 
received. Finding his right opposed whilst his left was clear, 
he checked the pace of the former and let the latter swing round, 

* His title then was ** Quartermaster-General." 


closing them to meet resistance, extending them again for 
subsistence ; but only regulating their marches as far in advance 
as it was safe to do so — precisely as all modem authorities advise 
— ^and not till the information received made it perfectly clear that 
the Russians could not interfere, did he conceive the idea of 
crossing the Danube and interposing between the separated portions 
of his enemy's front 

He certainly did not foresee Mack's continued inaction, for he 
was quite unaware of the motives which dictated it, and as these 
have never to my knowledge been presented in an English garb, 
it may not be amiss to enlarge upon them, as they certainly place 
Mack's conduct in a far better aspect than it has hitherto been 

Mack, it appears, had been seriously misled by the accounts of 
the Austrian secret agents in France, who had represented the 
whole condition of the country far more unfavourably than turned 
out to be the case ; and in particular, had underrated the strength 
of the Grand Army by nearly one half ; and since the French had 
generally disseminated false information on this head before, he had 
no reason to doubt the statement he received. 

Further, he had been led by his own Government to believe 
that England meditated an immediate diversion, both naval and 
militarj-, on Boulogne ; and he actually received information very 
early in October that this attack had been successfully undertaken. 
Since England had been foremost in urging on the war, and such 
a diversion was obviously sound in principle, he, as a soldier^ 
may be pardoned if he failed to fathom the depths of fatuous 
imbecility of which a civilian ministry is capable. Gordon was not 
the first, and will not be the last, brave man to be betrayed by his 
confidence in ministerial honour. 

Lastly, when the news of the violation of Prussian neutrality, by 
the passage of French troops through the territory of Ansbach, 
reached him, as it did in a very few hours after the event, he 
believed, and very naturally, that the Lord had really delivered his 
enemy into his hands. He knew the temper of the Prussian Army 
well, and was aware that every officer's hands were itching to draw 
their swords, and since even the King of Prussia's own wife failed 
to grasp the full extent of poltroonery that unfortunate monarch 
was capable of, he can hardly be blamed for a similar error of 


Now let us reconstruct the strategical problem as it appeared 
to him at the moment when Napoleon's left wing and centre were 
sweeping down on the Danube on his rear. 

His rear was the Russian front, and the Russian Army was to 


be about ioo,cxx> strong, and due on the Ino, only eighty miles 
away, about the 20th October. 

If the Russians advanced whilst he. Mack, stood still, he 
became the anvil on which the Russian hammer would crush the 
Grand Army. And as it happened, he had to stand still, because he 
had eaten up all the supplies in the district he had traversed, as the 
French were soon to discover to their cost, and could not have 
retreated even had he desired to do so. 

He had, however, under-estimated several points. First, he had 
not allowed for the extraordinary marching power the Frendi 
actually developed, nor on their peculiar talents for extracting 
nutriment out of places where his own men had starved ; and finally, 
he had counted on the punctual arrival of the Russians, as of 
•course, he had every right to do. 

These were his military external miscalculations ; but others, 
social and internal to the Army, were still to come and were 
rapidly developing. The Army, accustomed to regular magazine 
supply, felt the hardships requisitioning entailed very severely— far 
more so than the French, who were used to the system, and knew 
too well the futility of complaint The men grumbled to their 
officers, the officers took the part of the men, and finally the 
generals carried all their woes to the Archduke's entourage, who, 
in turn, were only too glad to have a handle of offence against the 
underbred ranker upstart, and under these influences the Arch- 
duke began to turn restive. To put a stop to these evils, which 
threatened to make command impossible. Mack determined to 
reorganise the Army, redistributing the regiments amongst all the 
-corps, and rearranging these to get the controlling power into 
better hands. In referring to this reorganisation, M. Colin is 
hardly fair to the general, for he represents the step as merely 
taken as an idle whim, to gratify Mack's imaginary passion for 
interference ; and throughout he takes the part of the young Prince, 
who, to my mind, appears to have played the part of an intractable 
young prig, lending a ready ear to all Mack's detractors, and 
ignoring the responsibilities which the Emperor had imposed on 
the latter, together with the respect undoubtedly due to his riper 
experience. The situation was, in fact, closely analogous to, 
though even more difficult, than Bazaine's position vis^-vis with the 
Imperial Staff in Metz, and it seems astonishing that M. Colin can 
have overlooked the resemblance. 

This reorganisation consumed very nearly a week of "^^V 
precious time, and meanwhile reports were pouring in that left no 
room for doubt as to Napoleon's crushing numerical preponderance, 
or of its almost inexplicably rapid approach. The position of 


anvil to the Russian hammer was clearly no longer tenable ; 
but Mack still thought^ very much as Nelson had done at sea 
during his long continued chases of Villeneuve, that, however 
great the odds, he would still be able to inflict sufficient punish- 
ment on his adversary to keep him quiet for the remainder of the 
season, and calculated that under all circumstances — of supply, 
dissatisfaction in the Army, etc. — he would be able to hit harder with 
a force recuperated by rest, than with one exhausted by hard 
marching and scanty food, and it might have been well had he 
stuck to this decision. At the last moment, however, the French 
gave him an opening he would have been almost more than 
human to have resisted. They left the whole of^the north bank of 
the Danube bare, and there was nothing to prevent Mack's retreat 
right across their lines of communication towards Bohemia and the 
Saxon frontier, where he might well count, not only on the support 
of the second Russian Army, but on a most friendly reception 
from the whole of the north Germans including Prussia, whose 
orders for mobilisation were, in fact, already issued.* 

This opening arose from a misconception on the part of 
Napoleon of his adversary's position and frame of mind, quite as 
much at variance with the real facts, as any of which the unfortunate 
Mack was guilty. He had formed a fixed idea, almost from the 
moment of his passage of the Danube, that the Austrians would 
try and escape by marching south towards lake Constanz and the 
Tyrol, and was urging on Soult by forced marches to intercept this 
line of retreat 

Actually, though a small force under Jellachich did make its 
escape, not without heavy losses, by this route, the idea of taking 
the whole Army out by this way had never entered Mack's head, 
who knew only too well the want of resources in that district But 
curiously, the news of the fighting in which Jellachich's force became 
engaged, served only to confirm him in his decision to march out to 
the north-east The idea sprang quite naturally from the false 
information he had already received, and deserves, to my mind, 
far more serious consideration than has been accorded to it 

Though Mack by this time knew that the strength of the Grand 
Army had been falsely reported to him, he still firmly believed in 
the British diversion at Boulogne and rumoured risings in France. 
When, therefore, he learnt of the French movement towards the 
west — Soult, of course, had attacked from the east — he pictured to 
himself Napoleon in full retreat back to France, by the only line on 

• I cannot trace whether this was actually known to Mack at the time ; but there 
was free Communication with Ulm and the Prussian frontier, which was not more than a 
day's ride distant, and hence may well have been the case. 


which he could hope to find adequate subsistence, for his devastation 
of the country to the north was by this time common knowledge 
to all south Germany. 

With his own Army in its semi-mutinous ph'ght (i>. as regards 
its commanders), he could not hope to oppose successfully the on- 
set of the whole French Army, and hence his resolution to move 
towards Prussia was strengthened, not shaken, by the rapidity of 
Soult's movements. He issued a general order to his troops in 
which he stated that the French were in full retreat for their own 
country, and whilst still maintainhig secrecy as to his proposed 
movement, led them to understand that stirring events were toward, 
and arranged for a general concentration around Ulm. Read by 
the light of subsequent events, the order appears bombastic ; but I 
have little doubt that had success crowned his efforts, we should 
now be as lost in admiration of his skilful concealment of his 
intentions and soldierlike appeal to raise the drooping spirits of 
his men, as we are taught to be over NapoIeon*s infinitely ex- 
aggerated bulletins announcing victory to his troops before the 
battle. Compare, for instance, the orders issued on the nights 
preceding Austerlitz and Jena, and think how these would have 
been held up to ridicule had not the events justified the 

Historians always forget that secrecy is the very essence of a 
successful stratagem, and that no word of despondency or retreat 
should be allowed to leak out in preliminary orders. A small 
Army confronted by a larger one, must always be at a great dis- 
advantage if defeated, and the confidence the leader shows in the 
fighting spirit of his Army is simply a measure of the strength of 
his character. Rewrite Napoleon's pre-Jena order of the day io 
accordance with the facts as we now know them. '' Soldiers, 
during the last three days I have lost the Prussian Army and 
found part of it again where I did not expect it ; where the other 
part may be, or how large a fraction it is of the whole, I know as 
little as you do. But of the following facts I am absolutely certain. 
There is a hostile barren and mountainous frontier ten miles 
behind us, and our only possible retreat lies through some 500 
miles of country which we have stripped bare of every resource, 
and whose inhabitants will cut up every single straggler they can 
possibly lay hands on. The issue of the battle lies in your courage 
and determination, and if you do not do your duty better than I 
have done mine, 'we shall never see our darlings any more.'" 
Such an order would, I take it, hardly have conduced to victory, 
yet that is about what Mack's critics, after the event, would have 
had him produce before it. 


Ultimately, on the loth October, the decision was taken to 
march north on the following day, and the troops moved out next 
morning ; but the terrible weather had rendered roads, normally 
reliable, almost entirely impracticable. A whole stretch overhang- 
ing the Danube gave way under the passage of the guns, and 
a number, with their teams and limbers, crashed over into the 
swollen river beneath. The fields were almost swamps, and hours 
were consumed in covering distances which usually might have 
been traversed in minutes. At length the right wing fell suddenly 
upon Duponfs Division, peacefully encamped near Albeck, and, 
apparently, completely surprised it Something like a stampede 
resulted ; but the Austrians were in too great disorder, owing to 
the lengthening of their columns, to take advantage of it, and a 
remnant of the French being rallied, still held on to some ground 
in the vicinity when night put an end to the struggle, thus enabling 
Dupont, who had not studied the art of despatch writing under 
his great master for nothing, to claim a victory. The Austrians, 
leaving a few outposts in observation, fell back about halfway to 

Then followed, on the part of the French, a series of Staff* 
blunders and miscalculations as to the time of the delivery of 
orders, far too intricate to unravel in the space at my disposal, but 
the upshot of which was to leave the Austrians in undisputed 
possession of the north bank for the two following days. Un- 
fortunately for them, they were in no case to profit by the 

On the 14th, the French had corrected their errors, and Ney 
was marching in all haste with his whole corps for Elchingen. 
The place was weakly held by the Austrians at the moment, and 
by a most brilliant piece of daring, the bridge was captured and 
troops poured over it before the Austrians, already on their way 
since early morning, could arrive. A very obstinate fight ensued, 
ending, as usual, in the defeat of the Austrians — a defeat directly 
traceable to the growing spirit of mutiny amongst the leaders. 

* It is usual to seek to fasten the responsibility for these failures either on Ney or 
Murat, according to the writer's sympathies ; to me it seems merely a case of indifferent 
staff training and want of proper precautions — sending one officer to deliver several orders 
and the like. Actually, the important order had only about five miles to traverse, and 
the steeple of the village where it should have been delivered was clearly visible from 
the point of despatch, the intervening country being perfectly practicable ; but the officer 
by whom it was despatched, not being informed of its contents and having several others 
to deliver as well, chose to take it on his way back, lost his way in the Danube morass 
in the dark, and ultimately found himself within three miles of his destination at daybreak, 
but unable to get there without going back to his starting-point and making the road he 
should have taken the first time. 


Mack, in his defence, states that, on news of the attack being 
received^ the Archduke left headquarters without giving him notice, 
taking with him the bulk of the Staff, and obstinately kept at a 
distance of a couple of leagues from him all day, giving orders and 
interfering in the details of the fight Nevertheless, though locally 
defeated at Elchingen, one half the Army only had been engaged, 
and the remainder, under Wemeck, halted outside the radius of 
French observation, continuing its movement towards Neresheim 
next morning, and there would seem still to have been a good 
chance for the bulk of the Army at least to withdraw. But at this 
point the strength of men and horses gave out Though there 
was still food in Ulm, only about seven miles distant, it was as 
impossible to get at it, as it was for our troops oi the Plateau of 
the Crimea to traverse the two miles of mud which lay between 
them and their ships in Balaclava. Moreover, intrigue and dis- 
sension in the higher ranks had done its work, and all discipline 
above the company commands had disappeared. 

Wemeck still struggled on for two days further, and was joined 
by some Cuirassiers with the young Archduke by the way ; these 
latter succeeded in making good their escape, but the Infantry, 
worn out by hunger and pursued by Murat with his usual relent- 
less enei^, ultimately allowed themselves to be deceived by the 
false statements of French Parlementaires, and laid down their anus 
to a force they believed to be overwhelming, but which actually 
consisted only, as has been already stated, of the stragglers of the 
dismounted dragoons left behind to protect the convoys on the 
lines of communication. 

We need not pursue the fate of the garrison of Ulm and its 
unfortunate commander further, it is sufficiently well known in its 
outlines to every one. The only points calling for attention are 
the persistent faith in Russian promises, revealed in Mack's effort 
to secure fourteen days' delay in the actual surrender, and the 
treachery by which this clause, after being admitted, was finally 
evaded by the conqueror. All may be fair in love and war, but 
such acts of perfidy leave an unpleasant savour after all. 

The point on which to fix one's attention is, after all, the 
bearing of these events on the general principles of war as taught 
in our schools, and from this standpoint I fail to perceive any 
foundation for the deductions so freely drawn. That 200,000 men 
under a brilliant leader, trusted by his men as no commander 
before or since, should beat 80,000 under an average man, who 
started with the feeling of his Army against him, seems to me a 
foregone conclusion. Why then drag in theories as to angular 
bases, the line of the Main, and so forth, to account for the obvious ? 


But the fact that in spite of all adverse circumstances these 80,000 
very nearly did escape from the toils of the 200,000, seems to me 
conclusive proof of the superiority of troops bred up in tradition of 
hereditary and regimental discipline over the looser organisation 
of revolutionary France. 

F. N. Maude. 

{To be contimtzd.) 


By Colonel H. C Wvlly, C.B., late Sherwood Foresters. 

I AM aware that in restricting myself to ''small columns/' I am 
terribly out of the fashioa : from the days when I was a boy of 
eighteen at Sandhurst up to the present time, anybody who has 
tried in any way to instruct officers alwa3rs deals with Army Corps, 
but I thought it would be more interesting if I dealt with nothing 
larger than a brigade — such a force as certainly any field officer 
might at any time, through the fortune of war, be called upon to 

I propose, then, first to ask the reader to accompany the ist 
Brigade of the Tirah Field Force in a week's excursion into the 
Bazar Valley. The starting-point is Jumrood, at the mouth of 
the Khyber Pass» about ten miles west from Peshawar. The 
composition of the brigade — ^some 3650 fighting men in all— is as 
follows : — 

3 Battalions British Infantry. 
2 Regiments Native Infantr)'. 
I Native Mountain Battery Royal Artillery. 
I Company Bengal Sappers and Miners. 
I Battalion Madras Pioneers. 
I British Field HospitaL 
I Natixx Field HospitaL 
Se\\:n days* rations were taken by the brigade and, in addition, 
three da\V rations were in regimental charge. 

There is a cart-road from Jumrood to Ali Musjid — ^about ten 
miles within the Khyber — but from thence onwards the brigade 
could only move by the merest tracks, consequently only pack 
tHdinsport cvHiId be taken. Generally speaking, only two classes of 
tran$}»rt animals are used on the Indian Frontier — the mule and 
the camel. Of these I suppose all of us who have had anything 
to dv) with either will agree with me that nothing can beat that 
^rand little animol-of-all-work — the mule ; in spite of the fact that 
his K\id is a small one, and that he has to cany his own rations as 
well AS thi^se of the fighting mea The brigade was altogether 


equipped with mule transport ; but when you remember that a 
battalion of British infantry — one unit of the brigade — requires 
nearly 400 mules to itself ; that the total number of pack animals 
on charge of the brigade would amount to something like 4000 ; 
when you realise that, in addition to the large number of ordinary 
followers, there is one driver to every three mules, or a rough 
total of 2500 followers; and when you understand that all this 
long and ever lengthening line of transport and unarmed men has 
to be guarded throughout its march on a narrow track from camp 
to camp in an enemy's country, one begins to have some concep- 
tion of the enormous difficulties and anxieties which beset a column 
commander on the Indian Frontier. 

Fortunately for the brigade, its difficulties did not begin at 
once ; between Jumrood and Ali Musjid the road was picquetted 
by other troops, and by those of the Khyber Rifles whom self- 
interest or tribal jealousies had kept faithful when their fellow- 
tribesmen broke out. Christmas Eve 1897, the brigade spent in 
bivouac in the bed of the Khyber stream under Fort Ali Musjid 
(which was then again permanently held by us) and consequently 
only a very few insignificant picquets were necessary on the 
neighbouring heights. Even then, however, the sniper was not to 
be denied his usual evening amusement, and one of them managed 
to creep through our picquets and shoot a man of the Sussex 
Regiment through that portion of his body which it is considered 
equally indecorous to present either to a friend or an enemy ! 

The next day's march was believed to be quite a short one, 
but the road was little known. The path led over the low spurs 
and under-features of the very steep, lofty, and, in many places, 
precipitous heights which flanked it on the right for the first six 
miles up to a village called Alachi. But few of the tribesmen 
had modern rifles — perhaps 40 per cent, of the fighting men were 
thus armed— and the crest of the line of heights must have been 
at least 2000 yards from the path along which the column moved ; 
but these heights had to be picquetted and held by a battalion 
while the column moved below. On the left of our advance were 
the low foothills and broken ground fringing on the Peshawar 
Valley, and here, too, any points commanding the path had to be 
picquetted and held. Until the nearer at least of these picquets 
were in position, it was manifestly useless, or at least unwise, for 
the bulk of the transport — viz. that not in charge of units — to 
make a start It may be taken as a good general rule — which I 
. make a present of to anybody who cares to note such details — that 
it takes roughly one hour for 500 pack animals to get out of a 
camp or to pass a given point on a hill path ; so that no very 


elaborate calculation is necessary to see that die bulk of the trans- 
port, its escort, and the rear-guard could not possibly reach thdr 
intended destination before dark. 

As a matter of fact, the head c^ the column was delayed by a 
little desultory opposition in the village of Alachi and again on 
arriving at its bivouac at a place called Karamna ; so the O.C 
battalion of Gurkhas, which was guarding the baggage, made up 
his mind early in the afternoon that he would not attempt to push 
on to camp. Accordingly, about 4 p.m., he called a halt, closed up 
and parked his transport, put out picquets and settled down for 
the night, having only reached a distance of little more than two 
miles from the previous night's bivouac! As far as I can re- 
member, this party was quite unmolested during the night, whereas 
had it struggled on to camp in the dark, the tribesmen would have 
been offered such an opportunity as they most delight in. It is an 
axiom on the frontier that night marches — particularly with convoys 
-^should very rarely be undertaken, and that if a commander finds 
himself in any degree likely to be overtaken by darkness on the 
march, he should halt early and make himself snug before night 
comes on. There are innumerable instances in border warfare 
where a neglect of this rule has led to disaster, while over and 
over again even quite small parties have successfully and without 
much loss held out for the night in isolated positions,* merely from 
having decided during daylight upon the posts they meant to 
occupy and the dispositions necessary for their defence. 

Early next morning four British and four Native infantry com- 
panies were sent back to picquet the hills and help in the transport 
with its escort : these all reached camp by midday. 

I must now give some description of the bivouac of the brigade 
and of the dispositions which were made for its protection. The 
place was a large open valley, its greatest length 2\ miles, its 
greatest width perhaps 3000 yards. It was necessary to find 
no fewer than ten strong picquets— hardly one of less strength 
than a half company — and some of these were 1800 yards distant 
from camp and 600 feet or more above it These picquets were 
necessarily terribly isolated, and from their situation it follows that 
it was practically impossible to support or reinforce them. Strict 
orders were given that all picquets were to make themselves 

* Lieut.-Colonel Hanghton's action during the retirement from the Waran Valley on 
the 1 6th November, 1897 ; and Major Downman's stand, three miles from camp, with 
350 rifles of the Gordons, Dorsets, 2nd Gurkhas, and 2nd Punjaub Infantry, composing 
the rear-guard of the 2nd Division in the Bara Valley on the nth of the foUowing 


absolutely secure against any rush, and all perfectly well under- 
stood that whatever happened they had to " stick it out." I cannot 
call to mind any single instance in modem border warfare of a 
picquet being overwhelmed, while the question of "surrender" 
does not of course admit of any consideration, when its one possible 
result would be instant death, followed — or possibly preceded — by 
a horrible mutilation. 

There is a matter connected with the increased distance at 
which picquets must now be placed from the force they are pro- 
tecting, and that is in reference to the responsibilities of " the field 
officer of the day " as to their posting and visiting. The duties of 
the field officer of the day have in these respects become, I submit, 
very greatly narrowed. I do not think that it is any longer always 
possible for the field officer personally to see and correct the 
positions of all the various picquets. I do not believe it to be 
practicable, under modem conditions, for him to go round them 
systematically by day, and I am certain that it is not possible and 
that it is in every way undesirable that he should visit them by 
night It should, I submit, be understood that anybody who with- 
out notice approaches a picquet by night is an enemy, and he should 
be shot down without challenge. 

The march of the 26th December was only three miles to a 
place called Burg: the distance was of course absurd, but the 
road was awful : it led the whole way through a rocky defile, with 
only just room for the stream and a narrow boulder-strewn path 
between the high walls of rock which rose up precipitously on 
either hand. All the Sappers and the Pioneer Battalion had gone 
forward by daylight to picquet the pass and to make the road at 
Jeast passable for the mules. At midday — when, as I have 
mentioned, the last of the convoy was coming into camp — the road 
was reported fit for pack animals, and a start was made to pass 
them along. It was 7.30 P.M. before the last of the transport had 
entered the defile and 10 P.M. before the rear-guard reached Burg. 
The ten picquets all round the camp were left out until the baggage 
was clear, and their withdrawal was anything but an easy task, 
when you remember that it had to be done in the dark ; that the 
picquets were all so placed as to support each other ; and that some 
of them took upwards of an hour to reach the valley from their 

Burg, where the brigade remained two days, was an easier 
place to picquet, in that the valley was not so wide and the sur- 
rounding hills rose more steeply from the level, but the number 
and strength of the picquets did not admit of much reduction in the 
numbers of the men employed. 


Soon after daybreak on the 28th the brigade began to retrace 
its steps, and M once the enemy became h'vely. The rear end of 
the Burg defile had been seized by us before day broke, and four 
mountain-guns with a company of infantry placed on a hill which 
commanded the greater part of the pass. Directly the Buig 
picquets began to retire, the enemy opened fire from all command- 
ing positions and followed persistently the rear-guard, which only 
got in at 4 P.M. 

The greater part of the baggage which had come in early was 
sent on back to Alachi with a suitable escort and one company of 
Sappers ; the idea being to relieve the burden of transport on the 
next day's march back to AH Musjid and to enable work to be 
started early on the road. 

Rain fell heavily all the afternoon and night of the 28th and 
was still falling on the morning of the 29th; the hilltops were 
hidden in mist and some of the higher-placed picquets were con- 
cealed from view all the morning, making their withdrawal a 
delicate operation in the presence of a watchful enemy. The rear- 
guard consisted of a mountain battery and a British battalion ; 
these took up a position on hills to the east of the valley to cover 
the retirement of the baggage and the withdrawal of the picquets, 
not one of the latter being called in until the tail of the column 
was well on its road to Alachi. As a picquet withdrew, its place 
was at once taken by the enemy, while as we retired from the 
valley the tribesmen skirmished boldly across the open and tried— 
with some success — to work round on either flank. 

As the picquets came in they were at once passed through the 
rear-guard and directed to take up fresh positions in rear. All 
surplus men, too, were sent back, since it is almost better in a 
closely pressed rear-guard action to have too few rather than too 
many men. On arriving at Alachi there was found to be a block 
of transport, and the heights had to be held for some hours longer, 
the final retirement being covered at the last by only a very few 
rifles. The rear-guard got in at 6 P.M. 

The casualties of the brigade in these six days, during which 
fighting took place daily, were only eight killed and thirty-six 
wounded, a number which might easily have been infinitely 
heavier had not all ranks already learnt the lessons of this frontier 
warfare in the previous four months' fighting. 

(It is perhaps worthy of notice that it was just about this period 
that volley-firing was practically given up and individual firing was 
nearly always employed.) 

I would just briefly recapitulate what we learnt : that no 
onward movement should ever take place until the heights in 


front and on the flanks have been occupied, and that these latter 
positions should never be given up until the last of the rear-guard 
has passed through. As these picquets withdraw they take their 
place in advance of the rear-guard, fresh troops, as a rule, being 
detailed from the column for fresh picqueting. In a retirement, 
the fewer men you have the better — of course within limits ; if 
hard pressed, nothing pays so well against a Pathan as a resolute 
and sudden offensive. But above all, there is no procedure so 
fraught with danger on the frontier as for the main column to go 
on into camp leaving the rear-guard to " come on." On the border, 
and especially in a retirement,^ a rear-guard is not safe until it is 
acttially within range of tJte camp picquets ; it is within a mile or two 
of camp that the tribesmen press on most resolutely : every man of 
the rear-guard who falls requires at least three others to bring him 
in— for wounded men cannot be left to the tender mercies of the 
enemy ; evening is coming on, and the infantry of the rear-guard 
have probably been on their feet since long before dawn. Fresh 
troops should always, when possible, be posted some mile or two 
out of camp to help in the rear-guard, touch with which should 
never be lost; this is a small precaution, but its disregard has 
frequently led to great and unnecessary loss of life and, not in- 
frequently, to disaster. 

In camp the picquets must be strong and numerous : they must 
entrench themselves to the utmost and expect no assistance from 
camp. Their withdrawal is always a difficult and sometimes a 
dangerous operation : the signal for individual recall must be 
simple and clear, since the premature retirement of one picquet 
may involve others in serious difficulties, while the withdrawal 
once begun should be carried through with the greatest possible 

I now propose to deal with a much smaller force, composed, 
however, of the three arms, in the Western Transvaal in the spring 
of 1 90 1. We had been operating for some time with a tolerably 
large force, as columns went, consisting of about 1200 mounted 
men, four guns of one field battery, two of another, a howitzer, a 
pompom, and some 400 British Infantry. The G.O.C. then 
decided to move off with all his mounted men and most of his 
guns to co-operate with two other columns which were in the 
neighbourhood, and directed that the infantry, two guns, a maxim, 
and fifty Imperial Yeomanry, should escort his empty waggons into 
Ventersdorp — about twenty-six miles off— fill up there, and then 
rejoin him at a spot some thirty-five miles on the other side of 
Ventersdorp. No orders were issued until long after midday, and 
it was not until 2 P.M. that the two columns marched off in opposite 
VOL. cu 20 

[vol. zxix. new sebibs.] 



directions. The transport with the smaller force consisted of about 
fifteen mule waggons and sixty ox waggons. Now, with a small 
escort and especially with so small a number of mounted men— 
and the Yeomanry, I may mention, though keen enough were 
quite new to the game — it is of course impossible to move your 
mule and ox waggons separately, furnishing an escort for each, 
while it is equally impossible to make them march tc^ether, the 
mules moving so very much more quickly than the oxen. I think 
the only possible plan is to put the mule waggons in front, lay 
down some maximum distance to be maintained between the rear 
of the mule-convoy and the head of the ox-transport, and have 
constant halts to permit of closing up. I have always tried, but 
with, I admit, singularly ill-success and serious loss of temper, to 
make the transport move on a broad front of four to six waggons 
abreast. This is nearly always possible on the veldt ; it, of course, 
immensely decreases the depth of the column ; while it renders 
you far less vulnerable. I never, however, had the good fortune 
to " trek " with a transport ofBcer who held the same views on this 
subject as I did, with the result that the smallest column always 
occupied a terrible length of road. Perhaps some officer of the A.S. C 
could tell me whether he thinks that the small increase of traction 
strain involved in moving on the veldt, and the time lost in returning 
to single file at drifts, etc., is not more than compensated for by the 
increased security due to this curtailing of the depth of column. 

Both mules and oxen can move on for many hours without 
halting, but it seems to do oxen more harm than mules to halt in 
the yoke, so the mode of progression adopted admitted of the oxen 
moving steadily on at their own pace, while the mules only were 
subjected to the constant halts required for " closing up." 

The distance to Ventersdorp was some twenty-six miles of a 
bad road — a large column had passed along it during wet weather, 
the veldt surface had been much cut up and the big ruts had dried 
hard. It was, of course, impossible, starting at 2 in the afternoon, 
to reach our destination that day, so the length of our first march 
was decided for us, happily enough, by the question of water, there 
being only one spot, and that eight miles distant, where water was 
to be found in the whole twenty-six miles. The mounted men— 
whom we managed to make up to something over sixty by mount- 
ing grooms and others on spare horses — were far out in front and 
on the flanks : the bulk of the infantry remained with the waggons 
and supplied a strong rear-guard, with a maxim, some half-mile or 
more behind the column. The difficulty at first with the Imperial 
Yeomanry was to induce them to keep far enough out : they 
remained within a half-mile or looo yards of the waggons, and it 


was long before they realised how absolutely necessary it was (in 
the open, rolling downs we were passing over) that they should be 
well away— at least 1500-2000 yards— from the column. The 
reason, which when explained they soon grasped, was that if they 
were close in, the attack would be on us before due dispositions 
could be made to meet it ; whereas by keeping the mounted men 
well out and the infantry close at hand, such timely warning would 
be received as would admit of the slow-moving infantry being 
brought up to the point threatened. 

The guns always moved with, and near the head of, the main 
column with a very small infantry escort. At one time, in deference 
to the idea of separating guns, one gun had almost invariably— no 
matter what the size of the column — been detailed to accompany 
the rear-guard. It was found, however, by experience, that rear- 
guard commanders — who cannot under all conditions be specially 
selected men — were apt to find that a gun added very considerably 
to their anxieties, and that on the rare occasions when the rear-guard 
was in any ytdy pressed, the commander was inclined to think more 
of keeping the gun out of danger than of so employing it as to reap 
all the advantages of its presence. But with a small column there 
is no doubt that its few guns are better with the main body: 
they can reach the point of attack quite quickly enough for all 
ordinary purposes, and are less liable to be called upon to come 
into action at a disadvantage, as must often happen with the guns 
of the rear-guard. 

We did not reach camp that night until long after dark, and 
then settled down on the banks of the '' vlei," or pond : we could 
spare but few men for picquets, so our camp and transport were 
closed in as compactly as possible ; the infantry bivouacked on 
three sides, the Imperial Yeomanry on the other; while four 
picquets, each of half a company, were put out one on each flank of 
the camp and at a distance from it of 1000 yards. This was not 
an ideal disposition by any means ; but nowadays the smaller the 
force the more difficult does it seem to become adequately to 
protect it, unless, of course, the camp happens to be in some 
peculiarly favoured position. These picquets would not perhaps have 
kept off an attack, but at least they would have given timely 
warning of one. Here, again, as nearly always in South Africa 
and on the Indian frontier, it was impossible for any one responsible 
officer to select the position for every one of these picquets ; but 
each picquet had an officer, each was in signalling communication 
with Uie camp, each had the strictest orders as to entrenching, and 
every man of every picquet perfectly well understood that whoever 
Came near his picquet was an enemy. 



South Africa was diflerent to the Indian frontier in that there 
were not a few instances of picquets being overwhelmed often with 
disastrous result to the forces they were covering. It would be 
interesting to know whether the artificial strengthening of picquet 
posts was always insisted upon. I am inclined to think it was not, 
and that this most necessary precaution was not made a point of, 
especially in many irregular corps. 

We started next morning as soon as it was light, and moving 
in the same formation halted at 9 for two or three hours to let the 
cattle graze, while infantry and mounted picquets on the rising 
ground looked out for any enemy. None appeared ; but if he had, 
it would, I fear, have taken some time, and led, perhaps, to con- 
siderable confusion and some loss, to drive in the oxen to the 
shelter of their waggons. Cattle always seem to make a point of 
grazing as widely as possible ; the transport conductors were nearly 
all civilians, while the men actually in charge of the teams were 
Kaffirs, and it seems impossible to make such people realise that it 
is not desirable, from a military point of view, to permit the cattle 
to roam and graze right up to the distant picquets. 

We reached Ventersdorp that afternoon, and camped that night 
and the following day within the town picquets ; filled up our 
waggons and prepared to start to rejoin our column. Now while 
it was seldom worth the enemy's while to attack an empty 
convoy, the capture of a full one was quite a desirable achievement ; 
so while our empty waggons with their small escort had been fairly 
safe on the road into Ventersdorp, it by no means followed that we 
should be equally unmolested when travelling with the same force, 
escorting that which would be of immense value to the Boers, 
while its loss would render our G.O.C quite unable to play his 
part in the general scheme of operations. Nobody in Ventersdorp 
knew our road, but a very indifferent map showed tivo : on the 
more southerly road there was water all the way, but it passed close 
to a native " stadt," the attitude of whose chief was uncertain : it 
appeared, however, to be the better road of the two. The other 
one had drinking water only at one place — a farm called Wild- 
fontein — about twenty miles from Ventersdorp, but there was 
believed to be water fit for animals at about eleven miles. This 
information was given us by the local butcher, a tame Burgher, 
who admitted he had passed that way many years before during 
the rainy season, so this was not much of a guarantee that we 
should find water there in May. However, he was ordered to come 
with us — much to his distress — and I never expected to see him at 
the rendezvous next morning in the dark — nor was I disappointed. 
Consequently we set out to find the way ourselves. I confess I 


was anxious about water, for our loads were very heavy ; it was 
impossible to do the full twenty miles before dark unless we were 
able to outspan halfway for water and grazing ; and I dreaded the 
idea of being benighted on an unknown road, in the middle of the 
veldt, without water for man or beast. We adopted the same 
procedure on this march as before, and came along at a very 
promising pace before the sun got hot About 10 o'clock, to my 
great relief, we came upon the water — ^a group of two or three reed- 
grown ponds — and here we decided to outspan till i P.M. (I know 
that this is not as long as transport officers consider necessary, for 
the ox is an annoying beast : not only does he take a long time to 
graze, but he wastes so much time over it : he will never begin at 
once, but when released from the yoke, he sits down and thinks for 
quite a long time before he begins to feed. However, three hours 
was all we could spare if we were to reach our proposed bivouac 
before dusk.) The scene of our " outspan " was anything but an 
ideal military position ; it was well enough on the left, where a 
convenient low ridge of rock covered the " outspan *' and afforded a 
clear field of view to our picquets ; in rear the view was unobscured 
for miles ; but in front and on the right the ground was rather 
nasty. In our immediate front was quite a large wood, irregular 
in shape, perhaps a mile in extent each way, and full of bushy trees 
and a certain amount of undergrowth. Our onward road ran right 
through the very heart of it From a high mound on the outskirts 
of the wood our signallers opened communication with those of 
our G.O.C. some sixteen miles off, who told us "to be on the 
look-out for Boers ! " 

The wood was of course thoroughly searched and mounted 
vedettes, supported by infantry, placed along the outer or further 

Our right was equally objectionable, for it was covered at a 
short distance by several patches of Kaffir-corn, which grows to a 
beight of four to five feet, effectually concealing the advance of an 
enemy. These patches, too, were of considerable depth, and it was 
necessary to push a few mounted men a very long way out on this 
flank with a company of infantry in fairly close support. 

I was not sorry when we inspanned again, and our convoy 
V9ZS safely through the wood and out once more in the open 

It was getting on for 5 o'clock before the mounted men of our 
advance-guard topped the last ridge and saw the farm buildings of 
Wildfontein in the hollow before them. They saw something more 
at the same time ; for at the open doors of the farm was quite a 
number of saddled horses, whose riders were inside. 


Our Yeomaniy, as I have said, were inexperienced, and instead 
of galloping straight at the horses, they dismounted where they 
were and opened a long range and ineffectual fire. The Boers— 
'there were not more than about forty of them — ^wereoutand off and 
firing from the far side of the little valley in no time. Of course they 
did not stay, and all we got were a few of their spare horses. This 
camp was a difficult one to guard. The farm buildings, with fields of 
Indian com, stretched for nearly three-quarters of a mile along the 
banks of a little stream away to the left, while on the left rear was 
a very large wood, a salient from which ran down to within about 
1500 yards of the farm lands. The front and right were fairly 
open, but the right rear was a little awkward, the ground sloping 
upwards to one of those South African hills which seem to have 
fw top. We were able to manage with the usual three picquets on 
the front, right, and rear, but on the left two were necessary, so 
placed as to command both sides of the little valley at a spot 
where it suddenly narrowed ; the picquet on the left rear was 
drawn fairly close in so as to be well clear of the large wood 
I am glad that no attack was made upon us that night, for I think 
that we should have had some difficulty in beating it off, although 
we could easily have held out among the farm buildings till our 
G.O.C. could have come to our assistance. 

Our march next day was through a more sticky bit of country, 
but we completed it unmolested (though our Yepmanry got once 
into touch with a Boer patrol), and late in the afternoon the convoy 
reached the column quite safely. 

The two examples I have quoted of the measures taken to 
safeguard a small force in Tirah and in South Africa, are, of course, 
quite different, but the principles are, I submit, much the samc^ 
In neither case could absolute safety be guaranteed and some 
risks must always be run, for what is laid down in text-books 
cannot invariably be carried out ; and so long as the CO. has 
honestly tried to think out all probable eventualities, has drawn 
up and issued careful orders, and is supported by officers who may 
be trusted to carry them out, he will — ^should the worst happen — at 
least be spared the thought that his own neglect has contributed to 
the misfortunes of his command. 

H. C. Wylly. 


By "Soldado." 

" All movements on the battlefield have but one end in view, the 
development of fire in greater volume and more effectively directed 
than that of the opposing force • . » it is superiority of fire that 
decides the conflict " (Combined Training, Section 3 (i.))a 

" Success is only to be obtained by fire at decisive range " 
(Infantry Training, Section 213 (i.)). 

Terms applied to rangesa 


J^lSlSint ••• ••■ aaa aaa »mt 
X^OIl K aaa aa* » »» m»m •«• 
JLIlCCtlVC »m» mm* aaa •»« aaa 
JurCClSlVC ••• aa« aaa aaa aaa 


3000 to 2000 
2000 „ 1400 
1400 „ 600 

600 and under. 

[Infantry Training, Section 215. Combined Training, Section 2j 

In the continuous advance of thought and method that i^ 
absolutely necessary for^a nation to keep abreast of the world's 
progress, thinkers constantly express new opinions which differ 
from or go further than accepted principles. This is an inevitable 
and vivid sign of national vigour. Many experienced and thought- 
ful soldiers hold an opinion on the subject of this paper whiclv 
differs from the description of ranges quoted above. This opinion 
is that battles will in the future be won and lost at far more than 600 
]rards, or, that decisive ranges are much extended by the weapons 
of to-day. 

The third section of our text is the outcome of the latest 
conflict fought between opponents armed equally with modern 
weapons. The first and second sections contain no new tactical 
principles.' The discharge of missiles by infantry established its 
value at Cre^y. The main principles of tactics never change. 
Modern science merely demands their suitable application to 
existing conditions. The great problem is, how to obtain 
superiority of fire at the decisive point 

There are four main conditions that lead to fire superiority : 
numbers, fire-discipline, surprise, and direction, e.^., enfilade 


and mnerse. Fire superiority; therefore, may be physical or 
ccraL The end of its development is almost invariably moral. 
The defeat of an army is followed, as a rule, by its retreat or 
sciTccier. Seldom does a force in civilised war continue fighting 
cntil c^efy man is k,^s de combat. That would be the result of 
phir^Scal superiority of fire pore and simple, which had, however, 
never sccceeded in establishing moral superiority. Hence, moral 
superiority of fire is. generally speaking, the direct cause of victoty 
cr of defeat The question remains as to when it becomes dedsive ; 
at what sta^e the battle is von or lost. 

Dedshre raises are those ranges at which the end of an action 
b reached, ob;ecti¥es. whether intermediate or final, are won or 
lost, phases of the battle are determined. Those ranges, that is, 
at which the establishment of superiority of fire settles once and 
fcr all whkii side dommatcs the fidd, or any portion of the field, 
can assume the initiative for further action, and can dictate to the 
oppocent his future moves in the struggle. Our text-books tell 
cs that those ranges are 600 j-ards and under. Our late Com- 
maoder-in-ChieC fresh from battlefields where Lee-Enfield 
answered Mauser, sa>^ '"It is by snap-shooting at the closest 
ranges that battles of the future will be won." On what grounds 
can be founded the theory that a foe can be repulsed, a position 
wocu when half a mi!e or more divides the combatants ? 

The following are, perhaps, the three chief arguments. Firstly, 
ift-e deliberately throw away much of the great power and value of 
the modem ride by basing our tactical ideas on the premise that 
its dedsive rai^e is not more than 600 jrards. With its flat 
trajectory* the rifie shoots so accurately that we should, ha^ 
e:>tablL>hed superiority of fire, crush our enemy at longer ranges. 
The defence should allow no attacker to approach the position 
over a reasonablv eood field of fire. The attack should shoot the 
defenders out of their position or into surrender. 

Secondly, the advants^^ of superior fire-discipline and good 
marksmanship, which belong to a highly trained Army like ours, 
are lost at ranges irtiere mere numbers, noise, and volume of lead 
decide the day. 

Thirdly, we must, whatever else seems desirable, learn to win 
battles at longer ranges, because our men are few and valuable ; 
dose-range fighting is costly in blood, and we are bound, for 
political, finandal, and national reasons, to economise life, and to 
win our campaigns with the fewest possible casualties. 

Let us examine these arguments in turiL 

The power of the modem rifle has certainly extended the 
dangerous zone be}x>nd those of the classic wars of 1870-71 and 


1877. Combined Training, Section 3 (3), shows this clearly. But 
will any good troops own themselves beaten because they are 
feeling the fire of an enemy whom they can hardly see ? They 
may admit that their opponents have obtained superiority of fire at 
certain points for the time being, but they will only do so by 
changing their dispositions accordingly, occupying more command- 
ing or better sheltered ground, or gaining respite and relief by 
hurling theoQselves on their foes, as the French Turcos charged 
from the Niederwald the Prussians. But that they will break in 
flight or raise the white flag we can not believe. In an attack, 
resolute troops will not be repulsed by fire only at half to three- 
quarters of a mile, for the defender's fire will seldom sweep an 
unbroken glacis of over 600 yards in width. Comparatively sheltered 
and practicable lines of approach exist in front or on the flanks of 
any position ; the nature of the earth's surface makes this a 
constant factor. And troops that understand the construction and 
use of cover should never be shot out of their position or into 
surrender. Fire alone would not have driven the Turks from 
Plevna. Infantry Training, Section 2 1 3 (i.), says, " The fire of attack- 
ing troops beyond that (the decisive) range can have very .little 
eflfect on a well covered enemy." This must always be so. 

The loss of the advantage of fire-discipline at short ranges 
occurs only when the better trained force has not established 
superiority of fire. In this case the development of the enemy's 
fire-power is in the nature of a surprise, a condition that makes for 
superiority of fire. Hence that superiority lies with the enemy. 
The South African War furnishes instances of this. At Magers- 
fontein the Boers opened fire on the Highland Brigade at 200 
.yards. Our men had approached the Boer position by night, and 
had no notion of the enemy's proximity. At Stormberg our 
troops marched, again by night, into a valley commanded on all 
sides at 400 yards. At dawn the Boers opened fire from the heights 
into our closed and tired ranks. At Sannah's Post our force 
marched into an ambush in full day, and was caught on an open 
plain by a smaller Boer force concealed in a donga across our line 
of march. The Boer fire opened at from a few yards to 500, from 
front and flanks. 

Such instances, however, do not prove that the advantage of 
short range lies, as a rule, with the worse trained, even if stronger. 
Side. We gained no considerable action in South Africa without 
getting to close quarters. At Paardeberg we maintained a superiority 
of fire for nine days, but it was only on the approach of our 
trenches to within a hundred yards of his that Cronje surrendered. 
-At Diamond Hill the advance of the Guards* Brigade against the 


Boer's left centre ended a fire fight that had lasted three days. At 
Belfast it took four days, and the charge of the Rifle Brigade at 
Beigendal, to dislodge the Boers. The latter stages of the war 
teem with instances of hand-to-hand fighting at the closest ranges. 
If discipline and training are ever valuable, it is in the tumult and 
confusion of close quarters. 

The problem of how to save and when to sacrifice men bristles 
with difficulties. Decisive results can seldom be achieved without 
loss, but when the supply of men is limited, it seems rather like 
drawing on our capital to lose them. Our soldiers are costly 
luxuries, and we increase their value by a careful system of 
high training. Our leaders realise the men's value and handle 
them accordingly, seeking to lose as few as is compatible vdth 
the object to be gained. From the purely military point of view 
this IS wrong. To crush your foe, it is said, you must face heavy 
losses. The Continental Powers can, perhaps, afford to lavish 
their conscripts on each victory, as Grant could afford to lose 
more men in beating Lee than there were men in Lee's whole 
army. But we must undoubtedly count the cost before we lose a 
man. We shall not, however, win battles, though we may save 
men, by keeping at a respectful distance from the enemy. We must 
solve the problem by training our men to such a pitch of discipline, 
self-reliance, and mobility that by sheer power of manoeuvre we 
shall obtain superiority of fire when and where we wish. If with 
inferior numbers we can learn by fire-discipline, surprise, rapidity 
and secrecy of movement, or staying power, to establish superiority 
of fire at the decisive point, then, on the happy days when we have 
the big battalions, we can rely on possessing physically at the 
outset what we have known how to acquire morally at the end. 
And when the occasion demands loss, we must not hesitate to 
suffer it. 

But whether we aim at making the most of our infantry weapon 
and fire-discipline, or at keeping down the casualty list, we cannot 
doubt that in a struggle between troops of nearly equal quality, 
armament and morale^ the result will be fought out at close 
quarters, and often decided by the bayonet We cannot draw 
general conclusions from the abnormal clearness of atmosphere 
and openness of terrain of South Africa, nor from our wide ex- 
perience of warfare in desert, hills, and jungle. The highest test 
of tactical skill is applied on European battlefields, in a close and 
intersected theatre where view and field of fire are limited. Fire 
at much over 600 yards will not shake the morale of modem 
soldiery. The bullets are not thick enough, the noise is incon- 
siderable, and cover from view and fire is freely to be found. It 


is when the troops approach to charging distance, when a sheet of 
lead sweeps the open ground, when the roar of musketry and 
artillery prevents an order being heard and dulls the acuteness of 
every faculty, that the nerve tension nears the breaking strain. 
This decisive moment the greater leader will seize to throw in the 
straw that will snap his opponent's quivering nerves. 

But this will be at short range. To whatever distance the 
rifle of to-morrow may reach, the decisive range will be limited 
by the same conditions as to-day and yesterday — ^the field of fire 
and sight, and the resolution and training of the troops. 

Nor does this apply only to carrying out and beating off real 
attacks, but to other phases of fighting, such as containing and 
delaying actions. We shall not hold an enemy to his ground by 
merely firing at him at " long " or even " effective " ranges, nor will 
such fire delay a foe whose object is not to be delayed. We can 
annoy our opponent and force him to deploy, or, if he is on the 
defence, to develop his strength and dispositions, as soon as we can 
reach him with our fire ; but we must always be ready to close 
with him to be finally successful. 


By "K." 

In an Army Order, published in October, 1902, Lord Roberts 
called attention to the importance of musketry, and pointed out 
that the first object in the training of a soldier is, or should be, to 
make him a good shot ; since that date other Army Orders and 
circular letters have been issued with the same object. 

The annual musketry course has twice been altered during the 
last four years, and another course for the new rifle has been com- 
piled and issued in Army Orders. Each of these alterations has 
been made for the purpose of improving, in the most practical 
manner, the shooting of the individual soldier, and consequently of 
the whole Army, and this object each of these changes undoubtedly 

The day has now quite gone by when the oflficer at the firing- 
point brought down with him to the range, as a necessary part of 
his equipment, an easy-chair and a novel,* and the officer in the 
butts if he also hadn't a novel went to sleep ; when good shots 
fired on the targets of bad shots, or actually fired in their places. 
Greater interest is now shown by everybod)', especially by the 
private soldier, and the keenness displayed by all ranks is as great 
as could be desired. 

At the same time the weather, at any rate in this country, 
greatly militates against a satisfactory course ot" musketry. 
Musketry usually commences about the first week in February, 

* During my experience, extending over thirty years, I have never met with a case 
such as that suggested. The presence of an officer in the butts during individual practices 
is, by the way, a comparatively recent innovation, dating from long since the days when 
slackness at musketry was tolerated even in cavalry regiments. From " slackness " we 
have now gone to the opposite extreme, and introduced so much " worry" and inter- 
ference that efficiency is rather hindered than assisted. Some day we shall perhaps 
learn that the way to get the best work from a good man is to let him do it, so far as 
possible, his own way ; and that no amount of "worry" will make a silk purse out of a 
sow's ear. Those who stand in need of much supervision are not worth keeping and 
should be got rid of. To begin with, however, we could well spare a few of the super- 
visors — to, for example, the House of Commons, or some such noisy assembly of 
notable nonentiiies.— Ed. U. S. M. 


when the leave season is over, and though the musketry regulations 
lay down that " the range practices will not be fired in cold or 
otherwise unfavourable weather," it is impossible to choose favour- 
able days to shoot on when the weather continues bad week after 
week. Thirty-six days are allowed for company training, and this 
Dumber of days has to include the annual course of musketry. 
Now, in the last two years, how many days in February and March 
can be said to have been really good, or even fair, for musketry ? — 
the writer of this article knows by the bitter experience of both this 
year and last. It is only when one finds one's self standing on a 
range for some time that one is able to appreciate the coldness of 
our climate during those two months. 

As much as possible is done to prevent men from having to 
wait any length of time on the range. They are brought to the 
firing-point one or two sections at a time, and are sent away as 
soon as they have fired. But when the ranges are some distance 
from barracks, it is impossible to regulate the arrival of the men so 
that they need only wait a short time before their turn to fire 
comes. Any one who wishes to appreciate the difficulties of firing 
or of taking a great interest in musketry can do so by standing still 
on any day in February and March for half an hour or so. It will 
be found that there is considerable difiScuIty in firing when the 
fingers are numb with cold ; and a good score is out of the question. 
This is bad enough for the private, but for the unfortunate section 
commandeT, or the still more unfortunate officer who has to stop on 
the range for three or four hours at a time coaching the bad and 
indifferent shots, it is a good deal worse. Fortunately the standard 
of qualification for the new " service pay " is very low, or the ill- 
luck of having to fire during February and March would be greater 
than it is. It would not seem a very difficult task to arrange that 
company field training, independently of musketry, should be com- 
pleted by the whole battalion first (four companies are usually 
struck oflf at a time), and the musketry taken at a later period of 
the year, when, at least, standing on the range for any length of 
time would not be such a bitter penance. 

The writer feels it would be presumption on his part to suggest 
any alteration in a course of musketry which has been arranged 
after (we hope) much thought and experience by experts ; but it 
strikes even a casual observer that a system .by which a soldier 
fires most of his rounds in a fortnight at the beginning of a year, 
and the remainder in a week at the end of it, is capable of being 
improved upon. 

Theoretically, of course, musketry instruction goes on continually 
throughout the year. This it does to a certain extent, but though 


during company and battalion field training, field days, etc., the 
men are continually watched to see that they adjust their sights 
properly, etc., it is impossible for the officers, or section commanders, 
to be passing down the ranks extended to ten paces when advanc- 
ing to an attack, to ascertain if a man has accurately, or even 
approximately, judged the distance correctly. The individual 
soldier has to be relied on to do his best to improve his shootii^ 
by the correct use of his rifle on field days, because, though it may 
be possible to ensure that his sights are adjusted to the correct 
distance, it is quite impossible to be certain that he is taking a 
correct aim, or taking any aim at all. Fortunately one can rely on 
the majority to do this ; but weeks of such practice will not do as 
much to improve the shooting powers of any individual as one day 
on the range will. 

It does not appear to be a very difficult task to devise some 
scheme by which the annual course of musketry might be split np 
to cover a larger portign of the year than the present one. And 
yet there must be great objections, as no scheme has yet been 
devised, though it must have occurred to a great many. It would 
be easy enough to arrange that companies should fire for a certain 
number of days in each month. 

The course of musketry published for use with the new rifle, 
working progressively as it does, lends itself in a particular manner 
to such an expansion. It is not intended to go into minute details 
in this paper, and only one or two practices will be taken as 
examples to illustrate the method, because it is felt that the working 
up of such a scheme is essentially the task of an expert, which the 
writer in no sense professes to be. 

Take, for example, the first three practices of the new course. 
All three are at two hundred yards, and the position for all of them 
is lying. No. i is independent, No. 2 independent behind cover, 
No. 3 rapid independent, with a time limit of thirty seconds. Sup- 
pose Nos. I and 2 to have been fired, enire autres, in one month, 
and No. 3 left for the next month. The first two practices should 
have taught the soldier the sighting of his rifle at two hundred yards, 
and one sighting shot should enable him to correct any allowance 
for light or wind. According to the present regulations no sighting 
shot is allowed before firing any practice ; but most of those who 
have to put any number of men annually through courses of 
musketry, are agreed that it ought to be allowed, especially as it is 
not always possible to arrange that deliberate and rapid practices 
for any particular range shall be fired on the same day. When 
these practices are not fired on the same day it is quite possible to 
fire all seven shots, in the rapid practice, and score either nothing 


at all, or only a few points, owing to the difference of elevation 
required for a dull and bright day, or an error in judgment of the 
exact strength of the wind. And it must be allowed that it is very 
disheartening, especially to a young soldier, to find that his chance 
of making a good score has been spoilt by an error in judgment, 
to which even the best shots are liable. For one of the hardest 
points in musketry, and one which requires a large amount of 
experience, is accurate judgment of the strength of the wind. It 
may be objected that before firing rapid practices, and the previous 
remarks refer more to those carried out at longer ranges, the 
strength of wind is ascertained by the ofHcer in charge, or an 
instructor. This is true, and theoretically should be sufficient ; but 
it is one thing to lie down and fire, say, five shots in twenty-five 
seconds, allowing two feet for wind and a little more elevation than 
the previous day, and quite another to find the exact amount 
required by experiment. By the aid of the scoring book kept by 
each individual soldier nou', one sighting shot should be sufficient. 
The three practices, mentioned above, should be sufficient to 
demonstrate the scheme, and no more will be given for the reasons 
stated before. 

The authorities have come to the conclusion that it is better to 
disperse gymnastic training throughout the year (two hours per 
week have to be spent on it), and have given up the old twelve day 
annual course, and perhaps it would not be too much to hope that 
the same system may some day be adopted with musketry. 
Whatever else it might do it would certainly tend to increase the 
interest in the individual soldier ; because finding, for example, he 
was not shooting well in his first month, with the thought of his 
diminished service pay, it is very likely he would spend a certain 
amount of his spare time before the second month in practice,* and 
once a man has had his faults pointed out to him nothing is so 
likely to improve his shooting powers as constant practice. The 
result the writer confidently expects would be the increased 
efficiency of any unit. 

* I have long held that the musketry course should be divided into monthly parts, 
for a variety of reasons, and to the number of these I think that " K " has here added 
another of considerable importance. — Ed. U. S. M. 

By Captain C. S. Collison, 2nd W.I. Regiment. 

At a time when so much attention is being devoted to reforms 
and alterations in the drill and discipline of the Army, a few 
extracts from a book on * Tacticks/ by William Dairy mple, LicuL- 
Colonel of the Queen's Royal Regiment of Foot, and published in 
1781, are of interest as showing that in those days, too, the need 
for reform was engaging the attention of thinking officers. 

The book from which I quote was dedicated to the King, and 
the author, in the course of his dedication, expresses the hope 
that "this attempt to improve the discipline of the Army may 
merit your Majesty's most gracious acceptance." 

In his introductory chapter. Colonel Dalrymple says, "The 
British Army, like others, has increased to an enormous extent, 
but has not made an equal progress in its regulations and tacticks ; " 
in explanation of which he points out that " There are not two 
regiments that form column from line and line from column in the 
same way." He concludes, " The mode of training, I advocate, 
has been practised with success in the Queen's Regiment, which I 
have the honour to command." 

After enlarging upon the advantages of having a regularly 
constituted chain of responsibility from the general to the private 
soldier, he starts on his first proposed reform, which is no less than 
the abolishment of the Light and Grenadier Companies, for the 
following reasons : — 

" A Light Infantryman can only be a marksman ; every soldier 
thus armed ought to be the same ; as to dress, if a man can march 
better and is more at his ease in a jacket than a coat, why should 
he be encumbered with the latter ? If a cap be more useful than 
a hat, why should not every man wear one .? . . . In short, our whole 
infantry, if properly clothed and disciplined, ought to be equally 
useful in every situation." Coming to the Grenadier Conopanies 
he says, "The tallest and most useful men, when formed for 
service, are separated from their own corps and placed under 
accidental commanders, totally unacquainted with them." 

When we remember that Light and Grenadier Companies were 

A REFORMER OF 1781. 305 

in existence until comparatively recent years, one can imagine 
the ridicule a reform of this far-reaching effect must have caused 
at the time of its publication. 

On the subject of dress he maintains that the hair should be 
cut short, and advocates a round hat, white for hot countries and 
black for cold, condemning in no measured terms the cocked hat 
of the line, the Light Infantry helmet, and the Grenadier busby, 
" and such trumpery." 

" Leather gaiters," he says, " when wet are very uncomfortable, 
and turn hard by use. Woollen spatterdashes appear to me to be 
the best." Thereby probably being the first to raise his voice in 
favour of the puttie. 

Dealing with arms, he recommends a reform which actually 
comes into force 120 years later, as follows: "To affirm that 
officers would not attend to their men if armed with fusils (or 
carbines) only marks a great defect in discipline. The officers 
by having firearms may prove advantageous by increasing the 
quantity of fire ; I am therefore of opinion that officers and 
sergeants should be armed like the men with fusils and bayonets. 
The caliber of the fusil to be the same with the firelock of th& 
men." He adds, however, ** That the colonel, the majors, the: 
adjutant, the quartermaster, sergeant-major, and drummers should, 
carry swords only." As regards the clothing of the officers, " it 
should be similar to that of the men," though each should have 
a badge according to his rank. 

Colonel Dalrymple's idea of the " Stand at Ease " during drills 
and parades appears to me a most sensible one, although in these 
days, when the soldier airs his grievances in the public Press, I 
question whether its adoption would not be at the expense of 
discipline. On the command " Stand at Ease," he says, '* he is. 
then to stand at ease, without quitting his post or talking." 

Turning to the right, left, and to the right-about are practically 
identical with those in use to-day, viz. '* Face to the right upon the 
right heel, raising the left foot a little off the ground, at the same 
time bring the left heel in a line with the right." Turnings to the 
left and to the right-about were arranged on the same principle. 

Coming to the " March of Route," he goes at some length 
into the importance of this part of a soldier's training, and fixes 
the length of a pace at thirty-two inches, the rate of the " quick 
step" at 120 paces per minute, and the ''charging pace," or double, 
at 1 50 paces per minute. 

With regard to the manual exercises he is in accord with the 

Military Authorities of our times in reducing these exercises to a 

minimum. " The fewer they are the better," he says. " Principally 
VOL. cu 21 



he (i>. the recruit) should leara to prime and load, present and 
fire. As soon as he can go through these motions, he should be 
taught to fire ball at a target" 

I do not propose to follow Colonel Daliymple in his attempts 
to simplify and improve the laborious and complicated motions of 
priming, loading, and firing, for with all his good intentions he does 
not succeed in reducing to less than twelve motions this important 
part of the soldier's education ; but the stress, he lays throughout, 
on the necessity of establishing a systematic and progressive form 
of individual instruction, combined with the importance of impart- 
ing such instruction so as to accustom the recruit to think and 
act with intelligence, proves that he was far from satisfied with the 
pedantic and machine-like methods of the barrack square drill of 
the period. 

There are many other points worthy of notice in this book, but 
I have selected only those that I considered to be of particular 
interest I have not the means at hand by wh'ch I might trace 
the subsequent career of this practical officer, but I think that few 
will underestimate the worth and honesty of his ideas, or can help 
feeling some regret that this " attempt to improve the discipline of 
the Army " should have met with so little success. 




By "E. A. S." 

CiRCOLARS from tourist agents and innumerable guide-books and 
pamphlets, issued by railway and steamship companies, describing 
the scenery and other attractions of this route home from India, 
must be familiar to almost everybody ; but a short account from 
the traveller's point of view, without entering into any elaborate 
descriptions of the sights and other matters fully dealt with in 
these bookd, may be useful to any one contemplating the trip, and 
interesting to all. 

First as regards finances. A through ticket issued in Bombay 
for the complete journey, steamer and rail first-class, costs a little 
over £80. In addition to this, say, ;^20 may be taken in gold, and 
£iQO in circular notes or letters of credit to provide for the usual 
extra expenses of travelling, sleeping berths, hotels, purchase of 
curios, etc, making a total of ;^200, which will suffice to do the 
journey with every comfort, but without extravagance. Of course 
incidental expenses may be reduced to one-half of this with 
economy and roughing it. On the other hand, one can spend any 
amount of money on the beautiful artistic things to be purchased 
in China and Japan. 

Next as regard season of year. Spring and autumn are the 
best, and in some parts the only times to travel. Hong Kong i9 
pleasantly cool up to April, when it begins to get muggy, and is 
not at all agreeable again till October. In Japan the cherry 
blossom is at its best about the beginning of April, but this is apt 
to be a rainy month ; May is warmer, and the wisteria is out In 
Canada, the Rocky Mountain hotels only open after the middle of 
May, and there is still a good deal of snow then on the higher 
ground, so it is not advisable to arrive there before that date, if it 
is desired to spend a few days among the Rockies. Some people 
prefer both Canada and Japan in the autumn, when the maple leaf 
changes colour and gives most gorgeous effects. 

Lastly as to time. About three months from Bombay to 
London may be taken as a fair average period in which to see 



sufficient without uncomfortably hurrying. It might be done in 
about two months by going straight through, and if time is no 
object, another month or two might easily be spent 

I left Bombay by P. and O. China mail towards the middle of 
March, and after a rather hot three days arrived at Colombo, 
where the P* and O. from London to Australia met us and 
transferred her China passengers. Here the ships always coal, and 
coaling in this steamy climate is more than usually disagreeable; 
they generally take nearly twenty-four hours transferring passengers, 
mails, and cargo, so every one goes on shore to dine at the 
various hotels in Colombo or at Mount Lavinia, a pleasant resoit 
about seven miles by rail or road down the coast As a rule there 
Is hardly time even to get up to Kandy, the pretty and interesting 
old capital, but an afternoon easily passes driving round the place 
in rickshaws, then out to the gardens with their wonderful tropical 
vegetation, followed by a tour of the shops and curio dealers' stalls. 
Ceylon is famous for its precious stones, though it is necessary to 
be a judge of these things if buying, all the best being, of course, 
brought up by experts. 

Leaving Colombo with a rather crowded ship, after five days 
we reached Penang, a small uninteresting place with few European 
Inhabitants, where a very short stay of only an hour or two is 
made, and the ship goes on to Singapore, rather over twenty-four 
hours distant Singapore is a prosperous commercial centre, with 
a large European community ; the surroundings and harbour are 
beautiful, and the climate, though warm, moist, and rainy, is quite 
tolerable, as the nights are cool. The stay here just gives time 
to get up to the town, dine, and spend a night on shore. Singapore 
to Hong Kong is a five-day run, and the cool breezes of the China 
Sea were a relief after the hot Straits, especially as the ship was 
much over-crowded. Unusual numbers of people were travelling 
owing, it was said, to the Delhi Durbar; many visitors there 
returning to England and America this way. 

At Hong Kong it was necessary to wait five days, as there is 
a chaise here from the P. and O. to C.P.R. (Canadian Pacific 
Railway) Empress boats for Vancouver vid Japan ; this time can 
be very pleasantly spent Hong Kong is an extremely pretty 
place, with a lai^e amount of shipping, and being an important 
station of the Royal Navy there are always numbers of warships 
of every sort here, not only British, but foreign ; the American 
squadron from the Philippines comes frequently. It is also said to 
hold the record for steam-launches, every one seems to keep one, 
and the place swarms with them. The Peak rises abruptly almost 
from the quays, and is more often than not wreathed in white 


mists ; it is easy to ascend by a few minutes* run in the funicular 
railway, and many of the residents have houses at the top for sake 
of coohiess ; but it is not an unmixed blessing, for the damp mists 
seem to ch'ng all round and penetrate even inside the houses, 
saturating everything ; on a fine day the view is very fine. One 
of the prettiest views of the place is from a ship in the harbour at 
night, the town brilliantly lighted by electric light rising tier upon 
tier up the steep slopes of the Peak. There are several large and 
well-conducted hotels, and an excellent club, where it is possible 
to become an honorary member. A small racecourse is in the 
Happy Valley, on the northern outskirts of the town, where suc- 
cessful meetings are held ; I heard that these are chiefly limited 
now to Chinese ponies, though at one time mostly Australians and 
Arabs ran. Polo, football, and some good sailing constitute the 
general amusements. Canton is reached from Hong Kong in a 
few hours by a daily service of comfortable steamers ; it is worth 
seeing as a typical dirty Chinese city, in which Europeans are not 
regarded with much favour. 

I left for Japan in a C.P.R. steamer ; they are usually called 
^Empress" boats, and are handsome, well-arranged, and well- 
managed ships, 6000 tons, twin screw, with a possible speed of 
eighteen to nineteen knots ; at sea they usually do about fifteen 
knots. They are most comfortable in every way ; all the stewards 
are Chinamen, who do very well in this capacity. Shanghai is the 
first port of call, or rather Woosung, for most ships lie off there 
some miles down the river, and a steam-launch took us up to the 
Bund of the Foreign Settlement, where we had an hoiu* or two for 
a hurried drive round. The ship left the same afternoon for 
Nagasaki, our first Japanese port, about twenty-seven hours' steam, 
so we only anchored in the harbour there after dark. The whole 
of the next day was spent at this place, so it was possible to have 
a long day on shore, seeing the town and curio shops, and then 
taking rickshaws and driving over the wooded hills at the back, 
down to a little seaside resort on the other side, famous for its fish 
luncheons. The scenery was charming, cherry blossom and fresh 
green leaves everywhere, and the lunch very creditable, served at 
a superior Japanese tea-house in European style. 

Nagasaki to Kobe through the Inland Sea takes a little over a 
day, and in fine weather is well worth seeing. Many people think 
the entrance to Vancouver finer. On arrival at Kobe, we found a 
large Japanese fleet of some fifty vessels ready for review by the 
Mikado ; Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and the United States 
being also each represented by one or two warships. I left the 
Empress boat, which went on next day to Yokahama for Vancouver, 


and vent to Ae principal hotel There are plenty of good hotels 
in Japan, a few ovned or mam^ed by Europeans, others hf 
J apan e se, bat ran on the European system, fitted with electric l^ht 
and eireiy convenience ; the charges vary from six to ten yen a day 
fcr e veijf th ing (a yen = 2x. id,). The Japanese inns are also avail- 
able ; diey are kqpt acnipalously dean, have few, if any, European 
cooveniences, and cost one to three yen per diem. 

The Mikado*s review of the fleet caused Kobe to be very full 
at this time. He arrived by train and drove down to the landing- 
stage wi& a cavalry escort, through streets lined with troops and 
decorated with triumphal arches ; we followed him out to the fleet 
in a stcam-Ianncli, he went on board a first-class cruiser, which 
then got under we^h and moved slowly along the lines, then 
anch ore d again, and all the commanders went on board to pay 
their respects. The Japanese ships closely resemble the British 
in general appearance and also in a good deal of detail ; they 
looked smart and eflectiveL That evening the fleet and town were 
illuminated; the land illumtnattons were most eflfectively carried 
ooft with thoosands of paper lanterns. Torchl^ht processions 
penraded the streets, headed by brass bands playing European 
airs radier discordantly. The crowds were dense, but Japanese 
crowds are the best bdiaved in the woiid, and a few odd pdicemeo 
here and there were more tilian suflident to preserve order. 

The Osaka Exhibition had just opened at this time, and I 
spent one day there ; it dosely resembled an ordinary European 
ediibition with the excep ti on of the art section, which was unique, 
most magnificent specimens of lacquer, bronze, d<Msonn^, satsnma 
embroideries^ etc* being on view, and besides the ordinaiy dass 
of pictuie» paintings on ^Ik and cut vdvet. Owing to the exhibition, 
the railways were densely crowded ; the people, however, were 
very courteous and well bdiaved. Railway travelling in Japan is 
quite comfortable; though a little slow ; the scenery sometimes 
most attracti\'e with hiUs, woods, lakes, and streams, sometimes 
flat, uninteresting stretches of paddy. The up-to-date Jap, plants 
boards along the route, bearing huge advertising posters. English- 
speakir^ guides can be engaged from the Guides' Society ; their 
p^y is }^n 2 a day, increased in proportion to the size of the 
party they conduct Many people do without a guide at alL So 
mudi English is spoken in Japan that it is easy enough to get 
along. In railway stations and other public places notices are 
generally in two lai^uages. Japanese and English. In fact English 
is their second language ; all their naval oflScers are taught it 

Kioto^ an ancient cai^tal, is most picturesquely situated among 
wood<overed hills ; here are seen Imperial palaces and numbers of 


iine temples. Beautiful modem cloisonne, bronzes, and other 
artistic things can be bought ; there are also plenty of antiquities 
for sale, but Japan has now been cleared of so many old things 
that it is well to be cautious about buying. The development of 
art in Japan is of recent date ; it has gradually been brought in 
from China, where it has flourished for centuries. There are many 
excursions in this neighbourhood, notably to Lake Bliva, returning 
in a boat by torchlight on a canal tunnelled through the hills. 
Some rapids can be shot where a river passes through a goi^e in 
the hills ; these are small, and are navigated in flat-bottomed boats 
of very light draught The boatmen show great skill, as the boat 
swept along by the boiling surf, grazes great boulders, and follows 
the sharp twists of the river-bed. The scenery, too, is veiy 

Space prevents more than a passing reference to a few of the 
many places worth visiting. At Nagoya is a most perfect specimen 
of an old feudal castle, which gives an excellent idea of the ancient 
architecture and defences of the country. No troops occupy it now^ 
but outside the castle outworks are the barracks of a division oP 
Infantry, and close by some Cavalry lines, with large open parade^ 
grounds, riding schools, etc The sturdy Japanese Infantryman^ 
reminds one of our Goorkhas, though he is a bit bigger and 
rounder looking, they are full of pluck and dash, hardy, inured 
to heat and cold, and all the ration they want is a little tea and 
rice. The Artillery is also good, the Cavalry weak — the Japs are* 
not a nation of horsemen ; they are mounted on rough vicious^ 
ponies, which, however, look as if they could go for ever and live 
on nothing ; and, although the men don't look like fighting in the 
saddle, they would probably make formidable Mounted Infantry. 
Compared with the Cossacks in the Far East, the latter have 
undoubtedly a great advantage as regards horsemanship and 
purely Cavalry work — in mounts and hardiness they are about 
equal ; the Japs have the best of it in pluck and intelligence, and 
a great point with them is their intense patriotism. The equipment 
and organisation of every branch of the Japanese Army has been 
thought out to the smallest detail, and whatever was considered 
best in any European Army was at once adopted. It is important 
to remember that the Japanese Government foresees probabilities, 
and quietly and steadily prepares to meet them, this was proved 
in the war with China, and without doubt the possibility" of a 
struggle with Russia has been carefully thought out and prepared 
for during several years past 

A good view of the celebrated Fuji-Yama, with its snow-capped 
cone, can be had on the way from Nagoya to Tokio, as the railway 


circles round its base ; in dear weather it is visible for miles. 
Tokio, the present capital, can be seen most conveniently on the 
way up north to Nikko ; the chief Imperial palace is here and all 
the foreign legations ; distances are great as the native city is very 
large. Nikko, about six hours by rail further north, is one of the 
most beautiful places in Japan, rivalling Miyanoshita in the hills 
near Yokahama, and has the magnificent shrines of the Shc^us. 
It is situated high up among thickly wooded hills^ with rushing 
streams and many fine waterfalls all about it ; miles of paved 
avenues, lined with gigantic trees, lead up to the principal shrine. 
The famous red lacquer bridge was recently washed away in a flood, 
and has not been replaced. A very pretty excursion from here is 
to Lake Chuzenzi, about seven miles into the mountains from 
Nikko, and over looo feet higher. A footpath, rough but passable 
for rickshaws, leads up a river-bed for some distance, entering a 
wild and picturesque gorge in the hills, the sides of which are 
covered in April with the pink blossoms of the wild azalea, then 
<:limbing by steep zigzag paths to the top of a small pass, from 
-u'hich a slight descent leads to the lake ; this is very pretty with 
clear blue waters surrounded on all sides by woods and snow- 
covered hills rising steeply from its shores. There is a good hotel 
here, and the place is a favourite summer resort for the legation 
people ; the lake has been well stocked with all sorts of trout, 
including salmon trout, and the fishing is said to be very good. 
Some people consider it a good walk here from Nikko, but it is 
pleasantest to ride it on a pony. Returning to Yokahama to catch 
4he C.P.R. steamer for Vancouver, I had a few days at this, the 
•<hief foreign port of Japan ; though of great commercial importance, 
•the large foreign element makes it less interesting to the traveller. 
«Curio dealers abound here, and there are large nurseries for the 
cultivation of the famous miniature trees, of which most extra- 
ordinary specimens may be seen, hundreds of years old and about 
two feet high ; this result is said to be obtained by careful pruning 
of the roots and application of saki, the native liquor. 

Before leaving Japan a word must be said about the geishas. 
The most celebrated geisha entertainment is the cherry blossom 
dance, at Kisto, every spring, in which over fifty geishas take part, 
half of whom play stringed instruments and small hand drums, 
the remainder dance. Four scenes are shown, first a summer 
scene, with good effects of running streams and fire-flies darting 
about, then autumn, winter with snow and an ice-bound river, and 
finally the cherry blossom scene in which everything, including the 
dancers, are a mass of blossom. The dancing rather recalls the 
Indian nautch, as it consists chiefly of slow movements and gestures ; 


in the singing some peculiar notes come in repeatedly a little 
suggestive of cats. 

From Yokahama to the American Continent there is a choice 
of routes ; one vid. Honolulu to San Francisco, thence across the 
States ; the weather is warmer and sea passage smoother this way. 
The alternative is the northerly passage by the C.P.R Empress 
boats to Vancouver, then across Canada by the Canadian Pacific 
Railway, a cold sea voyage of about twelve days without sighting 
land. These boats are excellent, and there is no ice, as Behring 
Strait is too shallow to allow of it drifting south ; the scener}' of 
the Canadian Rockies is much finer than in the States, and it is a 
British railway and territory the whole way. 

It is well known that, when travelling, the days are never 
exactly twenty-four hours, but a few minutes more or less, according 
to whether the direction is to the west or east This gain or loss 
has to be rectified somewhere, so there is an international line at 
longitude 1 80 degrees in the middle of the Pacific, at which a day 
is' either added or dropped according to whether the vessel is 
travelling east or west. As we were going east, we had, therefore, 
an extra day without date, called Antipodes Day. 

The entrance to Vancouver is considered very fine scenery ; on 
the Canadian coast dense pine woods come right down to the shore, 
and on the United States side are great lines of snow-clad 
mountains, covered on their lower slopes with dark pines. The 
climate is mild, and has none of the intense cold of Eastern Canada. 
The steamer stops for an hour at Victoria, the seat of Government 
of British Columbia, with the naval station of Esquimault close 
by, then proceeds to Vancouver, the terminus of the voyage. 
Vancouver is a very rising town, fine brick and stone edifices are 
rapidly replacing the last of the wooden houses of which the place 
was first composed, and which were repeatedly destroyed by fire. 
In the Stanley Park here, a portion of the primeval forest has been 
kept quite untouched, and shows what difficulties the early settlers 
must have had in clearing the ground ; an almost impenetrable 
mass of growing pines is closely interlaced with dead and fallen 
trees ; some of them are of gigantic size. 

The terminus of the Canadian Pacific Railway, or C.P.R., is at 
Vancouver, and once a day a train leaves for its run of nearly five 
days across the Continent to Montreal. This famous railway is 
splendidly managed, and it also owns first-class hotels at various 
places on the line, those at Banff in the Rockies, and at Quebec, 
being especially good. The train is made of three classes ; tourists 
cars corresponding to third class, for which the passengers bring their 
own food, and can cook it, if necessary, as each car is provided with 


a small Idtchen ; first class for holders of cMxiinary tickets, and lastly 
pariour and skeping-cars, for which extra tickets are required. 
These cars have numbered sections, which by day are ananged 
into two scats facti^ one another, and by night into two berths, 
upper and lower, screened by curtains hanging from the roof; each 
car has also a smoking-room, and there is a conductor, generally a 
negro^ in charge: Refreshment-cars are always attached, except io 
the mountains, where the train stops for meals at certain stations^ 
thus avoiding the necessity of an extra car on the steep gradients. 

Briefly the trip across Canada is as follows : Leaving Vancouver 
about 2 P.M^ the train proceeds up the right bank of the Frazer 
river, crosses the Cascade and Selkirk ranges and then the Rockiesy 
reachii^ the prairie on the eastern slopes in about forty hoars, 
and crossing to Winnipeg, soon after which the lake district begins, 
and Montreal is reached on the morning of the fifth day. The 
scenery of the first forty hours has rightly been described as some 
of the grandest in the world ; it is one endless succession of snowy ^ 
mountains, precipices, rocky gorges, foaming torrents, and pine / | 
forests, which latter seem to suffer much from forest pines. Miles , y^ 
of wooden sheds protect the line from snow-drifts and avalanches ; 
without these it would be often impossible to run trains in winter. 
The s te epes t gradient is just before reaching the watershed of the 
Rockies, where four powerful engines on a full train only move it 
at a foot's pace. The line reaches an altitude of 5400 feet at a 
place called the ** Great Divide ; " here may be seen a stream 
flowing under an arch, and then dividing into two branches, one of 
which goes to the Atlantic, the other to the Pacific 

Bans' hot springs, about thirty hours from Vancouver, is on the 
eastern slope about 500 feet lower than the Great Divide : here is 
the Canadian National Park, a sanctuary for all wild animals ; in a 
corral is a herd of some thirty buffalo^ a few survivors of their now 
almost extinct race. Wapiti, caribou, moose, bear, big horn and 
wild goat can still be got in various districts ; the game laws are 
very strict, and vary in the different States ; only in the autumn 
months may deer of any species be shot : a license costs jCio^ 
and the number of heads is limited to twa Best sport with the 
gun is afforded by duck and prairie chicken. 

There is nothing much to be seen on the prairies now, though 
buffalo trails and wallows everywhere tell of former days : travelliog 
across them soon gets monotonous. As far as the eye can reach, low, 
undulating ridges stretch out in unbroken succession in every 
direction. On entering the lake district, the scenery again becomes 
interesting and attractive. A few Indians are occasionally seen 
along the line near their reservations ; they sell curios, such as bead 


pouches and polished buffalo boras ; as a rule they wear some sort of 
European clothes, and have a great taste for gorgeously coloured 

At F<Mt William the train may be exchanged for the steamer on 
Lake Superior, and twenty-four hours' run on this Inland Sea, where 
nothing is to be seen but an occasional mirage, bring the voyager 
to the two towns, one Canadian, the other American, both called 
Sante Ste. Marie. Huge locks here take the vessel down to Lake 
Huron, which it crosses to Owen Sound, whence there is a short 
railway journey to Toronto. 

From Toronto a whole day may well be devoted to a visit to 
Niagara, easily reached by steamer across Lake Ontario, thence by 
electric railway passing the whirlpool and rapids to the Falls. Both 
Canadian and American sides and Goat Island are now laid out 
in ornamental gardens and parks ; and as, when looking at the Falls, 
the suspension and railway bridges and factory chimneys on the 
American side are behind, they do not detract from the magnificent 
effect One of the best views is to be had from a little steamer 
called TJie Maid of the Mist^ which makes trips close under the foot 
of the Falls, all the passengers being clad in oil-skins, as a pro- 
tection against the blinding spray, which is thrown up again higher 
than the Falls themselves, and often blown a quarter of a n}ile down 
the river. In the museum here is shown the barrel in which a lady 
successfully went over the Falls. From Toronto to Montreal it is 
possible to travel by train ; a night's journey in a sleeping-car, or by 
river steamer down the St. Lawrence, through the thousand isles 
and rapids, which takes two days. 

At Montreal the French Canadians are first met with in any 
numbers ; they enjoy great freedom of laws and language, and if 
they are not content and loyal they ought to be. 

Between all Canadians and Americans is keen rivalry; they 
have a great deal of intercourse, and are always competing against 
each other in all kinds of sports ; but the Canadians never show 
the slightest desire that Canada should join the States. On the 
contrary, though they have acquired or adopted many of the 
American customs, they strongly object if mistaken for Americans ; 
and on the other hand, Americans dislike to be mistaken for 

The volunteer drill-hall and armoury at Montreal consists of a 
very fine large central hall, from the sides and galleries of which 
open a number of rooms belonging to the various regiments, among 
which are Highlander and French Canadian corps. Each regiment 
has a room for arms and accoutrements, a mess-room for N.CO.'s, 
and another for ofiicers. All ranks are very keen and smart, and 


any night op to ten o'clock some of them may be seen drilling on 
the Champs de Mars. Quebec, an afternoon's train journey from 
Montreal, is one of the most fascinating old places in the world ; 
it is built on a steep slope rising from the St Lawrence to the 
Heights of Abraham. The ancient citadel now garrisoned by 
Artillery Militia of the ** Permanent Forces," with numbers of old 
French mediaeval houses, and the statues of such men as Champlain, 
Frontignac, Wolfe and Montcalm recall many historic memories.* 
The Senate house of the State of Quebec, a fine modem building, 
has rows of niches along its front in which are placed statues of all 
famous men in the history of the place, and the motto, '' Je m*en 
soaviens" is here inscribed. In the foreground of the principal 
entrance is a most artistic group in bronze of Indians. 

Walking over the plains of Abraham a good idea can still be 
formed of how the great battle was fought there ; just under the 
last ridge, the capture of which would g^ve the assailants command 
of the citadel, is a plain stone obelisk inscribed, *' Here died Wolfe, 
victorious/* Besides this there are many other things of historical 
interest to be seen. 

To cross the Atlantic the traveller may either go to New York, 
and choose one of the lines from there to Liverpool or Southampton ; 
or take a Canadian line from Montreal or Quebec in sunamer, 
Halifax in winter. The latter way there is not so much chance of 
being crowded up, and the Allan Line have most comfortable boats 
leaving Montreal once a week for Liverpool viA Moville on Lough 
Foyle ; they take practically the same time as the average New 
York boats, and in some ways are much preferable ; they can be 
joined at Quebec Crossing the Atlantic in the beginning of June, 
it was much pleasanter than the Pacific a month previous. At this 
time of year the ice is drifting south, and off the Newfoundland 
banks we met with many large icebergs, they are a very pretty 
sight, but dangerous at night, especially when nearly submerged ; 
extra care is always taken till the vessel meets the Gulf stream, 
when all danger from ice is over. The first land sighted in the 
British Isles is Malin Head in the North of Ireland, and the Allan 
steamer enters Lough Foyle and, after landing the mails and a few 
passengers, proceeds at once to Liverpool, whence special trains are 
always ready to start for LondorL 

♦ Major W. Wood's valuable book, 'The Fight for Canada,' is reviewed ia this 
number. — Ed. U. S. M* 



The Engineer reports a revolutionary change in the Warroir 
class of British cruisers. The ten 6-inch guns mounted in the main 
deck battery, 14 feet above the water-h'ne, all disappear, and their 
places will be taken by four 7"S-inch guns, which, however, will be 
mounted on the upper deck between tiie amidship 9*2 -inch turrets. 
This gives a height of 22 feet above the water-line, which, in 
turn, entails increased command, range, and ability to fight in all 
weathers. But the result is heavy rolling. The French, however, 
place the guns in their latest vessels 28 feet or so above the water. 


The annual course of ballooning in Austria-Hungary com- 
menced on the 1st May, and will continue till the 30th September. 
It is being followed by 17 officers, lieutenants or sub-lieutenants, 
1 1 of whom belong to the infantry, i to the pioneers, 3 to the 
artillery, and 2 to the navy ; 45 men from the fortress artillery, 40 
from the pioneers, 5 from the railway regiment, 44 artillery drivers 
with 2 non-commissioned officers, and 82 saddle or draft-horses 
have been placed at the disposal of the staff of the School of 
Ballooning for this course. Two manoeuvres with troops, which 
may last for 14 days, will take place at the camp at Bruck 00 the 
Leitha during the course, with a view of exercising pupil officers in 
observing the movements of troops. 


The Technical Military Academy, which has been for some 
time stationed at Vienna, and where a large proportion of the 
Austro-Hungarian officers of the artillery and the engineers are 
trained, will be transferred, at the commencement of the scholastic 
year 1904-5, to Modling, some kilometres distant from the 


The French Grand Manoeuvres, which will take place this year 
in the C6te d'Or, under the direction of General Brugire, will 
consist : — 

1st Division Manoeuvres on the 5th and 6th September. The 
7th will be a day of rest. 

2nd Army Corps Manoeuvres from the 8th to the 13th 
September, with i day for rest 

3rd Army Manoeuvres against a skeleton enemy, finishing with 
a review in the neighbourhood of J)ijon, on the 14th and 15th 



The France MUitaire in a very readable article draws attention 
to an error which obtains not only abroad but also in France itself, 
viz. that when speaking of the so-called Alpine troops, as a rule 
only the Alpine battalions are understood. That a portion of the 
French infantry is also to be reckoned amongst the Alpine troops 
is but little understood. There are, nevertheless, in the XlVth 
and XVth Army Corps a g^at many battalions which are trained 
on precisely similar lines as the Alpine Chasseur battalions for 
mountain sennce in the Alps, and assist the latter for nearly half 
the year in gajrisoning mountain posts, and frequently experience 
very great hardships during their winter service in those regions. 
Such battalions are to be found \^ith the 30th, ssth, 58th, 97th, 
I nth, 1 1 2th. 140th, 157th, and 159th raiments. That belonging 
to the 97th regiment is especially similar to the Alpine Chasseurs 
raised for service in the Alps, for the men not only wear similar 
clothing, but the waggons are also drawn by mules. In short, all 
the infantry Alpine troops are clothed like the Alpine Chasseur 
battalions, even to their red breeches, the peculiar caps or barretu 
the wading stockings, Alpine-stock, the woollen putties, skis, and 
protections against the snow. 


At present the horse artillery brigade division usually attached 
to the cavalry division in Germany (divisions of 3 brigades are 
formed every year for manoeuvres) consists of 2 batteries of 6 
guns, or 12 guns per division. In the February number of that 
excellent journal, Xhe JaJtrbiichr fiir die detiUcJieArmeeand Marine^ 
General Rohne, studying the new organisation to be given to 
artillery, proposes to transform this brigade division of 2 batteries 
of 6 guns into one of 3 batteries of 4 guns each. He is of opinion 
that thus considerable progress would be made, without the addition 
of a single man, gun, or waggon, to the artillery of the cavalry 
division, for the ammunition wagons now belonging to the 2 
batteries of 6 g^ns would be equally distributed amongst the 3 
batteries of 4 guns, and the latter would be better officered and more 
easily handled, which is a most important factor in cavalry acticms. 

This organisation of the brigade division would also permit of 
the attachment of a battery to a cavalry brigade that was temporarily 
detached, without cutting the divisional artillery in two, as is the 
case at present The General considers it unnecessary to increase 
the present number of ammunition waggons with the horse 
artillery brigade divisions, because during its strategic rdle cavalry 
requires the expenditure of relatively little ammunition. Should 
it intervene in a battle, it would be in the proximity of Army 
Corps, and its batteries could then be supplied from the ammuni- 
tion columns of the nearest Army Corps without any difficulty. 


The Netie Militdrische Blatter announces that the Naval 
Autumn Manoeuvres will commence this year on the 15th August. 
They will consist of combined manoeuvres with the Regular Armyi 


very probably in combination with the Imperial Manoeuvres. These 
combined manoeuvres will tak^ place in the neighbourhood of the 
Bay of Neustadt. Should this intelligence be confirmed, it will be a 
further proof, if one were needed, of the importance attached in 
Germany to combined naval and military operations, and affords an 
example of what we would do well to emulate in Great Britain. 


In addition to the usual district autumn manoeuvres, and a 
grand ride of the General Staff and Cavalry, the following special 
manoeuvres have been ordered in Italy, viz. Manoeuvres in the 
Alps in the district of the Vth (Verona) Army Corps, from the ist 
to the 8th September, in which the following troops will take part : 
3 mixed infantry brigades, the 5th, 6th, and 7th Alpine Regiments, 
each strengthened by 2 companies of Mobile Militia, 2 Alpine Mobile 
Militia battalions, and the Venetian Mountain Artillery Brigade. A 
landing manoeuvre will be carried out in the district of the Xth 
(Naples) Army Corps, from the ist to the loth September, in which 
the following troops will take part, viz. the troops of the Xth 
Army Corps, strengthened by reservists of 1878, and part of the 
Territorial Militia (those being specially called out who have been 
trained in the Coast Defence Companies). A reconnaissance 
manoeuvre will be carried out between Stradella and Cuneo, from 
the 26th August to the 4th September, in which the following 
troops will take part, viz. the Milan and the Victor Emanuel II. 
Lancer Regiments, and the Alessandria and Rome Cavalry 
Regiments, altogether 24 squadrons. 


The Moltke of Japan, a man "whose name is rarely heard, 
whose face is never seen, and whose web is spinning on all sides of 
the Russian forces, as was that of the illustrious Danish strategist 
when he locked Napoleon in Sedan." Such, says the Army and 
Navy Jcurnalj is General Fuskushima, as described by Mr. 
Poultney Bigelow, in an interesting article in a recent number of 
Harpers Weekly. Mr. Bigelow met General Fuskushima when 
the latter was military attach^ at the German Court, a few years 
before the Chino-Japanese War, and he tells several anecdotes 
illustrating the shrewdness of the Japanese General, who, while 
purposely passing himself off as of feeble mental capacity, was 
keenly observant of Western military methods and principles, which 
he was supposed to be incapable of understanding. Although, 
says Mr. Bigelow, he spoke seven languages, he never allowed any 
one to suspect that he knew anything but a few scraps of 

Russia also despised his intellect, for he was permitted to ride 
unmolested across Siberia, from Moscow to the Manchurian coast, 
counting telegraph poles, and taking notes of the position of 
bridges, welk, farms, and everything that would prove interesting 
to Japanese visitors who might come after him. 



A writer in the New York Evening Mail mentions the fact that 
the Japanese are excellent hand-to-hand fighters, and this has 
been amply confirmed by the account of the desperate gallantry of 
the Japanese troops at Uie battle of the Yalu. The courage that 
promotes this species of warfare they inherit from the Samurai, 
who fought with their formidable two-handed swords in the dajrs 
of junks and of bows and arrows. The Japanese soldiers of to-day 
dispense with the heavy old weapons, but their officers and troopers 
cany the sabre. The blade of these sabres is of Japanese work- 
manship, handed down from former times, and excels even that of 
Damascus. Skill in bayonet fighting is another thing that the 
Japanese infantry have attained in a remarkable degree. The 
strongest point of the Japanese Army, however, lies in the readiness 
and eagerness of the infantry to charge. In no battle other than 
that fought by Japanese, has been shown so much recklessness and 
daring spirit in the tokkau (rush or rally), and no commander 
ether than the Japanese resorts to these tactics so frequently. 



The S^iss recruiting operations last year dealt with 42,010 
men, of whom rather more than 48 per cent were found fit for 
service. The number of recruits called out amounted to 15,9^ 
men, of whom 15,664 were actually exercised. Of these Iii34^ 
were sent to the infantry, 580 to the cavalry, and 17 10 to the 
artillery and transport. The effective strength of the Army on the 
1st January, 1904, amounted to 147,861 men in the Regular Army, 
63,094 in the ist Levy of the Landwehr, 25,476 in the 2nd Levy 
of the Landwehr. Total 236,431 men. 

It should be observed that 40,797 men of the ist Levy of the 
Landwehr belong to the field troops, whose total streng^th amounts, 
consequently, to 188,658 men. The men obliged to serve in the 
combatant branch of the Landsturm amount to 45,864, and in 
the non-combatant branch to 248,524 men. 


The Swiss Federal Chambers have recently adopted the new 
reorganisation scheme recommended by the Federal Council in 
consequence of the adoption of new Q.F. maiiriel; 72 batteries of 
4 guns each will be formed in place of the present 56 batteries of 6 
guns each, or 1 8 batteries more, but 48 guns less ; 2 to 3 batteries 
will form a brigade division ; 2 to 3 brigade divisions will form a 
field artillery regiment. According to arrangements, brigade 
divisions of 3 batteries will be the rule ; as regards the composition 
of the regiment, it will be adapted to the organisation of the large 
units ; the question with regard to the abolition of corps artillery 
remains an open one. 

Effectives of batteries, brigade divisions, and regiments will be 
fixed provisionally by decrees of the Federal Council. The 
allowance of ammunition is fixed at 8co rounds per gun, instead of 
500 as at present ; the battery will thus be supplied with 32CX)r 


instead of with 3000 rounds. The total number of waggons remains 
as formerly ; but the new battery consists of 4 guns, 10 ammunition 
waggons, I six-horse waggon with forge and kitchen, 1 six-horse 
van, and 2 two-horse provision waggons. Each battery will, in 
addition, have 8 ammunition waggons parked. 


The Bishop of St. Albans presided over the annual meeting of 
The Missions to Seamen held in the Church House, Westminster, 
on Tuesday, May loth. This Society makes spiritual provision 
for sailors and fishermen, lightshipmen and bargemen of many 
nationalities and creeds, in fifty-six harbours at home and twenty 
abroad. The total income for the year 1903 amounted to ;£'49,70i, 
or more than six times what it was thirty years ago. Still in many 
ports abroad the shipping are destitute of religious ministrations. 
The additional contributions given for that purpose have not yet 
sufficed to make up the ;^200 a year required for each chaplaincy, 
and so to enable the Society to respond to the invitations of the 
Bishops of Melbourne, Rangoon, and Falkland Islands to send out 
chaplains to serve the British shipping in their harbours. Appeals 
-are made for increased funds to employ additional chaplains and 
readers to serve our shipping when in'ports abroad, and to strengthen 
the work in harbours at home. Contributions may be sent to the 
Lay Secretary, Commander W. Dawson, R.N., The Missions to 
Seamen, 1 1, Buckingham Street, Strand, London, W.C. 



With Sketches of some of his Guests and 


By the late GEORGE Robert Gleig, M.A., Chaplain-General to her Majesty's 
Forces, &c. Author of * The Subaltern.' Edited by his daughter, Mary 
E. Gleig. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 
MCMIV. Price 15J. net. 

Miss Gleig claims for her father that, although verging upon 
his ninetieth year, his mind was as clear and his pen as vigorous 
when he wrote his reminiscences as at any period of his life ; and 
it is possible that in making this statement she may have been 
not entirely impartial. But if that be so, then the conclusion to 
which the reader must be led is that the late chaplain-general has 
been admirably served by an extremely capable editor, whose 

VOL. CL. 22 



labours have not only been inspired 1^ natural affection, but also 
aided by rare ability for the task. 

It will be a surprise to many to find that the soldier-chaplain, 
whose name is so familiar to us. adds but little in this volume to 
our knowledge of the Duke of Wellington from the military point 
of view. In Spain Mr. Gleig saw the Duke only twice, and has 
not much of any importance to relate in connection with iHese 
meetings. It is of the Duke as a man that we are invited to 
think ; and although Mr. Gleig denies any intention to speak of 
him as a soldier or as a statesman, politics run through the whole 
book, and altogether monopolise the greater part of it. The 
admiration and respect entertained by Mr. Gleig for the great man, 
with whom for many years he lived upon terms of close friendship, 
were boundless ; the Duke's life was the life of a statesman, and, 
consequently, matters of State were too intimately connected with 
his every thought and action to admit of their being placed other- 
wise than in the foreground of so detailed a sketch. It would be 
untrue to say that Mr. Gleig agreed always with the Duke's 
opinions, but it is very certain that he served him, and aided him 
too, with a loyalty and devotion that was beyond all praise. Mr. 
Gleig had a real genius for political diplomacy, and by his tact as 
well as sound conunon sense, he frequently succeeded in smoothing 
over the difficulties that obstructed the relations of the Duke with 
various members of his party. He had a full mastery of the issues 
involved in all their bearings, from the greatest to the most trivial 
items, and obstinate as the Duke undeniably was, Mr. Gleig was 
sometimes successful in convincing him of the necessity to make 
reasonable compromises. 

Unlike some of his contemporaries, and also of his successors in 
the arena of Party Government, the Duke was immovable upon 
any matter in which he conceived that his onn honour or that of 
his sovereign was involved, and in such cases it would have beoi 
useless for Mr. Gleig or any one else to approach him, even if it 
had been desired to do so. Yet, obstinate as he might be, and in 
some cases prejudiced, he was open to conviction. For example: 
as we all know, the Duke regarded the " Brown Bess " as the queen 
of victory; yet, when actually shown the performances of the 
"Minie" by Sir George Brown, he was converted — to his oau 
regret He hated the change, but recognised the necessity. Nor 
were his objections without reason ; h^^ view was, as it is now 
the opinion of Lord Roberts, that the fire-fight at short ranges 
must usually furnish the real decision. The Brown Bess could be 
fired nearly three times as quickly as the Mini^, and this, he 
thought, counter-balanced the greater range of the latter. But when 
he saw with his own eyes how accuracy was combined with long 
range in the case of the rifle, he yielded. 

From the political point of view, the most interesting chapters 
are those relating to the days of the great riots and of the Reform 
Bill ; but of little less interest are the word portraits and remarks 
made by Mr. Gleig of the statesmen and others who were the Duke's 
guests. Of the Arbuthnots, too, a good deal is said, and Mr. Gleig 
totally denies the truth of the insinuations that have so frequently 


been made. One excellent reason given against the more usual 
opinion is that, with his extremely fine sense of honour, the Duke 
himself could not have tolerated Mr. Arbuthnot if the latter had 
been content to act the complacent part assigned to him by 

The Duke's opinions of various politicians are deeply interest- 
ing ; but for the soldier-reader his remarks upon Marlborough, 
Moore, Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and others, will naturally 
have especial attraction ; though even more than these references 
to individuals, will his detailed criticism of Napoleon's Russian 
campaign, which is given as an appendix. There are very many 
officers who have never previously had an opportunity of reading 
this careful examination of all the proceedings of the Emperor, of 
his opponents and of his subordinates, that contributed towards so 
mighty a disaster. 

It is very interesting to note that, according to Mr. Gleig, the 
Duke, in his political contests, " fought for the Crown as the head,^. 
not of the United Kingdom only, but of the great British Empire." 
This is the sentiment that should prevail more generally to-day ^ 
for it is by the influence of loyalty to the common sovereign that 
the links of our Empire are maintained, and can alone be 
strengthened. " Fiscal Policy," and the like, will influence those 
whom it may suit to adopt them ; but it is only for the sake of 
their loyalty to the Throne that people at home and in the Colonies 
will nerve themselves to do their duty to the Empire. 

Mr. Gleig's task has been admirably performed. The 
voluminous correspondence with the Duke, and the accounts of 
conversations with him, upon all sorts of subjects, give the character 
of the man in a clear light. The book is altogether excellent from 
every point of view, and is one that will often be taken up again,^ 
however carefully it may have at first been read. 

A History of his Administration, 1868- 1874. 

By General Sir Robert Biddulph, G.C.B., G.C.M.G. With a Portrait. 
London : John Murray, Albemarle Street, W. 1904. Price 9J. net. 

The Crimean war demonstrated the rottenness of the British 
military system, and the steps taken to remedy the mischief 
having been hastily conceived by ignorant people out of their own 
conceit, consequently rendered the last state worse than the first: 
It was reserved for Lord Cardwell to execute a root and branch 
reform, which presents no really serious defects at the present 
day except the fact that it has never been completely applied. 
" Squeezed lemons," provisional battalions, and such-like inefficient 
absurdities never entered into the philosophy of Lord Cardwell, nor 
into that of Sir Garnet Wolseley by whom all the best of Mr. 



Cardwell s refomis were inspired, but to whom Sir Robert Biddulph 
does not asstc^n the credit for them that is his due. 

The qualincations required for the civilian head of the Anny 

arc brains, courage, common sense, and ''strength." Mr. Cardwell 

had all these qualities in a very high degree, and it is because of 

this that be stands a bead and shoulders above all others who have 

occupied the same position ; not really so much because of his 

ccdenlably greater achievements as upon account of his entire 

::tDcss for the office. \\*hat Mr. Cardwell thoroughly understood, 

and what was the secret of his success, was the art of usiug other 

people 5 brains and yet reserving to himself the decision upon the 

carter in reference to which ad\'ice was asked or tendered More 

than thiSw however. Mr. Cardwell was himself a man of ideas, and 

in all cases where the statesman's \'iews are as good if not better 

thas the nrere soldier's, he was ever equal to the occasion ; he was 

ir: favxxir of compulsory service for the militia, and as long ago as 

!>.«> be m-TV?te a memorandum in which he advocated what we now 

rr^rard as quite a new idea; namely, putting the Navy and the 

.\rrr.y cr.ier a single * Minister of Defence." The objection to this 

yrccv^sal. of cccrsc is that the Prime Minister being, under the 

Cro«r. the nr^ai authority, it is better that his influence should be 

c ^^:tIy brought to bear, and this has now been provided for 

cnicr the Esber scheme, by which the Defence Committee, with 

the Frlnte Minister as chairman, is placed in strat^cal control of 

bvvh tbe Sen ices. 

The grea^e^t achievements of Mr. Cardwell were the creation of 
th^ Ansy Reserve by the introduction of short service, and the 
aS^.:.c*f: of rcniis^ : but a very noteworthy feature of his 
ji.' r:t:::::v:ra:L"c was his success in recondlii^ efficiency with economy. 
K/'^c.<=!C>- cochin^ w>cli induce him to aband(»i, and, when pressed 
by Mr Oljios^vCe. be made it clear at once that his resignation 
wjLS the al^^rruitiw: to compliance with the demands he considered 
r<v>«5>vir\\ Fy sirzilar nrsmess he also overcame the Treasury, of 
^ i^\» KX-' Aocs in dealing with the Anny he had a poor opinioa 
t;c Kx::*.: thit e5.c:eEcy and economy were at war, and that **the 
^>v\c ;v .,i:jLr>^ acrainistration of Great Britain had been organised 
ot! A 5i>^^^MV. vV want o; trust * just in fact the situation exposed by 
tb\"^ I >ier Cv\rnii:tee— and which Lord Halliburton, Sir Ralph 
K:x\x. Jir^: oAer:? wv^Id perpetuate. 

>^ KX^vit F.^iiul.irs interestii^ volume contains a wealth of 
l.ic;^ jitt J r^urv> coca<xtevi with the histoi>- of Army administration 
c\:: ^^ :ise ;*v:'.;> \^:ar? irvxa i:?54 to 1874 ; and in a great measure 
w 4^^^ ^:\s^h: c/ to di^^ by frequent references to the conditions 
V-; :o v\x\. \\ •>. the exorr:ion of one regrettable omission, already 
K xHvxi ^\ t>>e Kv^ aj'-txrirs to be one of which few will be found 
^- vu- ^r\ :> r^ b^^t ^hut is gooA The Army was fortunate in 
hAX \^ l.o:u CA:v^^^:: 05 Scoetarj- of State, and Lord Cardwell 
^.i^ .uxv^ S.vis K^:uturs'^ in ha\-:-^^' Sir Robert Biddulph for his 
i a\-,aaSsH. Ns- nv:nVcr o:^ rarliament who has not carefully 
xI^.n' >m •.> >i K\ ^v >>oc:s: jwsun::^ to open his mouth upon Anny 



By Lieut. -Colonel W. L. Hime. London : Longmans, Green & Co. 1904. 

Price 9^. 

The Army gladly welcomes this book. It will be interesting to 
chemists and scientific men, it will be exhilarating to soldiers, and 
it is to be trusted that it will also be disconcerting to the foreign 
pedants who delight in ridiculing British officers, and with Teutonic 
elegance deride the eflTorts, past and present, of our artillery. But 
chiefly will many rejoice to find Colonel Hime again at work, and 
placing the results of his great knowledge and research at the 
disposal of his brother officers. The man who thirty years ago 
proved that our reliance on voluntary service must fail, and advo- 
cated conscription in that brilliant essay which gained the gold 
medal of the Royal United Institution, would, it is safe to say, in 
any other army have found a place high in honour and usefulness. 
It seemed otherwise to the potentates who controlled the destinies, 
of our officers in the seventies ; it will appear inexplicable to those, 
who read these pages in these latter days when intellect and, 
industry are supposed to have come by their own at last. Here is. 
a man >\''ho, as these pages attest, possesses a knowledge of history 
and general literature probably not only unsurpassed, but unrivalled 
amongst the students of military science of our race. He picks up 
his pen once more to set an English searcher after scientific truth, 
firmly on the pedestal whence an effort has been made to oust him,, 
and to vindicate the claim of an English gunner against the 
detractors who have ventured to belittle him in Germany. In brief, 
he launches forth to prove that Roger Bacon was the discoverer of 
gunpowder, and that Shrapnel was the one and only begetter of. 
that projectile which has added a new word to language, and made 
his name famous throughout the world. Step by step, with patience 
illimitable, with knowledge profound, in words so moderate and 
convincing as to become invested with a judicial flavour, is the., 
argument as to the achievement of Roger Bacon built up. The 
performances of the Greeks, the Arabs, the Chinese, and the Hindus 
in the art of manufacturing incendiary, and so-called explosive 
compositions are examined. A precis of a whole library of learning 
is exhibited in the investigation, such as will stagger those who 
would have us believe that our oflicers are all stupid, and that 
education was almost in vain to be sought for amongst them in the 
past From Sanscrit to French, almost every language with any- 
pretence to a literature, is here cited at first hand. From Froissart 
to Moossom, every writer on military subjects is subpoenaed, every 
action bearing on the subject from the siege of Syracuse to that of 
Charleston is discussed. The writer shows himself as familiar with 
Syriac as with German, and establishes the fact that the qualities 
of saltpetre were unknown until the second quarter of the Thirteenth 
Century. Then comes his great coup. Colonel Hime has succeeded 
in elucidating a steganogram of Bacon's, which when he lifts the 
veil shows us plainly how that man of genius placed the secret of 


gunpowder on record for the benefit of the illuminati. Wrapped 
under swathings of apparent nonsense the recipe has Iain for 
centuries ; but it is open to us all to read now, and it is doubt- 
ful whether any man will rise from the perusal of Chapter yill. 
without a sensation of absolute conviction. On this point no more 
need be said. To follow the shrewd reasoning which bit by bit 
piles up the argument, and finally clinches it with so brilliant a 
flash, is a real pleasure of which it is to be hoped that many will 
avail themselves, and from which it would be a sin to detract 
by any piecemeal revelations here. Then Colonel Hime turns 
upon those Germans who have presumed to question Shrapnel's 
claim to the invention of the shell that has revolutionised modem 
warfare. They betray an elementary ignorance in their effort to 
establish a rival in his field. Zimmermann wanted to put a bursting 
charge at a maximum in his suggested shell. In these enlightened 
days no doubt every half-lieutenant is aware that the essence of 
Shrapnel's system was to make the bursting charge a minimum. 
Zimmermann intended, it is clear, not only that his bursting charge 
should open the case, but that it should accelerate the velocity of , 
the bullets. That, the same half-lieutenant will be aware, is not the 
reason why Shrapnel shells contain bursting charges, and he will 
recognise at once that Zimmermann was groping about blindly for 
that projectile which the British gunner. Shrapnel, found in 1784. 
Gladly do we concede all honour to Zimmermann as an artillerist 
in advance of his age, but it is not to be wondered at that an effort 
to give him the credit for the great invention that belongs to our 
countryman should be resented by so representative a gunner as 
Colonel Hime. It may be added that much unprofitable contro- 
versy would have been prevented had foreign critics taken pains to 
make themselves acquainted with the nature of ShrapneFs spherical 
case before discussing the history of the projectile he has given his 
name to. 

Per contra there is cause for satisfaction and congratulation that 
their action has drawn from his tent so very redoubtable a champion 
as the author whose invaluable pages form the subject of these 


SINCE 1866/ 

By T. Miller Maguire, LL.D., Inner Temple, Barrister- at-Law. London : 
HughRees, Ltd., 124, Pall Mall, S.W. 1904. Price 3^. 6^. net. 

The authorities, with characteristic light-heartedness, have ruled 
that the Historj'' and Development of ^the Tactics of the Three 
Arms since 1 866 shall be one of the subjects for future examina- 
tions, but without troubling themselves about the absence of a 
text-book. Dr. Maguire has supplied what was wanting ; and it 
is needless to say that the task could not have been placed in 
better hands. The lack of official sanction is of no great importance, 


except, perhaps, in referefice to the sale of the book, and candidates 
who take the trouble to study intelligently what Dr. Maguire has 
provided for them need be under no apprehension as to being 
imperfectly prepared for any questions that can be set before them. 

Changes of weapons involve modifications in the application of 
tactical principles ; it has beeif said tliat such modifications are 
required every ten years. But the fundamental principles of tactics 
have never and can never be altered — except in the imaginations 
of the foolish. War is too old a science to admit of any fresh 
discoveries in the methods of making it successfully. The only 
differences between the sling, with which David slew Goliath, and a 
magazine rifle, are that the latter has a longer range, is more 
weighty and cumbersome to carry, and needs ammunition that 
cannot be picked out of a gravel pit or from the bed of a brook. 
David denied to his foe the opportunity of using his sword and 
spear, and secured for himself all the advantages of the missile 
weapon with which he was armed. To obtain similar advantages 
against an equally well-armed adversary the secret lies in the cunning 
" use of ground." It has ever been so ; and what applies to single 
combat applies also to the shock of armies. But the British Army 
is always deaf and blind ; the teachings of history are invariably 
lost upon it, and hence the rush to extremes that has resulted from 
the so called " lessons of the Boer war." With all these Dr. Maguire 
deals, giving a wealth of quotations from the Boer war itself as well 
as from others. 

Commencing with a general introduction of the whole subject 
of war and the influences brought to bear upon it, Dr. Maguire 
gives details of armaments, reviews the tactical effects of the various 
weapons, and presents a summary of the tactical changes that have 
resulted from great campaigns. Chapter IV. contains "General 
Remarks upon the Tactics of To-day," and then follow, in Chapter V., 
" Some Examples of Modern Battles," commencing with Koniggratz 
and ending with Elandslaagte. In the appendix, the author says 
that after reading the German account of the Boer War, he sees no 
reason to modify any of the views that he has expressed, and also 
quotes from the very able standing orders issued by General Kelly 
Kenny to the Sixth Infantry Division. Such are the contents of 
the volume. 

Just one thing Dr. Maguire has omitted that would have been 
of great value to the young officers ; he has not given, in brief, the 
particular lesson of a general character that is taught by each of 
the several battles that he quotes as examples. For instance, in 
the case of Koniggratz, it might have been pointed out that it is 
not well to await the attack of hostile forces converging upon the 
battlefield, instead of striking hard at one of them ; and, secondly, 
that it is an error to dispose troops in such depth that the army 
can be beaten though a large proportion of it has been unable to 
come into action. Then, again, there is the general lesson from 
the Austro-Prussian and the Franco-German wars that the man 
and his leader, not the weapons, decide the fate of battles. The 
superiority of the needle-gun no doubt aided the Prussians against 
the Austrians, but the superiority of the Chassepot failed to give 


victory to the French. The army that is the better trained and 
handled will win, in spite of any inferiority of weapons, unless the 
numerical odds against it are altogether over-powering. The 
savages, whom we are accustomed to defeat in little wars, might 
more often turn the tables against us were it not that they usually 
play our game for us, by charging over a fair field of fire, in place 
of waiting patiently for their opportunity to fall upon us in the bush 
or on broken ground. There are lessons in everything done and 
left undone in war, just as there are lessons for the reader, be he 
general or subaltern, in every page of Dr. Maguire's admirable 
little book. 


A Naval and Military Sketch from the History 

OF THE Great Imperial War. 

By William Wood, Major, Sth Royal Rifles, Canadian Militia, Secretary 
Quebec Branch of the Navy League, President Literaiy and Historical 
Society of Quebec. Westminster : Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., 2, 
Whitehall Gardens. 1904. Price 21s, net. 

The names of Wolfe and Montcalm are familiar to every schoolboy, 
and also the result of the historic fight on the Plains of Abraham, 
during which the equally gallant and skilful commanders of the 
French and English Armies both received their mortal wounds. 
But only a comparatively small number of people know more about 
the action than that Wolfe's force gained the heights, by surprise, 
during the night, and defeated the French in the morning. Not 
only is there a general ignorance of details ; of the difficulties 
opposed to Montcalm by the arrogance, malignity, dishonesty, and 
foolishness of Vaudreuil the governor-general ; or of the niggardly 
procrastination of the British Government in providing the needful 
funds and supplies for Wolfe ; but in addition to this, the part 
played by the Navy — in short, the influence of sea-power upon the 
campaign — is practically ignored. In actual fact, it was the 
supremacy of the Navy on the ocean, and the assistance rendered 
in the St. Lawrence itself, that enabled Wolfe to bring his opera- 
tions to a successful issue, and eventually saved Quebec from re- 
capture by the French, whose attempt under L^vis had almost 
proved victorious, when the return of the British fleet compelled 
him to abandon the enterprise. 

The story of the entire campaign, so ably narrated by Major 
Wood, is intensely interesting, not only to naval and military, but 
also to civilian readers. Thanks to the facilities placed at his 
disposal by Mr. Doughty, and to his own local knowledge and 
researches, Major Wood has been placed in a position to deal 
exhaustively with the most minute details, from the commence- 
ment of the campaign to the surrender of Montreal and the cession 
of the Dominion. 


The baneful influence of Vaudrelul, and of the even more 

infamous Bigot and Cadet, undoubtedly contributed far m6re 

than the skill and gallantry of Wolfe to the loss of Canada by 

France. Montcalm was at least equal to Wolfe as a general, and 

the forces nominally at the disposal of the former were considerably 

superior in numbers though inferior in quality to those of the latter ; 

but all Montcalm's generalship was counterbalanced by the ignorant 

interference of the rascally Vaudreiul, who even after Wolfe had 

effected his landing, still denied to Montcalm the power to dispose 

the available troops for battle, and even neglected to supply the 

early information that had been brought to himself. That Wolfe's 

landing was unopposed, was, moreover, due to the fact that 

Vaudreiul had taken upon himself to remove the troops that had 

been placed by Montcalm to meet any possible attempt in the 

locality where it took place. As Major Wood says in his preface,. 

" The famous definition of dirt, as * matter in the wrong place,* was 

never more admirably exemplified than by those intermeddling 

politicians who, like their successors in the present day, are always 

out of place in naval and military affairs." Major Wood, however^ 

was not in this sentence referring especially to Vaudreiul, but to 

the equally corrupt politicians who were, at the time, a curse to the 

mother countries of England and France. Party politics are, in 

the United Kingdom at this very day, just as they were a hundred 

and fifty years ago, as antagonistic to patriotism as oil to water. 

The Bastard Fauconbridge prophesied immunity from danger for 

England, even in face of the " four comers of the world in arms," 

provided " England to itself do rest but true." That England has 

been mercifully preserved, in spite of the fact that the prescribed 

condition of her safety has never been complied with for one single 

day, is the only real " wonder of the world." Vaudreiul and his 

base confederates, Bigot and Cadet, indeed ruined Canada, in 

order to enrich themselves, but these were mere rogues — common 

thieves — and as such deserving of the gallows, no whit more than 

the hypocritical politicians who, from their high places in England, 

have fought against her with lying lips— for what ? Office ; at any 

cost to t/ieir country t 

* The Fight for Canada ' is a most facinating book that must itself 
be read in order to be fully appreciated as it deserves. To detail its 
virtues, be it as history or as a critical narrative of combined naval 
and military operations, would need many pages of this Magazine ;. 
but its faults can be told in a very few words : (i) A general map 
would have been a convenience, and the map of Quebec itself is 
clumsy — it would have been better in parts facing the text. (2) 
The famous Sir Thomas Byam Martin, the heroic captain of the 
Imp/acad/e, is erroneously described as "Sir Theodore." Thus 
we have one alleged imperfection and one obvious inaccuracy to 
represent all that can be complained of in 363 pages of history, 
bibliography, and index. This should furnish sufficient proof of 
rather exceptional merit. 




For Promotion Examinations, Militia Entrance, 
Volunteer Classes, etc., etc. 

Compiled by Captain H. T. Russell, Royal Artillery. Author of 'The 
Employment of Artillery in the Field' and 'Practical Gunner\%' 
London: Gale & Polden, Ltd., 2, Amen Corner, E.C. Price 4J. net. 
post free. 

The author of this admirable little work has been far too modest 
in his dedication of it to the use of candidates for promotion. 
Militia entrance, and Volunteer classes ; Captain Russell's " notes " 
fully deserve the most careful study by every officer of whatever 
rank. The subject is carried from its root, National policy, to all 
its branches ; and the teachings of miUtary history are ably applied 
in order to fortify the opinions given. Strategy, as Captsdn 
Russell so truly says, is not only the business of generals, but 
also of statesmen ; " for the impulse to preparation for war must, 
during peace, be given by the statesman." Great Britain has never 
had a strategical policy, because the politicians who, with us, pass 
for statesmen have always regarded even international politics 
solely as means whereby to retain or obtain office. An unpatriotic 
people is ruled by such as it deserves to have — unpatriotic ministers. 
No exponent of a straightforward "right or wrong my country" 
policy can possibly secure the support of a united British nation. 
Thus, when we have, as the result of " masterly inactivity," drifted 
into war, the soldier has always been expected to make good the 
initial disadvantages that have resulted from the absence of 
strategical preparation. As Captain Russell very aptly remarks, 
*' Tactics is the handmaid of strategy, carrying out the orders of the 
latter. This being so, strategy must not demand more than tactics 
can perform." But this is just what always occurs under the policy 
of " muddle through." 

In this book, intended for British officers, the author has 
naturally treated his subject, not only comprehensively, but also 
in reference to "small wars." For example, whilst pointing out 
the general advantages of invasion by interior lines in the 
case of a great war, it is pointed out that, in the case of a small 
war, a savage enemy is likely to be more impressed by the advance 
of several widely separated columns, and would seldom be sufficiently 
astute to concentrate against one of them, whilst ignoring the rest. 
The value of the " initiative," and the influence of sea-power receive 
the attention they deserve, and also the disasters that have so often 
resulted from the strategical mistakes of meddling politicians — for 
example, Sedan. In reference to "Sea- Power," Captain Russell 
takes care to remind us that even after having swept the navy of a 
Continental opponent completely from the seas,. Great Britain, 
without an army, cannot count upon extorting favourable terms of 

. REVIEWS. 331 

peace. The Sultan of Turkey put all this in a nutshell when he 
remarked, '* Iron-clads cannot clicnb hills." A condition of " stale 
mate " would suit Great Britain even less than any of her possible 
adversaries ; and she must, therefore, if she is wise, create an Army 
capable of carrying on the war from the point at which the Navy 
has been compelled to arrest its victorious career on the sea. 

Space does not permit any attempt to follow the author 
throughout his very instructive, as well as interesting chapters; 
and it must now suffice to conclude with the assertion that so much 
excellent matter has very seldom been collected within such small 
compass. A number of blank pages, for notes, will be found at the 
end of the volume. A word of praise must be added for the 
definitions. For example, "The objective "is summarised as "a 
bulFs-eye marked upon the theatre of war." Too many generals 
as well as so-called *' statesmen" have constantly failed to realise 
this truth ; and not only missed the buU's-eye, but wasted their 
shots on the wrong target. 


'The Naval Development of the Century.' By Sir N. Barnaby, K.C.B. 
The Nineteenth Century Series. Chambers. 1904. Price 5 J. net. 

The chief fault to be found with this book is that it does not fulfil 
the promise of its title. The preface, indeed, gives warning that the 
subject is treated of from a shipbuilder's point of view, but even this 
notice is not strictly accurate. There are included, for instance, 
two chapters dealing with the legal and moral aspects of naval war, 
chapters which are interesting indeed when regarded from a political 
standpoint, but which are not immediately concerned with the art 
and progress of shipbuilding. The book, however, does bear out 
the preface in leaving questions of personnel severely alone ; and, 
seeing that changes in the entry and training of both men and 
officers have been of as revolutionary a character as the develop- 
ments of mat&iel, it is to be regretted that the author has confined 
himself to merely one half of the subject. The book is written for 
the general reader, and would, therefore, be all the better if it 
treated the subject comprehensively. As it is it deals sketchily 
with the early part of the century, and far more completely with 
the introduction of steam and armour-plated ships. With this 
period, of course, the author was intimately connected, especially the 
years 1870 to 1885, and his detailed examination of progress in 
those years has a special value of its own. The last fifteen years 
of the century, again, are not fully treated, and in respect of them 
the author's accuracy is at times at fault on minor points. The 
manuscript was completed tjvo years ago, and the narrative runs 
only to the end of the nineteenth century. 



Proceedings of the US. Naval Institute. March, 1904. No. 109. 

Vol. XXX. No. I. 

Included in the current issue is the Essay which has won the 
Institute's gold medal for the year. The author is Lieutenant b. r. 
Fullinwider, who deals with the matlriel and personnel of the Navy. 
Beginning with a consideration of what would be a desirable 
organisation for the existing fleet, he passes on to a demand for 
certain additions to the active strength of the Navy. It is to be 
noticed that in this respect the author is not revolutionary. The 
types for which he asks are battleships, big armoured cruisers, 
scouts similar to those now building in England, and destroyers. 
Also he shows a due appreciation of the value of fleet auxiliaries. 
The latter part of this essay deals with the entry and training of 
men, and from it one is led to the conclusion that the Americans 
think that by our recent reforms we have stolen a long march on 
them. The recent British reforms are not directly mentioned, but 
the author is profoundly dissatisfied with the existing state of things, 
and suggests changes which point to an appreciation of what has 
been done in this country. The essay which receives honourable 
mention is by Medical Inspector H. E. Ames, and deals entirely 
with the personnel^ advocating a higher physical, moral, and intel- 
lectual standard for the Navy. The remaining papers which will 
attract most attention are, one on cable cutting by Captain C. F. 
Goodrich, the other entitled ' The Movable Base,' by Civil Engineer 
A. C. Cunningham. Captain Goodrich deals entirely with the 
mechanical side of the question, and the experience he had of this 
work in (he late war gives his notes an extra value. The * movable 
base ' is to consist of a floating dock, in which the author has great 
faith, and of numerous fleet auxiliaries, gathered together at such a 
point as strategy may indicate. The Professional Notes are as 
welcome as usual. 


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This admirable little book is not for the use of beginners ; but is 
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it is with the latter that the author deals. Having had great 
practical experience of means and methods, Captain Simonds 1* 
enabled to give advice that others may follow with confidence, 
thereby saving themselves much trouble, and also ensuring the 


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No. 908.-JULK 1904. 


By Arnold White. 

The Anglo-French agreements, signed by Lord Lansdowne on 
the 8th April, 1904, are documents with which, in their spirit, any 
Foreign Minister may be proud to associate his name. What their 
effect will be is another matter. Almost by common consent the 
declarations relating to Newfoundland, West Africa, Egypt, Siam, 
Madagascar, and the New Hebrides are regarded as a final settle- 
ment of all our long-standing differences with France. On the 
barren field of prophecy all men are equal, and hence the lamp 
of history is the only light that can effectively illuminate the path 
into which Lord Lansdowne has led us. 

Differing from the majority of my fellow-countrymen as to the 
value of the " concessions " we have obtained from France, there is 
one omission from the agreements that is of so vital a character — 
i>. the retention by France of Miquelon and St. Pierre — that I 
venture to recall in some detail the facts relating to the sale of 
Louisiana, a century ago, by Spain to France, and by France to 
the United States of America, in order to show that the agreement 
just signed with France settles nothing, leaves the door open for 
strife the next time France and England are at variance, and 
whenever the Quai D'Orsay desires once again embHer les Anglais. 
The retention by France of St. Pierre and Miquelon gives her the 
power at any time of embroiling England, not only with Canada, 
but with the American Republic, by selling to the latter Power 
the islands, which ought never to have known any flag but that of 
England. The history of the transactions about to be related 
throws a clear light on the omission of our Foreign Office to make 
our agreement with France a reality and a settlement, and not the 

VOL. CL. 23 



superficial expression of the pleasant frame of mind that for the 
nonce possesses the two nations, rather as the result of consumtnate 
diplomacy by the King of England, than as the consequence of 
any fundamental change in our international relations with our 
neighbours across the Channel. 

The Treaty of St Ildephonso, concluded on the ist October, 
1800, between the French Republic and Spain, had given back 
Louisiana to France. 

The territorial extent of Louisiana was vast and ill-defioed. 
It was commonly held to extend to the sources of the Mississippi, 
and to comprise all the territories north of Mexico, and west of 
the great river. 

Louisiana, after having been granted at first to Antoni Crozax, 
and then to John Law, reverted to the French Crown in 1732. 
But, on the 3rd November, 1762, the Colony was transferred to 
Spain by a secret treaty. It is only on the i8th August, 1769, 
however, that the Spaniards took possession of it The Colonies 
wished to remain French, resisted, and appealed to VersaUles. 
The Spanish General O'Reilly landed at New Orleans with 3000 
men, and a cruel repression ensued ; six French officers were shot 
The treaty of 1783, by which England placed the United States 
in possession of the eastern bank of the Mississippi, did not, of 
course, affect the status of Louisiana. And it is only in 1800 that 
Bonaparte, through his brother Lucien, prevailed upon the all- 
powerful Godoy, Prince of the Peace, to cede back the Colony to 
France. It may be said, however, that already in 1795 Carnot 
had thought of retaking Louisiana, with the view to the establish- 
ment of a Republic there. 

As France was still at war with England, Bonaparte carefully 
avoided making public the cession granted by the Treaty of St 
Ildephonso. He had another^ reason for keeping silent on the 
subject. The relations of France with the United States were 
still strained. The misunderstanding between the two Republics 
dated from the period of the Terror, when Gouvemeur Morris, the 
American Minister in Paris, had shown himself openly hostile to 
the new French institutions. He had been recalled upon the request 
of the French Government, and Washington had commissioned 
in his place, on the 28th May, 1794, James Monroe, senator of 
Virginia. Monroe was a fierce opponent of the Federalist 
Administration, of which Washington was the head ; but his 
appointment, it was hoped, would be welcomed by the French and 
Republican party in America. 

Monroe reached Paris a few days after the fall of Robespierre. 
He was soon received by the Convention, and he expressed his 


sympathy with the French Republic in such an enthusiastic way 
that he became very popular. Washington, it is true, thought 
that the Ambassador's language was little in keeping with the 
United States' neutral policy. Meanwhile, John Jay, the American 
Minister in London, had negotiated a treaty of amity and commerce 
with England; and the Directory, furious in the belief that the 
earlier treaty of 1778 was violated by this, was inclined to resort 
to extreme measures. It was with difficulty that Monroe induced 
the Directory not to declare war. He vehemently protested 
against the treaty concluded by Jay, and called it *'a most 
shameful transaction." Washington recalled him on the 22nd 
August, 1796. Still, Monroe did not leave France before the 30th 

The* Directory refused to receive his successor. General C^ 
Pinckney, whom they considered to be an aristocrat It offended 
the United States Government in many other ways ; provocation 
followed provocation ; American ships were seized in the French 
ports, their crews were imprisoned, their cargoes confiscated. The 
Congress, nevertheless, wished to avoid resort to violent means. 
And Talleyrand having become Minister for Foreign Affairs, and 
expressing an earnest intention of settling in a friendly way all 
pending difficulties, three American Commissioners with pleins 
pouvoirs were sent to France (Oct 1797). 

They were soon surrounded, to their dismay, by intrigue under 
all its forms. "The most shameful cupidity showed itself un- 
masked in Paris, and expressed great surprise at not finding the 
Americans ready buyers of its favours," writes Barb^-Marbois. 
They were even reproached with " being more particular with the 
French than with the Redskins, whose tributaries they were.'^ 
Talleyrand offered to settle the difficulties if 1,200,000 francs were 
paid to him. The honest Americans refused to entertain the 
proposal, and negotiations, after having dragged on for about six 
months, were* broken. The animosity between the two Republics 
grew more and more. In the beginning of 1799 the Congress 
declared all friendly relations at an end. Hostilities at sea 
followed ; American merchant ships were captured by French 
corsairs. After a while, however, negotiations were resumed ; they 
assumed a serious character when Bonaparte became Consul A 
convention was signed on the 30th September, 1800 (just the 
day preceding the conclusion of the Treaty of St. Ildephonso). 
According to one of the stipulations of this convention, indemnities 
were to be paid to the United States for all illegal seizures of ships 
{pour toutes prises indAtnent faites). The American Minister at 
Paris, Livingston (generally known as Chancellor Livingston), had 



s dumsL He did so, but onsiiccessfiilly. 

On die iitfa December, 1802, 
TMre) letter to TaUQrnmd The 
lLi=. <2£r » Fofcag:: KKatinas made ao reply at the time ; but 00 
Mafci;. 1&35L Ire cjOMUuiii ra trd with LivingstCHi, leading 
sahsfKitory settlement was not far off. 
03t f^rssMs graia in France. He was un- 
a Gua of Exdiocre intellect ; lie bdcmged, mofcover, to 
FeocraZist parti, tbe American party whidi was anti-French 
i'^ ac:::r,:.^y, pro-Ec^SdL Since the cstaUishmeot of the 
£7c'rLc. two sTStc2s of garerament had divided the American 
tbe i^A was snpported t^ the advocates of strong 
bLc prsdp^csw desiroas to restrict the power of the superior 
i to icrtiiy the authority of each of the thirteen 
-»--c; «»««iB- Repcblkan or Democratic) could boast of 

the most able men of the United States. 
dei' jtc d ndther to France nor to Eaglaod, hot 
nd saw in the friendship of France a guarantee 
cc r^Qepecyrrr 

defended by men of conservative 
ticicsoiSL wbo toczied, with Washington at their head, the 
Fi-icralist rortr. Tlus party professed a deep admiration for 
rrltlii •=:5:Lritik:c5 ; it would have liked to strengthen the superior 
grv^irrrrKCt. t:> restrict the power of the independent States, and 
tc cr^i^re a Lfe tsr.iae cf his post to the President. Washington 
Lii SLs Jrrt-r. a State coach, a sort of royal dress, etc. His wife was 
K^ Sr ci:>i \jkcy WashEngtox The Federalists did not deem it 
yossTri^ t? rCaoe the United States under the sceptre of the King 
cc En^Iini : bet die%- th^aght that the>' coold give to England, 
cv^r th;rx own cxmtiy. an influence which woald have all the 
•vl real aivasta^es of direct domination. They hated France. 
Tb^" Atterrpted to separate fron the Union the five Northern 
StateSL * T-ie interests of the Northern States," they said, "must 
cte-n^Ilv clash with those of tiie Southern and Western States." 
T::^ Gorerrxxs of Canada had for long excited the Federalists ; 
if ji cessicc hii taken place the British Cabinet would have become 
the unawxiable nnapire. The democratic instinct of the great 
n^.asscs of the pecple ranged them 00 the side of the Republicans. 
T.'xc Sitiv>oghcCis of the Federalists were in the north-east 

When Mcmoc was recalled firom Paris in 1795 the conflict 
^ctw<t^n ^c two parties was bitter. He reached America full of 
\^Tath ; but he was enthusiastically welcomed by the Opposition. 
He at once published his cdebrated 'View/ a long and violent 
ivjimi^hkt which vindicated his conduct in France, and vehemently 


attacked Washington's government. Party feelings were ablaze, 
A terrible war of pamphlets and newspapers raged between, to 
use Jefferson's words, " the advocates of republican and those of 
kingly government" Monroe became Governor of Virginia, and 
he continued his opposition to the Federalists during Adams' 

New events were about to render more acute the quarrel 
between the two parties. In 1801 a rumour reached the United 
States that Spain had ceded to France her rights to Louisiana. 
The Peace of Amiens having been signed in the b^inning of 1802, 
and Bonaparte having no longer reason to keep secret the transfer 
of the Colony to France, the rumour was confirmed. The excite- 
ment was great in the United States. The Federalists tried to 
make capital out of the agitation ; and the Republicans themselves^ 
although doing their best to quiet down the public mind, were 
alive to the gravity of the situation. Their feelings can be best 
represented by the quotation of a despatch sent by President 
Jefferson to Livingston, and dated i8th April, 1802 — 

" France is our natural friend, one with whom we could never have an 
occasion of difference ; but there is one spot on the globe, the possessor of 
which is our natural enemy. That spot is New Orleans. France, placing 
herself in that door, assumes to us t)ie attitude of defiance. From that moment, 
we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation." 

In spite of Jefferson's endeavours, the alarm was great in all 
the establishments of the West The population on the eastern* 
bank of the Mississippi numbered at least 800,000. These people 
wanted to have the free navigation of the river. They threatened 
to secede from the Union if the other States did not protect them ;. 
they feared that the neighbourhood of France might deprive then^ 
of all security. Their apprehensions found a powerful echo in the 
Congress; and, notwithstanding a letter of Livingston, giving 
assurance that the treaties concluded between France and the 
United States would be faithfully executed, the irritation did not 
abate. An unexpected event added fuel to the flame. 

In October, 1802, the Spanish Intendant (who had not yet 
handed over the Colony to France) declared the lower Mississippi 
closed to the vessels of the United States. It was surmised that 
he had acted at the instigation of France. There was a general 
outcry. Even for the most determined advocates of the status quo 
one thing was now clear ; that the free navigation of the river, and 
accordingly New Orleans, its key, had to be secured by the United 
States. The only question was to know whether peaceful or 
warlike means would be resorted to. The Federalists were the 
Jingoes. The Republicans were for peace. Among them Monroe 


made himself noticeable for his energy and clear-sightedness. In a 
pamphlet, published under a nam de plttme^ he shows that it 
would be an easy matter indeed to capture New Orleans ; that — 

^ The rascal rabble, the motley crew whom the Spaniards honour with the 
name of soldiers, would be frightened into prostration by the gleaming of a 
dozen bayonets, the waving of a single banner. 

'^But," he adds, ''there is no law, no pretence on which we can found a 
claim to the dominion of the province. We claim the passage of the river, and, 
that being secured to us, we can legally and equitably claim no more. To go to 
war would deprive us of all excuse for retaining possession. We are not tyrants 
who rob their neighbours without provocation or remorse. We boast of our 
enlightened and pacific principles. The expenses of an expedition and of 
occupation would be greater than purchase. Better to treat, because if the 
French come, quarrels with them will be unavoidable, and much more serious 
4han with Spain. What a ridiculous and fatal scheme for facilitating the 
purchase, and reducing the price, is that of taking previous possession ! Who, 
but an idiot, would ever dream of winning the French to compliance by this 
means ? Look at them, meditate the character of their present ruler ! They 
-(the Federalists) place their hopes in England ? England has not wasted even 
a little paper and a few words in opposition to the cession." 

It was true. England, neither at the time of the conclusion of 
the Peace of Amiens nor since, had made the slightest allusion to 
the transfer of Louisiana. Had she not seen what an opportunity 
it was for her just at a time when all the enet^ies of the pro- 
English party in the United States were wound up to force her 
politics upon America ? Had she not seen that she could then try 
with all chances of success, and perhaps through diplomatic means 
-only, what she was to attempt in vain ten years later ? 

But, after all, was it absolutely exact to say that England had 
not wasted even a few words in opposition to the cession } No, 
not quite. The words had been wasted ; and just in the only 
place where, being given the circumstances, all reference to 
Louisiana was uncalled for: in Parliament. M.P.'s had spoken 
against the transfer of the Colony. " The cession," they said, "is 
wholly contrary to the interests of England. It will be the means 
•of giving to the French a great ascendency over the United States 
which will, sooner or later, force this Republic into an alliance against 
England's supremacy. New Orleans is the key to Mexico." Lord 
iiawkesbury defended the cession ; then explained it ; then said 
that the French had never drawn any benefit from the possession 
of Louisiana ; and he wound up his clever speech with a well- 
contrived sentence — "We have concluded only an experimental 

Bonaparte appears to have had an inkling of the fact Maybe 
that he, on his part, was only making an experiment too. But 
it was not quite certain ; his love of peace might have 


been sincere. At any rate, a little more reserve would have 
served better the interests of the British Cabinet ; a little more 
perspicacity also. It was clear that Bonaparte had not succeeded 
in getting rid of his Oriental dreams ; he was still under the spell 
of the East Was it an impossible thing cleverly to direct his 
ambition towards the coast of Africa, for instance ? and to get in 
exchange a free hand in America ? An understanding of France 
with England, then, for the partition of a portion of the world ? 
And why not ? The First Consul himself had proposed it to Lord 
Whitworth. "See," he had said, "what a power we should 
exercise over the world if we could continue to rapprocher the two 
nations. You are the masters of the sea ; I am the master on 
land. Let us think, then, rather of uniting than of fighting. All 
will become possible. We shall rule or will the destinies of the 

Lord Whitworth did not understand. He was a straight- 
forward man, but stiff and unbending ; " not genial," says Mr. Rose ; 
and be adds, as an exculpation, that England had already tried 
geniality with Comwallis. And why not try it again ? 

The situation was no longer that of 1801. Besides, it was not 
necessary to work up to the proposals of Bonaparte. It would 
iiave been sufficient to see in what way they could have been 
turned to a profit Was it utterly impossible to find a modus 
Vivendi about Malta } And was not Bonaparte's obdurate, senti* 
mental anxiety concerning the fate of that nerve centre of Empire, 
a. simple proof of the potency of the spell exercised over him by 
the East ? Was it not practicable to give another and fixed 
direction to his vague longings } For example, to induce him to 
attempt the conquest of the Barbary States >. He had himself 
thought of it. The missions of Sebastian and others only prove 
that Bonaparte's imagination was roaming over the coasts of Asia 
Minor and Africa ; it would have been an easy matter to fix it. 
He could have experienced, before Algiers, the fate of Charles V. ; 
and a failure there would have been a deadly blow at his prestige 
and power in France and elsewhere. If he had been successful, 
England would have had nothing to lose. The conquest of what 
is now Algiers would have occupied his energies for a considerable 
time ; and in any case, owing to England's supremacy at sea, the 
conquered land would have been but a pledge, pawned (so to 
speak) to Britannia. 

Anyhow, something could be attempted. The great question 
for the British Cabinet ought to have been this : Is it possible for 
England to recover her position in North America ? Does not the 
cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, mainly in view of the 


state of mind of the divided United States people, and also of 
the sheer impossibility for France to keep the Colony, oflTer a 
golden chance to England ? 

We shall see what the British Cabinet thought of it— when it 
was too late — and that it did not think fit to move when it was 
time to do so, in spite of the warnings of an English agent in Paris, 
and in spite of the fact that it would easily have found in the 
entourage of the Consul powerful help. It was not without reason 
that Sheridan described the Addington Administration as the fag- 
end of Mr. Pitt's, " who had remained so long on the Treasury 
Bench that, like Nicias in the fable, he had left the sitting-part of 
the man behind him." 

The fact is, that Bonaparte had never known what to do with 
Louisiana. Why, then, had he ever thought of getting it back at 
St Ildephonso? 

It is highly probable that such was indeed Bonaparte's in- 
tention in October, 1 800. The will of the Consul was powerful ; 
but continually shifting, if not its aim, at least the means proposed 
for enforcing it. The Consul was a schemer much more than ever 
was the Emperor, whose politics were simplified by England's policy. 
It may be asserted that during 1802 and the earlier part of 1803 
Bonaparte's mind was in a perpetual state of flux. The most 
contradictory plans were incessantly unfurling themselves in his 
brain. In fact, he was staring vacantly into the future, catching an 
occasional glimpse of some reality, but not knowing in what 
direction to throw the weight of his potential energy. Had 
England tapped him gently on the shoulder and pointed out a 
goal, he might gladly have accepted the hint. 

The reconstitution of the French colonial power in America, 
then, had veiy probably been the foremost intention of the Consul 
in 1800. But very soon events had occurred which had certainly 
gone far to change his mind. The most important had been the 
revolt of St Dominique. The rising of the blacks had been a 
terrible warning against the possibility of a colonial empire in the 
West. The Consul had done his best to repress this revolt The 
expedition had left France in December, 1801, as soon as the 
preliminaries of the peace signed in London on the ist October, 
1 80 1, had opened the sea to the French ships. But failure had 
followed upon failure ; the army had been decimated ; in the end 
of 1802 news reached France of the death of Ludovic, the Consul's 
brother-in-law ; and it could be seen that no hope was left of 
subjugating the island. 

Bonaparte was heard more than once, while the conflict raged 
between whites and blacks, to rant against ces colonies d csclaves, 


and to declare that nothing could be expected from countries 
where labour was to be exclusively performed by negroes. It is 
at least probable that in speaking thus he associated in his mind 
Louisiana with St Dominique. One fact at least is certain : he 
was in no hurry to take possession of Louisiana ; we shall see that 
this taking of possession was carried out only formally, and this on 
the very day when the Colony was handed over to the United 

Bonaparte's plan at first had been this : the army sent to St. 
Dominique, after having crushed the rebellion of the blacks, was to 
land at New Orleans, and a part of its troops would occupy 
Louisiana. The Consul wished to give the Governorship of the 
Colony to General Bemadotte, but this Bemadotte was not eager 
to accept. He said that he would not go to Louisiana unless he 
were provided with at least 3000 soldiers, 3000 agriculturists, a 
great number of women, and a quantity of implements, stores, eta, 
of all kinds, in the eventuality of the communications with France 
being interrupted for a long time. The Consul refused to entertain 
this proposal ; and he created Governor- General Victor, who 
hastened to Helvoett Sluyss in Holland to prepare his expedition. 
This happened in 1802. But quite at the beginning of 1803 
disastrous news from St. Dominique induced the Consul again to 
alter his plan. 

He resolved to send Bemadotte to the United States as pleni-* 
potentiary minister. The purpose of this intended embassy for 
Bemadotte is scarcely known ; and more obscure still is the mission 
with which he was to be entmsted. It has been said that he had 
to negotiate the cession of a part of Louisiana to the United States. 
But while it must be admitted that the Consul had come then to 
consider the Colony but as a trump in his hand, as a possession to 
be parted with for a consideration (whatever it might be), it is 
difficult to understand why he would have sent a special ambassador, 
a man like Bemadotte, simply to carry out a transaction which 
could have easily been conducted in Paris. Livingston was there ; 
unofficial American emissaries lika Daniel Clarke also; and the 
United States would have been only too glad to send to Paris (as 
they did shortly afterwards) special commissioners. But it was 
not of a cession of territory only that Bonaparte had thought. 

The mission of Bemadotte was this : he had to conclude with 
the United States Government an alliance, offensive and defensive. 
In the event of war breaking out between England and France, 
St Dominique would be evacuated by the French troops, which 
would be transported to New Orleans (practically the whole of the 
French fleet was then craising in the waters of St Dominique). 


Fraoot would cede to tibe Uohicd States her rights over the totality 
of Louisiana, and the French Anny, commanded by Beraadotte 
and reinfoRcd by United Stales troops, would reconquer Canada. 
The state of tibe political psuties in America, the Republicans 
being in power and the Federalists losing ground eveiy day, 
rendered this fJan practicable. 

Bemadotte left Paris for La Rochelle, where a frigate was 
waiting for him. He went on boaid, and he was about to start 
when, for some reason {very likely a communication received fiom 
Talleyrand, who had des^ns of his own concerning Louisiana^ he 
landed. He came back to Park without authorisation, and declared 
to Bonaparte, dumfounded, that he refused to leave France because 
a war wiA England was imminent. A quarrel ^isued, and an 
estrangement between the Consul and the general 

MeanwhOe General Victor at Helvoett Sluyss had had 4000 
men embarked on transports for the occupation of Louisiana ; he 
had even bought a quantity of things that he intended to use as 
^ gifts to the savages." However, he could not get an order of 
departure ; perhaps his expediticMi (or rather the preparation of it) 
had only been a blind unknown to him, a tactical move, destined 
to mask the real and fll-fated plan of die Consul and to deceive 
the English Cabinet Victor, not knowing what to do; quarrelled 
with M. Lausset, the newly-created prefet of New Orleans ; and 
this official started alone, intent upon tiying to induce the Spanish 
authorities to hand him over the Colony. 

The fate of Louisiana, anyhow, was to be decided before long. 
In the United States the agitation caused by the restrictions iffl* 
posed upon the free navigation of the Mississippi was growii^ from 
day to day. In the first days of 1803 ^^ ^^ readied its climax. 
The Federalist party, finding there was an excellent opportunity of 
recuperating its lost power, was clamouring more and more loudly 
for a resort to arms. Jefferson saw that the only remedy to the 
situation was to try to obtain from France, peacefully, the outlet to 
the Gulf of Mexico. Accordingly, on the lOth January, 1803, be 
wrote to Governor Monroe — 

" I have but a moment to inform you that ihe fever into which the Wcstcni 
mind is thrown by the affair at New Orleans, stimulated by the mercantile and 
generally the Federal interest, threatens to overbear our peace. In this situa- 
tion we are obliged to call on you for a temporary sacrifice of yourself to prevent 
this greatest of evils. I shall to-morrow nominate you to the Senate for an 
extraordinary mission to France. The whole public hopes will be rested on 

And three days afterwards he informed Monroe that he was 
sent to France " as Minister Extraordinary to be joined with the 
Ordinary one, with discretionary powers." He added, "You 


possess the unlimited confidence of the Administration and of the 
Western people. All ^yts are now fixed on you. On the event of 
this mission depend the future destinies of this Republic" 

Monroe, who lived then in Richmond, was not in good health. 
A few days before, on the 7th January, he had written to Jefferson 
that he intended visiting the West, but durst not, on account of his 
weakness, go to New York and to Washington. He did not 
hesitate, however, to accept this mission. He had to negotiate 
the purchase of New Orleans and of the territory embracing the 
mouth of the Mississippi. The Congress had appropriated two 
million dollars for the purpose. 

A letter of his to J. Madison, Secretary of State, dated the 
22nd February, 1803, announces his arrival in New York. He was 
much overcome with the fatigue of the journey, and could not take 
a ship that had been engaged for him. " It is said here,'' he writes, 
''that a new constitution is formed or forming in France whereby 
Bonaparte is Emperor of the Gauls.'' 

The news was premature ; but truer news he could learn, which 
showed him how timely was his mission to France. A prominent 
Federalist, Mr. Ross, Senator of Pennsylvania, had presented to 
the Congress a resolution requiring the Government at once to 
take New Orleans by armed force. The sitting grew so tumultuous 
that the public were turned out After two sittings with closed 
doors, it was resolved that Mr. Ross's resolution would be discussed 
publicly. Gouvemeur Morris, rabidly pro-English, said that the 
arrival of the French had to be prevented at any cost, that their 
troops were already at sea, etc., etc. 

Jefferson continued to temporise with wisdom and great clever- 
ness. The situation was highly dangerous. It was impossible for 
the United States to attack France without ranging themselves on 
the side of England ; without consequently giving to Great Britain 
a new and perhaps definitive entry into their politics. There was 
no doubt that Gouvemeur Morris and Mr. Ross were in corre- 
spondence with Livingston, the U.S. Minister to Paris, who was 
exasperated by his persistent failure to draw from the French 
Government the promised compensations for prises indHment faiteSy 
a failure with which he was bitterly reproached by American 
shipowners. Dangerous as it was for the Republicans, the situa- 
tion might have offered some chances to the English Cabinet. 

On the 7th March Monroe wrote to Jefferson that he would 
sail from New York on the morrow in the ship Richmond, of about 
4CX> tons burden. He was taking his family with him. He adds, 
"The resolution of Mr. Ross proves that the Federal party will 
stick at nothing to embarrass the Administration and recover their 


lost power. If the negotiation succeeds, the Federalists will be 
overwhekned completely." 

The Richmond was bound to Hamburg, but landed Monroe 
at Havre on the 8th April Monroe was received with particular 
attention. On the loth he left Havre for Paris ; and having left 
his wife and daughter at St Germain, he reached the French 
capital, accompanied by Colonel John Mercer, on the I2th April 

It is certain that the idea of sacrificing Louisiana, considered as 
an hypothesis or a contingency, was a new one neither in the minds 
of many French officials nor in the mind of Bonaparte himselt 
Many people had always thought that the only value of the 
Colony for France was in the possibUity of using it for a barter. 
But until the arrival of Monroe at Havre the Consul had taken no 
absolute decision on the point 

The maintenance of peace between England and France, it is 
true, was increasingly imperilled. The King's message to Parlia- 
ment on the 8th March had shown that the war party in England 
was about to triumph ; the little expedition for Louisiana prepared 
by Victor at Helvoett Sluyss (two ships, two frigates, and 4000 
men) had been represented as an enormous armament directed 
against Great Britain. The Consul had been irritated beyond 
measure. H is well-known reception of Lord Whitworth on the 1 3th 
March shows what was his frame of mind. He had given orders 
to engineers and officers to inspect the coasts of France ; he had 
made preparations to invade the kingdom of Naples ; he had 
ordered Victor to land his 4000 men, who were to form part of the 
corps placed in Holland under Mortier's orders. Still he was not 
sure that the peace would be broken. And, in fact, it lasted for two 
months more. 

It is why no importance is to be attached to a story to be found 
in the wretched ' Memoires de Lucien Bonaparte,' and of which no 
mention would be made here were it not for the fact that it is 
regularly trotted out every time that the cession of Louisiana 
is discussed. According to this childish tale, Bonaparte's brothers, 
Lucien and Joseph, had earnestly protested, on the 7th Apnlf 
against the sale of the Colony. The truth is, that at that date the 
Consul had not made up his mind to sell ; that Lucien had long 
known that the Colony would not be kept by France, happen 
what might ; and that Joseph— but let us hear Monroe himself-- 

" Joseph Bonaparte," he says, " had invited me to an interview 
immediately after my arrival in Paris, and gave me assurance of his 
good offices." And he kept his promises, adds Monroe. Really> 
Joseph Bonaparte does not appear here in the light of a con- 
scientious objector. 


It is during the evening of the loth April that the Consul 
resolved to arrive at an irrevocable decision concerning Louisiana. 
We have seen that already, on the 24th March, Talleyrand had, 
after a long silence, communicated in a friendly way with 
Livingston ; he even paid him a visit in the beginning of April 
Livingston, in a letter to Madison, speaks of" M. Talleyrand calling 
on me, previous to the arrival of Mr. Monroe, for a proposal for the 
whole of Louisiana ; of his afterwards trifling with me and telling 
me that what he said was unauthorised." As a matter of fact, 
Talleyrand had asked Livingston if the United States wished for 
the whole of Louisiana. The answer had been — ** No ; but that it 
would be politic in France to give it up." One understands 
Talleyrand's trifling. 

His visit had led Livingston to believe that the First Consul had 
renounced his intention to sell any part of Louisiana. Just what 
Talleyrand wanted. What game was he playing.^ Surely a 
pacific game. Talleyrand was, at the bottom, a man of peace. 
What was at the time his advice to the Consul ? We have it in 
the words of Bonaparte himself: "If I were to believe M. de 
Talleyrand, France would limit her ambition to the left bank of the 
Rhine, and would go to war only to befriend the weak, and to 
protect herself against dismemberment." Noble feelings, which, 
after all, were sincere. Peace had well served Talleyrand's interests. 
To say that he was not over scrupulous, is not to calumniate his 
memory. The reorganisation of Germany, for instance, had brought 
him large sums ; it was even rumoured that the Concordat had 
contributed to his welfare. Talleyrand, in short, would have given 
something, and received more, to prevent war. 

Now, what does man want to make war for ? Money ; three 
times money. It was the burden of Bonaparte's song. " I want 
money ! — Do you understand," said he to Barb^-Marbois, who was 
objecting to the sale of the souls of the Colonies of Louisiana, "do 
you understand that I want money to make war against the richest 
nation in the world ? " Talleyrand, man of peace, wished to prevent 
Bonaparte from getting money, and principally money which could 
be used against England. Then, since Louisiana was to be ceded, 
why not cede it to England instead of America ? War is unprofit- 
able, would be averted, and it would be possible to do business. 
Talleyrand communicated with the British Cabinet, tentatively 
through the channels of an English agent living in Paris — and not, 
x>f course, through Lord Whitworth. 

Talleyrand's visit had completely disheartened Livingston, who 
was not a prodigy of intellect. On the loth April, hearing of the ar- 
rival of Monroe at Havre, Livingston sent him the following letter : — 


'* I congratulate you on your safe arrival. We have long and anxiously 
waited for you. God grant that your mission may answer yours and the public 
expectation. War may do something for us ; nothing else would. I have 
paved the way for you, and if you could add to my memoirs an assurance that 
we were now in possession of New Orleans we should do well." 

The tone of despondency is very marked. Having disposed of 
the first American, Talleyrand was lying in wait for the second. 
But Bonaparte forestalled him. 

In the evening of the loth April, in St Cloud, it is not Talley- 
rand whom he called to him. He wanted to know the opinion of 
two men who knew America, and whose honesty he trusted. The 
first was M. de Barb^-Marbois, Minister of the Treasury ; the 
second, Admiral Decris, Secretary for the Navy. Bonaparte 
explained to them the reasons which induced him to sell Louisiana: 
war with England could not be avoided ; the Colony could be 
easily taken by the English ; would it not be better to sell the 
whole of it to the United States, instead of the territory of New 
Orleans, for which they solely ask ? 

Barb^-Marbois was the first to speak. He said that one must 
not hesitate to sacrifice a thing that one has not the power to 
defend. France had not a single soldier in Louisiana, and there 
was no possibility of sending troops. Besides, the fate of the 
European Colonies in America was extremely uncertain. " Those 
people will free themselves as soon as they have the power to do 
so. Louisiana is a cotanie d esclaves ; it will accordingly be the 
cause of money expenses, and bring little profit. A prohibitive 
system cannot be carried out there, near the United States whidi 
enjoy freedom. Colonies are to-day played out ; commercial 
establishments are to be preferred to them ; and in the absence of 
comptoirs let trade do for itself." 

Decr^s said in substance ; — 

'* We must not abandon Louisiana. We are not yet at war with England. 
We shall perhaps be able to defend the Colony. Suppose that peace is 
maintained : how shall we explain the cession ? Colonies are useful to a nation. 
No navy without Colonies ; no Colonies without a powerful navy. Let us 
suppose that England take Louisiana ; we take Hanover ; and England will 
have to give back the Colony. Louisiana can indemnify us for the loss of 
India. There is not, perhaps, on the globe a spot which can become as im- 
portant as New Orleans. Think of the canal which will one day cut the 
isthmus of Panama, and join one ocean to the other. Wliat an inestimable 
value will Louisiana have then ! We must keep the Colony." 

It was late when the conference came to an end. The Consul 
did not disclose his intentions. The ministers slept at St Cloud. 
On the morrow, at dawn, Bonaparte called to him Barb^-Marbois; 
he showed him despatches just at hand from the French Ambassador 


in London ; they gave information about the extensive preparations 
made for war. Bonaparte said in substance—* 

" You see that no understanding is possible with England. War is unavoid** 
able. I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I want to cede ; 
it is all the Colony. It would be madness to try to keep it. I entrust you with 
the conduct of the negotiation. Do not wait even for M. Monroe's arrival ; see 
M. Livingston to-day. But remember I want fifty million francs ; for less I will 
not treat I would rather make some desperate attempt. Tell frankly the 
American Ministers what I propose ; recommend them the utmost secrecy. The 
British Cabinet is aware of the resolutions taken at Washington ; but they 
cannot guess at those that I am taking. Acquaint me day by day with your 
progress, and keep M. Talleyrand informed." 

A sentence written by Monroe may be quoted here, " His 
[Bonaparte's] motive for committing the negotiation to M. Marbois, 
and in a manner not to wound the feelings of M. Talleyrand, may 
be readily conceived." Yes. 

Barb^-Marbois saw Livingston at once. The latter was full 
of diffidences ; besides, he had not the necessary powers. Still, he 
declared that fifty millions of francs would be a very high sum to 
be paid for the whole of Louisiana. 

Monroe arrived on the morrow. He had soon after an inter- 
view with Livingston, and Livingston deplored the fact that Mr. 
Ross's resolution had not been adopted. " We must take posses- 
sion of New Orleans first/' said he, " and negotiate afterwards." 
To this Monroe made no reply, but he heard with surprise of the 
readiness of the French Government to sell the whole Colony. 

In the evening, as Monroe was having his dinner with Living- 
ston and other Americans, Barb^-Marbois appeared ; he had